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AUTHOR: 


CASE,  THOMAS 


TITLE: 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


PLACE: 


LONDON 

DA  TE : 

1898 


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Case,  Thomas,  3844- 
«ans,  Green,  and  co  ,1188:     ^"°*^"'''  ^'^  Yorkf  l2ng 

3  p.  I,  387  p.    23"^, 


1.  philosophy.    2.  Realii^.        ,.  ^j 


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PHYSICAL    EEALISM 


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PHYSICAL    EEALISM 


BEING 


AN   ANALYTICAL  rilll-OSOl'IlY 


I'lllNlKD    BY 

SrOTJliSWOODE    AND    CO.,    NEW^TnEET    SQUAUE 

LONDON 


i'KOM 


THE    PHYSICAL    OBJECTS    OF    SCIExNCE 


TO 


THE    PHYSICAL    DATA    OF    SENSE 


BY 


rp 


THOMAS   CASE,  M.A.       ■ 

FELLOW  AND  SKNIOlt  TLTOU  COHPLS   CHKIsTl   COLLKUE,   AND  LKCTLIIKIt  AT 

•HHIST   CIlLJltll;    t'OlIVIKHLY   FELLOW   OF  BHAHKNUSK  AND 

TLTTOU   OK   BALLIOL   (  OLLKCK,   OXKolM) 


cVn  d    dnodfi^ut  (XeyKTiKcos—  Aiiistotlk 


LONDON 

L  0  X  G  :\L  A  X  S,     G  li  E  E  X,     A  X  I) 

AND  NEW  YOKK  :  15  EAST  10"'  STKEET 

1888 


CO. 


,4  //     ,  i  ijhf  .\     If  SI  r  ml 


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'  Neque  tamen  illis  nihil  addi  posse  affirmamus :  sed  contra, 
nos,  qui  Mentem  respicimus  non  tantum  in  facultate  propria, 
Bed  quatenus  copulatur  cum  Rebus,  Artem  Inveniendi  cum 
Inventis  adolescere  posse,  statuere  debemus.' 

Bacon,  Noi\  Org.  i.  180. 


)\ 


:> 


\K) 


TO 


WILLIAM    S.   SAYOEY,    F.R.S. 

SURGEON-EXTIJAORDIXARY    TO   II.M.    THE    QUEEN 

I'KESIDEXT   OF   THE    ROYAL   COLLEGE    OF    SURGEONS   OF   ENOLANH 

SUltGEON    TO    ST    ISAKTUOLOMEW'S    HOSPITAL 


-^ 


C3> 

c::. 


^ 


t 


O 

a5    S 


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0  73'31 


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CONTENTS. 


PART    I. 
GENERAL   PBOOF  OF  PHYSICAL   BEALTSM. 


cirAr. 


I.    THE    PHYSICAL    OBJECT   OF   SCIEXCE   .... 

II.    IDEALISM   AXD   REALISM 

•  *  •  •  . 

III.  THE    PHYSICAL    DATA    OF   SENSE 

•  •  •  • 

IV.  THE    HISTORICAL    ORIGIN   OF    PSYCHOLOGICAL    IDEALISM 


3 
13 

40 

82 


PART    II. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM. 


V.    DESCARTES 


VI.    LOCKE 


VII.    BERKELEY         .... 

VIII.  Berkeley's  theory  of  vision   . 


IX.    HUME 


X.    KANTS    'critique'   AND   NECESSARY   TRUTHS 


101 

141 

18G 


225 
256 
319 


\ 


APPENDIX 


383 


Part  I. 


GENERAL  PROOF  OF  PHYSICAL  REALISM. 


♦  Itaque  contemplatio  fcrc  desinit  cum  aspcciu ;   adeo  ut  rerum 
invisibilium  exigua  atit  nulla  sit  obscrvatio.' 

Bacon,  Nov.  Org.  i.  50. 


B 


CHAPTEE  I. 

THE   PHYSICAL   OBJECT   OF   SCIENCE. 

'  Natural  Philosophy,  as  now  regarded,  treats  generally 
of  the  physical  universe,  and  deals  fearlessly  alike  with 
quantities  too  great  to  be  distinctly  conceived,  and  with 
quantities  almost  infinitely  too  small  to  be  perceived 
even  with  the  most  powerful  microscopes ;  such  as,  for 
instance,  distances  through  which  the  light  of  stars  or 
nebulas,  though  moving  at  the  rate  of  about  186,000 
miles  per  second,  takes  many  years  to  travel ;  or  the 
size  of  the  particles  of  water,  whose  number  in  a  sino-le 
drop  may,  as  we  have  reason  to  believe,  amount  to 
somewhere  about  10^^',  or 

100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. 

Yet  we  successfully  inquire  not  only  into  the  composi- 
tion of  the  atmospheres  of  these  distant  stars,  but  into 
the  number  and  properties  of  these  water-particles  ;  nay, 
even  into  the  laws  by  which  they  act  upon  one  another.' 
This  quotation  from  Professor  Tait's  'Eecent  Ad- 
vances  in   Physical  Science'  is  a   recognition   of   the 
reality  of  the  insensible,  and  of  its  knowledge  by  the 
natural  philosopher,  as  facts,     ^o  metaphysical  theory 
of  existence  can  be  complete,  unless  it  recognises  the 
known  reality  of  the   insensible  physical  world ;  and 
no  psychological  theory  of  human  knowledge  can  be 
accepted    as    even   a   probable    hypothesis,   unless   it 

B    2 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


PART   T. 


CHAT.    I. 


THE   PHYSICAL  OBJECT  OF  SCIENCE 


0 


explains  liow  these  scientific  objects  of  human  know- 
ledge are  known  from  the  original  data  of  sense. 

"xhe  distinction  between  the  sensible  and  the  scien- 
tifi(5,  the  apparent  and  the  real,  the  perceptible  and  the 
imperceptible,  is  not  only  a  scientific  fact  but  has  be- 
come a  commonplace  in  natural  philosophy,    without 
having  produced  any  marked  effect  in  mental   philo- 
sophy^    Astronomy  has  long  opposed  the  real  to  the 
apparent  motions  of  celestial   bodies;    and   Sir  Isaac 
Newton  carried  this  contrast  so  far  as  to  oppose  abso- 
lute, true  and  mathematical,  to  relative,  apparent  and 
common,  time  and  space.     In  physics,  apparent  size  is 
the  room  which  a  body  seems  to  occupy,  physical  size 
is  the  real  space  taken  up  by  its  particles.     Not  only 
physics,  but  chemistry  and   biology  unite  in  the  anti- 
thesis of  molar  and  molecular  motion,  in  recognising 
therefore  motions  which  are  for  the  most  part  imper- 
ceptible, in   resolving  what  seem  to  our  senses  to  be 
heterogeneous  quaUties  into  mere  varieties  of  imper- 
ceptible  motion,    and   in   referring   these    motions    to 
particles  which  are  as  imperceptible  as  the    motions 
themselves.     In  all  these  sciences  the  latent  structures 
and  processes  of  things  are  opposed  to  their  external 
appearances  and  perceptible  changes. 

I  do  not  mean  that  these  undeniable  conclusions, 
very  far  removed  as  they  are  from  the  original  data  of 
observation  and  experiment,  are  at  all  inconsistent  with 
the  sensations,  perceptions,  observations,  or  experiences 
which  ordinary  men  have,  and  from  which  the  natural 
philosopher  starts.  On  the  contrary,  the  very  untutored 
senses  themselves  are  best  explained—nay,  can  be  only 
exphiined— by  statements  at  first  sight  opposed  to 
them.  It  is  only  in  appearance  that  the  motion  of  the 
earth  round  the  sun  contradicts  our  senses,  for,  though 


it  contradicts  one  single  appearance,  the  whole  sum  of 
astronomical  observations  is  only  to  be  explained  by 
means  of  it.  Similarly,  when  it  is  said  that  one  thing  is 
apparently  larger  and  physically  smaller  than  another, 
vision  is  contradicted,  but  the  sense  of  touch  is  justified, 
and  our  experience  as  a  whole  explained.  The  latent 
motions  of  particles,  into  which  sensible  qualities  are 
resolved,  at  first  sight  contradict  but  really  explain 
the  whole  system  of  our  sensations  of  touch,  vision, 
and  hearing. 

But  though  the  results  of  science  thus  explain  the 
data  of  sense,  it  must  be  remembered  that  they  only 
explain  them,  and  are  not  themselves  data  of  sense. 
No  man  can  make  himself  see  the  earth  cfoinfr  round 
the  sun,  except  by  standing  on  tlie  sun  itself.  No  niiui 
can  see  light  at  the  moment  when  it  starts  from  a 
distant  star  years  before  it  reaches  his  senses.  Micro- 
scopes  can  be  multiplied  in  power,  but  they  are 
millions  short  of  the  actual  (I  do  not  speak  of  the 
potential)  divisibility  of  the  particles  of  things. 

Moreover,  the  natural  philosopher  gives  even  greater 
reality  to  the  imperceptible  than  to  the  perceptible. 
The  astronomer  not  only  opposes  but  prefers  real  to 
apparent  motion,  the  physicist  physical  to  apparent 
size,  and  all  natural  jDhilosophers  latent  structures  and 
molecular  processes  to  masses  and  tlieir  molar  motions. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say,  that  the  mission  of  modern 
as  well  as  of  ancient  philosophy  is  to  convince  mankind 
that  sense  is  unequal  to  the  subtlety  of  things  ;  to  get 
behind  the  scenes  and  see  the  machinery  of  nature  at 
work ;  to  recognise  the  insensible  as  real,  yes,  and  more 
real,  than  the  sensible.     Sense  is  not  science. 

Our  knowledge  is  not  limited  to  sensible  phaeno- 
mena.     We    are    quite    as  certain  of  the  existence  of 


0 


PHYSICAL    REALISM 


PART   I. 


that  which  cannot  be  brouglit  within  our  sensibility 
as  of  that  which  can,  and  of  objects  which  we  do 
not  experience  as  of  objects  of  experience  itself. 
Further,  we  are  quite  as  certain  that  they  exist  in 
space  and  in  time ;  for  if  they  are  not  in  space  they 
have  no  size,  if  they  are  not  in  time  they  have  no  dura- 
tion, and  that  which  has  neither  any  size  nor  any  dura- 
tion is  nothing  ;  and,  if  they  are  neither  in  time  nor 
space,  they  do  not  move,  for  motion  is  change  of 
place  in  space  during  time.  Space  and  time  are  not 
mere  forms  of  our  sensibility,  but  conditions  of  things 
and  their  motions  beyond  the  range  of  our  sensibility. 

We  not  only  know  that  the  imperceptible  exists,  and 
that  it  exists  in  space  and  time,  but  also  we  know  im- 
perceptible attributes  both  of  the  perceptible  and  of  the 
imperceptible.  For  example,  I  know  that  the  hour-hand 
of  my  watch  moves,  though  I  cannot  perceive  it  moving, 
as  well  as  that  the  minute-hand  moves  which  I  can  per- 
ceive moving  with  difficulty,  or  the  second-hand  which 
I  can  perceive  moving  with  ease.  I  know  that  the  im- 
perceptible particles  of  matter  gravitate  imperceptibly 
towards  one  another,  as  well  as  I  know  that  their  masses 
gravitate,  and  that  unless  gravitation  is  true  of  the 
former,  it  is  not  true  of  the  latter.  Still  more  insensible 
are  cohesion  and  chemical  affinity,  which  are  imper- 
ceptible motions  exerted  between  imperceptible  particles 
and  at  imperceptible  distances.  The  whole  of  modern 
science  is  based  on  the  fact  that  there  are  numerous 
latent  structures  and  latent  processes  which  are  known 
to  be  real  attributes  of  particles  themselves  latent.  He,  \ 
then,  who  will  venture  to  assert,  as  mental  philosophers  | 
often  do  assert,  that  the  attributes  which  we  ascribe  to  ^ 
things  are  simply  the  phenomena  or  the  sensations 
which  they  cause  in  us,  must  be  prepared  to  deny  all 


CHAP.    I. 


THE   PHYSICAL  OBJECT   OF  SCIENCE 


the  imperceptible  structures   and   motions  which   are 
recognised  as  attributes  of  things  in  natural  philosophy. 

Natural  philosophy  does  not  stop  at  the  reality  and 
knowledge  of  imperceptible  things  and  their  imper- 
ceptible attributes.  It  takes  one  step  further  :  it  regards 
the  imperceptible  as  not  only  real  but  causal.  In  the 
first  place,  among  imperceptible  objects  there  are  latent 
processes  of  cause  and  effect,  no  part  of  which  can  be 
represented  by  a  sensible  object.  When,  for  example, 
the  physicist  declares  that  the  medium  called  rether 
remains  fixed  in  space,  while  each  successive  part  of  it 
undulates  in  consequence  of  the  previous  undulation  of 
another  part,  in  the  same  manner  as  water  connnuni- 
cates  successive  waves,  he  affirms  that  the  whole  of  this 
propagation  of  undulations  through  aether  is  real,  though 
the  whole  of  it  is  imperceptible.  Secondly,  he  affirms 
still  more ;  he  affirms  that  the  imperceptible  undula- 
tions not  only  cause  one  another,  but  finally  cause  our 
sensations  of  light.  In  this  instance  of  light,  as  well 
as  in  the  parallel  case  of  heat,  natural  philosophy  un- 
hesitatingly accepts  the  conclusion  that  imperceptible 
motions  of  imperceptible  things  not  only  exist  but  cause 
our  sensations.  In  other  w^ords,  secondary  qualities  as  [ 
existing  in  nature  are  insensible  primary  qualities  which 
are  causes  of  secondary  qualities,  as  sensible  in  us. 

Natural  philosophy  is  not  a  sham.  One  or  other, 
or  many,  of  its  propositions,  may  be  untrue.  But  its 
whole  fabric  of  the  physical,  but  insensible,  world 
which  causes  the  sensible  image  of  it  to  arise  in  us, 
cannot  be  an  invention.  There  is  a  thing  beyond  sense, 
a  reality  beyond  pha3nomena,  not  only  actual  in  nature, 
but  known  to  science.  There  is  a  thing  real  and  known 
which  is  not  a  sensible  phsenomenon,  because  such 
things  as  imperceptible  particles  are  known  really  to 


8 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART   I. 


exist,  though  they  are  incapable  of  becoming  sensible. 
There  are  attributes  real  and  known  which  belong  to 
this   thing,   but   are   not  sensations   or   sensible  phae- 
nomena,  because  such  attributes  as  the  imperceptible 
motions  of  imperceptible  particles  are  known  really  to 
take  place,  although  they  are  not  capable  of  becoming 
sensible.      Finally,    these   real   things    by    these    real 
attributes  are  real  and  known  causes  of  human  sensa- 
tions because  the  imperceptible  motions  of  the  imper- 
ceptible are  known  really  to  cause  sensations  of  light 
and  other  sensations  in  men,  although  the  latent  pro- 
cess, by  which  an  imperceptible  motion  such  as  the 
undulation  of  aether  produces  sensible  light,  is  totally 
beyond   the    reach  of  sense,  which  perceives  not  the 
undulation  but  the  sensible  result.     Thus  real  things 
and  real  attributes  transcending  yet  really  causing  sensa- 
tions are,  in  some  way  or  other,  known  to  the  natural 
philosopher.      The    insensible,    then,  is    not   a   simple 
reality,  but  contains  three  realities,  all  insensible :  real 
substances,  real  attributes,  real  causes  of  sensations. 

There  are  things  in  themselves.  A  thing  in  itself 
mif^ht  mean  a  thinfij  out  of  all  relations.  In  this  sense 
nature  contains  no  things  in  themselves ;  it  is  a  system 
of  related  things  the  universe  of  which  is  alone  out  of 
relation  as  the  sum  of  all  relations.  But  this  is  not 
what  is  meant  by  a  thing  in  itself  in  philosophy  :  what 
is  really  meant  is  not  a  thing  out  of  all  relations,  but  a 
thing  distinct  from  the  ph^enomena  it  causes  in  us,  a 
thing  in  itself  as  opposed  to  its  sensible  appearance.  In 
this  meaning,  nature  contains  infinitely  more  things  in 
themselves  than  it  contains  phaenomena ;  and  man,  as  a 
natural  philosopher,  knows  things  in  themselves  which 
are  not  phaenomena,  when  he  knows  imperceptible 
particles;    knows  not  merely   the   phenomena  which 


CHAP.   I. 


THE  PHYSICAL   OBJECT   OF  SCIENCE 


9 


they  cause  in  us,  but  their  real  attributes,  when  he 
knows  imperceptible  motions,  and  knows  that  the 
thing  in  itself,  not  as  an  '  unknown  cause,'  but  by  its 
real^'attributes  produces  phaenomena,  when  he  knows 
that  imperceptible  things,  by  their  imperceptible 
motions,  cause  human  sensations.  There  are  real  things 
known,  real  attributes  known,  real  causes  known, 
beyond  the  phtenomena  of  sense.  All  this  knowledge 
does  man  as  a  natural  philosopher  possess  of  things  m 

themselves. 

Two  antitheses  have  been  handed  down  to  us  from 
ancient  philosophy,  the  natural  and  the  supernatural, 
the   visible  and  the  invisible.     These  distinctions  are 
often  treated  as  convertible ;  but  they  are  not  so.     The 
natural  and  the  visible  are  not  identical ;  and  the  super- 
natural and  the  invisible  are  not  identical :  there  is  a 
natural  yet  invisible  world.     Between  the  extremes  of 
visible   nature   and   the    invisible  supernatural   world 
there  is  an  invisible  nature,  distinct  from  both;  a  world 
which  is  neither  in  heaven  nor  in  man,  but  in  itself. 
If  we  combine  both  the  antitheses,  they  cease   to  be 
double,  and  form  this  triple  division  :— 

1.  The  natural  and  visible,  e.g.  sensible  phenomena. 

2.  The  natural  and  invisible,  e.g.  insensible  bodies 
and  imperceptible  particles. 

3.  The  supernatural  and  invisible,  e.g.  God. 
Natural  philosophy  is  the  science  of  nature  visible 

and  invisible.  From  the  former  it  infers  the  latter. 
But  it  stops  at  nature.  So  far  as  it  is  the  science  of  an 
invisible  nature,  it  is  a  philosophy  of  the  suprasensible, 
not  a  theology  of  the  supernatural.  It  outruns  sense, 
but  walks  w^th  reason  to  knowledge,  without  flying  to 
faith.  That  we  know  invisible  nature  beyond  sense  in 
natural  philosophy  is  a  simple  fact,  expUcable  by  logical 


10 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART  I. 


reasoning  from  sense.  Can  we  in  theology  further  know 
the  invisible  beyond  nature  as  well  as  beyond  sense  ? 
Can  we  know  the  supernatural  world  and  God  by  reason- 
ing from  sense  ?  These  are  questions  beyond  natural 
philosophy.  But  the  theologian  may  be  sure  that,  on 
the  one  hand,  unless  we  can  vindicate  our  knowledge 
of  insensible  nature,  \\^  can  hardly  hope  for  a  know- 
ledge of  an  insensible  world  beyond  nature  ;  and  that, 
on  the  other  hand,  reasoning  from  sense  to  nature 
encourages  reasoning  from  nature  to  God.  Natural 
philosophy  is  the  first  step  beyond  sense  into  the  unseen 
world,  within  which  natural  theology  soars  heaven- 
wards to  tell 

Of  things  invisible  to  mortal  sight. 

I  wull  conclude  this  chapter  by  quoting,  from  Sir 
John  Ilerschel's  '  Discourse  on  Natural  Philosophy,'  a 
passage  which  is  sufficiently  near  to  the  existing  state 
of  science  for  our  present  purpose.  Its  value  is  that  it 
groups  together  a  number  of  scientific  conclusions, 
which,  as  it  seems  to  me,  cannot  be  explained  by  any 
theory  of  reality  except  realism,  or  the  theory  that 
there  is  a  real  and  known  world  beyond  phaenomena, 
or  by  any  process  of  knowledge  except  syllogism,  or 
deductive  inference  which  carries  reason  beyond  sense. 

'  What  mere  assertion  will  make  any  man  believe, 
that  in  one  second  of  time,  in  one  beat  of  the  pendulum 
of  a  clock,  a  ray  of  light  travels  over  192,000  miles, 
and  would  therefore  perform  the  tour  of  the  world  in 
about  the  same  time  it  requires  to  wink  with  our  eye- 
lids, and  in  much  less  than  a  swift  runner  occupies  in 
takinix  a  single  stride  ?  Wliat  mortal  can  be  made  to 
believe,  w^ithout  demonstration,  that  the  sun  is  almost  a 
million  times  larger  than  the  earth  ;  and  that,  although 


CHAP.  I.         THE   PHYSICAL   OBJECT  OF  SCIENCE 


11 


so  remote  from  us  that  a  cannon-ball  shot  directly 
towards  it,  and  maintaining  its  full  speed,  would  be 
twenty  years  in  reaching  it,  it  yet  affects  the  earth  by 
its  attraction  in  an  inappreciable  instant  of  time  ?  a 
closeness  of  union  of  which  we  can  form  but  a  feeble 
and  totally  inadequate  idea,  by  comparing  it  to  any 
material  connection  ;  since  the  comnmnication  of  an 
impulse  to  such  a  distance,  by  any  solid  intermedium 
we  are  acquainted  with,  would  require,  not  moments, 
but  whole  years.  And  when  with  pain  and  difficulty 
we  have  strained  our  imagination  to  conceive  a  distance 
so  vast,  a  force  so  intense  and  penetrating,  if  we  are 
told  that  the  one  dwindles  to  an  insensible  point,  and 
the  other  is  unfelt  at  the  nearest  of  the  fixed  stars,  from 
the  mere  effect  of  their  remoteness,  while  amonf*-  those 
very  stars  are  some  whose  actual  splendour  exceeds  by 
many  hundred  times  that  of  the  sun  itself,  although  we 
may  not  deny  the  truth  of  the  assertion,  we  cannot  but 
feel  the  keenest  curiosity  to  know  how  such  things  were 
made  out. 

'  The  foregoing  are  amongst  those  results  of  scientific 
research  which,  by  their  magnitude,  seem  to  transcend 
our  power  of  conception.  There  are  others  again, 
which,  from  their  minuteness,  would  elude  the  grasp  of 
thought,  much  more  of  distinct  and  accurate  measure- 
ment. Who  would  not  ask  for  demonstration,  when 
told  that  a  gnat's  wing  in  its  ordinary  flight  beats  many 
hundred  times^  in  a  second  ?  or  that  there  exist  ani- 
mated and  regularly  organised  beings,  many  thousands 
of  whose  bodies  laid  close  together  would  not  extend 
an  inch  ?  But  what  are  these  to  the  astonishinir  truths 
which  optical  inquiries  have  disclosed,  which  teach  us 
that  every  point  of  a  medium  through  which  a  ray  of 
light  passes  is  affected  with  a  succession  of  periodical 


12 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


PART   I. 


CHAT.    II. 


13 


movements,  regularly  recurring  at  equal  intervals,  no 
less  than  five  hundred  millions  of  millions  of  times  in  a 
single  second  ;  that  it  is  by  such  movements,  communi- 
cated to  the  nerves  of  our  eyes,  that  we  see — nay,  more, 
that  it  is  the  difference  in  the  frequency  of  the  recur- 
rence which  affects  us  with  the  sense  of  the  diversity  of 
colour  ;  that,  for  instance,  in  acquiring  the  sensation  of 
redness  our  eyes  are  affected  four  hundred  and  eighty- 
two  millions  of  millions  of  times  ;  of  vellowness,  five 
hundred  and  forty-two  millions  of  millions  of  times  ; 
and  of  violet,  seven  hundred  and  seven  millions  of 
millions  of  times  ?  Do  not  such  things  sound  more  like 
the  ravinirs  of  madmen,  than  the  sober  conclusions  of 
people  in  their  waking  senses  ? 

'  They  are,  nevertheless,  conclusions  to  which  any 
one  may  most  certainly  arrive,  who  will  only  be  at  the 
trouljle  of  examining  the  chain  of  reasoning  by  which 
they  have  been  deduced;  but,  in  order  to  do  this, 
something  beyond  the  mere  elements  of  abstract  science 
is  required.  Waiving,  however,  such  instances  as  these, 
which,  after  all,  are  rather  calculated  to  surprise  and 
astound,  than  for  any  other  purpose,  it  must  be  ob- 
served that  it  is  not  possible  to  satisfy  ourselves  com- 
pletely that  we  have  arrived  at  a  true  statement  of  any 
law  of  nature,  until,  setting  out  from  such  statement, 
and  making  it  a  foundation  of  reasoning,  we  can  show, 
by  strict  argument,  that  the  facts  observed  must  follow 
from  it  as  necessary  logical  consequences,  and  this  not 
vaguely  and  generally,  but  with  all  possible  precision 
in  time,  place,  weight,  and  measure.' 


CHAPTER   II. 

IDEALISM   AND   RExVLISM. 

The   problem  of  this   essay   is    to   use  the  insensible 
world  of  science  as  a  fact  from  which  to  find  the  nature 
and  origin  of  knowledge.     Science  is  systematic  know- 
ledge.    Yet   the   mental  philosopher  usually  contents 
himself  with  endeavouring  to  explain  ordinary  know- 
ledtre.     If  he  is   a  mental  physiologist,  it  is  true,  he 
also  uses  natural  science  to  proceed  from  the  organs  to 
the  functions  of  sense.     But  there  is  another  use  of 
natural  science  to  mental  philosophy,  which  has  been 
too   much   neglected:    the   objects   of  science    are  as 
important  as  the  bodily  organs  to  the  explanation  of 
knowledge.     Natural  science  should  be  used  to  ascer- 
tain what  we  know  as  well  as  how  we  know  it.     More- 
over,   the    insensible    physical   world    of    the    natural 
philosopher  ought  to  prove  to  the  mental  philosopher 
that  neither  all  knowable  objects  nor  all  sensible  data 
are    psychical,  but  some  are  physical.     I   purpose  to  ^ 
show  that  physical  objects  of  science,  being  objects  of 
knowledge,  require  physical  data  of  sense.     Hence  this 
essay  is  called  Physical  Eealism.  , 

We  must  confront  natural  with  mental  philosophy. 
The  former  has  outstripped  the  latter.  Natural  philoso- 
phers have  long  ago  discovered  to  a  great  extent  how 
physical  nature  is  the  causa  essendi  of  sensible  data ; 
but  mental  philosophers  have  failed  altogether  to  show 


J 


14 


rilYSICAL   REALISM 


FART  I. 


CHAP.   II. 


IDEALISM   AND   REALISM 


15 


liow  sensible  data  are  the  causa  cognoscendi  of  physical 
nature.  The  reason  is,  the  data  are  mainly  unknown. 
The  existing  hypotheses  of  the  origin  of  knowledge  do 
not  explain  the  facts  of  science,  and  too  often  end  by 
denying  what  they  fail  to  explain.  Especially  to  blame 
is  the  hypothesis  that  all  the  data  of  sense  are  psychical 
facts,  such  as  sensations  and  ideas,  from  which  there  is 
no  way  to  insensible  but  physical  objects  of  scientific 
knowledge.  This  vicious  hypothesis  is  psychological 
idealism.  Hence  this  essay  is  designed  to  combat 
psychological  idealism  by  means  of  physical  realism, 
and  to  appeal  from  the  hypothesis  of  psychical  data  to 
the  physical  objects  of  science.  The  physical  world  of 
science  cannot  be  explained  by  the  common  hypothesis 
that  all  sensible  data  are  psychical,  nor  without  the  more 
moderate  hypothesis  that  some  are  physical. 

The  motto  of  all  idealism  is  ideale  prius  reale 
posterius.  But  it  has  many  meanings.  Anaxagoras 
founded  philosophical  idealism  by  the  proposition  that 
the  Divine  Intelligence  is  prior  to  the  order  of  nature ; 
and  in  adding  that  soul  is  also  prior  to  body  Plato 
became  its  second  founder.  The  Cartesian  idealism 
means  that  knowledge  begins  with  psychical  ideas,  and 
the  Kantian  idealism  that  it  adds  a  priori  mental  ele- 
ments. Of  these  idealisms  two  are  of  supereminent 
importance  in  the  history  of  thought ;  that  which  places 
God  at  the  beginning  of  the  world,  and  that  which 
places  psychical  ideas  at  the  beginning  of  knowledge. 
The  former  is  the  belief  of  the  majority  of  mankind,  the 
latter  of  most  philosophers  since  Descartes.  The  former 
is  theological,  the  latter  psychological  idealism. 

Theological  and  psychological  idealism  are  not 
necessarily  connected.  A  philosopher  may  hold  that 
God  causes  physical  nature  and  man  apprehends   it. 


n 


He  may  be  theologically  an  idealist,  psychologically  a 
realist.  On  the  other  hand,  he  may  suppose  that  all 
sensible  data  are  psychical  facts,  and  yet  doubt  the 
existence  of  God.  He  may  be  psychologically  an 
idealist,  theologically  an  atheist.  The  founders  of 
natural  theology  had  no  thought  of  making  psychical 
facts  the  beginnings  of  human  knowledge.  The 
followers  of  Hume  hardly  consider  themselves  supporters 
of  the  doctrine  that  God  created  the  world.  These 
distinctions  are  of  importance,  because  there  is  a  crude 
notion  in  our  times  that  idealism  in  mental  philosophy  is 
necessary  to  theology.  They  are  of  special  bearing  on 
the  scope  of  this  essay,  which  is  aimed,  not  at  theo- 
logical, but  solely  at  psychological  idealism. 

Psychological  idealism  began  with  the  supposition  of  / 
Descartes  that  all  the  immediate  objects  of  knowledge 
are  ideas.  From  Descartes  it  passed  to  Locke  and 
Berkeley.  But  with  Hume  it  changed  its  terms  from 
ideas  to  impressions.  Kant  preferred  phsenomena, 
Mill  sensations.  The  most  usual  terms  of  the  present 
day  are  sensations,  feelings,  psychical  pha^nomena,  and 
states  of  consciousness.  But  the  hypothesis  has  not 
changed  its  essence,  though  the  idealists  have  changed 
their  terms, — Verbum,  non  animum^  mutant.  They  at 
least  agree  that  all  sensible  data  are  psychical  objects 
of  some  kind  or  other. 

The  psychological  idealists  differ  widely  about  the 
origin  of  knowledge  from  these  psychical  data.  Some 
of  them  hold  that  there  are  a  priori  elements  contributed 
by  mind  to  the  psychical  data  of  sense,  others  that  these 
supposed  elements  are  a  posteriori.  But  this  difference 
about  the  origin  does  not  prevent  them  from  agreeing 
about  the  object  of  sense,  which  they  alike  hold  to 
be   some   kind   of  psychical  fact,   whether   idea,    ini- 


/ 


r 


16 


PHYSICAL   KEALISM 


TART   1. 


CHAP.   II 


IDEALISM  AND  REALISM 


17 


pression,  ])hn2nome]ion,  sensation,  feelhifr  or  state  of 
consciousness. 

There  is  a  further  difference  among  the  idealists. 
Some  of  them,  beginning  witli  Descartes,  believe  that, 
though  the  immediate  objects  of  sense  are  psychical, 
reality  also  includes  physical  facts.  Others,  beginning 
with  Berkeley,  reply  that  psychical  data  cannot  yield 
physical  objects,  and  therefore  the  psychical  is  all  that 
is  known  to  be  real.  The  former  divide  reality  into  the 
psychical  and  the  physical,  the  latter  resolve  it  wholly 
into  the  psychical.  The  former  have  been  called 
Cosmothetic  Idealists,  and  the  latter  Absolute  or  Pure 
Idealists.  But,  while  they  differ  oidy  about  the  objects 
which  can  be  mediately  known,  they  still  agree  about 
the  immediate  data.  Starting  from  the  common  hypo- 
thesis that  all  sensible  data  are  psychical,  the  cosmo- 
thetic idealist  nevertheless  believes  in  physical  realities, 
but  the  absolute  idealist  denies  or  doubts  them. 

Cosmothetic  idealists  further  differ  amon^r  themselves 
about  the  physical  world.  Descartes  held  that  a  physical 
w^orld  can  be  known  through  the  -  medium  of  ideas ; 
Locke,  in  one  of  his  many  moods,  that  it  is  a  cause 
of  ideas,  but  unknown.  This  difference  is  important, 
because  cosmothetic  idealism  is  the  usual  view  of  men- 
tal physiology  in  our  own  time,  and  it  is  held  in  both 
forms.  Mental  physiologists  have  unwaril}^  received 
from  psychologists  the  hypothesis  of  psychical  data, 
which  they  usually  call  sensations,  and  have  at  the 
same  time  learnt  from  nature  that  the  data  of  sense 
are  effects  of  physical  structures  and  motions  beyond 
sense.  Hence  they  are  cosmothetic  idealists.  But 
according  as  they  are  rather  physiologists  or  rather 
psychologists,  they  lean  to  Descartes  or  to  Locke.  The 
former  hold  that,  starting  from  psychical  sensations  as 


data,  by  inference  we  know  their  physical  causes ;  the 
latter,  that  the  psychical  sensations  are  produced  by  the 
physical  causes,  which  are  nevertheless  unknown  and 
unknowable.  Their  differences,  however,  do  not  dis- 
turb the  consensus  that  the  immediate  objects  of  sense 
are  not  physical,  but  purely  psychical. 

It  may  be  thought  that  this  consensus  of  idealism 
is  a  proof  of  truth.  But  agreement  is  one  of  the  chief 
causes  of  human  error,  because  it  tempts  men  to  dis- 
pense with  further  consider-ation  of  the  question.  More- 
over, we  shall  find  that  the  inconsiderate  assent  to  this 
common  proposition  is  the  very  reason  why  opposite 
schools  of  idealists  cannot  conclusively  answer  one 
another.  Lastly,  there  are  two  kinds  of  consensus  : 
one,  assent  to  a  self-evident  principle,  such  as  1  +  1  =  2 ; 
the  other,  agreement  in  a  common  hypothesis.  Now 
the  proposition  that  all  sensible  data  are  psychical 
phaenomena  is  not  a  self-evident  principle,  but  a  de- 
batable hypothesis. 

Eealism  is  the  philosophy  of  a  reality  beyond  psy- 
chical facts.  Th'fe  earliest  form  in  which  it  was  a 
conscious  doctrine  was  the  belief  in  the  reality  of 
universals.  Plato  thought  that  there  were  universal 
forms  existing  in  themselves,  incorporeal  and  super- 
natural archetypes,  in  accordance  with  which  similar 
individuals  are  produced  in  nature.  Aristotle  agreed 
that  there  are  real  universal  forms,  and  even  that  they 
are  incorporeal  substances.  He  contended,  however, 
that  they  exist  not  in  themselves  but  only  as  belonging 
to  individual  substances,  which  are  concretions  of  matter 
and  form.  In  the  Middle  Ages  the  disciples  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle  were  called-  Eeales,  to  distinguish  them 
from  the  Nominales,  who  either  contended  that  uni- 
versals  were  merely  general  names,   or  else   general 

c 


f? 


18 


14IYSICAL   REALISM 


PART  T. 


CHAP.  rr. 


IDEALISM  AND  REALISM 


19 


conceptions.  Those  who  adopted  the  latter  view  were 
afterwards  called  Conceptualists. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  be  either  a  Platonist  or  an 
Aristotelian.  There  is  a  third  realism  of  universals 
possible ;  and  that,  too,  without  falling  into  nominalism 
or  conceptiialism.  The  theory  of  the  reality  of  univer- 
sals, though  overlaid  with  manv  errors,  contains  two 
important  truths.  The  first  is,  that  science  knows  of 
classes  which  have  an  indefinite  number  of  similarities, 
such  as  triangles,  colours,  and  Hving  beings.  The 
second  is,  that  of  these  similarities  some  are  fundamental, 
others  derivative  ;  e.g.  three-sided  rectilineal  figure  is 
the  foundation  of  innumerable  other  similarities  of  tri- 
angle ;  undulations  of  ether  produce  the  facts  of  colour, 
metabolism  is  the  basis  of  the  facts  of  life.  The  first 
truth  shows  that  a  natural  class,  or  real  kind,  is  not  a 
name,  nor  a  notion,  but  a  real  sum  of  individuals  form- 
ino-  an  indefinite  number  of  similarities.  The  second 
truth  shows  that  the  distinction  between  essence  and 
property  is  not  a  nominal  difference  depending  on  the 
meaning  of  a  name,  nor  a  notional  difference  depending 
on  the  analysis  of  a  notion,  but  a  real  distinction  depend- 
ing on  the  fundamental  character  of  the  similarities, 
on  which  the  rest  depend.  Without  natural  "Classes, 
w^hose  similarities  can  be  expressed  in  laws,  thare  would 
be  no  science ;  and  w^ithout  essences,  or  fundamental 
similarities  of  those  natural  classes  on  which  other 
similarities  depend,  we  could  not  have  the  mathematics 
of  the  triangle  referring  its  propositions  back  to  its 
being  a  three-sided  figure,  nor  the  physics  of  light, 
referrintj  all  the  facts  of  colour  back  to  the  undulation 
of  aether. 

A  natural  class,  then,  is  the  sum  of  individuals 
possessing  an  indefinite  number  of  similarities.     A  real 


essence  is  the  fundamental  similarities  of  the  individuals 
of  a  natural  class.     It  is  easy  to  make  too  much  of  it 
or   too  little.     If  we  follow  the  nominalist,   and  make 
aithereal  undulation  the  meaning  of  the  name  'light,'  or 
the    conceptualist,  and   make   it   the   analysis  ""of '  the 
notion,  we  make  too  little  of  it,  because  the  undulation 
of  aether  began  before,  goes  on  without,  and  will  last 
after,  our  names  and  notions.     If,  on  the  otlier  hand, 
we  follow  Aristotle,  and  make  it  an  incorporeal  sub- 
stance coexisting  with  matter,  we  make  too  much  of  it, 
because  it  is  only  a  motion  of  matter  after  all ;  while,' 
if  we  try  to  soar  with  Plato  into  the  supernatural  world 
and  make   it  a  heavenly  archetype  of  earthly   light, 
we   fail   to  explain   the    facts  and  desert   science  ""for 
mysticism.  ^ 

The   realism   of    universals,    however,    is   not    tlie 
business  of  this  essay.     There  is  another  meaning  of 
realism,  which  we  may  call  the  Eealism  of  Individuals. 
This  is  the  theory  that  there  is  a  physical  world  of 
individuals  beyond  psychical  sensations  and  ideas.     It 
may  be  held  with  any  theory  of  universals  ;  the  realist 
of  individuals  is  not  necessarily  a  realist  of  universals. 
It  is  also  a  later  product.     The  realism  of  universals  is 
rather  a  doctrine  of  ancient,  the  reahsm  of  individuals 
rather  of  modern,  philosophers.      Not    that   Aristotle 
rejected  the   distinct  reahty  of   physical   individuals; 
but    it   never  occurred  to  him  that   it  needed   to  be 
proved.     There  was,  as  Brandis  remarked,  an  uncon- 
scious   realism    in    ancient    philosophy.       It    seldom 
doubted  a  world  beyond  the  psychical ;  the  question 
was  rather  whether  there  were  not  three  worlds  ;  natural 
individuals,  supernatural  universals,  and  psycliical  in- 
telligences.    But  in  modern  times  the  development  of 
psychological  idealism  has  brought  even  the  physical 

c   2 


20 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


PART   I. 


world  of  individuals  into  question.  In  opposition  to 
this  psychological  idealism  a  conscious  realism  has 
arisen,  the  object  of  which  is  to  show  that  there  are 
physical  things  beyond  psychical  facts.  This  realism 
of  physical  individuals  is  part  of  the  business  of  this 
essay,  and  for  shortness  will  in  the  sequel  be  called 
simply  Kealism. 

Eealism  is  constantly  misunderstood.  It  is  some- 
times supposed  to  be  a  synonym  for  mere  SensuaUsm, 
or  the  belief  that  physical  things  are  as  they  appear  to 
our  senses.  But  sensualism  is  only  a  crude  form  of 
reaUsm.  There  is  a  reaUsm  which  goes  beyond  sense  to 
science,  and  holds  that  things  are  not  as  they  imme- 
diately appear  to  sense,  but  rather  as  they  are  mediately 
inferred  by  science.  A  more  serious  misunderstanding 
is  the  confusion  of  realism  with  MateriaUsm.  Material- 
ism is  a  kind  of  realism ;  it  is  also  more.  It  is  a  double 
hypothesis :  first,  that  there  are  physical  things ;  secondly, 
that  they  are  either  the  only  reahties,  or  at  least  are 
prior  to  psychical  realities,  whether  in  nature  or  in  man. 

Only  the  first  part  of  this  hypothesis  is  essential  to 
realism ;  the  second  part,  which  contains,  too,  the  real 
sting  of  the  materialist,  is  unnecessary  to  the  realist. 
A  man  ceases  to  be  a  materialist,  but  he  remains  a 
realist,  if  he  holds  that  God  is  the  Creator  and 
Governor  of  the  world,  while  the  world  is  not  a 
psychical  fact  of  God's  Intelligence  but  a  physical  effort 
of  His  Intelligent  Will ;  and  that  nature  is  posterior  to 
God  though  prior  to  man.  The  motto  of  materialism  is, 
reale  prius  ideale  posterius  :  the  motto  of  realism  is  reals 
non  est  ideale.  In  short,  it  is  one  thing  to  affirm  a 
natural  world  of  individual  objects  beyond  sense, 
another  thing  to  deny  a  supernatural  world  beyond 
nature. 


CHAP.   II. 


IDEALISM  AND   REAUSM 


21 


Hence  realism  is  not  the  exact  contrary  of  all 
idealism.  It  is  not  opposed  at  all  to  the  idealism  of 
natural  theology.  It  is  not  even  the  direct  contrary 
to  aU  psychological  idealism.  Idealism  centres  itself 
on  the  data,  realism  on  the  objects  of  knowledge.  The 
former  says  that  all  sensible  data  are  psychical,  the 
latter  that  some  objects  are  physical.  Hence  a  difficulty 
in  contrasting  them,  and  even  in  keeping  them  distinct.; 
Some  ideahsts,  as  we  have  seen,  though  they  regard  all 
data  as  psychical,  admit  the  independent  reality  of 
physical  objects.  As  Hamilton  has  pointed  out,  the 
cosmothetic  idealists  are  also  hypothetical,  or,  as  some 
would  say,  transfigured  realists.  The  exact  contrary 
of  realism  is  not  all  idealism  but  pure  or  absolute 
ideahsm.  The  pure  or  absolute  idealist  denies  the 
reality  of  aught  beyond  the  psychical  world,  the  realist 
affirms  the  reality  of  the  physical. 

At  the  same  time  realism  is  not  a  single  body  of 
doctrines.  Eealists  agree  only  in  one  position — the 
reality  of  physical  things.  In  the  foundations  of  that 
position,  in  the  sensible  data  of  knowledge,  they  differ 
toto  ccelo.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  classify  them  to 
prevent  confusion,  and  that  sort  oiignoratio  ^Z^/zc/a',  which 
idealism  and  realism  alike  have  to  suffer  from  their 
opponents  when  they  are  not  properly  defined. 

Of  the  realism  of  individuals  there  are  two  species 
recognised  among  modern  philosophers — the  Hypo- 
thetical Eealism  of  the  cosmothetic  idealists,  and  the 
Intuitive  or  Natural  Eealism  of  the  Scotch  philosophers, 
Eeid,  Stewart,  and  Hamilton.  Agreeing  about  know- 
able  objects,  hypothetical  and  intuitional  realists  differ 
about  the  data  of  sense.  According  to  the  former,  the 
data  are  psychical  ideas  or  sensations  of  the  ego  ;  ac- 
cording to  the  latter,  they  include  the  primary  qualities 


22 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART   I. 


^ 


of  the  physical  non-ego.  Agreeing  in  a  physical  world, 
they  differ  about  the  way  in  which  it  is  to  be  reached, 
the  former  holding  that  it  is  inferred  from  psychical 
data,  the  latter  that  it  is  immediately  perceived.  Hypo- 
thetical or  transfigured  realism  is  the  hypothesis  that 
our  senses  present  psychical  ideas  or  sensations  repre- 
senting external  physical  objects ;  intuitive  or  natural 
realism,  the  hypothesis  that  the  senses  present  the  pri- 
mary qualities  of  external  physical  objects  themselves. 

Modern  philosophy  exhibits  a  constant  oscillation 
between  the  opposite  poles  of  the  ego  and  the  non-ego ; 
and  the  two  received  kinds  of  realism  are  opposite  cur- 
rents in  this  oscillation.  The  cosmothetic  idealist  or 
hypothetical  realist,  learning  from  natural  philosophy 
that  his  senses  do  not  directly  perceive  external  things, 
takes  refuge  in  the  psychical  world  of  his  own  soul. 
Dissatisfied  with  this  alternative,  and  conscious  that 
he  somehow  apprehends  something  physical,  the  in- 
tuitional realist  flies  forward  to  tlie  direct  perception  of 
an  external  world.  Extreme  views  are  usually  as  untrue 
as  extreme  measures  are  dangerous.  Is  there  a  via 
media  ?     I  venture  to  propose  a  new  Realism. 

When  I  consider  the  objects  of  science,  I  am  struck 
by  the  enormous  number  of  things  and  attributes 
entirely  beyond  the  reach  of  sense  and  not  even 
corresponding  to  any  sensible  object.  I  refer,  espe- 
cially, to  corpuscles,  their  structures  and  motions. 
Secondly,  on  going  further,  I  find  that  the  whole  ex- 
ternal world  has  been  discovered  by  sciences,  such  as 
optics,  acoustics,  and  biology,  to  be  insensible,  and 
that  notliing  is  sensible  except  what  has  been  impressed 
on  the  body,  and  in  the  body  on  the  nervous  system, 
of  a  sentient  being.  Thirdly,  I  notice  that  a  connection 
has  been  scientifically  estabhshed  between  external  in- 


CHAP.   II. 


IDEALISM  AND   REALISM 


23 


sensible  objects  and  the  objects  of  which  I  am  sensible. 
The  former  are  causes  of  the  latter.  They  are  also 
found  to  resemble  one  another  in  primary  qualities, 
such  as  duration,  extension,  motion,  but  not  in  secondary 
qualities,  such  as  light,  heat,  and  sound;  for  the  se- 
condary qualities,  as  they  are  in  external  nature,  are 
found  by  corpuscular  science  to  be  insensible  modes 
of  primary  qualities ;  light,  heat,  and  sound  being  all 
insensible  modes  of  motion  producing  a  heterogeneous 
effect  on  the  senses. 

I  cannot  believe  that  this  whole  fabric  of  insensible 
objects  can  be  scientific,  yet  unknown.  But  it  must  be 
either  physical  or  psychical.  If  the  objects  are  psy- 
chical, they  are  either  sensations  or  ideas.  But  they 
are  insensible  and  often  inconceivable.  Now  what  is 
insensible  cannot  be  a  sensation,  and  what  is  incon- 
ceivable cannot  be  an  idea.  Not  all  objects  of  science, 
then,  are  either  sensations  or  ideas ;  therefore  they  are 
Jiot  psychical  objects  at  all.  It  remains  that  they  are 
physical  objects. 

Again,  I  cannot  believe  that  this  whole  fabric  of 
physical  objects  of  science  can  have  been  inferred 
without  suflScient  data  of  sense.  I  therefore  proceed 
to  inquire  what  data  of  sense  are  required  to  infer  a 
physical  object  of  science.  This  is  a  question  of  logic. 
Now  the  rules  of  logic  teach  me  that  whatever  is  inferred 
is  inferred  from  similar  data.  If  I  infer  that  all  men 
will  die,  it  is  because  similar  men  have  died.  Now,  as 
we  liave  seen,  physical  objects  are  scientifically  inferred 
from  sensible  data.  It  follows  that  the  sensible  objects, 
which  are  these  data,  must  also  be  pliysical.  The 
similar  can  be  inferred  only  from  the  similar,  therefore 
the  physical  can  be  inferred  only  from  the  physical. 

This  conclusion,  liowever,  places  me  in  a  dilemma. 


24 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART  I. 


Science  shows  me  that  the  object  of  sense  is  internal, 
logic  that  it  is  physical.  The  former  evidence  might 
incline  me  to  cosmothetic  idealism,  the  latter  to  intui- 
tive realism.  Which  shall  I  prefer  ?  Am  I  to  say  that 
the  sensible  data  are  psychical  objects  within  me  ?  No, 
because  I  require  physical  data  of  sense  to  infer 
physical  objects  of  science.  Am  I  to  say  that  the 
sensible  data  are  physical  objects  without  me?  No, 
because  no  external  object  is  sensible.  I  can  be  neither 
a  cosmothetic  idealist,  because  of  logic,  nor  an  intuitive 
realist,  because  of  natural  science. 

If,  then,  natural  science  requires  that  the  object  of 
sense  must  be  within  my  nervous  system  in  order  to  be 
sensible,  and  logic  that  it  must  be  physical  in  order  to 
infer  physical  objects  of  science  in  the  external  w^orld, 
how  can  the  sensible  object  be  at  once  physical  and 
internal  ?  I  answer,  it  is  the  nervous  system  itself 
sensibly  affected.  The  hot  felt  is  the  tactile  nerves 
heated,  the  white  seen  is  the  optic  nerves  so  coloured. 
The  sensible  object  must  be  distinguished  from  its 
external  cause  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand 
from  the  internal  operation  of  apprehending  it :  it  is 
the  intermediate  effect  in  the  nerves  produced  by  the 
external  cause,  and  apprehended  by  the  operation  of 
sensation.  In  particular,  the  operation  and  the  object 
of  sensation  must  not  be  confused,  because  the  former 
may  be  psychical,  the  latter  is  physical.  There  is  some 
plausibility  in  saying  that  the  act  of  consciously  touch- 
ing is  psychical,  there  is  none  at  all  in  saying  that  the 
hot  felt  is  psychical.  Non  sequitur.  Vision  may  be  a 
psychical  sensation,  but  the  white  seen  is  a  physical 
object.  Nor  is  there  any  reason  w^hy  a  psychical  opera-, 
tion  should  not  apprehend  a  physical  object.  The  sen- 
sible object  then  is  identical  neither  with  the  external 


CHAP.    II. 


IDEALISM   AND   REALISM 


25 


cause  nor  with  the  internal  operation  of  sensation.  It 
is  the  effect  in  the  nervous  system  produced  by  the  one 
and  apprehended  by  the  other.  For  example,  the  hot 
felt  and  the  white  seen  are  produced  by  external  objects 
and  are  apprehended  by  internal  sensations  of  touch 
and  vision,  but  are  themselves  respectively  the  tactile 
and  the  optic  nerves  sensibly  affected  in  the  manner 
apprehended  as  hot  and  white. 

From  such  sensible  data,  internal,  as  science  re- 
quires, and  physical,  as  logic  requires,  man  infers 
physical  objects  in  the  external  world  by  parity  of 
reasoning.  Men  in  general  begin  by  inferring  that 
physical  objects  of  sense  are  produced  by  physical 
causes  exactly  similar.  Thus  from  the  hot  within  we 
infer  a  fire  without.  Such  objects,  directly  inferred  to 
correspond  with  sensible  data,  may  be  called  the 
originals  represented  by  them.  They  are  inferred, 
but  are  generally  said  to  be  perceived ;  thus  we  speak 
of  perceiving  the  fire  though  we  only  infer  it.  We 
may,  perhaps,  say  then  that  the  originals  of  the  sensible 
are  insensible  objects  inferentially  perceptible. 

Afterwards,  scientific  men  carry  on  this  parity  of 
reasoning,  and  infer  that  these  originals  beyond  sense 
consist  of  further  insensible  particles  similar  to  the 
originals,  but  not  at  all  represented  by  sensible  data  ; 
and  that  many  other  objects,  such,  for  example,  as  the 
side  of  the  moon  always  turned  from  the  earth,  are 
incapable  of  producing  sensible  objects  in  us.  These 
unrepresented  objects  may  be  said  to  be  not  only  in- 
sensible but  imperceptible,  and  are  objects  of  an  infer- 
ence which  may  be  called  transcendental,  in  the  sense 
of  transcending  both  sensitive  and  inferential  perception. 

Lastly,  science  also  finds  that  in  another  direction 
the    ordinary   man    has   carried    his    inferences  from 


20 


niYSICAL   REALISM 


PA.RT  I. 


similar  data  to  similar  objects  too  far.  Physical  objects 
are  found  to  be  like  sensible  in  their  primary,  not  in 
their  secondary  qualities ;  for  instance,  external  motion 
is  like  sensible  motion,  but  external  heat  is  an  imper- 
ceptible mode  of  motion  while  sensible  heat  is  not 
sensibly  a  motion  at  all.  How  is  this  inferred? 
J^ecause,  though  at  first  sight  sensible  heat  would 
demand  a  similar  external  object,  when  all  the  facts 
of  sensible  heat  are  accumulated  they  are  found  to  be 
the  kind  of  facts  that  are  only  produced  by  motion. 
Hence  from  sensible  physical  data  we  scientifically 
infer  insensible  physical  objects,  like  sensible  objects  in 
primary  but  unlike  in  secondary  qualities. 

Such  is  the  realism  proposed  in  this  essay.  It  may 
be  expressed  in  two  propositions  :  there  are  physical 
objects  of  science  in  the  external  world ;  therefore 
there  are,  as  data  to  infer  them,  physical  objects  of 
sense  in  the  internal  nervous  system.  It  is  a  via  media 
between  intuitive  realism  and  the  hypothetical  realism 
of  the  cosmothetic  idealist.  As  it  recognises  physical 
realities,  it  is  realism.  As  the  objects,  which  it  sup- 
poses to  be  sensible,  are  not  external  but  internal,  it  is 
not  intuitive  realism.  As  the  objects  of  sense,  which 
it  supposes  to  be  the  data  of  inferring  an  external 
physical  world,  are  not  psychical  but  physical,  it  is 
not  hypotlietical  realism.  As  they  are  physical  data 
within,  to  infer  physical  objects  without,  the  realism 
which  I  advocate  may  be  called  Physical  Kealism. 

There  are  three  realistic  ways  of  explaining  our 
knowledge  of  an  external  physical  world.  The  first  is 
cosmothetic  idealism,  which  supposes  that  we  are  sen- 
sible of  a  psychical,  but  infer  a  physical  world.  This 
is  against  logic,  which  shows  that  all  inference  is  by 
similarity.      The    second    is    intuitive   realism,   which 


CHAP.  II. 


IDEALISM   AND   REALISM 


27 


supposes  that  we  directly  perceive  an  external  physical 
world.  This  is  against  natural  philosophy,  which  shows 
that  we  perceive  nothing  directly  but  what  is  propagated 
into  our  nervous  system.  The  third  is  physical  reahsm, 
which  supposes  that  we  sensibly  perceive  an  internal 
but  physical  world,  from  which  we  infer  an  external 
and  physical  world.  This  agrees  with  both  natural 
philosophy  and  logic. 

Physical  Eeahsm  must  be  especially  distinguished 
from  intuitive,  or,  as  it  is  also  called,  natural  reahsm. 
It  is  true  that  the  theories  have  some  common  points. 
This  essay  owes  to  Eeid  the  instructive  remark  on  the 
'  Sentiments  of  Bishop  Berkeley,'  that  there  is  no  evi- 
dence for  the  doctrine  '  that  all  the  objects  of  knowledge 
are  ideas  in  my  own  mind.'^  The  rejection  of  idealism, 
the  reahty  of  the  physical  world,  the  belief  in  a  phy- 
sical object  of  sense,  and  the  possibihty  that  a  psychical 
subject  may  apprehend  a  physical  object,  are  all  points 
in  intuitive  realism  which  find  a  place  in  physical 
reahsm.  But  here  the  agreement  ends.  .  The  intuitive 
realist  holds  an  immediate  perception  of  a  physical 
world  outside.  I  distinguish  the  immediate  perception 
of  the  physical  world  within,  and  the  inferential  per- 
ception of  the  physical  world  beyond  myself. 

The  intuitive  realist  follows  the  idealist  in  thinkint? 
too  much  of  the  sensible  data,  and  too  Httle  of  the 
insensible  objects  of  science.  He  gives  too  much 
weight  to  consciousness,  and  too  little  to  science,  or 
rather  too  much  to  the  ordinary  and  too  little  to  the 
scientific  consciousness.  He  appeals  to  common  sense, 
which  is  the  problem  rather  than  the  solution  of  philo- 
sophy.     He  elevates  the  dicta  of   consciousness  and 

*  Reid,   Essays    on   tlie  Intellectual  Powers.     Essay  IL,   chap.   x. 
p.  283  (ed.  Hamilton). 


28 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


PART   I. 


common  sense  from  unanalysed  facts  into  self-evident 
principles.  Hence,  in  asserting  an  immediate  know- 
ledge of  external  natuix  he  contradicts  science.  But 
we  must  appeal  from  common  sense  to  universal  science, 
and  from  ordinary  to  scientific  realism.  The  ideahst 
can  never  be  answered  by  asserting  the  reality  of  the 
sensible  world,  which  he  admits,  and,  if  it  stood  alone, 
could  explain.  He  must  be  confronted  with  the  in- 
sensible world  of  science. 

The  intuitive  realists  have  an  impossible  theory  of 
the  data  of  sense,  comprised  of  two  incompatible  ex- 
tremes. On  the  one  hand,  tliey  admit  the  ideaUstic 
position  that  secondary  qualities,  as  sensible,  are  psy- 
chical sensations ;  on  the  other  hand,  they  assert  that 
external  primary  qualities  of  the  non-ego  are  imme- 
diately perceived.  The  admission  is  fatal,  because  the 
Berkeleian  at  once  points  out  that  primary  qualities  are 
apprehended  in  the  same  way  as  secondary,  and  there- 
fore if  one  set,  as  sensible,  are  psychical  sensations,  why 
not  the  other  ?  The  assertion  is  equally  fatal,  because 
scientific  analysis  shows  that  nothing  external  is  imme- 
diately perceived.  Hence  I  retract  the  admission  and 
reject  the  assertion.  Whether  directed  to  primary  or 
to  secondary  qualities,  sense  apprehends  neither  a  sen- 
sation nor  an  external  object,  but  an  internal  object  in 
the  nervous  system.     Everything  external  is  inferred. 

Perhaps  the  chief  reason  of  the  defect  in  intuitive 
realism  is  the  confusion  of  object  and  non-ego.  Object 
is  the  res  considerata  apprehended  either  by  sense  or  by 
reason.  It  is  not  always  an  external  object.  In  sense, 
it  is  always  internal,  whether  it  be  the  hot  or  the  moving, 
the  white  or  the  extended,  secondary  or  primary.  In 
reasoning,  it  is  external,  whenever  we  infer  something 
beyond  the  sensible  object  within  us.     But  the  intuitive 


CHAP.  ir. 


IDEALISM   AND   REALISM 


29 


realists,  having  confused  object  and  non-ego,  supposed 
that  whenever  sense  has  an  object  it  presents  the  non-ego. 
Eeally,  sense  always  apprehends  an  object  distinct  from 
the  operation,  but  never  a  non-ego  distinct  from  the  ego, 
that  is,  tlie  man  himself.  Hence,  also,  their  erroneous 
behef  that  in  apprehending  a  primary  quality,  as  an 
object,  sense  presents  a  quahty  of  the  non-ego,  and  in 
not  apprehending  a  secondary  quahty  as  it  is  in  the 
non-ego,  it  presents  no  object.  Eeally,  as  sensible,  botli 
primary  and  secondary  qualities  are  apprehended  as 
objects,  but  not  as  external.  For  example,  the  sensibly 
hot  and  moving  are  both  apprehended  as  objects  by 
sense,  but  entirely  within  the  sentient  being. 

The  subordination  of  secondary  to  primary  quali- 
ties is  not  at  all  in  the  sensible  effects,  but  in  the  external 
causes.  In  the  external  world,  secondary  quahties  are 
found  by  science  to  be  only  specific  varieties  of  primary 
quahties.  In  the  internal  world,  all  qualities  appear 
to  sense  to  be  equally  elementary.  As  sensible,  a 
primary  quahty,  such  as  motion,  is  not  in  the  non-ego, 
and  a  secondary  quality,  such  as  heat,  is  not  a  mere 
sensation ;  nor  are  they  both  sensations ;  but  they  are 
both  sensible  objects,  both  internal  to  the  sentient  beincr, 
both  physical,  both  parts  of  the  nervous  substance 
sensibly  affected,  both  apprehended  in  the  same  way  as 
objects  by  the  operation  called  '  sensation.'  From  these 
quahties,  all  apprehended  in  exactly  the  same  way  as 
sensible  objects  in  our  nervous  system,  the  ordinary 
man  infers  a  complete  correspondence  of  qualities  out- 
side, the  scientific  man  partly  corrects  him  by  reducing 
secondary  qualities  to  primary  qualities  in  the  external 
world. 

The  relativity  of  knowledge  has  become  a  common-  < 
place.     Is  it  a  fact  ?     A  sensible  effect  is  the  result  of 


30 


niYSICAL  REALISM 


PART   I. 


the  combination  of  two  causes.  As  active  or  efficient 
cause,  the  external  world  produces  the  sensible  effect 
m  the  nervous  system;  as  passive  or  material  cause, 
the  nervous  system  receives  this  effect  according  to  its 
susceptibility.  Hence  the  effect  is  hke  or  unlike  to  the 
efficient  causes,  according  to  the  varying  susceptibility 
of  the  nervous  system.  There  is  a  variation  in  different 
animals  and  in  different  men,  and  even  in  the  same  man 
at  different  times.  But  in  all  men  there  is  one  differ- 
ence of  main  importance.  The  nervous  system  is  far 
more  susceptible  of  similar  effects  from  primary  than 
from  secondary  qualities.  It  is  more  capable  of  re- 
flectinfT  the  waves  of  the  sea  than  the  undulations  of 
aether.  Not  that  the  effect  is  wholly  alike  in  primary 
or  wholly  unlike  in  secondary  qualities.  The  primary 
quality  of  distance  is  imperfectly  reproduced  in  sense, 
the  secondary  quality  of  aerial  vibration  is  to  some 
small  extent  represented  in  the  sense  of  hearing.  But, 
on  the  whole,  there  is  a  general  similarity  of  the 
sensible  to  the  external  in  primary,  and  a  general 
dissimilarity  in  secondary  qualities,  because  of  the 
inferior  susceptibility  of  the  nervous  system  to  receive 
like  effects  from  the  latter  qualities  in  external  objects. 
In  the  sense,  then,  that  the  sensible  effect  only  partly 
depends  on  the  external  efficient  cause,  and  partly  also 
on  the  matter  of  the  nervous  system,  there  is  a  rela-  ^ 
tivity  of  knowledge  to  the  structure  of  the  nerves. 
There  is  also  an  evolution,  which  consists  in  the  in- 
creasing adaptation  of  the  nerves  to  sustain  the  effect 
under  the  action  of  the  external  object. 

On  the  other  hand,  by  the  relativity  of  knowledge 
it  is  generally  meant  that  the  sensible  effect  produced 
is  a  psychical  fact,  not  partly  but  wholly  heterogeneous 
to  the  physical  object,  if  there  be  one.     In  this  sense 


CHAT.    II. 


IDEALISM    AND   REALISM 


^1 
'j1 


physical  reahsm  is  opposed  to  the  relativity  of  know- 
ledge.    It   is    true  that  red  refuses  to  appear  to  our 
senses  as  a  motion  representing   the  external  motion 
which  produces  it.     But  the  cause  of  this  fact  is  to  be 
found  in  the  construction  of  the  optic  nerve,  wliich, 
wlien  acted  on  by  a  certain  impercepti])le  motion  of 
asther,  receives   a   sensible    colour    apparently    unlike 
motion,  just  as  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in  certain  pro- 
portions, when  acted  on  by  electricity,  become  water. 
In  the  same  way,  when  a  wheel  rotates  too  quickly,  the 
sensible  effect  ceases  to  be  a  motion,  because  the  nerves 
are   insusceptible  of  taking  on  so  rapid  a  motion  in 
sense.      The  sensible  effect  is  similar  or  dissimilar  to 
the  external  object,  so  far  as  the  nervous   system  is 
capable  or  incapable  of  being  affected  similarly  to  the 
external  object.     There  is  no  occasion  then  to  resort  to 
the  hypothesis  of  a  psychical  relativity :  the  nervous 
element  is  sufficient. 

Moreover,  if  there  were  a  psychical   relativity,  it 
would  be  ineradicable,  because  the  sensible  effect  would 
then  be  completely   heterogeneous,  and  would  there- 
fore supply  no  data  of  inference  to  an  external  physical 
cause.      Eeally,  sensible    effects    are    partly   Hke    and 
partly  unlike  the  external  causes,  because  the  nerves 
are    partly    fitted    and    partly   unfitted    to    represent 
them.     Being  partly  like,  the  nervous  unfitness  to  re- 
present secondary  quahties   as  they  are   in  nature  is 
being    constantly   ehminated    by    scientific    reasoning. 
Thus,  sense  sometimes  presents  motion  as  motion,  but 
cannot    help    presenting    the    hot,    the    red,    <Szc.,    as 
heterogeneous  to  motion,  because  of  the  structure  of 
the    sensory   nerves;    science,    by  comparing    sensible 
motion  with  the  sensible  facts  of  the  hot,  the  red,  &c., 
infers  that  the  external  cause  of  the  latter  is  really  a 


32 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


PART  I. 


CHAP.  II. 


IDEALISM  AND  REALISM 


33 


\ 


mode  of  motion.     In  secondary  qualities  the  sensible 
effect  is  heterogeneous,  but  the  cause  inferred  by  science 
is  identical  with  the  external  object.     Not  that  scien- 
tific elimination  of  the  defects  of  sense  ever  becomes 
so  complete  as  to  end  in  absoluteness  of  knowledge. 
But  there  is  a  constant  progress  towards  making  science 
the  mirror  of  being.     Sense  starts  with  physical  data 
partly  like  and  partly  unlike  external  nature  ;  science, 
by  progressive  inferences,  tends  more  and  more  to  dis- 
cover the  external  quahties  which  cause  not  only  the 
like  but  the  unlike  data  in  the  nervous  system.     The 
sensible,  therefore,  is  not  a  psychical  effect  completely 
heterogeneous  to  the  external  physical   cause,  but   a 
physical  effect  partly  relative  to  the  nervous  system ; 
and  science  is  perpetually   correcting  this  partial  re- 
lativity. 

It  is  usual  to  divide  theories  of  sensation  and  per-    .: 
ception   into    presentative  and  representative.      There 
^arfijtwo  presentative  theories,  respectively  characterising  ' 
Jhe  pure  ideaUst  and  the  intuitive^realist.     The  former 
holds  that  there  is  no  distinction  between  sensation  and 
perception :  sense,  according  to  him,  immediately  per- 
ceives  psychical  facts,  which  are  the  sum  of  known 
existing  objects.     The  latter  distinguishes  sensation  and 
perception,because  he  distinguishes  the  psychical  and  the 
physical :  sensation,  in  his  view,  is  hmited  to  psychical 
sensations,  perception  immediately  apprehends  the  pri- 
mary  quahties   of   an   external  physical  world.      The 
pure  ideahst  says, '  What  I  se_e_is^what  exists.; '  the  intui- 
tive reahst,  '  Whar^S[5ts  I  sejej  '  .lh£iJoTm£r-jeduxie^ 
najvure  to  per^S^JtiS^T^l^         ^^^^^^  perception  to 
mituiv;   one3Qlds  ,£55e  „is^^rj^%^^  other  Msseper^ 

Iwitur.     But  the  point  is  that,  according  to  both,  the    ^ 
-^eal  is  the  sensible  world,  which  is  directly  presented, 


not  represented,  in  perception,  without  an  inference  to 
an  external  original.  JThe-Jceprejentative  theory^on  ^ 
^e  other  hand,  distinguishes  the  data  of  sense,  as  pre-  „ 
^sented,  from  the  external  world,  as  represented,  in 
perception.  It  exists  in  many  forms,  according  to 
various  theories  of  the  data  of  sense.  But  the  current 
form  is  that  of  cosmothetic  ideahsm,  which  holds  that 
sense  presents  psycliical  data  of  some  kind,  representing 
physical  objects  in  the  external  world. 

Physical    reahsm    must    accept    the    representative 
theory,  but  not  in  its  ideahstic  form.     The  data  pre- 
sented to  sense  are  internal,  yet  not  psychical.     They 
are  physical  parts  of  the  nervous  system,  tactile,  optic, 
auditory,  &c.,  sensibly  affected  in  various  manners,  repre- 
senting, but  only  partly  resembhng,  the  external  world. 
Further,  in  sense,  the  object  is  not  the  operation,  the  hot 
is  not  touch,  the  white  is  not  vision,  the  loud  is  not 
hearing.    From  these  points  I  form  the  following  theory 
of  sensation.    In  that  the  sensible  object  is  internal,  sen- 
sation is  not  the  immediate  apprehension  of  an  external 
object.    In  that  the  sensible  object  is  physical,  sensation 
is  not  the  immediate  apprehension  of  a  psychical  fact. 
In  that  it  is  the  immediate  apprehension  of  an  oljject, 
though  internal,  it  is  a  kind  of  perception.     I  should 
define   sensation,  or   sensitive   perception,   as   the    im-i 
mediate  apprehension   of  an   internal   i)hysical  object)  " 
within  the  nervous  system  of  a  sentient  beinrr. 

But  perception  cannot  be  confined  to  sensation. 
Although  it  is  true  that  sense  feels  the  hot,  and  reason 
infers  the  fire,  everybody  talks  of  perceiving  the  fire. 
The  philosopher  will  find  it  vain  to  fly  in  the  face  of 
the  universal  language  not  only  of  ordinary  life  but 
even  of  science.  He  must  recognise  this  perception 
and  analyse   it.     There  is,  then,  besides  sensitive   or 

D 


^ 


34 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


TART   I. 


CHAP.   II. 


IDEALISM   AND   REALISM 


35 


immediate  perception,  inferential  or  mediate  perception. 
Tlie  former  is  limited  to  the  internal  object  of  sense,  the 
latter  extends  to  the  external  original.  Moreover,  so 
long  as  we  remember  that  there  is  an  inference  in  this 
latter  operation,  the  term  '  perception '  not  only  does  no 
harm  but  serves  to  mark  a  most  important  distinction. 
We  first  infer  external  originals  of  sensible  objects,  e.g. 
the  fire,  the  sea,  &c. ;  we  cannot  be  said  to  see,  but  we 
may  be  said  to  perceive,  these  external  objects,  and  also 
to  observe  and  experience  them,  though  indirectly. 
Afterwards,  we  go  on  to  infer  other  external  objects  not 
represented  by  any  sensible  object,  e.g.  a  corpuscle, 
aether  :  these  we  cannot  be  said  either  to  see  or  per- 
ceive ;  they  are  not  only  insensible  but  imperceptible, 
and  we  infer  them  by  reasoning  which  transcends  per- 
ception. In  short,  we  must  distinguish  sensitive 
perception,  inferential   perception,  and  transcendental 

inference. 
^         Hence  the  following  classification  of  physical  objects 
knowable,  and  of  the  operations  concerned  with  them  : — 

1.  Internal  parts  of  the  nervous  system  sensibly 
affected:  sensible  data :  immediately  perceptible,  objects 
of  sense,  or  of  sensitive  perception,  observation,  ex- 
perience. 

E.g.  the  sensibly  moving,  the  sensibly  hot. 

2.  External  parts  of  the  universe :  insensible  objects  : 
objects  of  inference. 

(1)  Originals  represented  by  sensible  objects,  and 
resembling  them  in  primary  not  in  secondary 
qualities  :  insensible  but  mediately  perceptible 
objects  of  inferential  perception,  observation, 
experience. 
E.g.  the  fire,  the  waves  of  the  sea. 


(2)  Objects  unrepresented,  though  causing  some 
sensible  objects  by  imperceptible  secondary 
quaHties  :  the  imperceptible :  objects  of  trans- 
cendental inference. 

E.g.  corpuscles,  the  undulations  of  sether. 

This  essay  contemplates  not  only  a  new  realistic  hypo- 
thesis, but  a  different  method  from  that  usually  used  in 
mental   philosophy.      Every  philosophy   must   have  a 
beginning.      But  the  beginning  must  be  what  is  best 
known  ;  and  in  mental  philosophy  the  present  objects 
of  science   are  better   known   than    the  original  data 
of  sense.     The  method  in  use  takes  too  direct  a  way 
of  getting  at  the  original  data.      It  is  true  that  the 
beginnings    of    human    knowledge   are   sensible    data. 
But  the  philosopher  does  not  stand  at  the  beginning  of 
human  knowledge.     Philosophy  did  not  begin  with  the 
infancy  of  the  human  race.     The  philosopher  cannot 
observe  his  own  infancy.     The  sensible  data  have  lon^^ 
since  been  overlaid  witli  an  immense  mass  of  inferences. 
Hence,  though  man  may  have  begun  once,  it  is  impos- 
sible for  the  philosopher  to  begin  now,  with  the  data. 
Yet  most  books  on  knowledge  begin  with  the  dogmatic 
assertion  that  the  immediate  objects  of  the  senses  are 
psychical  sensations,  from  which  they  proceed  to  allow 
man  as  much  knowledge  of  nature  as  can  be  squeezed 
out  of  the  original  hypothesis.     But  the  assertion  itself 
must  be  proved. 

Besides  the  induction  of  causation,  we  may  either 
reason  synthetically  from  cause  to  effect,  or  analytically 
from  effect  to  cause.  But  the  latter  is  the  more  usual 
method,  because  man  knows  so  much  more  about 
facts  than  about  their  causes.  Hence  the  order  of 
science  is  usually  the  reverse  of  the  order  of  nature. 

D  2 


3G 


IMIYSICAL   KEALISM 


TART  I. 


I 


CHAP.   II. 


IDEALISM  AND   REALISM 


37 


Nature  always  proceeds  from  cause  to  effect,  science 
usually  from  effect  to  cause ;  so  that  science  becomes 
an  analysis  of  the  synthesis  of  nature. 

Similarly,  the   order   of  mental   philosophy  is  the 
reverse  of  the  order  of  human  knowledge.     It  is  true 
that  the  order  of  human  knowledge  is  from  cause  to 
effect  in  the  sense  that  sensible  data  are  the  caus(^  cog- 
noscendi  of  pliysical  knowledge.     We  begin  with  them 
as  children ;  hence  also  we  are  tempted  to  begin  with 
them  again  as  psychologists.      But   the   procedure  is 
fallacious;    we  must  begin  with  the  more  knowable. 
Now  every  mental  philosopher  is  an  adult  man,  and 
every  adult  man  is  more  certain  what  he  now^  knows, 
than  how  he  originally  came  to  know  it,  of  the  dis- 
coveries  of  science    than  of   'the  secret  springs  and 
principles  by  which  the  human  mind  is  actuated  in  its 
operation,'  of  the  known  objects  than  of  the  sensible 
data.     Accordingly,   as,  in  the  science  of  nature,  we 
nmst  generally  begin  with  present  facts  and  go  back- 
wards to  the  Ciuisce  essendi,  so,  in  the  science  of  know- 
led<^e,   we   must   generally   begin   with    the    facts    of 
scientific  knowledge  and  go  backwards   to   the  causce 
coijnoscendi.     Modern  philosophers  have  made  the  mis- 
take of  attempting  to  repeat  the    synthesis  of  know- 
led<^e   from   the   original   data   of  the   child  and   the 
race.     But  we  must  rather  retrace  our  steps  from  the 
present  to  the  past;    instead  of  trying  to  follow  the 
synthesis  of  knowledge  from  an  unknown  beginning, 
we  must  make  an  analysis  from  the  present  objects 
of  scientific  knowledge  to  the  original  data  of  sense. 
In  a  word,  our  method  must  be  an  analysis  from  science 

to  sense. 

Hence,  I  began  with  attempting  to  give  an  outline 
of   the    kind  of  objects   recognised   in   science.     This 


beginning  has  several  advantages.  First,  science  is 
knowledge ;  hence  to  begin  with  its  objects  is  an 
appeal  not  from  knowledge  to  reality,  but  from  the 
data  to  the  objects  of  knowledge.  It  is  not  a  dogmatic 
assertion  of  what  is,  but  an  historical  description  of  what 
is  known.  Secondly,  science  is  knowledge  at  its  widest 
extent,  knowledge  proceeding  from  the  sensible  through 
the  insensible,  but  perceptible,  to  the  imperceptible 
world.  Hence  we  get  a  more  extended  view  of  know- 
able  objects  than  that  usually  attained  by  mental 
philosophers,  who  tend  to  concentrate  themselves  on 
the  world  of  sense  and  perception.  Thirdly,  science  is 
knowledge  at  its  best,  whereas  the  hypotheses  of  mental 
philosophers  about  sensible  data  can  hardly  be  called 
knowledge  at  all.  In  appealing  from  the  hypothetical 
origin  of  knowledge  to  what  is  actually  known  in  science, 
we  are  appealing  from  the  less  known  to  the  more 
known.  In  short,  we  are  getting  the  facts  of  knowledge, 
wherewith  to  test  our  hypothesis  of  its  causes. 

The  next  step  is  analytically  to  find  the  sensible 
data  required  to  cause  the  knowledge  of  the  objects  of 
science  as  facts.  All  theories  of  the  sensible  data  and 
of  the  origin  of  knowledge,  idealistic  and  realistic,  must 
be  treated  and  compared  as  hypotheses.  We  must  ask, 
indeed,  what  is  their  direct  evidence,  but  also  and 
mainly  whether  they  account  for  the  knowledge  of  the 
objects  of  science.  The  general  examination  of  these 
hypotheses  will  follow  in  the  next  chapter.  Afterwards, 
the  various  hypotheses  of  Psychological  Idealism  will 
be  taken  in  detail.  The  elimination  of  these  hypotheses 
will  finally  bring  us  to  Physical  Eealism. 

Philosophy  began  with  the  external  object,  which 
was  first  of  all  treated  as  a  pure  reality  by  the  Pre-So- 
cratic  philosophers.     Gradually  it  came  to  be  regarded 


38 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


PART  I. 


as  also  an  oljject  of  knowledge,  a  view  wliicli  culminated 
with  Aristotle.  Aristotle's  method  was  essentially  to  be- 
gin with  being  as  being,  then  to  consider  it  secondarily  as 
a  knowable  object,  and  thus  to  proceed  from  the  known 
object  to  the  knowing  subject.  Objective  are  generaUy 
the  foundation  of  subjective  distinctions  in  his  writings. 
Descartes  revolutionised  philosophy  by  beginning  with 
the  conscious  subject  and  passing  through  its  conscious 
operations  to  the  object  apprehended.  From  his  time 
the  general  order  of  mental  philosophy  has  been  syn- 
thetic, from  the  subjective  operations  to  the  objective 
world.  I  propose  to  revert  to  the  old  order,  and  pro- 
ceed analytically  from  object  to  subject,  but  in  a  new 

spirit. 

Ancient  philosophy  rightly  began  with  the  object,  but 

considered  it  too  much  as  being,  and  too  Uttle  as  known. 

Consequently,    it   had  a  tendency  to  multiply  entities 

without  considering  whether  they  are  knowable.    Hence 

the    Cartesian   revolution    and   the    synthetic    method 

from  subject  to  object.  But  after  the  first  consciousness, 

I  think,  the  object  is  on  the  whole  better  known  than 

the  subject ;  else  natural  philosophy  would  not  be  more 

advanced  than  mental  philosophy.     In  order  to  avoid 

at  once  the  dogmatism  of  ancient,  and  the  doubtfuhiess 

of  modern,  philosophy,  I  propose  to   begin  with  the 

object,  not  as  being,  but  as  known  in  science,  the  most 

perfect  form  of  knowledge.      I  proceed  to  ask  what 

sensible   objects   are   required  as  data   for   science  to 

know  these  objects.     Of  the  knowing  subject  I  treat 

only  so  far  as  it  bears  on  the  objects  known  by  sense 

and  reason,  because,  though  I  know  well  that  I  am,  I 

know  less  what  I  am  than  what  I  know.     The  ancient 

method  from  being  to  knowing  was  the  right  order, 

though    too    dogmatic   in   appUcation.      The   modern 


CHAP.   IT. 


IDEALISM  AND   REALISM 


89 


method  inaugurated  by  Descartes,  from  the  subject 
through  the  data  of  sense  to  the  objects  of  science,  was, 
after  its  first  step,  fallacious,  because  it  then  proceeded 
synthetically  from  the  less  to  the  more  knowable.  The 
analytic  method  of  physical  realism,  without  neglecting 
direct  evidences  of  the  data,  proceeds,  on  the  whole, 
from  the  more  knowable  objects  of  science  to  the  less 
knowable  data  of  sense. 

TABLE   OF  IDEALISM  AND  REALISM. 


Idealism. 


Realism. 


I. 

Pure. 


3. 

Physical. 


4. 
Intuitive. 


2. 

Cosmoihetic,       or 
Hypothetical. 

(1)  All        sensible  (l)All        sensible  (1)  All        sen.-ible  (1)  Some    sensible 

data    are  psy-  data  are   psy-  data  are  inter-  data  are  exter- 

chical.  chical.  nal   but  some  nal  and  physi- 

are  physical.  cal. 

(2)  All  objects  ( 2)  Some    objects  (2)  Some      objects  (2)  Some     objects 

knowable    are  are  physical.  of  science  are  are  physical, 

psychical.  physical. 


40 


PHYSICAL   llEALISM 


PART   I. 


CHAPTEE  III. 


THE    rilYSICAL    DATA    OF    SENSE. 


Nihil  est  in  intellecta,  quod  non  prius  in  sensu.  How 
far  is  this  time-honoured  proposition  true  ?  As  we  have 
seen,  it  is  not  true  of  the  objects  of  science.  The  whole 
physical  world  is  beyond  the  reach  of  sense,  insensible  ; 
the  corpuscles,  of  which  it  consists,  are  beyond  the  reach 
of  inferential  perception,  imperceptible.  It  is  true  that 
objects  of  science  are  similar  to  sensible  objects,  but 
they  are  not  the  same.  They  are  objects  of  intellect 
which  are  inferred  from  sensible  objects  but  have  never 
been  in  sense.  But  even  this  more  modest  statement 
must  be  qualified. 

In  the  first  place,  it  requires  Locke's  correction  that 
knowledixe  has  two  sources — sensation  and  reflection, 
outer  and  inner  sense,  or  sense  and  consciousness.  We 
immediately  apprehend  not  only  the  objects  of,  or 
rather  in,  our  senses,  but  also  ourselves  apprehending 
those  objects,  and  performing  many  other  conscious 
operations.  Secondly,  there  is  also  a  simpler  source 
than  sensation — the  feelings.  We  immediately  feel 
pleased  and  pained,  and  that  too  without  apprehending 
any  object ;  as  in  the  pain  of  hunger,  the  pleasure  of 
nutrition.  Sensation  is  more  complex  than  feeling,  be- 
cause it  is  the  apprehension  of  an  object ;  touch  the 
apprehension  of  the  hot,  vision  of  the  coloured,  hearing 
of  the  sounding,  &c.     Frequently  we  have  a  feehng  and 


CHAP.   III. 


THE  PHYSICAt,  DATA  OF  SENSE 


41 


a  sensation  together  ;  for  example,  when  we  feel  pleased 
or  pained  at  the  same  time  as  we  taste  sweet  or  bitter. 
But  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  distinguish  feeling 
as  a  source  of  knowledge,  especially  as  it  is  not  at  all 
improbable  that  it  was  the  original  source  even  of  sensa- 
tion. Even  now  that  feeling  and  sensation  are  distinct, 
feelings  are  still  the  raw  experiences  of  volitions,  passions 
the  beginnings  of  actions.  We  feel  pleasure  and  pain 
before  we  will  to  pursue  the  one  and  avoid  the  other. 
All  knowledge,  then,  does  not  begin  with  sensation,  but 
with  feeling,  sensation,  reflection. 

JX  is  true,  however,  that  all  knowledge  of  nature 
begins  with  sensation.  Yet  even  this  modified  proposition 
must  be  carefully  guarded.  In  the  first  place,  though  phy- 
sical knowledge  begins  with  the  operation  of  sensation,  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  object,  in  apprehending  which 
the  operation  of  sensation  consists,  is  also  a  sensation. 
Yet  this  non-sequitur  appears  in  the  first  few  pages  of 
most  books  of  modern  philosophy.  The  causes  of  the 
confusion  of  sensation  with  its  object  are  to  be  found 
partly  in  the  structure  of  modern  languages,  which, 
being  far  richer  in  abstract  than  in  concrete  terms, 
tempt  philosophers  to  fall  into  a  loose  way  of  speaking 
of  perceiving  a  sensation  instead  of  perceiving  a  sensible 
object ;  but  mainly  in  another  confusion,  that  of  object 
and  non-ego,  which  makes  philosophers  shrink  from 
speaking  of  perceiving  a  sensible  object,  lest  they  should 
seem  to  assert  an  intuition  of  the  external  world.  But 
an  object  {to  avTLKeCixevop)  is  merely  that  which  is 
apprehended  as  opposed  to  the  operation  of  apprehend- 
ing it,  and  is  not  necessarily  external  to  the  apprehend- 
ing subject.  In  sense,  without  being  external,  the 
object  is  still  distinguishable  from  the  operation ;  the 
hot  from  touch,  the  sweet  from  taste,  the  coloured  from 


42 


rHYSICAL  REALISM 


TART   I. 


vision,  the  loud  from  hearing,  the  scented  from  smeUing. 
Although,  therefore,  physical  knowledge  begins  with 
sensation  as  an  operation,  it  does  not  begin  with  sensa- 
tion as  a  sensible  object.  Given,  then,  that  physical 
knowledge  bejrins  with  sense,  we  still  have  to  ask,  what 
is  the  object  apprehended  immediately  by  sensation; 
what  is  the  sensibly  hot,  sweet,  coloured,  loud,  scented? 
This  is  the  question  of  the  present  chapter. 

There  are  two  main  evidences  of  hypothesis — the 
direct  and  the  indirect.  Direct  evidence  is  the  best,  if 
possible,  but  it  is  seldom  attainable  ;  for  example,  there 
is  no  direct  evidence  for  the  hypothesis  of  aether.  But 
where  direct  proof  fails,  indirect  should  be  all  the 
stronger  in  compensation.  It  consists  in  using  the 
facts  to  test  the  hypothesis,  and  that  in  two  ways. 
First,  the  facts  must  be  explained  by  the  hypothesis  ; 
secondly,  they  must  eliminate  other  explanations.  Thus 
the  hypothesis  of  an  undulating  aether,  as  the  vehicle  of 
light,  though  wanting  in  direct  evidence,  is  proved  by 
its  power  of  explaining  all  the  facts  of  light,  and  by  the 
elimination  of  the  hypothesis  of  emission,  which  explains 
some,  but  not  all  the  facts. 

I  propose  to  apply  these  rules  to  the  various 
hypotheses  of  sensible  data,  stated  in  the  last  chap- 
ter. Are  the  objects  of  sense,  which  form  the  data 
of  science,  psychical  or  physical ;  and,  if  physical,  ex- 
ternal or  internal?  On  the  one  hand,  how  far  is 
there  direct  evidence  for  any  of  these  hypotheses? 
On  the  other  hand,  how  do  they  stand  the  indirect  test 
of  the  facts  of  science  ?  That  is,  can  the  objects  of 
science  as  facts  of  knowledge  be  explained  by  any 
hypothesis  of  the  data  of  sense  ;  and  can  the  other 
hypotheses  be  ehminated  ?  Being  hypotheses,  ideahsm 
and  realism  alike  must  be  treated  by  the  logical  rules 


* 


Vv 


CHAP.   III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF   SENSE 


43 


of  hypothesis.  Sensible  data  must  be  made  to  explain 
the  scientific  facts,  as  aethereal  undulations  have  been 
made  to  explain  luminous  facts.  We  must  be  on  our 
guard  against  synthetic  hypothesis.  What  would  be 
thought  of  a  natural  philosopher,  who  dared  to  start 
with  the  hypothesis  of  emission  and  denied  all  the  facts 
of  lij?ht,  which  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  emission 
of  corpuscles  by  a  luminous  body  ?  What,  then,  shall 
we  think  of  mental  philosophers,  who  start  with  the 
hypothesis  of  sensations  and  deny  all  the  insensible 
world  which  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  contempla- 
tion of  sensations  by  sensation?  I  admit  that  there 
may  be  direct  evidence  of  an  hypothesis.  But  even 
so,  unless  that  evidence  be  mathematical  certainty,  the 
hypothesis  must  also  be  submitted  to  the  indirect  or 
analytical  evidence  of  explaining  the  facts.  Now  it 
cannot  be  pretended  that  the  direct  evidence  of  the 
hypothesis  of  perceiving  sensations  or  any  other  hypo- 
thesis of  sensible  data  is  mathematically  certain.  There- 
fore all  the  hypotheses  of  idealism  and  realism  must  pass 
through  the  alembic  of  analysis. 

The  first  direct  evidence  is  that  of  consciousness. 
Consciousness  is  the  immediate  apprehension  of  oneself 
performing  some  operation.  Thus  I  am  conscious 
that  I  feel,  that  I  perceive  through  my  senses,  that  I 
imagine,  remember,  reason,  desire,  will,  act.  Unfor- 
tunately, however,  this  operation  of  apprehending  other 
operations  has  come  to  be  confused  in  psychology 
with  the  operations  themselves.  Hamilton,  seeing  that 
perception  requires  an  object,  and  consciousness  of 
perception  requires  perception,  falsely  concluded  that 
the  consciousness  includes  the  perception  of  the  object, 
whereas  it  only  requires  it  as  a  condition.  He  com- 
mitted the  common  fallacy  of  confusing  a  thing  with 


£^»B».»«i;jTn   'ilirarjiiiUj-Ji-  -il^  -.  : 


44 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


TART  I. 


its  condition.  Eeally,  perception  is  the  apprehension 
of  the  object,  consciousness  of  perception  the  apprehen- 
sion that  I  am  apprehending  the  object.  Mill,  again, 
seeing  that  feeling  pleasure  and  pain  are  the  same  as 
being  conscious  of  feeling  them,  falsely  concluded  that 
every  operation  is  the  same  as  its  consciousness.  He 
committed  the  fallacy  of  over-generalisation.  In  feeling 
pleasure  and  pain  there  is  no  distinction  between  opera- 
tion and  object,  and  hence  none  between  feeling  and 
consciousness.  But  whenever  there  is  a  distinction 
between  operation  and  object,  the  operation  is  concerned 
with  the  object  and  the  consciousness  with  the  operation. 
Hence  to  see  w^hite  is  different  from  being  conscious  of 
seeing  white.  So  with  other  operations.  Eeasoning  is 
a  mediate  operation  from  premises  to  conclusion.  The 
consciousness  of  reasoning  is  an  immediate  apprehension 
that  I  am  performing  that  mediate  operation.  Will 
is  an  active  operation,  the  determination  to  act ;  its 
consciousness  an  intellectual  operation,  apprehending 
that  I  determine  to  act.  To  reason  and  to  will,  then, 
are  not  the  same  as  being  conscious  that  I  reason  and 
will. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  the  lowest  potency  of  sensi- 
tive life  may  have  been  mere  feeling,  and  the  beginning 
of  consciousness  mere  conscious  feeling  ;  and  that  as, 
in  the  growth  of  the  senses,  the  operation  and  the  object 
became  distinguished,  consciousness  became  distinct 
from  the  operation,  the  operation  being  concerned  with 
the  object,  and  the  consciousness  with  that  relation  of 
oneself  to  the  object,  in  which  an  operation  about  an 
object  consists.  But  whatever  may  have  been  the 
genesis  of  consciousness,  its  nature  consists  not  in  being 
the  sense  of  objects  but  the  sense  of  operations.  When, 
as  in  feeling,  there  is  no  distinction  between  operation 


CHAP.   III. 


THE  PHYSICAL  DATA  OF  SENSE 


45 


and  object,  there  is  none  between  consciousness  and 
operation.  When,  as  in  sensation,  there  is  a  distinction 
between  operation  and  object,  the  operation  is  con- 
cerned with  the  object,  the  consciousness  with  the  opera- 
tion. Not  that  consciousness  has  no  reference  to  the 
object,  but  only  that  it  is  not  the  apprehension  of  it. 
The  operation,  which  is  the  apprehension  of  the  object, 
is  a  certain  relation  of  subject  to  object :  the  conscious- 
ness, which  apprehends  the  operation,  is  an  apprehension 
not  of  the  object,  but  of  the  relation  of  the  subject  to  the 
object.  For  example,  I  see  white,  I  am  conscious  that 
I  am  seeing  white. 

It  was  necessary  to  have  thus  defined  consciousness 
on  account  of  the  mass  of  confusion  and  inconsequence 
imported  into  psychology  by  regarding  consciousness 
as  identical  with  all  the  conscious  operations.  Hamilton, 
seeing  that  consciousness  is  intuitive,  but  falsely  identi- 
fying it  with  the  perception  of  an  external  world,  falsely 
concludes  that  perception  of  an  external  world  is  also 
intuitive.  He  ought  by  the  same  argument  to  have 
made  reasoning  immediate,  or  else  consciousness  mediate, 
either  of  which  alternatives  is  absurd.  Mill,  seeing  that 
consciousness  is  limited  to  the  apprehension  of  mental 
operations,  and  falsely  identifying  it  with  the  mental 
operations,  falsely  concludes  that  the  mental  operation 
of  sensation  is  also  limited  to  the  apprehension  of 
mental  operations.  He  might  as  well  have  said  that 
will,  being  identical  with  its  consciousness,  is  an  intel- 
lectual apprehension  of  a  mental  operation.  But  as 
will  is  an  active  determination  to  do  something,  while  its 
consciousness  is  an  intellectual  apprehension  that  one 
has  that  active  determination,  so  sensation  is  an  appre- 
hension of  an  object,  while  its  consciousness  is  an 
apprehension  that   one   is   performing  that  operation. 


~~-     '-T     "  i\       -T      •  T"! "U     — i^"--^"-^--'  aw     "~"        1*  ' 


46 


PHYSICAL   REALISxM 


PART  I. 


Sensation  says,  '  This  is  white  or  sweet';  consciousness 
says,  'I  am  seeing  something  white  or  tasting  something 
sweet.' 

This  being  consciousness,  one  operation  of  which  I 
am  conscious  is  that  I  know  objects.  What  knowledge 
of  objects  am  I  conscious  of  possessing  ?  In  answering 
this  question,  it  must  be  remembered  that  science  is  a 
kind  of  knowledge  of  which  we  are  conscious.  There  is 
an  ordinary  consciousness  and  a  scientific  consciousness. 
The  ordinary  man  thinks  little  or  nothing  about  it,  but 
the  man  of  science  is  conscious  that  science  passes 
beyond  sense  into  the  insensible,  and  beyond  the  objects 
represented  by  sense  into  w^hat  I  have  called  the  im- 
perceptible world.  We  are  conscious  of  knowing  a 
sensible,  an  insensible,  and  an  imperceptible  world  by 
natural  philosophy. 

Now,  this  knowledge  does  not  appear  to  conscious- 
ness to  apprehend  a  psychical  object.  When  I  reflect 
on  my  inferential  knowledge  of  the  number  of  corpuscles 
in  a  drop  of  water,  or  of  the  distance  of  the  sun  from 
the  earth,  or  of  the  size  of  the  earth ;  when,  again,  I 
reflect  on  my  indirect  perception  of  a  fire,  or  the  waves 
of  the  sea ;  when,  finally,  I  reflect  on  my  sensation  of 
the  white  object  I  see  or  the  hot  object  I  feel ;  in  all 
three  instances,  I  appear  to  my  consciousness  to  be 
apprehending  not  psychical,  but  physical  facts.  The 
conscious  subject  maybe  psychical,  the  conscious  opera- 
tions may  be  psychical ;  but  I  am  not  conscious  that 
the  vision  of  white,  or  the  perception  of  a  fire,  or  the 
inference  of  a  corpuscle,  apprehends  a  psychical  object. 
So  far  as  I  am  conscious  of  the  sensations  of  my  five 
senses,  a  white  object  in  vision,  a  hot  object  in  touch, 
a  scent  in  my  nostrils,  a  sound  in  my  ears,  a  flavour 
in  my  mouth,  cannot  but  seem  to  be  apprehended  as 


CHAP.   III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA  OF  SENSE 


47 


physical  objects.     Consciousness  of  the  apprehension  of 
objects  is  in  favour  of  realism. 

But  when  I  apprehend  the  white,  the  hot,  a  scent,  a 
sound,  even  a  flavour,  I  further  appear  to  be  appre- 
hending an  object  not  only  physical,  but  also  external 
to  myself.  This  seemingly  conscious  appearance  is  the 
strong  point  of  intuitive  realism,  which  depends  on  it  to 
claim  an  intuition  of  an  external  world.  Nevertheless, 
the  appearance  is  a  delusion,  which  we  can  trace  to  its 
source.  From  my  earliest  infancy,  whenever  a  sensible 
effect  has  been  produced  in  my  nervous  system,  I  have 
beeiL- accustomed  to  infer  an  external  object.  By  asso- 
ciation, perhaps  also  facilitated  by  evolution,  the  in- 
ference has  become  so  automatic  as  to  be  unnoticed.  The 
consequence  is,  I  think  I  am  intuitively  sensible  of  tlie 
external  object  when  I  am  really  inferring  it.  Nothing 
can  prevent  the  delusion.  I  appear  to  see  the  paper 
and  its  distance  from  me.  I  cannot  now  consciously 
disengage  the  sensation  of  the  sensible  object  from  the 
inference  of  the  perceptible  original. 

Hence  the  limits  of  consciousness  as  an  evidence. 
Consciousness  does  not  become  reflective,  and  therefore 
a  source  of  psychology,  till  many  operations  have 
already  become  automatic  in  the  conscious  subject. 
The  process  from  the  sense  of  the  insensible  object  to 
the  inference  of  the  perceptible  original  has  been  re- 
peated an  incalculable  number  of  times  before  any  man 
is  suflSciently  adult  to  consciously  reflect  on  what  he 
has  been  doing.  Accordingly,  consciousness  is  the 
source  rather  of  the  nature  than  of  the  origin  of 
knowledge ;  invaluable  for  what  we  know  now,  delusive 
for  how  we  came  to  know  it.  I  am  conscious  that 
I  somehow  apprehend  a  sensible  and  an  insensible 
world  ;  but  I  am  not  conscious  of  the  exact  point  at 


48 


rHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART  I. 


which  it  ceases  to  be  sensible,  and  becomes  insensible 
and  inferred.  Intuitive  realists  were  right  in  appeahng 
to  consciousness  for  the  nature  of  knowledge;  only 
they  should  have  appealed  from  the  ordinary  to  the 
scientific  consciousness.  But  they  were  quite  wrong  in 
appealing  to  consciousness  for  the  ultimate  origin  of 
knowledge.  They  said  truly,  '  I  apprehend  an  external 
world ' ;  they  said  falsely,  '  I  apprehend  it  intuitively.' 

Nevertheless,  the  antithesis  between  the  nature  and 
ori<nn  of  knowled^^^e  must  not  be  exaggerated.  Con- 
sciousness  tells  us  something  of  the  origin  of  our  know- 
ledf^e  We  are  not  conscious  of  the  inferences  of  child- 
hood :  when  we  are  old  enough  to  take  notice  we 
become  conscious  of  new  inferences.  We  are  not  con- 
scious of  inferring  an  external  world :  we  are  conscious 
of  inferrhig  corpuscles.  The  exact  Hmit  is  that  we 
are  not  conscious  of  the  primary  data  and  the  first 
inferences,  but  of  adult  inferences.  But,  again,  con- 
sciousness has  something  to  tell  us  concerning  even 
the  primary  data  of  sense.  It  is  not  their  direct  but 
their  indirect  evidence.  It  tells  us  w^liat  is  our  know- 
ledge of  objects,  and  this  conscious  knowledge  must 
be  explained  by  the  primary  data.  Thus  consciousness, 
on  the  whole,  is  the  apprehension  of  our  knowledge 
of  objects  and  the  test  of  the  primary  data  and  origin  ; 
it  is  the  direct  evidence  of  the  nature,  the  indirect 
evidence  of  the  origin  of  knowledge.  The  facts  of  con- 
sciousness must  be  first  described  and  then  explained 
by  all  scientific  psychology.  The  main  fact  to  be  ex- 
plained is  our  consciousness  that  we  somehow  appre- 
hend a  sensible  and  an  insensible  physical  world. 

There  is  a  superficiality  of  consciousness  as  there  is 
of  sensation.  Yet  each  is  the  origin  of  a  philosophy. 
Without  sensation  there  would  be  no  natural,  without 


ciiAr.  III. 


THE  niYSICAL   DATA  OF   SENSE 


49 


consciousness  no  mental  pliilosophy.  Sensation  is  neces- 
sary to  the  science  of  nature,  consciousness  to  tlie 
science  of  mind.  Sensation  appreliends  what  is  sensible, 
consciousness  what  is  knowledge.  Sensation  carries  us 
some  little  distance  into  physical  causation,  conscious- 
ness into  the  origin  of  knowledge.  But  sensation  leaves 
us  to  infer  causcv  essendi  in  external  nature,  conscious- 
ness causce  cognoscendi  in  internal  knowledge.  Yet 
sensation  is  the  indirect  test  of  all  hypotheses  to  ex- 
plain the  causes  of  sensible  objects,  consciousness  of  all 
li3^potheses  to  explain  the  origin  of  conscious  know- 
ledge. Nevertheless,  both  in  themselves  are  superficial ; 
for  sensation  has  no  immediate  intuition  of  the  external 
causes  of  nature,  and  consciousness  none  of  the  internal 
data  of  knowledge.  As  direct  evidence,  sensation  tells 
us  only  the  bare  sensible  effect  and  not  its  external 
causes,  consciousness  only  what  we  know  now,  not  how 
we  came  to  know  it.  Sensation  and  consciousness  are 
two  senses,  the  outer  and  the  inner.  Neither  is  false  ; 
Ijotli  are  limited.  Truth  is  in  profundi) ;  yet  not  in  a 
bottomless  abyss,  but  in  depths  to  be  2)lumljed  only  by 
reason,  and  that  reason  not  a  priori^  but  logical  inference 
from  the  outer  and  inner  senses.  Not  sensation,  but 
reasoning  from  sensation,  discovers  external  causes ; 
not  consciousness,  but  reasoning  from  consciousness, 
discovers  the  primary  data  and  origin  of  knowledge. 

Consciousness,  then,  does  not  aid  the  idealist  in  his 
assertion  that  all  the  immediate  objects  of  sense  are 
psychical.  It  tells  us  that  we  somehow  know  physical 
objects.  It  is  so  far  in  favour  of  realism.  Having, 
however,  inferred  long  ago  from  sensible  data  that 
physical  objects  exist  in  the  external  world,  we  cannot 
now  help  seeming  to  be  conscious  of  perceiving  them 
intuitively.     This  confusion   favours  intuitive  realism. 

E 


50 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


TART   I. 


But  consciousness  cannot  be  used  as  direct  evidence  to 
tell  us  what  we  intuitively  perceive,  because  our  intui- 
tions were  overlaid  with  our  inferences  long  before  our 
consciousness  became  attentive.  Moreover — and  this  is 
the  main  point — the  confusion  of  what  we  intuitively 
perceive  by  our  senses  with  what  we  mediately  infer  by 
our  reason  is  cleared  up  by  philosophy.  What  philo- 
sophy ?  Tliis  question  brings  us  to  the  second  kind  of 
direct  evidence  for  the  data  of  sense.  The  philosophy 
which  has  distinguished  the  data  of  sense  from  their 
inferred  causes  is  natural  philosophy. 

Natural  philosophy  has  shown  that  the  sensible 
object  is  not  really  identical  with,  but  is  an  effect  distinct 
from,  its  external  original.  When  a  person  hears  a 
cannon  fired  at  a  considerable  distance,  his  first  impres- 
sion is  that  he  hears  the  sound  at  the  very  moment  the 
ball  issues  from  the  cannon's  mouth,  and  that  the  cannon 
sounds  as  he  hears  it.  But  if  he  ascends  a  hill,  and  the 
cannon  airain  fires,  he  finds  that  he  sees  the  smoke  of  the 
cannon  lonix  before  he  hears  the  sound,  and  can  count 
several  seconds  between  the  object  seen  and  the  object 
heard.  There  is  only  one  possible  explanation  of  this 
distinction.  The  object  seen  and  the  object  heard  are 
neitlier  identical  with  one  another,  nor  with  the  external 
object  which  })roduces  them.  The  smoke  ascends  from 
the  cannon  and  reflects  the  undulations  of  light,  at  the 
same  moment  as  the  ball  leaves  the  cannon  and  com- 
nuuiicates  vibrations  to  the  air.  But  the  undulations 
of  liurht  travel  faster  than  the  vibrations  of  air,  and 
produce  a  visible  effect  on  the  person  before  the  audil)le 
effect  is  produced  by  the  slower  mode  of  motion.  The 
visible  effect  produced  by  the  undulations  is  not  the 
smoke,  and  the  audible  effect  produced  by  the  vibra- 
tions  is  not    the   cannon's  roar  :    else  they  would  be 


CHAr.    III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF  SENSE 


51 


apprehended  at  the  same  moment.     Both  are  effects  of, 
neither  identical  with,  the  external  object. 

Again,  natural  philosophy  in  the  department  of 
physics  has  shown  that  external  things  do  not  in  all 
their  attributes  precisely  correspond  to  their  effects  on 
our  senses.  They  have  duration,  extension  and  motion 
corresponding  to  their  attributes  as  sensibly  perceived ; 
but  they  have  not  heat  or  colour  in  the  way  in  which 
we  touch  what  is  hot  or  see  what  is  coloured.  On  the 
contrary,  the  causes  of  sensible  heat  and  colour  are  in- 
sensible motions.  The  attributes  which  are  in  nature 
as  they  are  in  our  senses,  are  called  primary;  while 
those  which  are  not  in  nature  as  they  are  in  our  senses, 
are  called  secondary  qualities. 

Again,  natural  philosophy  lias  proved  that  external 
things  affect  our  senses  by  the  causation  of  motion.  To 
begin  with  motion  before  it  affects  the  senses ;  either  a 
given  external  thing  may  itself  move  from  a  distance, 
until  it  comes  into  contact  with  a  sensitive  subject,  as 
a  cannon-ball  does  when  it  hits  a  man  ;  or  it  propagates 
a  motion  from  particle  to  particle  until  the  particles  im- 
mediately in  contact  with  the  sensitive  subject  receive 
the  motion,  a  process  which  takes  place  in  the  propaga- 
tion of  the  undulations  of  hght.  In  both  cases  the  result 
is  the  same :  the  object  immediately  apprehended  could 
not  be  the  thing  at  a  distance,  but  the  thing  immediately 
next  to  the  sensitive  organ.  But  we  shall  find  that  it  is 
not  even  the  nearest  thing,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  but  an 
effect  within  our  senses. 

Again,  biology,  from  Galen  onwards,  has  shown  that 
the  nervous  system  is  the  material  cause  susceptible  of 
the  effect  produced  by  the  efficiency  of  the  external 
object.  It  has  discovered  much  of  the  structure  of  the 
nervous  system.    The  peripheral  terminations  of  nervous 

E  2 


52 


niYSICAL   REALISM 


r.\hT  I. 


fibres   are   not   actually   exposed   to   external    things. 
Hence  the  motion  has  to  be  propagated  through  a  non- 
sensitive  covering  before  it  is  actually  brought  to  the 
nerve.     It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  be  sensible  of  an 
external  object,  from  which  the  nervous  substance  is 
divided  by  a  medium  in  the  body  of  the  sentient  being. 
Moreover,  when  the  peripheral  termination  of  a  nervous 
fi])re  has  been  reached,  the  effect  is  still  insensible  till 
the  motion  has  been  communicated  to  the  brain.    When 
a  nerve  has  been  cut  off  from  the  brain,  if  the  part 
between  the  peripheral  termination  and  the  section  be 
irritated,  no  sensible  effect  takes  place  ;  but  if  the  part 
between  the  brain  and  the  section  be  irritated  by  pres- 
sure, or  electricity,  or  disease,  the  effect  is  sensible. 
The  brain,  therefore,  is  an  integral  part  of  the  nervous 
material  susceptible  of  a  sensible  effect.     I  say  a  part, 
because  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  brain  alone  would 
be  sensitive,  if  a  whole  nervous  structure  up  to  the 
point  at  which  it  loses  itself  in  the  brain  were  removed. 
But  the  whole  evidence  together  clearly  shows  that  no 
sensible  effect  is  produced  by  an  external  object  until 
the  propagation  of  motion  from  the  external  object  has 
passed,  not  only  the  external  medium,  but  what  may  be 
called  the  internal  medium  of  the  periphery,  has  reached 
the  nervous  fibres,  and  communicated  itself  to  the  brain. 
The  nervous  system  is  the  primary  matter  susceptible 
of  a  sensible  effect,  and  the  sensible  effect,  therefore,  is 
internal. 

It  is  further  evident  that,  like  other  material  causes, 
the  nervous  system  partly  determines  the  effect.  It  is 
susceptible  of  effects,  like  the  primary  qualities  of  ex- 
ternal objects,  but  not  like  their  secondary  qualities. 
Probably  its  structure  is  adequate  to  the  former,  but 
not  sufficientlv  subtle  for  the  latter.     Hence  the  dura- 


en  a  p.  III. 


THE   PHYSICAL  DATA   OF   SENSE 


53 


tion,  extension  and  motion  of  external  bodies  is  able 
to  produce  similar  sensible  duration,  extension  and 
motion  in  the  nervous  system.  But  when  the  delicate 
vibrations  of  the  air  and  the  still  more  subtle  unduhi- 
tions  of  aether  strike  upon  the  organs  of  hearing, 
touch  and  vision,  the  nervous  structure  of  these 
organs  is  too  coarse-grained  to  reproduce  them,  and 
substitutes  the  heterogeneous  effect  of  sensible  sound 
and  the  still  more  heterogeneous  effects  of  sensible  heat 
and  light. 

Lastly,  evolution  has  made  it  exceedingly  probable 
that,  like  other  material  causes,  the  nervous  system  has 
itself  been  modified  by  the  repeated  action  of  the  ex- 
ternal efficient  on  its  structure.  It  is  probable  that,  by 
the  frequent  operation  of  appropriate  stimuli  on  parti- 
cular parts  of  the  general  sensitive  system,  the  original 
sense  of  touch  has  been  differentiated  into  the  iiye  senses. 
I  would  make  two  further  suggestions.  First,  it  is 
probable  that  as  touch  preceded  the  other  senses,  so  the 
feehngs  preceded  touch.  In  this  case,  the  sentient  being 
at  first  simply  felt  mere  pleasure  and  pain  from  external 
objects;  afterwards  proceeded  to  the  more  conq)lex 
operation  of  touch,  in  which  the  sensation  of  touching 
is  distinct  from  the  sensible  object,  hot  or  cold,  in  the 
tactile  nerves,  and  the  consciousness  of  touching  distinct 
both  from  the  sensation  and  the  sensible  object ;  and, 
last  of  all,  proceeded  to  infer  external  causes.  Secondly, 
it  is  probable  that,  as  the  nervous  system  has  become 
more  differentiated,  it  may  also  become  more  subtle,  and  ^ 
therefore  more  discriminative  of  secondary  qualities. 
Some  approach  to  this  ideal  may  be  found  in  sensible 
sound,  in  which  there  is  some  trace  of  vibrations,  thouirh 
not  adequate  to  the  external  vibrations.  Why,  then, 
may  not  the  nervous  system  some  day  become  more 


54 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART  I. 


attuned    to    represent    sethereal   undulations   to   some 
extent  in  the  wonderful  sense  of  vision  ? 

The   discoveries   of    natural    philosophy    eliminate 
intuitive  realism,  by  proving  that  the  external  is  not 
identical   with   the  sensible  object,  but   is    the   cause 
which  produces  it  in  the  nervous  system.     Contenting 
himself  with  crude  consciousness  and  common  sense, 
forgetting  how  late  consciousness   becomes   reflective, 
and  that  common  sense  never  becomes  a  science,  the 
intuitive  realist  takes  the  appearance  that  we  have  an 
intuition  of  the  external  world  for  a  fact,  and  some- 
times even  converts  it  into  a  first  principle.     But  he 
comes  into  contradiction  with  science.     Natural  philo- 
sophy shows  that  the  external  world  affects  us  indi- 
rectly, and  that  we  have  no  empirical  intuition  except 
of  ourselves.    We  might  doubt  between  consciousness 
and  science,  if  we  could  not  see  that  the  supposed  in- 
tuition of  the  external  world  is  a  delusion  of  association, 
and  that  consciousness  is  put  out  of  court  by  its  in- 
ability to  reflect  at  the  time  when  the  inference  of  the 
external  world  was  being  made ;  made  so  often  then  as 
to  have  become  automatic,  and  now  made  so  quickly 
as  to  seem  an  intuition.     On  the  strength  of  science, 
then,  we  must  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  data  of 
sense  are  to  be  found  in  the  external  world,  in  the 
non-ego. 

The  same  scientific  discoveries  raise  a  strong  pre- 
sumption in  favour  of  physical  realism,  which  simply 
adopts  the  scientific  account  without  further  hypo- 
thesis. In  the  first  place,  I  suppose  that  the  effect 
produced  on  the  nervous  system  is  the  sensible  physical 
object,  which  we  are  conscious  of  apprehending,  but  by 
a  confusion  believe  to  be  an  object  external  to  ourselves  : 
for  instance,  when  we  see  something  white,  it  seems  to 


CHAP.    III. 


THE   PHYSICAL    DATA    OF   SENSE 


55 


be  tlie  external  paper,  or  what  not,  but  it  is  really  the 
effect  produced  by  the  paper  reflecting  undulations  on 
the  optic  nerve.  Secondly,  I  suppose  that  as  we  know 
the  external  physical  cause  to  produce  the  sensible 
physical  effect,  and  as  we  must  start  from  sense,  we 
must  use  the  sensible  physical  object  impressed  on  our 
nerves  to  infer  the  external  physical  object,  as  cause. 
The  scientific  account  of  the  causation  of  tlie  sensible 
effect  leads  directly  to  physical  realism,  whicli  simply 
reads  the  process  of  causation  backwards  into  a  process 
of  knowledge. 

Biolo<^v  has  brouirht  the  sensible  effect  within  the 
nervous  system.  Has  it  carried  it  further?  Tlie 
attempt  has  often  been  made  by  biologists.  Tliey  sup- 
pose that  the  physical  effect  produced  in  the  nervous 
svstem  is  not  yet  sensible,  even  when  it  has  reached  the 
brain;  that  it  remains  a  mere  impression,  no  more 
sensible  than  the  external  object;  and  that  when  the 
motion  of  the  external  object  has  produced  the  motion 
of  the  medium,  the  motion  of  the  medium  the  motion  of 
the  nerves,  the  motion  of  the  nerves  the  motion  of  the 
brain,  the  process  is  not  yet  finished.  They  suppose 
that  the  cerebral  motion,  which  is  physical,  produces  a 
sensation  which  is  psychical;  and  they  do  not  ordi- 
narily distinguish  the  sensible  object  from  the  sensation. 
From  this  hypothesis  it  would  follow  that  the  hot  felt, 
the  white  seen,  the  sweet  tasted,  the  durable,  extended, 
and  moving,  apprehended  by  any  sense  are  psychical 
affections  produced  by  cerebral  motion.  T!ie  sensible 
object  will  be  neither  the  external  object  nor  the  in- 
ternal effect  in  the  nervous  system,  but  the  internal 
psychical  sensation.  If  so,  realism  will  liave  to  succumb 
to  idealism. 

The  question  we  now  have  to  ask  ourselves  is  not 


oG 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


TART    I. 


whether  the  external  object  causes  our  sensation  in  some 
way  or  other.  The  scientific  evidence  of  the  propa- 
gation of  motion  from  external  oljjects  to  our  bodies 
and  the  conscious  involuntariness  of  sensation  are  suffi- 
cient proofs  that  the  external  oT)ject  does  cause  our 
sensation.  It  is,  however,  a  different  question  how  one 
causes  the  other.  Secondly,  the  question  we  now  have 
to  ask  ourselves  is  not  w^hether  there  is  anv  evidence  at 
all  that  the  sensation  produced  is  purely  psychical. 
What  is  to  be  said  on  this  point  will  follow  when  we 
come  to  the  Cartesian  philosophy  in  detail.  The 
present  questions  are,  first,  whether  biology  proves  that 
within  ourselves  nervous  and  cerebral  motion  produces 
a  psychical  sensation  ;  secondly,  if  so,  whether  it  follows 
that  the  sensible  object  also  becomes  a  psychical  sensa- 
tion. The  answer  is  that  biologists  have  gone  beyond 
biology,  and  that  no  affirmative  answer  can  be  given  to 
these  questions  from  the  observations,  or  direct  in- 
ferences from  sense,  which  are  the  evidences  of  their 
science. 

In  the  first  place,  the  nervous  system  is  imperfectly 
known.  It  is  quite  clear  that  external  objects  propa- 
gate motions  to  the  nerves,  but  it  is  not  at  all  clear 
wliat  happens  when  the  effect  has  been  produced.  In 
optics,  for  example,  so  long  as  we  are  reading  of  the 
undulations  of  light,  of  the  manner  in  which  rays  are 
connnunicated  to  the  eye,  of  the  structure  of  the  lens 
by  which  the  rays  are  made  to  converge  on  the  retina, 
and  of  the  general  structure  of  the  retina,  and  even  of 
its  nervous  elements,  everything  is  clear.  But  the 
further  we  penetrate  from  the  retina  along  the  optic 
nerve  to  the  optic  centres  at  the  base  of  the  brain,  the 
darker  the  subject  becomes,  and  fact  seems  to  pass  into 
hypothesis.     It  is  the  same  with  all  our  senses.     Nay, 


CHAP.   III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF   SENSE 


57 


difficulties  begin  at  the  very  terminations  of  the  nerves. 
What,  for  example,  are  the  precise  functions  of  the 
tactile  corpuscles,  of  the  rods  and  cones  of  the  retina, 
of  the  rods  of  Corti  in  the  ear  ? 

We  know  more  of  nervous  structure  than  of  nervous 
action.  What  is  nervous  action  ?  This  is  an  unsolved 
problem.  What  is  cerebral  action?  This  is  a  more 
unsolved  problem.  The  structural  connections  of 
afferent  nerves  with  centres,  of  centres  with  efferent 
nerves,  of  efferent  nerves  with  muscles,  and  to  some 
extent  the  structural  constituents  of  nerves  and  muscles 
are  fairly  made  out.  It  is  also  found  that  an  appre- 
ciable interval  takes  place  between  the  sthnulation  of 
an  afferent  nerve  and  the  muscular  motion  which  it 
indirectly  but  ultimately  produces.  This  interval  proves 
an  important  point  about  nervous  action  ;  it  is  a  motion 
because  it  takes  time  to  go  from  place  to  place. 

The  genus  of  nervous  action,  then,  is  known  to  be  mo- 
tion. But  what  is  its  differentia  ?  After  the  first  crude 
hypothesis  of  animal  spirits  moving  in  the  nerves,  nervous 
motion  was  supposed  to  be  the  simplest  form  of  me- 
chanical motion  by  impact,  as  if  the  impression  were 
pushed  along  to  the  brain,  as  a  series  of  bricks  knock 
one  another  over.  Then  it  was  supposed  to  be  vibra- 
tion. Later  researches  tend  to  show  that  it  has  relations 
to  the  motions  of  electricity  and  of  chemical  action.  It 
is,  no  doubt,  some  molecular  motion  allied  to  other 
motions  of  the  same  kind;  but  its  pecuharity  is  its 
slowness,  compared,  for  instance,  with  electricity.  Its 
precise  differentia  is  at  present  unknown.  Cerebral 
motion  is  still  more  unknown.  It  has  been  found, 
by  experimenting  on  various  parts  of  the  brain,  that 
different  parts  are  to  some  extent  connected  with 
different  muscular  motions,  from  which  it  is  inferred 


58 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PAllT   I. 


that  tliey  are  also  connected  witli  different  nervous 
motions,  l^ut  how  the  brain  moves  between  the  stimu- 
lus of  an  afferent  nerve  and  its  effect  on  an  efferent 
nerve  is  unknown.  lie  would  be  a  bold  man  who 
would  come  forward  and  say  he  knows  the  motion  by 
which  the  effect  impressed  on  the  nerves  is  conmiuni- 
cated  to  the  brain  and  there  made  ready  for  sensation. 
How,  then,  can  he  say  he  knows  that  cerebral  motion, 
of  which  in  biology  he  is  ignorant,  produces  a  psychi- 
cal sensation,  which  is  l)eyond  tlie  veime  of  a  physical 
science  ? 

Secondly,  the  so-called  transmutation  of  cerebral 
motion  into  psychical  sensation  is  admitted  to  be  per- 
formed in  some  mysterious  way,  unknown  and  inex- 
plicable. This  point  may  be  made  clear  by  the  following 
quotation  from  Professor  Huxley's  Lay  Sermon  on  Des- 
cartes' Discourse,  in  which  the  Professor  is  trying  to 
prove  that  thought  is  existence,  and,  so  lar  as  we  are 
concerned,  existence  is  thought : — 

'  For  example,  I  take  up  a  marble,  and  I  find  it  to  be 
a  red,  round,  hard,  single  body.  We  call  the  redness, 
the  roundness,  the  hardness,  and  the  singleness,  "  quali- 
ties "  of  the  marble  ;  and  it  sounds,  at  first,  the  height 
of  absurdity  to  say  that  all  these  qualities  are  modes  of 
our  own  consciousness,  which  cannot  even  be  conceived 
to  exist  in  the  marble.  But  consider  the  redness  to 
beuin  with ;  how  does  the  sensation  of  redness  arise  ? 
The  waves  of  a  certain  very  attenuated  matter,  particles 
of  which  are  vibrating  with  vast  rapidity,  but  with  very 
different  velocities,  strike  upon  the  marble,  and  those 
which  vibrate  with  a  particular  velocity  are  thrown  off 
from  its  surface  in  all  directions.  The  optical  appa- 
ratus of  the  eye  gathers  some  of  these  together,  and 
gives  them  such  a  course  that  they  impinge  upon  the 


CHAP.    III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA    OF   SENSE 


59 


surface  of  the  retina,  which  is  a  singularly  delicate 
aj^paratus,  connected  with  the  termination  of  the  fibres 
of  the  optic  nerve.  The  impulses  of  the  attenuated 
matter,  or  a^.ther,  affect  this  apparatus  and  the  fibres  of 
the  optic  nerve  in  a  certain  way,  and  the  change  in  the 
fibres  of  the  optic  nerve  produces  yet  otlier  changes  in 
the  brain  ;  and  these,  in  some  fashion  unknown  to  us, 
give  rise  to  the  feeling,  or  consciousness,  of  redness. 
If  the  marble  could  remain  unchamred,  and  eitlier  the 
rate  of  vibration  of  the  a3ther,  or  the  nature  of  the 
retina  could  be  altered,  the  marble  would  seem  not  red, 
but  some  other  colour.  There  are  many  people  who 
are  what  are  called  colour-blind,  beinc^  unable  to  distin- 
guish  one  colour  from  another.  Such  an  one  mio-ht 
declare  our  marble  to  be  green,  and  he  would  be  quite  as 
right  in  saying  that  it  is  green  as  we  are  in  declaring  it 
to  be  red.  But,  then,  as  the  marble  cannot,  in  itself,  be 
both  green  and  red  at  the  same  time,  this  shows  that 
the  quality  "  redness  "  must  be  in  our  consciousness,  and 
not  in  the  marble.' 

Thirdly,  the  hypothesis  of  this  unknown  transmuta- 
tion is  inconsistent  with  one  of  the  best  established 
facts  of  the  nervous  system — its  physical  continuity.  It 
supposes  that  physical  motion  of  afferent  nerves  and 
brain  causes  psychical  sensation,  which  causes  psy- 
chical volition,  which  causes  physical  motion  of  efferent 
nerves,  which  causes  physical  motion  of  muscles.  But 
wherever  nervous  structure  is  accessible  to  observation, 
the  afferent  nerves  finally  communicate  with  centres 
which  communicate  with  efferent  nerves,  without  any 
rupture  of  physical  continuity.  It  might,  indeed,  be 
urged  that  the  intermediate  purely  psychical  processes 
nevertheless  intervene  insensibly  in  the  centre  between 
the  afferent  and  efferent  nervous  processes.     But  this 


00 


niYSICAL  KEALISM 


PART   1. 


hypotliesis  is  rendered  most  difficult  l:)y  the  pliosnomena 
of  reflex  action.  In  reflex  action,  the  afferent  and 
efferent  nervous  processes  are  certainly  connected  with- 
out any  breach  of  physical  continuity.  It  might  again 
be  o])jected  that  only  the  nerves  of  reflex  processes  are 
continuous.  But  we  cannot  divide  the  nerves  of  reflex 
action  from  those  of  conscious  action,  and  say  that 
the  former  nerves  are  physically  continuous,  whereas 
the  latter  are  interrupted  by  purely  psychical  sensations 
and  volitions,  because  the  very  same  nerves,  which  are 
used  in  conscious,  are  used  also  in  reflex  actions.  For 
example,  we  may  wink  either  voluntarily  or  automati- 
cally. An  object  strikes  the  eye,  transmits  its  motion 
to  the  afferent  optic  nerve,  which  communicates  with 
the  brain,  which  transmits  the  motion  to  the  efferent  facial 
nerve,  c^overninij^  the  orbicular  muscle  of  the  eyelids, 
which  makes  them  close.  The  whole  of  this  process  often 
takes  place  automatically,  without  any  rupture  of  phy- 
sical continuity.  When  it  takes  place  consciously, 
are  we  to  say  that  the  physical  motion,  having  arrived 
from  the  optic  nerve  to  the  brain,  does  not  produce  the 
motion  of  the  efferent  nerve,  but  produces  a  psychical 
sensation  instead,  which  produces  a  psychical  voHtion, 
which  at  length  affects  the  efferent  nerve?  There  is 
not  a  tittle  of  biological  or  any  other  evidence  that  the 
physical  continuity  is  sometimes  preserved  sometimes 
broken  in  this  manner  in  the  very  same  series  of  nerves. 
To  escape  this  gratuitous  hypothesis  of  psychical 
interruption,  some  of  the  mental  physiologists  resort  to 
paradoxes,  in  order  at  once  to  preserve  the  physical 
continuity  of  the  nervous  system,  together  with  purely 
psychical  sensations.  Allowing  that  in  all  cases  the 
motion  of  the  afferent  nerves  propagated  through  the 
centres  produces  the  motion  of  the  efferent  nerves  in  a 


CHAP.    III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF   SENSE 


61 


continuous  manner,  some  suppose  that,  standing  quite 
apart  from  these  physical  processes,  the  conscious  sub- 
ject is  a  sort  of  impartial  spectator,  performing  purely 
psychical  operations  that  have  no  physical  effects,  while 
others  positively  go  the  length  of  supposing  that  not 
only  in  sentient  beings,  but  in  all  nature,  there  are 
always  two  independent  but  parallel  streams,  the  well- 
known  physical  motions  and  supposititious  psychical 
processes  accompanying  them.  These  hypotheses  are 
exceedingly  like  the  Pre-established  Harmony,  and  like 
it  in  being  made  to  get  over  a  self-made  difficulty. 
They  are  hypotheses  to  cover  an  hypotliesis.  The 
former  alternative  does  not  ^o  beyond  conscious  beiufjs, 
but  it  fails  to  explain  a  fact  of  consciousness  far  more 
certain  than  the  hypothesis.  We  are  certainly  con- 
scious that  external  objects  somehow  affect  our  feelings 
and  sensations,  that  our  sensations,  desires  and  infer- 
ences affect  our  volitions,  that  our  volitions  somehow 
affect  the  motions  of  our  bodies.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose 
that  our  conscious  operations  are  inert  and  idle,  when 
they  are  consciously  both  passive  and  active,  and  that 
the  conscious  subject  is  like  a  child,  given  his  opera- 
tions like  a  toy  to  make  believe  he  is  very  busy,  but 
really  to  keep  him  quiet.  The  latter  alternative  which 
carries  this  inert  psychism  into  everything  whatsoever, 
without  any  evidence,  except  the  original  hypothesis 
of  two  parallel  streams  in  a  sentient  being,  would  have 
us  believe  that  the  wind  blows,  the  waves  swell,  the 
earth  moves,  with  some  obscure  sentience.  Such  a  per- 
sonification of  nature  was  excusable  in  primitive  religion, 
but  it  is  not  worthy  of  modern  science. 

Lastly,  to  return  to  the  usual  hypothesis  that  nervous 
motion  produces  psychical  sensation,  which  again  issues 
in  nervous  motion,  one  cannot  help  asking  what  can  be 


G2 


PHYSICAL   KEALISM 


PART   I. 


the  source  of  a  biological  liypotliesis  so  foreign,  nay, 
so  contradictory  to  the  evidence  of  biology  ?  Biologists 
have  become  psychologists,  and  have  fallen  under  the 
dominion  of  the  ideahsts.  Without  any  criticism,  with- 
out any  biological  proof,  simply  because  it  is  the  fashion, 
and  as  if  it  were  a  first  principle,  they  have  accepted 
the  idealistic  hypothesis  of  purely  psychical  sensation, 
and  thereon  have  reared  an  hypothesis  of  their  own,  that 
nervous  motion  produces  this  psychical  sensation,  which 
reproduces  nervous  motion. 

Now,  the  present  question,  as  I  said  before,  is  not 
whether  there  is  a  purely  psychical  sensation,  but 
whether  there  is  any  evidence  that  motion  propa- 
gated from  the  afferent  nerves  to  the  brain  produces  L 
such  a  tcrtUun  qiiid^  instead  of  producing  motion 
from  the  brain  to  the  efferent  nerves.  There  is  no 
evidenc^e,  either  psychological  or  biological.  As  a 
psvchologist,  I  am  conscious  that  I  perform  the  opera- 
tion of  sensation,  which  for  argument's  sake  may  be 
assumed  as  purely  psychical ;  but  I  am  not  conscious  of 
mv  nervous  motion.  I  am  not,  therefore,  conscious  of  ^ 
sensation  arising  out  of  nervous  motion.  A  biologist, 
not  in  himself  but  in  another  bodv,  can  observe  a  nervous 
system,  its  physical  continuity,  and  the  time  of  its 
action  proving  motion;  but  this  dissector  cannot  either 
observe  or  be  conscious  of  the  sensation  of  another 
nervous  system  ;  he  cannot,  therefore,  observe  nervous 
motion  issuing  in  sensation.  That  there  is  such  a  pro- 
cess from  the  physical  into  the  psychical  and  back  is 
sheer  hypothesis,  an  arbitrary  concordance  of  idealisu) 
and  biology. 

Nor  is  this  all ;  they  proceed  to  suppose  that  the 
effect  produced  by  the  external  object  on  the  internal 
nervous  system  is  not  yet  sensible,  but  that,  when  the 


ciiAr.  III.  THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF  SENSE 


0^ 


)o 


psychical  sensation  is  produced,  the  effect  for  the  first 
time  becomes  sensible,   so  that  the  sensible  object  is 
either  identical  with  the  sensation,  or  at  all  events  is 
equally  psychical.     But,  in  the  first  place,  even  if  a 
purely  psychical  sensation  is  produced  in  this  maimer, 
it   does   not   follow   that   the  sensible  object  becomes 
psychical.     There  is  no  reason,  except  the  old  and  ex- 
ploded hypothesis  similia  si7nilibus  cognoscuntur,  why 
a  psychical  operation  may  not  apprehend  a  physical 
object.     Secondly,  whatever  may  be  the  nature  of  the 
operation,  it  is  most  improbable  in  itself  that  the  hot  felt 
through  one's  body,  the  white  seen  through  one's  eyes, 
the  loud  heard  through  one's  ears,  is  anythin(T  but  a 
physical  condition  of  tlie  tactile,   optic  and  auditory 
nerves  in  connection  with  the  brain.      The  idealistic 
hypothesis  of  psychical  sensation,  then,  does  not  prove 
the  biological  hypothesis  of  the  transmutation  of  nervous 
motion  into  psychical  sensation,  nor  either  hypothesis 
the  third  hypothesis  that  the  sensible  object  is  psychical. 

Ter  sunt  conati  impoiiore  Pelio  Ossam 

Scilicet  atque  Ossaj  frondosum  involvere  Olympum. 

The  Study  of  the  mental  physiology  of  the  present 
day  suggests  several  reflections.  In  the  first  place,  the 
insensible  and  imperceptible  motions  of  ccther,  their 
reflections  from  other  bodies,  and  their  impact  on  the 
senses  are  now  well-established  discoveries  of  science. 
Tliey  are  known  qualities,  which  are  not  sensations,  but 
the  insensil)le  causes  of  sensations.  Not  all  knowable 
qualities,  therefore,  are  sensations.  Secondly,  as  we 
recede  from  the  exfernal  world  behind  the  periphery 
into  the  nervous  system,  science  becomes  more  vague. 
What  are  nervous  and  cerebral  motions  ?  Thirdly,  we 
are  told  that  cerebral  motion,  which  is  physical,  pro- 
duces a  heterogeneous   sensation,  which  is  psychical. 


G4 


PHYSICAL  ki:alism 


TART   I. 


}5ut  we  are  given  no  evidence  of  this  transmutation.  We 
cannot  observe  it  in  a  dissecting-room.  If  it  be  said  we 
are  conscious  of  it,  we  answer  that  we  are  conscious  of 
sensation,  but  not  of  cerebral  motion,  and  therefore  not 
of  cerebral  motion  producing  psychical  sensation  as  a 
separate  and  indeed  heterogeneous  fact.  Fourthly,  this 
transmutation  of  one  unknown  into  another  unknown 
is  admitted  to  take  place  in  an  unknown  manner. 
Fifthly,  we  are  illogically  asked  to  infer  from  this  trans- 
mutation of  cerebral  motion  into  psychical  sensation 
that  the  sensible  object,  e.g.  the  red  seen  in  vision,  is 
also  a  psychical  sensation.  Sixthly,  we  are  not  told 
how,  if  the  object  of  sense  thus  becomes  psychical,  we 
infer  the  external  causes,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  are 
much  the  clearest  part  of  the  whole  business.  Seventhly, 
we  often  fmd  that,  with  more  logic  than  consistency, 
the  external  objects  which  were  previously  made  the 
scientific  causes  of  sensation  are  nevertheless  afterwards 
declared  unknown  and  unknowable.  Meanwhile,  the 
fallacy  of  this  so-called  biology  is  its  assumption  of 
psychological  idealism.  All  that  is  really  proved  by 
natural  philosophy  is  that  external  redness,  for  example, 
is  an  insensible  quality  of  insensible  aether,  consisting  of 
a  vibration  of  a  certain  velocity  ;  and  that,  reflected 
by  an  external  object,  it  produces  in  the  optic  nerves  of 
a  sentient  being  a  sensible  redness,  which  is  not  iden- 
tical with  the  external  vibrations  nor  itself  a  sensible 
vibration  at  all.  The  simple  conclusion  from  these 
scientific  facts  would  be  that  the  nervous  effect  is  the 
sensible  redness,  from  which,  together  with  sensible 
motion,  the  external  motions  of  vibration  are  inferred. 
Nothing  more  is  proved  by  mental  physiology. 

When  we  look  back  at  the  whole  light  thrown  by 
natural  philosophy  on  the  sensible  object,  we  shall  find 


CHAP.   III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF   SENSE 


65 


that  it  is  known  that  external  physical  objects  produce 
internal  physical  effects  in  the  nervous  system,  but  it  is 
not  known  that  these  internal  2)liysical  effects  in  their 
turn  produce  an  internal  psychical  object  of  sense. 
Meanwhile,  we  are  conscious  that,  when  we  use  our 
senses,  we  somehow  apprehend  a  physical  object,  which 
seems  by  an  illusion  to  be  also  external.  The  simplest 
liypothesis,  which  can  be  made  in  these  circumstances, 
is  that  the  sensible  object  is  neither  external  on  the  one 
hand  nor  psychical  on  the  other,  but  the  internal 
physical  effect  on  the  nervous  system.  In  other  words, 
there  is  a  via  media  between  intuitive  reahsm  and 
idealism  of  all  kinds,  closer  to  the  scientific  facts  than 
either  hypothesis  ;  namely,  physical  realism. 

At  the  same  time,  scientific  observation  is  not  a 
positive  proof  of  physical  realism.  It  brings  the  sensible 
object  within  the  man :  it  cannot  decide  whether  it  is 
or  is  not  within  the  soul.  Its  ultimate  result  is  that 
the  sensible  object  is  not  external  but  internal,  not 
without  but  within  the  sentient  being,  not  identical  with 
the  physical  object  in  the  outside  world  but  produced 
in  the  interior  microcosm  of  the  animal  organism.  This 
negative  conclusion  eliminates  intuitive,  but  it  does  not 
positively  establish  physical  realism.  As  a  direct 
evidence,  natural  philosophy,  being  founded  on  obser- 
vation, is  able  to  show  that  the  sensible  object  is  not 
the  physical  object  outside,  but  is  within  the  nervous 
system ;  not  being  founded  on  consciousness,  it  is  not 
able  to  decide  whether  this  internal  sensible  object  is 
physical  or  psychical,  whether  it  is  the  nervous' effect, 
or  something  even  more  internal.  It  leaves  this  prol)lem 
unsolved.  Accordingly,  there  still  remain  two  pos- 
sible alternatives — physical  realism  and  psychological 
idealism. 


GO 


rilYSICAL   REALISM 


PAKT  I. 


Nevertlieless,  scientific  observation  makes  physical 
realism  the  more  prolmble  alternative,  because  this 
hypothesis  simply  accepts  the  proved  nervous  effect  as 
the  sensible  object,  instead  of  hypothesising  a  further 
psychical  object,  which  is  unproved,  and  breaks  the 
nervous  continuity.  When  as  a  mental  philosopher  one 
adds  consciousness  to  scientific  observation,  the  proba- 
bility of  physical  realism  is  increased.  Consciousness 
tells  us  that  we  somehow  apprehend  physical  objects, 
which  appear  also  to  be  sensibly  external.  Scientific 
observation  disabuses  us  of  the  appearance  that  the 
sensible  object  is  external,  but  not  of  the  consciousness 
that  it  is  physical.  Natural  philosophy,  as  a  direct 
evidence,  may  be  said  to  remove  the  physical  object 
of  sense  from  the  external  to  the  internal  world,  but  no 
further  than  the  nervous  system.  The  most  probable 
mental  philosophy  would  simply  conclude  that  it  there 
becomes  sensible— though  only  the  most  probable. 

We  asked  for  direct  evidence  that  the  immediate 
object,  hot,  coloured,  &c.,  perceived  by  our  senses  is  a 
psychical  phacnomenon,  and  we  find  there  is  none.  Con- 
sciousness is  so  far  from  saying  so,  that  it  confuses  the 
immediate  and  the  mediate,  and  leads  us  to  think  that 
the  immediate  object  is  not  only  physical  but  external. 
Scientific  analysis  corrects  this  confusion,  and  teaches  us 
that  the  innnediate  object  is  not  external  but  internal, 
but  does  not  iro  on  to  show  that  it  is  not  only  internal 
but  psychical.  I  suspect  that  the  idealists  by  a  kind  of 
confusion  have  changed  the  truth  that  the  object  of 
sense  is  not  external  but  internal  into  the  hypothesis 
that  it  is  not  physical  but  psychical. 

The  idealist  may  reply  that  direct  evidence  is  not 
required  for  an  hypothesis,  and  that  the  psychical  object 
is  like  aether — something  inaccessible  to  direct  evidence, 


ciiAr.  III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF  SENSE 


67 


but  needed  to  explain  the  facts.  I  accept  this  issue. 
I  admit  that,  if  the  ideahstic  hypothesis  of  the  sensible 
object  could  explain  the  facts  of  the  known  world  and 
eliminate  the  hypothesis  of  physical  realism,  it  would  be 
proved  by  this  indirect  evidence.  There  would  still  be 
no  direct  evidence  that  a  hot  or  coloured  object  is  not  a 
pliysical  but  a  psychical  fact.  But,  contrary  to  all  ap- 
pearance, we  should  be  obliged  to  conclude  that,  as 
light  is  paradoxically  but  really  an  undulation  of  jetlier, 
so  is  the  seen,  or  felt,  or  heard,  or  tasted,  or  smelt,  a 
psychical,  and  not  a  physical,  fact. 

The  gist  of  the  idealistic  hypothesis  is  that  not  some 
but  all  the  immediate  objects  are  psycliical,  and  that 
no  physical  object  whatever  is  apprehended  by  sense. 
The  consequence  is  that  all  our  sensitive  experience 
will  be  limited  to  psychical  objects ;  for,  so  for  as  it  is 
sensitive,  experience  is  merely  tlie  sum  of  our  sen- 
sations. Moreover,  the  supposition  of  a  priori  elements 
of  knowledge  wdll  not  help  us,  for  nobody  pretends 
that  we  have  an  a  priori  apprehension  of  the  pliysical 
to  add  to  an  a  posteriori  apprehension  of  the  psyclii(\al : 
sucli  an  hypothesis  would  be  too  great  an  inversion. 
The  consequence  is  that  all  the  data  of  our  knowledge 
will  be  psychical.  No  doubt  different  idealists  will  pro- 
vide more  or  less  of  such  psychical  data.  Some  will 
have  merely  psychical  sensations,  others  will  add  a 
psycliical  subject,  and  others  again  psychical  apprehen- 
sions a  priori.  But  at  the  widest  the  data  will  all  be 
psychical  facts  of  some  kind  or  other. 

Now  the  question  arises,  what  can  be  known  from 
psycliical  data?  If  all  the  immediate  objects  I  touch, 
see,  taste,  smell,  and  hear  are  psychical,  and  I  am  j)syclii- 
cal,  and  all  my  apprehensions  are  psychical,  if  all  my 
sensitive  experience  is  of  nothing  but  psychical  phocno- 


F   2 


08 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


TART   I. 


mena,  if  all  tlie  data  which  form  the  immediate  premises 
of  my  mediate  knowledge  are  psychical,  what  can  I 
infer  from  such  facts  in  the  premises?  To  answer  this 
question  we  must  consult  the  logical  rules  of  inference. 
All  inference  is  by  similarity.  Not  to  enter  into  the 
question  whether  there  is  one  fundamental  type,  there 
are  three  apparent  kinds  of  inference — induction,  deduc- 
tion, and  analogical  inference.  All  these  are  different 
modes  of  reasoning  from  similar  to  similar.    In  induction 

CD 

we  apprehend  that  similar  particulars  have  a  similar 
characteristic,  and  infer  that  the  class,  including  those 
and  all  other  particulars  similar  to  them,  have    that 
similar  characteristic.      In  deduction  we  start  with  a 
proposition  stating  the  similar  characteristics  of  a  class, 
either  inferred  by  induction    or  otherwise   known,  as 
major  premise ;  we  combine  it  with  a  minor  premise, 
asserting  that  somethimr  is  one  of  the  class  of  similar 
particulars  ;  and  from  this  combination  we  infer  that  this 
new  but  similar  particular  has  the  similar  characteristic 
alreadv  known  to  belon^]^  to  the  class.     In  analo2^ical  in- 
ference,  which  is  an  imperfect  substitute  for  induction 
followed  by  deduction,  we  apprehend  that  a  particular 
has  a  characteristic,  or  several  similar  particulars  have 
a    similar   characteristic;    we    apprehend   by    analogy 
that  another  particular  is  similar  to  the  given  parti 
cular  or  similar  particulars  ;  and  from  the  analogy  we 
infer  that  this  new  but  similar  particular  may  have  the 
characteristic  similar  to  that  of  the  given  particular 
or  particulars.     Various  men  are  mortal,  .  * .  all  men 
are  mortal  :  all  men  are  mortal,  I  am  a  man,  .  * .  I  am 
mortal  :    the    earth    is    inhabited,    Mars    is    like    the 
earth,  .  * .  Mars  mav  be  inhabited  : — these  inductions, 
deductions,  and  analogical  inferences  are  nothinc^  but 
inferences  from  similar  to  similar.     Thev  are  founded 


CHAP.  III.  THE   rilYSICAL   DATA   OF  SENSE 


G9 


also  on  the  reality  and  knowledge  of  classes  and  laws. 
But  what  is  a  class  except  similar  things,  and  what  is  a 
law  except  the  fact  that  similar  things  possess  similar 
characteristics  ? 

From  this  limitation  of  inference  to  similarity  it 
follows  that  whatever  the  character  of  the  data,  such 
will  be  that  which  is  inferred.  If  all  the  data  were 
psychical,  then,  by  parity  of  reasoning,  we  could  only 
infer  the  psychical.  If  we  never  had  direct  experience 
of  anything  physical  whatever,  then,  there  being  nothing 
physical  in  the  premises,  nothing  physical  in  the  con- 
clusion could  possibly  be  inferred.  From  the  similar 
the  similar  is  inferred  ;  from  the  psychical  the  psychical. 
But  in  order  to  infer  the  physical  we  must  have  some 
physical  data. 

The  universal  similarity  between  the  data  in  the 
premises  and  the  inferred  in  the  conclusion  requires  to 
be  guarded  from  misapprehension.  I  said  above  that 
the  old  hypothesis— like  is  known  by  like— is  a  fallacy. 
I  now  say  that  Hke  is  known  from  like.  These  positions 
are  not  inconsistent.  The  former  refers  to  the  relation 
of  subject  and  object,  the  latter  to  the  relation  of  object 
to  object.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  object  appre- 
hended should  be  Hke  the  subject  api^rehending  ;  but 
there  are  reasons  why  objects  inferred  should  be  like  the 
objects  from  which  they  are  inferred — the  rules  of  logic. 
If  the  subject  has  constantly  had  physical  objects  pre- 
sented to  it,  it  must  apprehend  them,  or  be  useless. 
But  when  the  subject  has  before  it  the  immediate  objects 
which  can  be  presented  to  it,  whether  a  posteriori  or 
a  priori,  it  has  all  the  data  from  which  reasoning  can 
start ;  and  if  that  reasoning  is  to  maintain  the  consistency 
of  truth,  it  can  add  nothing  in  the  conclusion  which  is 
not  justified  by  the  presence  of  something  similar  in  the 


70 


PHYSICAL    REALISM 


PAKT   1. 


premises.  If  reasoning  contains,  on  the  Kantian  hypo- 
thesis, a  jmori  apprehensions,  these  will  be  part  of  the 
data ;  but  if  it  adds  anything,  not  in  the  data  but  in 
the  conclusion,  which  has  no  analogue  in  the  premises, 
reasoning  becomes  paralogism.  This  fallacy  is  wxll 
known  in  deduction ;  but  it  is  equally  true  of  induction, 
which  only  generalises  the  subjects  and  predicates  con- 
tained in  the  particular  instances,  and  of  analogical 
idference,  wdiich  infers  that  one  particular  similar  to 
another  may  be  similar  also  in  a  characteristic  already 
apprehended  in  that  other.  Therefore,  although  like 
objects  are  not  necessarily  immediately  apprehended  by 
a  like  subject,  only  hke  objects  are  inferred  from  hke 
c)l)jects,  not  by  any  necessity  in  the  relation  of  subject 
and  object,  but  by  the  nature  of  reasoning.  Hence  a 
l)sychi(*al  subject  may  innnediately  perceive  physical 
objects  ;  but  if  it  were  a  psychical  subject  and  perceived 
psycliical  objects  it  could  infer  nothing  but  psychical 
things,  similar  either  to  the  psychical  subject  perceiving 
or  to  the  psychical  objects  perceived. 

Aixain,  the  lou^ical  canon,  like  is  known  from  like, 
nuist  not  be  confused  w^tli  the  metaphysical  hypothesis, 
like  causes  have  like  effects.  Aristotle  extended  the 
})rinciple  of  the  propagation  of  the  species  from  the 
organic  to  the  inorganic  w^orld,  and  thought  that  every 
cause  is  homoc^eneous  with  its  effect.  Modern  science 
has  discountenanced  this  view,  except  in  the  far-off  sense 
that  all  physical  causation  may  be  the  propagation  of 
motion  in  various  forms.  But  wdien  I  say  that  we  can 
only  infer  like  objects,  wdiat  I  mean  is  not  that  w^e  must 
infer  causes  like  the  effects,  but  causes  like  the  causes 
which  w^e  have  already  known.  For  example,  New^ton, 
already  knowing  the  effects  requiring  gravitation  to 
cause  them  in  terrestrial  bodies,  wdien  he  found  similar 


cii.vp.  irr. 


TIIK   rilYSlCAL   DATA    OF   SENSE 


effects  in  celestial  l)odies,  inferred  that  their  cause  also 
is  a  celestial,  similar  to  terrestrial,  gravitation.  Xow%  if 
all  the  data  of  sense  were  psychical,  not  only  the  effects 
but  also  the  causes  in  sense  w^ould  be  psychical :  conse  - 
quently,  w^ien  w^e  came  to  a  sensible  effect,  similar  to 
other  sensible  effects,  ])ut  not  due  to  any  sensible  cause, 
w^e  should  have  to  infer  a  similar  cause  beyond  sense ; 
and,  as  all  the  causes  in  sense  would  ex  hijpothesi  be 
psychical,  w^e  should  have  to  infer,  by  parity  of  rea- 
soning, a  psycliical  cause,  not  because  the  effect  was 
psychical,  but  because  all  previously  know^n  causes 
w^ould  be  psycliical.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  were 
physical  causes  in  the  data  of  sense,  we  could  then,  and 
only  then,  infer  a  similar  physical  cause  beyond  sense. 

Again,  w^hen  I  say  that  only  like  objects  are  inferred 
from  like,  I  do  not  mean  that  nothing  new^  can  be  inferred, 
but  only  nothing  new^  w^hich  is  not  similar  to  the  data. 
The  conclusion  is  no  mere  restatement  of  the  premises. 
What  is  inferred  need  not  have  been  already  experi- 
enced, nor  is  reasoning  confined  to  merely  reproducing 
the  immediate  data  of  the  senses.     But  wdiat  is  inferred 
must  be  similar  to  what  has  already  been  experienced. 
What  is  new^,  and  has  never  been,  nor  ever  w^ill  be,  in 
experience,  such  as  an  asthereal  undulation,  can  be  in- 
ferred.    But  the  asthereal  undulation  is  a  motion  similar 
to  the  experienced  motion  of  weaves  of  w^ater.     Xothiug 
new^  w^hich  is  not  similar  to  the  data,  can  be  inferred. 
It  is  true  of  the  Deity  Himself,  w^ho,  though  not  experi- 
enced, is  inferred  to  be  like  man,  but  infinitely  intensi- 
fied in  the  attributes  w  liich  w^e  already  know^  in  our- 
selves.   Consequently,  if  all  the  data  w^ere  psychical,  we 
should  be  able  to  draw^  inferences  to  similarly  psychical 
subjects  and  similarly  psycliical  objects,  new  but  similar 
to  the  data.     But  w^e  should  not  be  able  to  infer  some- 


72 


PHYSICAL   RHALISM 


PART  I. 


thing  wliolly  new,  dissimilar  and  heterogeneous,  for 
which  there  was  no  analogue  either  in  the  sentient  sub- 
ject or  in  the  sensible  objects.  Hence,  the  physical, 
for  which  there  would  be  ex  hypothesi  no  analogue  in 
the  premises,  could  not  be  inferred.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  as  I  suppose,  the  sensible  data  are  physical  facts 
in  my  organism,  I  can  then  infer  new  but  similar  physical 
objects  outside,  although  I  have  never  immediately  per- 
ceived them  by  sense. 

Another  misapprehension  will  immediately  arise.  It 
is  said  that  one  opposite  imphes  another,  and,  therefore, 
though  we  experience  only  one  opposite,  we  infer  the 
other.  Thus,  it  is  supposed,  from  psychical  data  we 
infer  their  opposites,  physical  things.  I  am  almost 
ashamed  to  write  down  Aristotle's  distinction  of  con- 
tradictories and  contraries ;  but  it  is  necessary  in  an 
illogical  age.  Contradictory  opposites  are  the  positive 
and  its  negative,  as  relative  and  not  relative,  finite  and 
not  finite.  Contrary  opposites  are  the  furthest  removed 
positives,  as  w^hite  and  black.  Now  contradictory  op- 
posites in  a  sense  imply  one  another,  but  contrary 
opposites  do  not.  White  implies  not  white :  it  does  not 
imply  black.  We  might  have  apprehended  white  without 
having  any  conception  of  black,  much  less  having  proof 
of  its  existence.  Secondly,  great  harm  is  done  by  such 
vague  terms  as  '  imply '  and  '  implication,'  which  some- 
times mean  conceiving  and  sometimes  inferring.  The 
positive,  when  apprehended,  makes  us  conceive  the  con- 
tradictory negative,  but  does  not  make  us  infer  that  it 
exists.  Are  we  to  fall  into  the  old  sophism  of  arguing 
that  as  something  is  contradicted  by  nothing,  nothing 
exists  ? 

It  is  a  common  argument  that  the  relative  which 
we  experience  implies  the  non-relative  and  absolute, 


CUAP.   III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DxVTA   OF  SENSE 


the  finite  implies  the  infinite.  This  is  an  utter  confu- 
sion of  contradictories  and  contraries.  The  relative  im- 
phes the  not  relative;  but  the  contradictory,  not 
relative,  is  not  necessarily  the  positive  contrary,  abso- 
lute, for  it  also  includes  nothing ;  and  the  relative,  in 
implying  the  not  relative,  does  not  decide  whether  it  is 
absolute  or  nothing.  As  white  implies  not  white,  but 
not  necessarily  black  or  any  other  particular  colour,  so 
the  relative  implies  not  relative,  but  not  necessarily  the 
particular  species  of  not  relative,  absolute.  The  same 
remark  applies  to  the  opposition  of  finite  and  infinite, 
except  that  in  this  case  the  term '  infinite '  is  ambiguous, 
being  properly  the  not  finite,  but  including  both  that 
which  is  not  finite,  because  it  is  nothing,  and  that 
which  is  not  finite,  because  it  extends  without  limit. 
The  finite  implies  its  contradictory,  not  its  contrary :  it 
implies  the  negative  not  finite,  but  does  not  imply 
the  particular  positive  species,  the  infinite  which 
extends  without  limit.  Secondly,  the  relative  and 
finite  imply  only  in  the  sense  of  making  us  conceive 
the  mere  contradictories,  not  relative  and  not  finite. 
The  positive  sides  of  the  contradictions  not  only  leave 
the  content  of  the  negatives  undetermined,  but  also 
leave  the  question  undecided  whether  we  can  infer 
that  there  is  anything  corresponding  to  the  ideas  of 
the  negatives.  Nor  do  they  even  give  us  the  ideas 
till  we  have  not  only  apprehended  the  positives,  but 
also  apprehended  that  they  are  relative  and  finite. 
The  relative  and  the  finite,  then,  when  apprehended  to 
be  such,  make  us  conceive  the  ideas  of  the  not  relative 
and  not  finite,  but  give  us  no  idea  of  a  positive  some- 
thing absolute  and  extending  without  limits,  much  less 
make  us  infer  that  this  species  of  not  relative  and  not 
finite  is  something  real  as  distinguished  from  nothing 


74 


rriYSICAL   REALISM 


r.vuT  I. 


at  all.  When  we  merely  experience  something  which 
happens  to  be  fniite,  we  need  not  think  of  any  opposite  ; 
if  we  think  of  it  as  finite,  we  must  have  an  idea  of  the 
not  fniite  ;  but  we  need  not  form  an  idea  of  the  positive 
infinite,  much  less  can  we  prove  that  there  is  somethinir 
infinite,  and  say,  '  I  experience  the  finite  and  relative" 
therefore  there  is  an  infinite  and  absolute.'  Men  accept 
such  arguments  because  they  think  it  helps  to  prove 
the  existence  of  a  Deity.  But  the  finite  and  relative  do 
not  make  us  conceive  a  positive  infinite  absolute,  mu(^h 
less  infer  its  existence ;  and  theology  has  better  argu- 
ments for  a  Deity  than  the  confusion  of  negative  and 
positive,  of  contradictory  and  contrary  opposition,  of 
conception  and  inference,  of  ideas  and  judgments. 

Similarly,  the  psychical  does  not  imply  the  i^hysical. 
The  physical  and  the  psychical  are  contraries,  not  con- 
tradictories.    The  contradictory  of  the  psychical  is  the 
not  psychical,  which  may  be  anything  else  or  nothing. 
Su})pose  that  I  had  experienced  nothing  but  psychical 
data.    If  I  had  never  thought  of  them  as  psychical,  but 
only  as  hot,  red,  and  so  on,  I  should  have  had  no  reason 
to  conceive  the  not  psychical.    If  I  had  thought  of  them 
as  psychical,  I  must  then  have  had  the  bare  idea  of  not 
psychical  as  its  contradictory.     But  I  should  neither 
have  been  able  to  have  inferred  that  it  existed  nor  what 
it  was.     The  content  of  the  idea  would  have  been  the 
bare    negation   or   contradictory  of  the   psychical.     I 
should  have  had  no  idea  of  the  physical  as  a  positive 
contrary,  much  less  have  proved  its  existence.     Just  as 
the  apprehension  of  white  makes  me  conceive  the  idea 
of  not  white,  but  does  not  infer  that  there  is  any  other 
colour,  much  less  the  contrary  black,  and  just  as  the 
apprehension  of  the  relative  and  finite  makes  me  con- 
ceive the  idea  of  not  relative  and  not  finite,  but  does  not 


CHAP.    III. 


THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF   SENSE 


iO 


I 


infer  that  there  is  anything  which  is  not  relative  and  not 
finite,  much  less  the  contrary  absolute  and  extending 
without  limits,  so  the  apprehension  of  the  psychical 
would  make  me  conceive  the  idea  of  not  psychical,  but 
would  not  tell  me  that  there  is  anything  positive  which 
is  not  psychical,  much  less  that  it  is  the  contrary, 
physical.  To  infer  the  existence  of  the  positive  con- 
trary, the  physical,  I  should  have  required  other  than 
psychical  data,  which  would,  however,  have  been  e^v 
hypothesi  all  the  data  possible. 

In  all  cases  the  existence  of  a  contrary  is  a  matter  not 
of  implication  in  the  knowledge  of  the  opposite  con- 
trary, but  a  matter  of  independent  inference.  Human 
reasoning  would  indeed  be  easy,  if  without  further 
([uestion  the  moment  one  had  ascertained  a  thing,  one 
knew  that  its  contrary  existed ;  when  one  had  exjDcri- 
enced  white,  one  knew  black  ;  when  all  experience  had 
been  of  the  relative  and  finite,  one  knew  the  absolute 
and  infinite  ;  when  all  the  immediate  data  of  all  reason- 
ing were  psychical,  one  straightway  knew  that  there 
are  physical  things.  Why,  one  contrary  does  not  even 
make  us  conceive  the  idea  of  another,  much  less  infer  its 
existence.  The  white  makes  us  conceive  the  idea,  not 
white :  we  want  other  evidence  to  infer  the  existence  of 
the  black.  The  psychical  makes  us  conceive  the  idea, 
not  psychical :  we  want  other  evidence  to  prove  the 
existence  of  the  physical.  A  synthesis  from  psychical 
data  to  physical  things  must  be  founded  on  some  better 
device  than  the  fallacy  of  the  implication  of  opposites. 
But  in  reality  the  whole  hypothesis  of  such  a  synthesis 
is  illogical.  To  infer  physical  things  we  require  more 
than  psychical  data,  and  their  implications,  and  their 
consequences  :  we  require  physical  data  in  the  premises 
similar  to  the  physical  objects  in  the  conclusion. 


76 


PHYSICAL  REALISM 


PART   I. 


The  canons  of  inference,  then,  teach  us,  first,  that 
from  siniihirs  similars  are  inferred ;  secondly,  that  what 
is  inferred  may  be  something  new  so  long  as  it  is  similar 
to  some  of  the  data  ;  and  thirdly,  that  it  cannot  be  the 
contrary  of  all  the  data.  Therefore,  on  the  idealistic 
liypothesis  that  all  the  data  are  psychical,  in  the  first 
place,  what  is  inferred  would  also  be  psychical ;  secondly, 
it  would  include  other  psychical  subjects  and  other  psy- 
chical objects  similar  to  those  which  ex  hypotliesi  form 
the  data  of  inference  ;  but,  thirdly,  it  would  not  include 
physical  things,  for  which  there  would  be  no  analogy, 
and  which  are  not  implied  in  merely  psychical  data  :  for 
psychical  data  would  not  make  us  even  conceive,  much 
less  infer  their  contraries,  physical  things.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  some  of  the  data  are  physical,  what  is 
inferred  can  be  physical  like  the  data,  different  yet 
similar  objects,  the  data  being  in  our  own  bodies,  the 
inferred  objects  in  the  external  world. 

We  constantly  hear  at  the  present  day  of  two  worlds 
and  their  correspondence — the  psychical  and  the  physical. 
It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  essay  to  deny  this  anti- 
thesis, nor  to  depend  upon  it.  But  it  is  also  commonly 
supposed  that  all  the  data  of  our  knowledge  belong  to 
the  former  world,  from  which  the  latter  is  inferred. 
Agahist  this  hypothesis  I  direct  this  essay.  If  all  the 
data  of  sense  were  psychical,  the  parity  of  reasoning 
would  have  no  data  to  infer  the  physical.  But  the 
physical  world  is  the  object  of  natural  science,  which  is 
knowledge.  Therefore,  not  all  the  data  of  sense  are 
psychical.  There  must  be  similar  physical  data  to  infer 
similar  physical  objects. 

Such,  then,  are  the  data  required  by  the  rules  of 
reasoning  to  infer  a  physical  world.  We  began  by 
saying   that,  if  the   idealistic    hypothesis   led    to    the 


s 


ciiAr.  HI. 


TEIE   niYSICAL   DATA   OF   SENSE 


77 


only  possible  explanation  of  the  facts,  we  must  accept 
it  even  on  this  indirect  evidence.  We  now  see  to 
what  it  logically  leads.  All  that  is  inferred  as  well 
as  all  that  is  perceived,  all  that  is  immediate  and  all  that 
is  mediate,  all  that  is  apprehended  in  us  and  all  that  is 
known  beyond,  will  be  psychical.  That  is,  all  known 
realities  will  be  psychical  facts  of  some  kind  or  another. 
As  Berkeley  says,  the  whole  known  world  will  be  mind 
and  ideas  ;  with  Hegel,  thought  will  be  being  and 
being  will  be  thought.  These  are  the  logical  idealisms. 
Nothing  physical,  and  not  psychical,  will  be  inferrible, 
still  less  knowable. 

This  logical  consequence  of  all  psychological  idealism  / 
must  be  confronted  with  the  discoveries  of  natural  philo- 
sophy. A  survey  of  these  discoveries  shows  an  enormous 
mass  of  insensible  and  inconceivable  realities,  which 
are  scientifically  known  by  inference  from  sensible  data. 
But  they  are  physical  realities,  incapable  of  being  re- 
solved into  any  kind  of  psychical  fact;  being  insen- 
sible they  are  not  sensations,  being  inconceivable  they 
are  not  ideas.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  some  things 
physical,  and  not  psychical,  are  knowable,  and  not  all 
known  objects  are  psychical. 

The  ph^^sical  objects  of  scientific  knowledge  directly 
eliminate  pure  idealism.  Starting  synthetically  from 
the  common  idealistic  hypothesis  that  the  sensible  data 
are  psychical,  the  pure  idealist  draws  the  strictly  lo^ncal 
conclusion  that  all  known  objects,  inferred  from  these 
psychical  data  of  sense,  must  also  be  psychical.  Accord- 
ing to  him,  then,  there  are  no  physical  objects  of  know- 
ledge. His  logic  is  consistent,  but  his  conclusion  is  ^ 
false.  He  has  omitted  the  physical  world  which,  being 
beyond  our  sensations  and  ideas,  cannot  be  resolved 
into  sensations  or  ideas,  but  which  yet  is  an  object  of 


•8 


niYSICAL   llEALISM 


PART   T. 


science — the  most  perfect  form  of  knowledge.  Xot  all 
known  objects,  therefore,  are  psycliical;  some  are  phy- 
sical. Pure  idealism  then  is  false,  and  some  form  of 
realism  true.  As  intuitive  realism  has  already  been 
eliminated  by  natural  philosophy,  it  only  remains  to 
decide  between  the  hypothetical  realism  of  the  cos- 
mothetic  idealist  and  the  physical  realism  of  this  essay. 
The  physical  objects  of  scientific  knowledge  in- 
directly eliminate  cosmothetic  idealism  with  its  hypo- 
thetical realism.  The  cosmothetic  ideahst  tries  to 
reconcile  the  idealistic  theory,  that  the  sensible  data 
are  psychical,  with  the  realistic  theory  that  some  objects 
knowable  by  inference  from  these  data  are  physical. 
We  have  found  that  the  realistic  part  of  his  theory  is 
correct.  lie  has  the  merit  of  admitting  that  there  are 
physical  objects  of  knowledge  :  this  is  his  superiority  to 
the  pure  idealist.  He  has  the  merit  of  admitting  that 
they  are  not  intuitively  perceived  by  sense,  but  inferred  : 
this  is  his  superiority  to  the  intuitive  realist.  But  he  is 
illogical.  His  defect  is  the  inconsequence  of  supposing 
that  })hysical  objects,  though  not  intuitively  perceived, 
could  be  inferred  from  purely  psycliical  data.  But  we 
have  seen  that  all  inference  is  bv  similarity,  and  there- 
fore  [)hysical  objects  could  not  be  inferred  from  purely 
psychical  data.  The  physical  would  be  the  object 
of  a  new  term  in  the  conclusion,  absent  and  un- 
justified in  the  premises.  If  all  the  data  of  sense 
were  psychical,  then,  by  parity  of  reasoning,  all  objects 
knowable  from  them  would  be  psychical.  But  by  the 
discoveries  of  science,  and  by  the  admission  of  the 
cosmothetic  idealist,  some  objects  knowable  by  inference 
from  the  data  of  sense  are  physical.  Therefore  not  all 
the  data  of  sense  are  psychical.  Suhlata  consequent 
tollitur  nntecedens. 


CHAP.  III.  THE   PHYSICAL   DATA   OF   SENSE 


79 


\ 


Cosmothetic  and  pure  idealism  are  mutually  destruc- 
tive of  each  other.     The  former  admits  that  some  objects 
are  physical,  which  prove  that  the  latter  is  wrong  in 
supposing  all  objects  to  be  psychical.    The  latter  admits 
that  only  psycliical  objects  can  be  inferred  from  psychi- 
cal data,  so  that  the  former  is  wrong  in  supposin^r  that 
physical  objects  are  inferred  from  psychical  data.     Pure 
idealism  fails  to  recognise,  cosmothetic  idealism  f^iils  to 
explain,  the  knowledge  of  an  insensible  and  inconceiv- 
able physical  world.     If  we  combine  both  we  destroy 
the  common  data  of  both.     As  the  pure  idealist  says, 
if  all  the  data  were  psychical  all  the  objects  would  be 
psychical ;  but  as  the  cosmothetic  ideahst  admits,  not 
all  the  objects  are  psychical.     It  follows  that  both  are 
wrong  in  saying  all  the  data  are  psychical.     Their  data 
fail  to  explain  the  physical  objects  of  scientific  know- 
ledge.    Science  ehminates  all  psychological  idealism. 

Meanwhile  the  physical  objects  of  scientific  know- 
ledge   are    not    merely    destructive   of    psychological 
idealism,  but  are  also  constructive  of  pliysical  realism. 
They  prove  in  themselves  that  some  objects  of  know- 
ledge are  physical,  and,  in  combination  with  the  logical 
rules  of  inference,  that  some  data   of  sense  must  be 
pliysical,  to  infer  them.      Similars  are  inferrible  only 
from  similars.     Therefore  the  physical  is  inferrible  only 
from^  the  physical.      But  some  objects  of  science  are 
physical ;  therefore  they  are  inferrible  only  from  physi- 
cal data.  These  data  of  sense,  however,  though  physical, 
are  proved  by  scientific  analysis  to  be  internal ;  there- 
fore the  data  of  sense  are  physical  objects  within  our 
nervous  system,  from  whicli  we  infer  physical  objects  in 
the  external  world.      This   is    the    theory  of  physical 
realism,  established  by  the  logical  rules  of  h^^pothesis. 
I  admit  that  the  direct  evidences  are  not  a  positive 


80 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART  I. 


proof  of  pliysical  realism.  Consciousness,  alone,  is  even 
in  favour  of  intuitive  realism.  But  scientific  analysis 
destroys  this  hypothesis  by  separating  the  sensible 
effect  from  the  external  cause,  and  showing  that  the 
sensible  object  must  be  internal.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
does  not  show  that  the  sensible  object  is  not  only  in- 
ternal but  psychical,  and  therefore  does  not  favour 
idealism.  It  makes  the  intermediate  theory  of  physical 
realism  possible,  even  probable.  I  do  not  believe,  how^- 
ever,  that  the  data  of  sense  are  recoverable  by  any 
direct  method,  because  from  our  very  birth,  and  with 
inherited  power,  we  overlay  them  with  inferences. 
Hence  the  shipwreck  of  modern  philosophy,  which  sup- 
poses its  hypotheses  of  sensible  data  to  be  first  principles, 
and  has  alternated  between  the  opposite  but  equally 
futile  attempts  to  grasp  physical  things  by  sense,  or  to 
leap  from  psychical  data  to  })hysical  things. 

I  admit,  therefore,  that  the  crucial  evidence  must 
be  indirect.  That  hypothesis  of  the  data  of  sense  must 
be  accepted,  which  explains  the  knowledge  of  the  objects 
of  science.  This  insensible,  this  inconceivable,  this 
physical  world  of  science  is  not  an  object  of  intuition, 
is  not  a  sum  of  psychical  sensations  and  ideas,  is  not 
inferrible  from  psychical  sensations  and  ideas.  Its 
knowled^T^e  then  must  be  accounted  for  otherwise.  It 
is  inferrible  from  internal  and  physical  data,  the  nervous 
system  sensibly  affected  by  external  objects.  The  data 
of  sense,  then,  are  neither  physical  objects  without, 
which  are  the  causes  not  the  objects  of  sense  ;  nor 
psychical  objects  within,  from  which  nothing  physica 
could  be  inferred  ;  but  physical  objects  within,  from 
wdiich  physical  objects  without  are  inferred  by  all,  and 
known  by  science.  Physical  realism,  therefore,  or  the 
theory  of  internal  physical  data  to  infer  external  physi- 


CHAP.  III.  THE   THYSICAL   DATA   OF   SENSE 


81 


cal  objects,  is,  in  accordance  with  the  logic  of  explana. 
tion  and  ehmination,  the  only  hypothesis  of  the  data  of 
sense  sufficient  to  explain  the  knowledge  of  the  objects 
of  science.  It  is  a  mental  philosophy  born  of  natural 
philosophy,  '  tliat  great  mother  of  sciences.'  ^ 

^  Bacon,  Nov.  Org.  i.  80. 


G 


82 


rilVSICAL   KEALISM 


PARI   J. 


CIIAPTEE  IV. 


Tin-:    IIISTOKICAL    OKIGJX    OF   PSYCIIOLOGICAL    IDEALISM. 

Aristotlk  remarks  that  we  oii^lit  not  only  to  criticise 
our  opponents,  but  also  to  point  out  the  causes  of  their 
errors.     The  origin  of  intuitive  reahsm  and  its  presen- 
tative  theory  of  perception,  is  the  inevitable  tendency 
of  ordinary  man  to  confound  sense  with  reason,  and  his 
sensations  with  his  inferences.     He  has  so  long  been 
accustomed  to  infer  an  external  world,  that  at  last  he 
cannot  but  fancy  his  senses  perceive  it.     He  seems  to 
himself  even  to  be  conscious  that  it  is  so,  calls  his  con- 
lusion  connnon  sense,  and  at  last  defies  philosophers  to 
distinguish  the   sensible  and  the   real.     To   have    dis- 
abused  philosophy   of  this    confusion   is    one    of   the 
many  services  owed  by  mankind  to  Greek  philosophers. 
The  distinction  of  sense  and  reason  soon  dawned  on  the 
Greeks,  and  with  it  the  discovery  that  the  object  of 
sense  is  not  the  external  thing  at  a  distance  from  our- 
selves, l)ut  some  sort  of  result  on   our  senses,  from 
which    the    external  thing  is  inferred  by  reason.     In 
sliort,  the  Greek  philosophers  founded  the  representa 
live  theory  of  sensitive  perception.     But  they  did  not 
agree  about  the  nature  of  the  sensible  object,  or  repre- 
sentative of  the  external  thing  impressed  on  the  senses. 
Without  pretending  to  give  a  history  of  their  views,  we 
may  distinguish  two   great  epochs:  the  first,   that  in 
which  the  sensible  object  was  regarded  as  a  corporeal 


CHAP.  IV.        OrjIGIX  OF  rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


on 

bo 


effect  ;^  the  second,  that  in  which  it  began  to  l)e  regai-ded 
as  an  incorporeal  essence  in  our  senses.  In  tliis  second 
epoch  the  Greeks  prepared  the  way  for  the  tlieory  tliat 
the  sensible  object  is  an  incorporeal  idea.  ]3ut  they 
never  actually  reached  the  idealistic  theory. 

The  first  approach  to  a  scientific  tlieory  of  the 
objects  of  knowledge  is  to  be  found  in  the  Atomists, 
Leucippus  and  Democritus  of  Abdera,  the  pioneers  of 
a  sound  philosophy  of  nature.  To  them  we  owe  tlie 
dawn  of  the  truth,  afterwards  deveh)ped  into  the  dis- 
tinction of  primary  and  secondary  qualities,  that  the 
real  and  original  qualities  of  particles  are  figure,  position 
and  arrangement,  whose  different  combinations,  together 
with  motion,  give  rise  to  quahties,  such  as  heat  and 
colour,  which,  though  really  derivative,  appear  equally 
original  to  our  senses. 

The  manner,  however,  in  which  this  important  doc- 
trine was  presented  to  the  world  was  not  purely  unex- 
ceptionable.    The  Atomists,  it  is    true,  admitted   that 
there  is  for  every  variety  of  sensible  quality  a  distinct 
mode,  or  schema  in  their  language,  of  the  original  qua- 
lities ;  for  example,  a  sharp  taste  arises  from  angular, 
a  sweet  from  round  schemata.     But,  to  say  notliing  of 
their  crude  speculations  on  corpuscular  structure'and 
motion,  they  fell  into  the  fallacy  of  confusing  the  deri- 
vative   quahty  with  its  sensible  e/Tect   in  the  famous 
dictum,  '  Conventionally  there  is  sweet,  conventionally 
bitter,  conventionally  hot,  conventionally  cold,  conven- 
tionally colour  ;    but  really  atoms  and  void.'  ^     From 
this  Atomistic  identification  of  secondary  qualities  with 
their  sensible  effects,  assisted  by  the  Ilerachtean  identity 
of  contraries,  it  was  but  a  short  step  to  the  sceptical 
theory  of  Protagoras,  that  all  qualities  are  merely  the 

^  Sext.  Emp.  Adv.  Math.  vii.  135. 

G  2 


84 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART  I. 


appearances  in  our  senses,  witliout  any  correspondents 
in  the  fluent  matter  of  nature. 

The  Atomists  did  not  recognise  sufficiently,  the 
Sceptics  not  at  all,  the  fact  that  derivative  or  secondary 
qualities  are  qualities  of  external  things.  There  is 
also  a  common  tendency  in  modern  mental  philo- 
sophy to  identify  secondary  (pialities  with  their  sen- 
sible manifestations.  But  for  every  sensible  quality, 
which  is  the  product  of  an  external  object,  there  is  a 
distinct  quality  in  the  external  object.  A  primary 
quality  is  also  like  the  sensible  quality.  A  secondary 
quality,  such  as  heat  or  colour,  is  not,  indeed,  like  the 
sensible  effect,  being  a  mode  of  a  primary  quality,  such 
as  motion ;  but  it  is  a  distinct  and  specific  variety  of 
that  primary  quality ;  it  is  the  motion  of  a  different  kind 
of  matter,  it  goes  on  independently  of  the  sensible  effect, 
and  it  is  a  knowable  object  of  science.  Thus,  it  has 
been  discovered  in  natural  philosophy  that  heat  and 
light  are  not  molar  but  molecular  motions,  that  they 
are  motions  of  a3ther  ;  that  they  are,  in  rerum  naturd, 
different  motions  of  different  lengths,  the  waves  of  mere 
heat  being  longer  than  those  of  light,  and  that  they  are 
so  disseminated  throughout  the  nniverse  as  to  produce 
no  sensible  effect  incalculably  oftener  than  they  excite 
touch  or  vision. 

It  was  perceived  by  the  genius  of  Bacon  that  heat  is 
of  two  kinds,  in  ordine  ad  universum  and  in  ordine  ad 
sensiun,  the  former  being  an  insensible  mode  of  corpus- 
cular motion,  the  latter  the  same  thing  but  with  a  rela- 
tion such  as  is  competent  to  sense. ^  The  Atomists  were 
too  narrow  in  confining  heat  to  the  sensible  effect  of  a 
distinct  mode  of  matter  in  the  external  world,  and 
Protagoras  quite  wrong  in  denying  the  distinctness  of 

^  Bacon,  Nov.  Org.  ii.^20. 


CHAP.  iv.       ORIGIN   OF   PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


85 


3 


the  external  quality ;  Bacon  was  ri<dit  in  re<'-ardin<>'  heat 
as  a  mode  of  motion  in  the  external  world,  as  well 
as  a  sensible  quality  in  our  senses.  So  with  all  other 
secondary  qualities  ;  they  are  modes  of  primary  qualities, 
but  distinct  modes  ;  they  have  a  generic  resemblance  to 
other  modes,  but  they  have  also  specific  differences. 
Sound  is  a  vibration  of  air,  heat  and  li^dit  undulations 
of  ffither. 

The  only  plausible  objection  to  this  view  would  be 
that   the   names  'heat,'  'light,'  and  so   on,   should  be 
confined  to  the   sensible   effects   and  not  extended  to 
their   external   causes.      It   must    be   confessed,    also, 
that   so   long   as    distinctions  of  things  are  observed, 
the  use  of  names  is  comparatively  uninq^ortant.     But 
names  are  the  vehicles  of  distinct  ideas,  and  it  is  the 
duty  of  every  science  to  have  some  distinct  name  for 
every  real  distinction  of  things.      The  specific  modes 
of  primary  qualities  must  receive  some  name  or  other. 
It  will  not  suflfice  to  leave  the  external  cause  of  sensible 
sound  to  the  periphrasis,  vibratory  motion  among  the 
particles  of  an  elastic  aerial  medium ;  or  that  of  light  to  the 
periphrasis,  undulations  in  an  a3thereal   medium  per- 
vading interstellar  spaces  and  bodies  formed  of  ponder- 
able matter.    New  names  might  be  invented,  but  they  are 
not  forthcoming,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  would 
be  superior  to,  and  still  more  doubtful  whether  they 
would  be  victorious  over,  the  old  names,  '  -ound '  and 
'  hght.' 

Secondary  quaUties  are  real,  though  derivative, 
qualities  of  external  objects,  as  well  as  qualities  of 
sensible  objects  ;  and  their  names  should  be  equally 
extensive.  In  support  of  this  view,  let  us  quote  a 
passage  from  Professor  Stokes,  '  On  the  Beneficial  Effects 
of  Light,'  all  the  more  valuable  because  it    was   not 


8G 


niYSICAL  REALISM 


PART  I. 


written  to  support  any  general  philosophy  of  secondary 

qualities  : — 

'  Beyond  both  ends  of  the  visible  spectrum  there  lie 
radiations  which  do  not  affect  the  eye,  but  are  never- 
theless, as  we  have  every  reason  to  beUeve,  of  the  same 
physical  nature  as  those  which  do,  from  which  they  do 
not  differ  by  any  inherent  quality.  As  the  agent  which 
excites  vision  has  been  called  from  time  immemorial 
"  light,"  or  whatever  may  be  the  corresponding  term  hi 
other  lan'nia^'-es,  it  will  be  convenient  to  use  the  same 
word  to  desi<»'nate  the  accent  considered  in  itself,  and 
irrespectively  of  its  capacity  for  exciting  vision,  a 
capacity  which  would  be  regarded  as  a  mere  accident 
of  li^dit,  in  the  technical  logical  sense  of  that  word. 
Accordindv  I  shall  now  use  the  word  "  hght "  to 
designate  what,  for  want  of  a  better  term,  I  have  just 
been  calling  "radiation,"  a  word  which  would  more 
properly  denote  the  process  of  radiation  than  the  thing 
radiated,  be  it  the  material  or  immaterial,  be  it  matter 
or  undulations  '    (p.  6). 

Qualities,  then,  as  distinguished  by  natural  philo- 
sophy, are  divided  as  follows  : — 

I.  External,  in  ordine  ad  universum. 

1.  Primary,  original  qualities;  e.g.  duration, 

extension,  motion. 

2.  Secondary,  specific  modes  of  primary  quali- 

ties ;  e.g.  sound,  heat,  hght,  as  modes  of 
motion. 

II.  Internal,  in  ordine  ad  sensum, 

1.  Primary,  and  like  external  primary  qualities, 

which  cause  them. 

2.  Secondary,  unlike  external  secondary  quali- 

ties, which  cause  them. 


CHAP.  IV.       ORIGIN  OF  rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


87 


It  is  to  be  noticed,  in  this  division,  that  the  derivative 
character  of  secondary  qualities  refers  not  to  their 
sensible  but  to  their  external  aspect.  As  sensible,  we 
apprehend  them  in  exactly  the  same  way.  Again,  the 
ordinary  man  infers  external  qualities  ahke  in  both 
cases.  The  difference  entirely  arises  when  tlie  scientific 
man  begins  to  infer  that  external  secondary  ai-e  modes  of 
primary  qualities,  because  their  sensil)le  effects  are  so 
similar  to  those  of  primary  quahties ;  for  instance,  tliat 
the  effects  of  external  sound,  heat  and  h'glit  ai-e  tlie 
effects  of  motion  l)y  the  laws  of  motion. 

To  the  Atomists  is  due,  not  oidy  the  foundation  of 
the  theory  of  primary  and  secondary  ([ualities,  but  also 
the  discovery  that  the  object  of  sense  is  not  the  extei-nal 
thing  itself,  but  an  effect  produced  by  the  external  thing 
on  the  senses.  They  supposed  that  effluxes,  contimially 
thrown  off"  from  bodies,  come  into  contact  with  our 
organs.^  They  thus  anticipated  modern  j^hysical  in([uiiy 
on  the  senses,  although  their  necessary  ignorance  of  the 
laws  of  motion  prevented  them  from  reahsing  the  vibra- 
tions and  undulations,  which  have  taken  the  place  of 
emissions,  in  the  case  of  hearing,  sight,  and  the  perception 
of  temperature  by  touch.  The  consequence  of  this  sup- 
position to  the  theory  of  knowledge  in  Greek  pliilosoi)hy 
was  that  its  immediate  object  was  henceforward  ^^-ene- 
rally  agreed  to  be  not  the  thing  at  a  distance,  but  a 
result  of  the  thing  on  the  organs  of  sense. 

In  the  Atomistic  theory  the  immediate  object  of 
sense,  though  internal  and  representative,  is  neither  im- 
material nor  psychical :  it  is  a  physical  object.  This 
point  has  never  been  disproved.  Modern  physiology,  as 
we  have  seen,  has  brought  the  motions  of  matter  as  for 

]  Arist.  De  Divin.  per  Somn.  2  =  4G4  A  C  (Berlin  ed.) ;  cf.  Tlut.  De  Plac. 
Phil.  iv.  8. 


88 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


PART   I. 


as  the  physical  substances  of  the  nerves;  but  it  has 
never  shown  tliat  this  physical  object  is  converted  into 
a  psychical  sensation,  either  at  the  extremities  of  the 
nerves,  or  in  the  nervous  fibres,  or  in  the  nerve  centres, 
or  in  the  brain  itself,  or  beyond  it.  Why,  then,  should 
we  not  perceive  the  physical  effect  in  our  internal 
organs  ? 

The  physical  character  of  the  immediate  object  of 
sensible  knowledge  was  not  at  first  forgotten.  It  sur- 
vived in  the  Epicurean  pliilosophy.  It  even  left  a  relic 
in  the  philosophy  of  Plato,  who  always  represents 
sensation  as  a  motion  communicated  from  matter 
through  body  to  soul.^  Hence  sense  never  appears  in 
any  Platonic  dialogue  as  a  part  of  the  soul,  nor  the 
sensible  object  as  something  purely  psychical.  It  is  not 
in  his  theory  of  sense,  but  of  reason,  that  Plato  becomes 
idealistic.  The  objects  of  sense  are,  according  to  him, 
results  of  material  motion  communicated  from  body  to 
soul ;  the  objects  of  rational  knowledge  are  results  com- 
municated from  inmiaterial  '  forms '  to  the  pure  soul. 

Aristotle  was  the  author  of  a  new  theory  of  the  sen- 
sible object.  He  had  an  aversion  to  atomism,  perhaps 
because  he  confused  it  with  materiahsm.  For  atoms  he 
substituted  primary  matter ;  instead  of  figure,  position, 
and  arrangement,  he  regarded  heat  and  cold,  dry  and 
liquid,  as  its  primary  contrarieties.^  The  Atomists 
considered  the  external  thing  to  be  wholly  corporeal ; 
Aristotle  divided  it  into  two  heterogeneous  substances 
— corporeal  matter  and  incorporeal  form  ^  — the  former 
of  which  was  different  for  each  individual,  the  latter  the 
same  for  all  individuals  of  one  kind.  While  the  Atomists 
had  held  that  the  sensible  object  which  results  from  the 

»  Plato,  Phil.  34  A ;  Ti7n.  42  A,  64.       ^  Arist.  De  Gen.  et  Corr.  ii.  1. 

^  Id.  Met.  Z  7  =  1032  B  14. 


cuAr.  IV.       ORIGIN  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


89 


external  thing  is  a  corporeal  efflux,  Aristotle  persuaded 
himself  and  his  followers  that  it  is  the  identical  incor- 
poreal form  transferred  without  the  different  corporeal 
matter  from  the  external  thing  into  the  sensitive  faculty, 
as  an  impression  is  transferred  without  the  metal  from 
a  metaUic  seal  into  wax.^     For  example,  vision,  accord- 
ing to  him,  receives  the  essence  of  white  without  the 
matter   of   the  external  wax   into  the    visual  faculty. 
Hence   his  distinction   of  nutrition  and  sensation:  in 
nutrition  we  receive  the  whole  thing,  in  sense  tlie  form 
without  the  matter  of  the  thing.     He  agreed,  indeed, 
with  his  predecessors  in  the  fundamental  point  that  the 
external  thing  is  not  presented,  but  that  the  sensible 
object  presented  is  a  representative  result  of  the  external 
thing.     But  this  object  in  our  senses,  which,  according 
to  the  Atomists,  was  a  corporeal  efflux,  was,  according 
to   Aristotle,   an   incorporeal   form,  called   by  himself 
alo-dybv  €lSo9,  and  by  his  scholastic  followers,  species 
sensibilis.     From  his  time  onwards,  the  object  of  sense 
began  to  be  usually  regarded  as  not  only  internal,  but 
also  incorporeal,  though  not  yet  as  a  purely  psychical 
object. 

Aristotle's  new  theory  of  the  object  and  nature  of 
sensitive  perception  is  charged  with  errors.  He  substi- 
tuted for  the  explanation  of  the  world  by  particles,  the 
abstractions  of  matter  and  form ;  he  inverted  the  real 
order  of  primary  and  secondary  by  making  heat  and 
cold  original  quahties  ;  he  arbitrarily  severed  a  single 
corporeal  thing  into  a  corporeal  and  an  incorporeal  half, 
and  by  this  latter  figment  endeavoured  to  explain  the 
object  of  sense.  We  see  here  the  beginning  of  the  false 
hypothesis  that  the  object  of  sense  is  not  a  corporeal 
fact.     Aristotle  was  right  in  thinking  that  sense  does 

^  Arist.  De  An.  ii.  12. 


90 


niYSICAL   REALISM 


PART  r. 


not  perceive  the  external  thing,  wrong  in  thinking  that 
what  it  perceives  witliin  is  an  incorporeal  form. 

Hamilton  has  misunderstood  these  Aristotelian  errors.^ 
He  says  truly  enough  that  Aristotle  distinguishes  proper 
from  common  objects  of  sense,^  and  that  the  former 
agree  with  tlie  secondary,  the  latter  with  primary  quali- 
ties. Jhit  he  misses  tlie  real  point  by  supposing  that 
Aristotle  meant  to  derive  the  former  from  the  latter. 
Aristotle  distinguished  proper  and  common  sensibles 
solely  in  relation  to  the  senses  which  perceive  them. 
Heat  and  cold,  for  example,  are  proper  sensible  objects 
of  toucli ;  but  so  far  from  being  regarded  by  Aristotle 
as  secondary  qualities,  they  form  one  pair  of  his  primary 
contrarieties  of  matter.  The  classification  into  common 
and  proper  is  not  intended  by  Aristotle  for  a  classifica- 
tion into  primary  and  secondary;  so  far  from  it,  his 
primary  qualities  are  falsely  taken  from  what  are  really 
secondary  qualities,  heat  and  cold,  dry  and  moist. 

Secondly,  Hamilton  rightly  says  that  Aristotle  calls 
such  quaUties  as  heat  and  cold  affective  quahties,  be- 
cause they  produce  affections  in  us.^  But  we  must  not 
therefore  infer  that  he  meant  either  that  they  produce 
this  effect  through  insensible  primary  quahties,  or  that 
they  are  themselves  mere  affections  in  us,  or  that,  being 
qualities  outside,  the  affections  are  not  hke  them.  These 
are  opinions  of  people  who  hold  an  atomistic  theory 
of  primary  and  secondary  qualities,  but  they  are  not 
Aristotelian.  In  fact,  the  most  fundamental  defect  in 
Aristotle's  natural  philosophy  is  the  supposition  that 
heat  and  cold  are  primary  contrarieties  of  matter  in- 
capable of  further  resolution.     His  opinion  was  that 

^  See    Eeid's  Works,   ed.  by   Hamilton,   Note   D,   on  Primary  and 
Secondary  Qualities. 

«  Arist.  Dc  An.  ii.  G.  3  i,|^  (.^^  8  =  9  A  28  seq. 


CHAP.  IV.       ORIGIN   OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


91 


heat  and  cold  are  real  and  original  qualities  of  matter, 
derived  from  no  others,  and  that  they  produce  in  us 
affections  of  heat  and  cold  similar  to  themselves.  This, 
morever,  was  his  theory  of  the  perception  of  all 
qualities. 

Thirdly,  Hamilton  is  right  in  saying  that,  according 
to  Aristotle,  there  is  an  identity  between  the  external 
o])ject  and  the  ol)ject  perceived.^     But  he  is  wrong  in 
inferring   from    this    identification    that,    according    to 
Aristotle,  the  external  object  is  presentatively  perceived 
without  any  intermediate  object.     The  identity  is  not  of 
existence  but  of  essence,  not  numerical  but  specific, 
not  numero  but  specie.     Aristotle  supposed  that  in  all 
members  of  a  kind  there  is  one  form,  and  that,  when 
one  member  of  a  kind  produces  another  member,  it  pro- 
pagates the  form,  or,  as  we  say  to  this  day  in  organisms, 
the  species,  from  its  own  matter  to  the  matter  of  the 
new  recipient  of  the  form  or  species.     Thus  he  supposed 
man  to  beget  man.^     Hence,  in  sensible  knowledire,  he 
supposed  that  the  external  object  propagates  the  form 
of  the  sensible  quahty,  such  as  heat,  without  its  own 
matter  into  the  matter  of  the  sense,  which  thus  receives 
the  form  or  species  of  heat  into  its  own  matter  without 
receiving  the  matter  of  the  body  which  propagates  the 
heat.     Therefore  the  hot  body  and  the  hot  affection  of 
sense  are  the  same  only  as  the  impression  on  the  seal 
is  the  same  as  the  impression  on  the  wax,  or  as  the 
father  is  the  same  as  the  son  ;  that  is,  the  same  in  form 
or  essence,  not  in  matter  or  existence,  the  same  specie 
but  different  numero,  like  but  not  the  same  objects. 

According  to  Aristotle,  then,  the  sensible  object  is 
not  numerically  identical  with  the  sensible  object,  but 


^  Arist.  De  An.  iii.  2  =  425  B  25-7. 

2  Id.  Met.  Z  7  8,  esp.  1033  B  29-1034  A  8. 


92 


PHYSICAL   TJEALISM 


PART  I. 


CHAP.  IV.       OUIGIN   OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISxM 


93 


only,  identical  in  essence.  It  is  the  form  or  species, 
without  the  matter  of  the  external  object,  propagated 
into  the  senses.  Aristotle  was  no  intuitive  realist.  He 
held,  indeed,  that  sense  perceives  the  identical  essence 
of  the  external  thing,  but  not  the  external  thing  itself; 
and  he  held  that  it  receives  this  essence  into  the  sensi- 
tive faculty,  and  does  not  apprehend  it  in  the  external 
world.  In  short,  his  theory  was  a  new  form  of  repre- 
sentation, in  which  the  object  of  sense  was  regarded 
no  longer  as  a  corporeal  efflux,  but  as  an  incorporeal 
essence  received  without  the  corporeal  matter  from  a 
corporeal  object  into  the  senses,  and  there  perceived. 

As  the  objects  of  sensible  knowledge  are  sensible 
species,  so  the  objects  of  rational  knowledge  are  intel- 
ligible species,  according  to  Aristotle.  The  difference 
is  in  the  mode  of  production.  The  former  are  propa- 
gated by  external  ol)jects  into  the  sensitive  faculty,  the 
latter  by  active  intelligence  into  passive  intelhgence. 
Aristotle  has  not  explained  this  mysterious  influence  of 
intelligence  on  intelligence  in  the  same  soul ;  nor  is  it 
probable  that  he  proceeded  on  any  other  fact  than  the 
consciousness  that,  while  we  depend  on  externals  to 
perceive,  we  can  command  our  own  thoughts.  It  would 
be,  however,  useless  to  go  into  this  question.  The 
important  point  for  our  present  purpose  is  that  both 
sensible  and  intelligible  species  are,  in  the  view  of 
Aristotle,  immaterial,  not  material,  objects.  In  his  philo- 
sophy, for  the  first  time,  we  come  to  the  view  that  all 
the  immediate  objects  of  knowledge  are  immaterial  facts. 

We  must  not  therefore  fly  to  the  supposition  that 
Aristotle  thought  them  to  be  psychical  because  they 
were  immaterial.  We  have  not  yet  exhausted  the  mys- 
teries of  the  Aristotelian  form.  A  form  is  supposed 
by  him  to  be  not  only  one  in  connection  Avitli  many 


matters  of  different  members  of  the  same  kind,  but  also 
to  be  something  different  from  matter,  even  when  so 
closely  conjoined  with  matter  in  f^ict,  and  so  inseparable 
from  it  in  definition,  as  concavity  with  nose  in  snubnoye, 
and  soul  with  body  in  an  animal.    Every  form,  the  form 
of  a  triangle,  the  form  of  a  stone,  the  form  of  a  house, 
is  an  immaterial  substance,  even  when  conjoined  witli 
matter  in  a  material  substance.     The  form  of  God  Him- 
self is  pure,  not  in  tlie  sense  of  being  less  material  than 
other  forms,  but  only  in  the  sense  of  never  being  con- 
joined with  matter.      Hence,  sensible  and  intelhgible 
species  or  forms  arc  nnmaterial,  not  because  they  are 
in  the  soul,  but  simply  because  all  forms  are  immaterial, 
according   to  Aristotle,    who    thought  that   if  I   per- 
ceive a  white  paper,  I  receive  from  the  paper  into  my 
sensitive  faculty  an  identical  essence  of  white,  wliicli 
was  already  incorporeal  in  the  paper  before  it  was  com- 
municated to  the  sensitive  faculty  of  my  soul.     The 
object  of  sense,  then,  had,  in  his  pliilosophy,  ceased  to 
be  material,  but  had  not  yet  become  a  psychical  fact : 
it  is  an  essence,  which  is  not  matter,  whether  it   is 
without  or  within  a  soul. 

Descartes  completed  the  separation  of  the  sensible 
object  from  the  external  world.  The  Atomists  had 
taken  the  first  step  by  discovering  that  the  object  of 
sense  is  not  the  external  thing,  but  an  internal  effect ; 
but  they  admitted  that  it  is,  hke  its  external  cause, 
purely  physical,  and  no  more  has  been  proved  to  this 
very  day.  Aristotle,  however,  had  proceeded  to  apply 
the  hypothesis  of  incorporeal  forms  to  sense,  and  sup- 
posed that  the  object  of  sense  is  a  sensible  species, 
similar  to  the  physical  cause  in  identical  incorporeal 
essence,  but  not  in  diverse  corporeal  matter.  It  remained 
for  Descartes  to  take  the  final  step  and  destroy  the  last 


94 


rilYSICAL   REALISM 


PAUT   1. 


vestige  of  resemblance  to  tlie  pliysical  cause  by  identi- 
fying the  object  of  sense  with  a  psychical  idea. 

The  history  of  philosophy  had  insensibly  led,  or 
rather  misled,  Descartes  into  his  ideal  theory.  In  the 
philosophy  of  Aristotle  the  incorporeal  is  wider  than 
the  psychical,  because  all  essences  are  incorporeal  even 
in  physical  things.  But  in  the  interval  between  ancient 
and  modern  philosophy,  the  hypothesis  of  the  incor- 
porealism  of  essences  w\as  discredited,  partly  by  the 
attacks  of  Nominalism,  but  more  successfully  by  the 
revival  of  natural  philosophy,  and  especially  by  the 
return  to  Atomism,  inaugurated  by  Bacon,  from  whom 
it  passed  to  Descartes.  Bacon  discovered  that  the 
essence  of  anything  physical  is  nothing  but  a  uniform 
mode  of  its  matter.^  Descartes  thought  that  it  is  only 
a  psychical  idea.'^  In  these  circumstances  his  hypo- 
thesis of  the  sensible  object  developed  itself,  as  it 
were,  from  the  course  of  history.  The  sensible  object 
had  been  identified  by  Aristotle  with  the  incorporeal 
essence ;  the  incorporeal  had  been  recently  expunged 
by  Bacon  from  the  physical  world ;  the  essence  was 
limited  by  Descartes  himself  to  the  psychical  idea. 
What  more  natural  than  to  regard  the  sensible  object 
also  as  a  psychical  idea  ? 

Descartes,  it  is  true,  went  back  to  the  Atomists 
for  the  analysis  of  nature  into  corpuscles.  He  might 
also,  especially  since  Galen's  discoveries  in  the  nervous 
system,  have  restored  the  Atomistic  theory  that  the 
object  of  sense  is  a  pliysical  effect  on  our  organs,  and 
have  added  that  it  is  an  effect  on  the  nervous  svsteni. 
His  writings  do,  indeed,  show  that  he  was  not  always 
certain  whether  the  sensible  effect  is  physical  or  psy- 
chical.    Sometimes  he   even   seems  almost   to  express 

'  Nov.  Org.  i.  51 ;  ii.  17,  20,  52.  ^  Princ.  i.  58. 


CHAP.  IV.       GRICUN   OF   rSYCIIOLOGICAl.   IDEALISM 


95 


himself  as  if  the  idea  itself  were  not  distinct  from  the 
nervous  imprint.  But  he  finally  and  dehberately  sepa- 
rated it  from  the  physical  effect  in  the  brain  in  his 
Eephes  to  the  Objections  raised  ao^ainst  his  Medita- 
tions.  The  '  Eesponsio  ad  Secundas  Objectioiies '  con- 
tains a  synthetic  statement  of  reasons  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  arranged  in  geometrical  order,  and  the 
second  definition  is  a  formal  definition  of  the  idea,  as 
follows : — 

'  By  the  name,  Idea,  I  understand  that  form  of  any 
thought,  by  whose  immediate  perception  I  am  conscious 
of  that  same  thought;  so  that  I  can  express  nothin<T 
in  words  in  understanding  that  which  I  say,  but  tluat 
from  this  very  fact  it  is  certain  there  is  in  me  an  idea 
of  that  which  is  signified  by  those  words.  And  so 
it  is  not  only  the  images  depicted  in  the  fancy  that  I 
call  ideas :  nay,  these  I  here-  by  no  means  call  ideas, 
so  far  as  they  are  depicted  in  the  corporeal  fancy, 
that  is,  in  some  part  of  the  brain,  but  only  so  far  as 
they  inform  the  mind  itself  turned  towards  that  part 
of  the  brain.' 

The  influence  of  Descartes  did  not  at  once  make 
itself  felt  in  all  parts  of  philosophy.  Enghsh  natural 
philosophy  in  this  as  in  other  matters  took  an  indepen- 
dent course,  which  accounts  for  one  finding  Aristotle's 
theory  of  the  sensible  object  surviving  in  iS^'ewton's 
Optics.  In  Qua3st.  20  :N'ewton  asks  ;  '  Annon  sensorium 
animalium  est  locus  cui  substantia  sentiens  adest,  et 
in  quern  sensibiles  rerum  species  per  nervos  et  cerebrum 
deferuntur,  ut  ibi  praesentes  a  pra^sente  sentiri  possint  ?  ' 
Similarly  English  theology  did  not  at  first  think  it 
necessary  to  salvation  to  consider  sensible  objects,  or 
sensation,  or  even  consciousness  itself,  to  be  psy- 
chical, as  we   may  see  from  the  following  passao-e  in 


90 


PHYSICAL   REALISM 


TART  I. 


'Tritlieism  cliarged  upon  Pr.  Sherlock's  new  Notion 
of  the  Trinity,'  by  a  Divine  of  the  Church  of  Eng- 
land ^ : — 

'  I  deny  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as  sensation, 
whether  internal  or  external,  belonging  to  spirits  not 
vitally  united  to  organised  bodies.  For  sensation  is 
properly  the  perception  of  a  sensible  object  by  a  sensible 
species  of  it  imprinted  upon  and  received  into  the  proper 
orf^an  by  which  each  sensitive  faculty  operates  and 
exerts  itself.  This,  I  say,  is  sensation,  and  accordingly, 
as  it  is  external  or  internal,  so  it  has  external  or  internal 
organs  allotted  to  it ;  but  still  both  of  them  corporeal. 
And  therefore  for  this  man  to  talk  of  spiritual  sensa- 
tion is  nonsense  and  a  contradiction  in  the  terms,  and 
consequently  not  to  be  allowed'  (p.  15). 

But  mental  pliilosophers,  not  only  on  the  Continent 
but  also  in  England,  more  quickly  received  the  hypo- 
thesis of  a  psychical  object  of  sense.  At  first,  Locke 
simply  accepted  the  Cartesian  '  idea.'  Then  Hume  dis- 
tinguished the  '  impression'  from  the  idea.  Kant  made 
'  phcenomenon '  the  fashionable  term.  Mill  preferred 
'  sensation.'  But  all  agree  in  some  psychical  object  or 
other.  Moreover,  mental  physiologists  have  passed  over 
from  Aristotle  and  Newton  to  Descartes,  when  they 
ou<^ht  rather  to  have  retraced  their  steps  from  Newton 
through  Aristotle  to  the  Atomists.  The  Cartesian  hypo- 
thesis,  that  the  object  of  sense  is  a  purely  psychical  idea, 
is  not  so  near  the  truth  as  Aristotle's  hypothesis,  that 
it  is  an  incorporeal  but  not  psychical  species  in  the 
sensitive  faculty ;  nor  is  the  Aristotelian  so  near  as  the 
Atomistic  hypothesis,  that  it  is  a  purely  physical  effect 
on  the  bodily  organs.  All  that  is  required  to  make 
this  last,  or  rather  this  first,  the  truth  is  to  substitute 

»  Dr.  South. 


CHAP.  IV.       ORIGIN  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


97 


I 


for  effluxes   mechanical   motions,  and   for  the    bodily 
organs  the  nervous  system  sensibly  affected. 

'  Meanwhile,'  says  Bacon,  '  let  nobody  expect  great 
progress  in  the  sciences  (especially  on  their  productive 
side)  unless  natural  philosophy  has  been  extended  to 
the  special  sciences,  and  the  special  sciences  reduced  to 
natural  philosophy.     Hence  it  happens  that  astronomy, 
optics,  music,  most  of  the  mechanical  arts,  and  (what 
may  seem  more  strange)  moral  and  political  philosophy, 
and  the  logical   sciences,  have   Uttle  or  no  extent  in 
depth,   but   only  slide   over   the    surface  and  variety 
of  things  :  because,   as  soon  as  those  special  sciences 
have  been  divided  and  established,  they  are  no  longer 
nourished   by   natural   philosophy  ;    which,    from   the 
sources  and  true  contemplations  of  the  motions,  rays, 
sounds,  texture,  and  structure  of  bodies,  affections,  and 
intellectual  apprehensions,  had  been  able  to  impart  to 
them  new  force  and  increase.     It  is  not  at  all  wonderful, 
if  sciences  do  not  grow,  when  they  have  been  separated 
from  their  roots.'  ^     The  revival  of  Atomism  by  Bacon, 
together  with  the  gradual  establishment  of  the  laws  of 
motion  in  mechanics,  from  Galileo  to  Newton,  produced  an 
instauration  of  natural  philosophy.     Let  us  now,  in  the 
same  spirit,  return  to  natural  philosophy,  in  order  to 
restore  mental  philosophy.     '  Interitus  rei  arcetur  per 
reductionem  ejus  ad  principia.' 

*  Bacon,  Nov.  Org.  i.  80. 


I 


Part  II. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM. 


•  Pcssimum  cnim  omnium  est  augurium  quod  ex  Conscn&u  cajntur  in  rebus 
Litcllecttialibus.' 

Bacon,  Xov.  Org.  i.  77. 


H  2 


101 


CHAPTEE  V. 


DESCARTES. 

Philosophy  ought  to  begin  in  doubt.  But  I  cannot 
doubt  that  I  tliink.  Cogito,  ergo  sum.  As  a  thinking 
being,  I  am  a  soul,  distinct  from  the  body.  Soul  is 
thinking  substance;  body  is  extended  substance;  they 
are  heterogeneous  to  each  other.  The  soul  immediately 
apprehends  ideas,  innate,  adventitious,  and  fictitious. 
The  clearness  and  distinctness  of  ideas  are  a  criterion  of 
trutli,  and  by  the  veracity  of  God,  enable  me  to  know 
objects  beyond  ideas.  Starting  from  ideas,  I  infer  a 
physical  world  of  bodies  and  insensible  corpuscles,  whose 
quahties  are  partly  like  and  partly  unhke  those  which  I 
perceive  as  sensible  ideas,  and  whose  insensible  modes 
produce  sensible  ideas.  These  are  the  cardinal  points 
of  Cartesian  idealism. 

Cogito,  ergo  sum. — I  think,  therefore  I  am.  This  is 
the  indubitable  fact,  which  Descartes  had  the  undying 
merit  of  elevating  into  a  principle  in  mental  philosophy. 
The  proposition  was  not  new.  Aristotle  asserted  our 
consciousness  of  our  operations,^  and  even  recognised 
this  fact  as  a  proof  of  our  existence.  But  he  did  not  j 
convert  the  proposition  into  a  psychological  principle. 
He  rightly  founded  the  distinctions  of  operations  on  the 
distinctions  of  their  objects :  hence  his  discovery  of 
nearly  all  that  is  known  in   mental  philosophy.     He 

1  Eth.  Nic.  ix.  9,  9. 


102 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   IT. 


wrongly  neglected  tlie  consciousness  of  the  operations 
about  those  ol)jects  :  hence  his  tendency  to  dogmatism. 
Descartes  supplied  a  defect  in  psychology  when  he 
discovered  the  necessity  of  using  as  a  principle  the  con- 
sciousness which  says  to  each  of  us :  'I  think ;  that 
is,  I  feel,  perceive,  remember,  imagine,  judge,  reason, 
desire,  will :  I  therefore  am.' 

It  is  a  principle.  Is  it  the  only  principle  of  psycho- 
logy ?  How  far  will  this  conscious  fact,  that  I  am,  carry 
me  ?  I  am  conscious  that  I  am  a  thinking  subject. 
Jiut  two  further  questions  immediately  present  them- 
selves :  what  am  I,  and  what  do  I  apprehend  ?  Wliat 
is  the  thinking  subject,  and  what  the  apprehended  ob- 
ject? Now  the  mere  consciousness  that  I  think  will 
not  of  itself  solve  the  nature  of  either  subject  or  object. 
The  new  principle  of  thinking  was  no  more  fitted  than 
the  old  principle  of  contradiction  to  be  a  universal 
source  of  all  philosophy :  it  must  be  accepted,  without 
pledging  us  to  all  the  Cartesian  deductions. 

What  is  the  thinking  subject?  What  am  I?  This 
terrific  question  is  answered  by  Descartes,  as  if  it  im- 
mediately followed  from  the  principle,  I  think  therefore 
I  am,  but  really  by  another  argument.  He  cannot  say, 
I  am  conscious  that  I  now  think,  as  soul,  w^ithout  a 
body.  He  therefore  substitutes  the  hypothesis,  I  can 
suppose  that  I  had  no  body  and  was  still  thinking.  He 
then  concludes  that  I,  as  thinking  subject,  am  not  body 
but  soul.  Thus,  by  an  easy  transition,  he  leads  his 
readers  from  thinking  subject  to  soul,  and  makes,  not 
the  original  principle,  but  an  hypothesis  and  a  problem- 
atic conclusion  the  real  premises  of  his  philosophy. 

In  order  that  we  may  feel  the  weakness  of  this  non 
sequitur,  let  us  quote  from  the  '  Discussion  on  Method,' 
Part  lY.,  the  passage  which  innnediately  follows  the 


CHAP.   V. 


DESCARTES 


103 


enunciation    of    the    principle,    I    think   therefore    I 
am  : — 

'  In  the  next  place,  I  attentively  examined  what  I 
was,  and  as  I  observed  that  I  could  suppose  that  I  had 
no  body,  and  that  there  was  no  world  nor  any  place  in 
which  I  might  be ;  but  that  I  could  not  therefore  sup- 
pose that  I  was  not ;  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  from 
the  very  circumstance  that  I  thought  to  doubt  of  the 
truth  of  other  things,  it  most  clearly  and  certainly  fol- 
lowed that  I  was  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  I  had 
only  ceased  to  think,  although  all   the  other  objects 
which  I  had  ever  imagined  had  been  in  reality  existent, 
I  would  have  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  I  existed ;  I 
thence  concluded  that  I  was  a  substance  whose  whole 
essence  or  nature  consists  only  in  thinking,  and  which, 
that  it  may  exist,  has  need  of  no  place,  nor  is  dependent 
on  any  material  thing ;  so  that  "  I,"  that  is  to  say,  the 
mind  by  which  I  am  what  I  am,  is  plainly  distinct  from 
the  body,  and  is  even  more    easily  known    than   the 
latter,  and  is  such,  that  although  the  latter  were  not,  it 
would  still  continue  to  be  all  that  it  is.' 

'  I  could  suppose  I  had  no  body.'  What  is  the 
nature  of  this  proposition  ?  It  is  an  hypothesis  of  what 
might  be  but  is  not.  ^  I  am  not  conscious  that  I  have  no 
body ;  I  am  at  best>^%  conscious  of  the  supposition, 
Avhich  does  not  become  any  less  a  supposition  through 
my  being  conscious  of  making  it.  Nor  is  it  deduced 
from  the  consciousness  that  I  think,  but  is  a  separate 
hypothesis.  Again,  how  do  we  get  to  the  proposition, 
I  am  a  thinking  substance  wholly  distinct  from  the 
body  ?  It  is  a  conclusion  not  from  the  original  principle 
alone,  but  also  from  the  subsequent  hypothesis,  requiring 
also  a  second  hypothesis,  that  without  a  bodv  I  should 
still  be  thinking. 


104 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


We  must,  therefore,  most  carefully  distinguish  the 
original  principle,  cogito,  ergo  sum,  from  the  subsequent 
conclusion,  I  am  a  soul.  In  the  first  place,  I  am  con- 
scious of  the  former,  not  of  the  latter.  I  am  conscious 
that  I  am  a  thinking  subject :  I  am  not  conscious  that 
this  thinking  subject  is  not  body  but  soul.  Secomlly, 
in  order  to  deduce  the  conclusion,  the  principle  requires 
the  intervention  of  two  hypotheses — that  I  could  have 
no  body  and  that  I  should  still  be  thinking  ;  and  in  both 
cases  I  am  conscious  of  making  the  suppositions,  but 
not  conscious  of  the  facts  that  I  have  no  body  and  am 
still  thinking.  But  sectetur  partem  conclusio  deteriorem. 
An  hypothetical  premise  produces  an  hypothetical  con- 
clusion. The  conclusion,  then,  that  the  thinking  subject 
is  not  body  but  soul,  has  not  the  certainty  of  the 
principle,  cogito,  ergo  sum,  but  is  vitiated  by  the  hypo- 
theses combined  with  it.  Thus  does  Descartes  lead  his 
reader  to  confuse  the  thinker  and  the  soul,  and  transfer 
the  conscious  certainty  of  being  res  cogitans  to  the  hypo- 
thesis of  being  res  a  corpore  plane  distincta. 

That  I  am  a  thinking  subject  is  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness ;  but  what  I  am,  as  thinking  subject,  is  a  matter  of 
argument.  There  are  three  possible  alternatives:  the 
body,  the  soul,  the  man.  Nor  can  we  decide  between 
these  three  alternatives  by  consciousness  alone.  Con- 
sciousness, without  hypothesis,  never  made  a  philoso- 
pher either  a  materialist  or  a  spiritualist.  We  must 
not  make  a  fetish  of  consciousness,  but  interrogate  it 
carefully,  remember  its  superficiality,  add  to  it  observa- 
tion, and  combine  both  with  reasoning. 

In  discussions  of  this  kind  a  false  issue  is  generally 

/raised   at   once   by  speaking   of  the   consciousness  of 

thoughts.      This   is   an  abstraction,  useful   indeed  for 

some  purposes,  but  still   an   abstraction,  or  rather  a 


CHAP.   V. 


DESCARTES 


105 


double  abstraction.  There  is  no  such  a  thing  as  con-  | 
sciousness,  and  no  such  a  thing  as  a  thought ;  I  am 
conscious,  and  I  am  conscious  that  I  think.  Conscious- 
ness and  thought  are  not  there,  waiting  for  a  subject ; 
they  already  have  a  subject,  or  rather  subjects — myself, 
yourself,  every  other  thinker.  Descartes,  in  a  great 
measure  at  all  events,  avoided  this  fallacy  of  hypostasis- 
ing  abstractions.  He  was  aware  that  there  is  no  con- 
sciousness of  thoughts,  but  I  am  conscious  that  I  think. 
He  surreptitiously  changed  the  thinker  into  soul,  but 
not  into  abstract  thoughts.  Those  modern  philosophers 
Avho  suppose  consciousness  of  thoughts  are  not  votaries 
of  consciousness,  but  victims  of  abstraction. 

I  am,  then,  not  thoughts,  but  a  thinker  or  thinking 
subject.  But  what  is  this  subject  which  thinks  ?  What 
part  of  me  is  the  factor,  or  what  parts  are  the  factors  of 
thinking  ?  In  this  mortal  state,  in  which  I  cannot  ap- 
prehend myself  without  my  body,  I  am  not  conscious 
that  I  think  without  my  body.  Nay,  I  am  conscious  that 
I  think  with  my  body.  Whatever  operation  I  take,  I  in- 
variably find  that  I  am  conscious,  not  of  the  operation, 
which  I  may  afterwards  abstract,  but  of  myself  per- 
forming it ;  I  am  not  conscious  that  I  perform  it  by  my 
soul  without  my  body,  because,  though  I  am  conscious 
that  I  am  a  thinking  subject,  I  am  not  conscious  that 
this  is  a  soul ;  nor  am  I  conscious  that  I  do  it  by  my 
body  without  my  soul,  for  reasons  to  follow  presently. 
I  am  conscious  that  I  perform  every  operation  by  my 
body,  partly,  somehow,  and  somewhere.  I  consciously 
feel  pleased  and  pained  in  various  parts  of  my  body.  I 
cannot  disengage  my  consciousness  of  toothache  from 
my  mouth,  or  of  headache  from  my  head.  I  am  con- 
scious of  using  my  bodily  senses  in  touch,  taste,  vision, 
hearing,  and  smell.     I  do  not  consciously  first  feel  the 


106 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART  IT. 


sensation  and  then  refer  it  to  the  l>odily  member ;  I  am 
not  conscious  of  these  two  stei)s.  Reasoning  is  the 
highest  kind  of  thinking  ;  I  am  conscious  of  doing  it 
m  my  liead,  and  by  no  force  of  abstraction  can  I  get  it 
out  of  my  liead.  Similarly  I  am  conscious  that  I  will 
in  my  head,  and  I  am  conscious  that  my  head  may  ache 
with  reasoning,  and  dehberating,  and  resolving.  My 
body  is  not  a  mere  companion  but  a  conscious  partner 
of  all  my  thoughts. 

But  consciousness  is  a  superficial  power.     In  speak- 
ing of  the  data  of  sense  I  remarked  tliat  by  an  illusion, 
arising  from  the  confusion  of  sense  and  inference,  we 
cannot  help  seeming  to  be  conscious  that   sense  per- 
ceives an  external  object,  though  we  can  make  ourselves 
independent   of    the    illusion    by   science,    which   dis- 
tniguishes  the  external  from  the  sensible.     There  is  a 
similar  illusion  about  our  consciousness  of  the  thinking 
subject,  and  fortunately  we  can  explain  it  and  conquer 
it  by  science.     The  illusion  is  that  we  perform  some  of 
our  operations  on  the  surfaces  by  the  superficial  mem- 
bers of  our  bodies.     The  causes  of  the  illusion  are  that 
we  often  observe  the  outer  surfaces  of  our  bodies  when 
we  are  performing  an  internal  operation,  and  we  are  at 
the  same  time  unconscious  of  the  inner  structures  and 
motions  of  our  nerves  and  brain.     The  way  to  make 
ourselves  conquer  the  illusion  is  by  the  study  of  science, 
which  shows  that  what  performs^  the  operation  is  not 
the  outer  surface  but  the  inner  nervous  system.    For 
example,  we  are  conscious  that  we  see  something  red 
somehow  by  our  bodily  organs  of  sight.     J^ow,  thouoh 
we  are  sensible  of  the  optic  nerve  so  for  as  it  is  sensibly 
affected  with  red,  we  are  neither  sensible  nor  conscious 
of  it  as  nervously  constituted.     But  from  very  early 
inf^mcy  we  observe,  i.e.  directly  infer  from  sensation. 


CHAP.    V. 


DESCARTES 


107 


the  surfaces  of  our  bodies.     By  putting  our  hands  on 
our  eyes  we  find  that  they  no  longer  see  red,  and  we 
infer  that  it  was  our  eyes  that  saw  red.     It  is  so  with 
all   our  external  senses,  as  they  are  called  from  this 
illusion  of  observation.     Not  consciousness,  but  obser- 
vation from  very  early  infancy,  made  us  believe  that  it 
was  the  periphery  that  is  sensitive.     But  the  inference 
became  automatic  before  we  were  attentively  conscious, 
and  we  cannot  help  seeming  to  be  conscious  that  our 
eyes  see.     Eeally,  however,  as  science  discovers  at  last, 
the  eyes  are  but  avenues  to  vision,  and  what  sees  is  not 
our  eyes  but  the  optic  nerve  in  connection  with  the 
brain.     A  more  complicated  instance  is  when  a  person 
who  has  lost  a  limb  believes  that  the  pain,  which  he 
really  feels  in  the  nerves,  is  still  in  the  limb.     His  con- 
sciousness told  him  but  vaguely  where  he  feels  the  pain, 
his  observations  connected  it  with  the  surface  of  the 
limb;  hence  the  illusion.     Science  alone  can  conquer 
such  illusions  of  observation. 

The  rough-and-ready  way  of  dealing  with  this  evi- 
dence is  to  draw^  the  further  inference  that  we  do  not 
localise  any  operation  except  by  observation  and  ana- 
tomy, and  that  consciousness  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
body.      But  this  inference  goes  far  beyond  the  facts. 
Observation  is  limited  to  the  surface  of  the  body,  but 
the  operations,  of  which  we   are  conscious,  are   not. 
^"ow,  even  when  they  are  purely  internal,  we  are  still 
conscious    that   they  are    somehow  performed  by  the 
body,   without   observation   and   before   science.     For 
example,  we  are  conscious  of  the  pangs  of  hunger  in 
the  region  of  the  stomach,  to  descend  to  the  depths  of 
consciousness :  to  rise  to  its  summit,  we  are  conscious 
of  the  process  of  reasoning  in  the  region  of  the  head. 
But  in  neither  case  does  observation  of  the  surface  of 


108 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


the  body  reveal  tlie  whereabouts  of  the  operation :  yet 
we  are  conscious  of  the  body  performing  it,  without 
waiting  for  science. 

But  there  is  another  defect,  for  which  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  body  as  a  factor  in  thinking  is  responsible. 
It  tells  me  very  indefinitely  what  part  is  engaged  in  a 
particular  operation.  The  cause  of  this  indefiniteness 
is  the  unconsciousness  of  nervous  structure  and  motion. 
The  correction  of  it  is  the  science  of  nervous  structure 
and  motion.  Thus,  confining  ourselves  entirely  to  in- 
ternal operations,  the  locality  of  which  is  not  accessible 
to  external  observation,  I  am  conscious  of  the  pain  of 
hunjxer  somewhere  in  the  re^^ion  of  the  stomach  ;  science 
reduces  this  indefinite  verdict  to  definiteness  by  proving 
the  connection  of  the  nerves  of  that  region  with  the 
brain.  Consciousness  again  says  indefinitely,  '  I  think 
in  my  head ' ;  science  tells  me,  '  Yes,  in  your  brain.' 

Here  science  only  corrects  consciousness  :  it  does  not 
contradict  it.  Consciousness  apprehends  the  indefinite 
region  at  work,  science  discovers  the  definite  nervous 
structure  in  the  direction  of  that  region.  Secondly, 
unless  consciousness  apprehended  the  region,  science 
could  not  assign  tli3  nervous  structure  ;  if  we  were  not 
already  conscious  of  reasoning  in  the  head,  anatomy 
would  not  convince  us  that  we  reason  in  the  brain. 
Thirdly,  sometimes  consciousness  apprehends  the  region 
without  science  having  yet  discovered  the  nervous 
structure ;  for  example,  we  are  conscious,  in  what  is 
inadequately  called  muscular  sense,  not  indeed  of  mus- 
cular motion  but  of  the  action  of  our  limbs,  though 
but  vaguely  and  indefinitely ;  but  on  this  occasion 
science  is  still  more  vague  and  indefinite,  having  dis- 
covered the  nervous  mechanism  of  muscular  motion, 
but   not  of  muscular  sense.     Finally,  liowever  wrong 


CHAP.    T. 


DESCARTES 


109 


consciousness  may  be  in  the  definite  locality  of  a  parti- 
cular operation,  science  never  disproves  that  we  are 
conscious  of  its  being  performed  somewhere  in  the 
body.  I  am  conscious  that  I  perform  all  my  operations 
somehow  or  another,  partly  by  the  body,  with  more  or 
less  definiteness ;  science  discovers  the  definite  locality, 
still  within  the  body. 

There  are  two  points,  which  sometimes  appear  in 
biological  treatises,  but  are  not  proved.  In  the  first 
place,  as  we  have  already  seen,  there  is  no  biological 
proof  that  cerebral  motion  is  transmuted  into  a  psy- 
chical sensation.  Secondly,  biologists  often  distinguish 
a  sensation  from  its  localisation  ;  at  the  same  time  they 
sometimes  confuse  its  localisation  in  the  body  with  the 
inference  of  its  external  cause.  There  is  a  great  differ- 
ence between  a  sensation  of  an  internal  sensible  object 
and  the  inference  of  its  external  cause,  as  we  have 
already  seen  in  this  essay.  But  there  is  no  difference 
between  the  sensation  and  its  internal  localisation  in 
the  sentient  subject ;  there  is  no  proof  of  these  two 
steps.  I  am  conscious  of  the  sensation  in  a  locality  of 
my  body.  Neither  consciousness  nor  science  proves 
that  I  first  have  a  sensation,  then  localise  it  in  my 
body,  and,  thirdly,  infer  its  external  cause.  They  prove 
together  that  I  first  have  a  sensation  located  in  some 
part  of  my  body,  and  then  infer  the  external  cause 
which  produces  it. 

There  is  another  point,  which  is  proved  in  biology, 
but  does  not  disprove  the  consciousness  of  the  body  as 
a  factor  in  thinking.  I  refer  to  subjective  sensations. 
We  have  sensations  similar  to  our  ordinary  sensations, 
but  not  produced  by  the  ordinary  external  cause.  Thus, 
a  prize-fighter  may  be  made  by  a  blow  to  see  stars ;  a 
drunkard  under  the  influence  of  delirium  tremens  may 


no 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


have  a  vision  of  tlie  devil.  Such  sensations  are  excel- 
lent instances  to  show  that  the  sensible  object  is  different 
from  the  external  original,  and  is  not  always  caused  by 
it ;  that  there  are  internal  causes  of  sensations  in  the 
nerves  ;  and  that  the  superficial  structure  of  the  eye  is 
a  cause,  not  a  subject,  of  vision.  But  they  do  not  show 
that  the  soul  is  the  sole  subject  of  vision.  A  prize- 
fitditer  seeinf?  stars,  a  drunkard's  vision  of  the  devil, 
are  odd  proofs  of  psychical  sensations.  The  term  '  sub- 
jective '  sensations  is  misleading,  because,  in  the  recent 
sense  of  the  word,  it  suggests  'psychical,'  without 
proving  it. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  sensation,  or  any  other 
operation,  is  purely  psychical.  There  is  evidence  that 
the  body  is  a  factor  in  all  thinking.  It  is  the  evidence 
of  consciousness,  interpreted  by  science.  I  am  not 
conscious  first  of  a  sensation,  and  then  of  its  locali- 
sation. I  am  conscious  that  I  feel,  perceive,  reason, 
will,  partly  by  my  body.  External  observation  connects 
some  of  these  operations  with  the  surface  of  the  body. 
'Science  shows  that  I  do  all  of  them  by  my  nervous 
system.  Science  dispels  the  illusion  of  observation,  and 
corrects  the  indefiniteness  of  consciousness.  Science 
further  traces  the  continuity  of  the  nervous  system,  and 
leaves  no  gap  for  purely  psychical  operations.  Now, 
ordinary  and  scientific  observation  being  limited  to  the 
body,  if  I  were  only  conscious  of  mere  thinking,  I  should 
know  my  body  only  as  an  unthinking  cause.  But  when 
I  cannot  be  conscious  that  I  perform  any  operation 
without  being  conscious  that  I  perform  it  somehow  in 
my  body,  that  I  feel  headache,  that  I  use  my  bodily 
senses  to  see,  touch,  hear,  and  so  on,  and  that  I  reason 
in  my  head,  scientific  observation  becomes  an  inter- 
preter of  my  consciousness  that  I  use  my  body  to  think, 


CHAP.   V. 


DESCARTES 


111 


and  shows  that  the  part  which  I  use  is  the  brain  in  con- 
nection with  the  nervous  system.  The  body  is  a  patent 
factor  of  the  thinking  subject.  The  neglect  of  it  is  the 
fallacy  of  spirituahsm. 

It  does  not  follow  that  the  bodv  is  the  sole  factor  of 
thinking.     Man  does  not  know  the  whole  of  himself, 
either  by  consciousness  or  by  scientific  observation  ;  the 
former  is  superficial,  the  latter  hmited.     I  am  conscious 
that  I  perform  my  operations  partly  by  my  body  :  science 
observes  the  nervous  system,  and  in  combination  with 
consciousness,  infers  that  the  nervous  system  is  that  by 
which  the  body  in  part  performs  these  operations.     But 
I  am  not  conscious  that  my  body,  nor  does   science 
observe  that  the  nervous  system,  is  the  whole  thinking 
subject.     There  is  no  operation  which  can  be  traced 
throughout  its  whole  course.     I  am  conscious  that  I 
use   my  bodily  senses   in   sensation  and   my  head  in 
reasoning.     Science  observes   the  nervous  system  and 
brain.     But  it  has  not  solved  the  problem  of  nervous 
and  cerebral  motion.     If  it  solved  that  problem,  it  would 
stdl  remain  to  prove  that  nervous  motion  is  completely 
identical  with  the  operation  of  which  I  am  conscious. 
It  is  partly  so,  because  I  am  conscious  of  partly  per- 
forming the  operation  by  the  body,  in  which  science  ob- 
serves the  nervous  system  and  the  motion  it  performs 
during  the  operation.     But  it  is  another  thing  to  prove 
that  the  conscious  operation  and  the  nervous   motion 
are  completely  identical,  because  I  am  conscious  of  the 
operation  without   observing  it,   and  science   observes 
the  motion  without  being  conscious  of  it.     This  differ- 
ence of  evidence  does  not,  indeed,   prove  a  complete 
difference,  because  nervous  motion  and  conscious  opera- 
tion may  be  the  same  fact  approached  from  different 
sides,  but  the  very  difference  of  evidence  makes  it  diffi- 


112 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


cult  to  prove  a  complete  identity  of  fact.  Another 
evidence  might  be  evoked — the  method  of  explanation. 
If  all  the  facts  of  conscious  operations  were  known,  and 
nervous  motions  were  known,  it  might  be  urged  that 
the  former  are  explicable  by  the  latter,  as  the  facts  of 
light  are  explicable  by  undulating  motion.  But  there 
is  a  great  difference  in  the  two  cases.  In  the  case  of 
light,  we  can  say  that  its  facts  are  such  as  the  known 
effects  of  undulation  by  the  laws  of  motion.  But  the 
operations,  of  which  we  are  conscious,  do  not  seem  to 
consciousness  to  be  the  kind  of  effects  produced  by  any 
known  motion  according  to  any  known  laws  of  motion. 
There  is  a  latent  factor  in  all  thinking,  the  soul.  The 
neglect  of  it  is  the  defect  of  materialism. 

Two  opposite  errors  must  be  avoided,  spiritualism 
and  materialism.  The  former  neglects  the  patent,  the 
latter  the  latent,  factor  of  the  thinking  subject.  The 
former  despises  the  consciousness  of  the  body  as  a  factor, 
and  the  science  of  the  nervous  system  as  the  part  of 
that  factor,  engaged  in  every  conscious  operation  :  the 
latter  transgresses  the  limits  of  science.  Hence  the 
former  falsely  supposes  the  subject  to  be  all  soul,  the 
latter  all  body.  Both  neglect  the  man  ;  yet  as  men  we 
think.  There  is  room  for  an  intermediate  theory  of  the 
thinking  subject ;  for  a  theory  which  is  founded  on  the 
combined  evidence  of  consciousness,  of  observation, 
ordinary  and  scientific,  and  of  reasoning  about  oneself; 
for  a  theory  which  avoids  the  opposite  difficulties  of 
disturbing  the  physical  continuity  of  the  nervous  system, 
and  of  inventing  a  mere  parallelism  of  neurosis  and 
psychosis.  I  suppose  that  brain  and  soul  are  co-opera- 
tive factors  in  all  conscious  operations,  in  passive  opera- 
tions together  affected  by  external  causes,  in  active 
pperations   together   producing   external   effects.     The 


CHAP.   V. 


DESCARTES 


113 


thinking  subject  is  man,  thinking  partly  by  his  body, 
that  is,  his  nervous  cerebral  system,  and  partly  by  a 
latent  factor,  his  soul,  co-operating,  as  by  the  composi- 
tion of  forces,  in  every  operation. 

But  what  are  the  objects  which  I  apprehend  in  think- 
mg  ?  ^  This  is  the  second  question,  suggested  by  tlie 
consciousness  that  I  think,  but  not  answerable  without 
further    argument.     Descartes    assumed    that   all    the 
immediate  objects  are  psychical  ideas,  while  physical 
things  are  only  mediate   objects   known   through  the 
medium  of  ideas.     So  far  as  this  theory  recognises  the 
distinction  between  the  internal  objects  of  sense  and 
external  objects  of  inference,  it  is  correct,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  scientific  evidences  already  given  in  the 
First  Part  of  this  essay.     But  it  contains  a  further  sup- 
position, namely,   that  objects  of  sense  and  all  other 
innnediate  objects  are  not  only  internal  but  psychical, 
are  ideas.     Descartes  never  proved  this  ideal  theory. 

In   the   Third    Meditation   we    find    the   foUowin^r 
passage : —  ^ 

'  Nevertheless  I  before  received  and  admitted  many 
things  as  wholly  certain  and  manifest,  M^iich  yet  I  after- 
wards found  to  be  doubtful.  What,  then,  were  those  ? 
They  were  the  earth,  the  sky,  the  stars,  and  all  the  other 
objects  which  I  was  in  the  habit  of  perceiving  by  the 
senses.  But  what  was  it  that  I  clearly  (and  distinctly) 
perceived  in  them  ?  Nothing  more  than  that  the  ideas 
and  the  thoughts  of  those  objects  were  presented  to  my 
mnid.  And  even  now  I  do  not  deny  that  these  ideas 
are  found  in  my  mind.  But  there  was  yet  another 
thuig  which  I  affirmed,  and  which,  from  having  been 
accustomed  to  beheve  it,  I  thought  I  clearly  perceived 
although,  in  truth,  I  did  not  perceive  it  at  all ;  I  mean 
the  existence  of  objects  external  to  me,  from  which 


ru 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


those  ideas  proceeded,  and  to  wliicli  tliey  had  a  perfect 
resemblance  ;  and  it  was  here  I  was  mistaken,  or  if  I 
judged  correctly,  this  assuredly  was  not  to  be  traced  to 
any  knowledge  I  possessed.'  ^ 

Now  Descartes  does  not  state  precisely  how  he 
arrived  at  this  conclusion  that  what  he  perceived  were 
ideas.  No  doubt  he  was  unconsciously  influenced  by 
the  previous  course  of  philosophy,  detailed  in  my  last 
chapter,  and  thought  himself  entitled  to  accept  the  con- 
clusion much  more  rapidly  than  he  ought.  But  he 
probably  also  thought  that  it  followed  in  some  way 
from  the  principle,  cogito — from  the  consciousness,  I 
think.  Now  it  is  true  that  I  think  includes  the  con- 
sciousness, I  sensitively  perceive.  But  I  am  not  con- 
scious that  my  senses  apprehend  ideas.  As  I  walk  in 
the  fields,  I  am  conscious  of  perceiving  something  green, 
which,  so  far  from  being  an  idea  or  any  psychical  fact, 
appears  to  be  not  only  physical  but  also  external. 
Science  disabuses  me  of  the  externality,  but  not  of  the 
materiality  of  the  sensible  object.  What  further  evi- 
dence, then,  had  Descartes  to  disprove  its  physical  and 
prove  its  psychical  character  ? 

Descartes  derived  his  ideal  theory  of  the  sensible 
ol)ject  apparently  from  his  principle,  cogito,  ergo  sum, 
but  really  from  his  secondary  hypothesis,  '  I  am  a  soul.' 
Having  convinced  himself  that  the  whole  subject  is  soul, 
he  defined  soul  as  a  purely  thinking  substance,  and 
body  as  a  purely  extended  substance.  From  these 
definitions  he  deduced  tlie  heterogeneity  of  mind  and 
matter,  of  soul  and  body.  Hence  he  thought  it  would 
follow  that  the  soul  by  its  very  essence  thinking  cannot 
apprehend  body  by  its  very  essence  extended,  but  is 
limited  to  its  ideas.    The  real  Cai^tesian  evidence  is  this  : 

^  '  Ex  vi  meae  perceptionis,'  in  the  Latin  edition. 


CHAP.  V. 


DESCARTES 


115 


tlie  subject  is  soul,  the  soul  is  such  as  to  apprehend  only  /^ 
K^as;  therefore  all  immediate  objects  arfideas.  B  T 
neither  premise  is  proved.  / 

It  is  not  true  that  the  wliole  subject  is  the  soul 
Descartes  as  we  have  seen,  exaggerated  the  soul  from 
a  part  to  he  whole  thinking  subject.  The  man  is  the 
whole  subject  :  the  body  is  part  of  that  by  which  le 
hinks ;  and,  being  a  factor  in  thinking  as  well  as  ^^, 
It  is  not  a  purely  extended  substance.  The  assumntJon 
at  the  bottom  of  the  Cartesian  definition  of  b^C 
tnnking  and  extension  are  different.     So  they  are  h 

wfTtf '         ''''  """'  ^''"°"  ™'^J'  P°^««««  ^^^^^  attri- 
butes in    he  concrete.     Number  is  not  extension,  but 

it   rt    ""?  "  "r '''''''  '-'"^  <^^^^"^«^  ■'  ^-tensi;n  is 

Zl  tS"'wr    "  """  '"'^'  '"^^'  ^^  ^°''^  -tended 
and  think.     When  we  appeal  from  abstractions  to  con- 
sciousness, we  find  it  does  think.     The  body,  therefore 
>s   not  purely  extended  substance,  but  also  thinkin '' 
Again  the  soul  is  a  factor  in  thinking,  and  is  in  othe^r 
respects  latent :  it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  nothing  e   e 
Eather  such  a  supposition  is  impossible  ;  for,  as  Locke 
wittily  remarked,  men  think  not  always,  .nd  iV the  soul 
-ere  purely  thinking  substance,  either 'it  must  a  W 
tlnnk  in  order  to  be,  or  it  must  have  an  intermittei 
xistence,  both  of  which  alternatives  are  impossible      d 
absurd      Descartes  resolved  body  and  soul  Lo  the    wo 
opposite  abstractions  of  extension  and  thinking.     Bu^ 
he  did  not  thereby  prove  that  body  is  purely  ex'tended 
nor  that  soul  is  purely  thinking,  nor  their  heferoge^  y' 
nor   hat  the  body  is  no  factor  in  thinkin.,  nor  fhTit 
whole  thinking  subject  is  the  soul.  "  "" 

But  if  we  concede  that  the  soul  is  the  whole  thinkin<. 
subject,  and  that  thinking  is  accordingly  a  pure  v 
psychical  operation,  whether  it  be  feehng,  perceiving 


I  2 


IIG 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


reasoning,  willing,  or  wliat  not,  wliat  do  we  know  abont 
its  nature  ?  On  this  point  we  have  a  dictum  of  Sir  W. 
IlamiUon,  so  admirable  that  we  cannot  pass  it  by.  '  We 
know,'  he  says,  '  and  can  know,  nothing  a  priori  of  what 
is  possible  or  impossible  to  mind,  and  it  is  only  by  obser- 
vation and  generalisation  a  posteriori  that  we  can  ever 
liope  to  attain  any  insight  into  the  question.'^  The 
most  we  know  of  the  soul  is  that  it  thinks,  whatever 
else  it  is ;  we  camiot  enter  further  into  its  secret  nature 
to  determine  what  it  thinks.  We  must,  therefore,  judge 
of  it  by  its  fruits.  Now,  when  I  appeal  to  conscious- 
ness, I  am  not  conscious  of  perceiving  only  ideas,  but 
pliysical  things  apparently  external ;  and  when  I  correct 
the  illusion  of  externality  by  science,  I  find  that  sense 
perceives  internal  things,  but  not  ideas  ;  and  further, 
that  it  must  perceive  physical  things  within  in  order  to 
infer  pliysical  things  without.  I  conclude,  therefore, 
that,  as  we  apprehend  the  pliysical  as  a  fact,  the  soul 
must  have  a  power  of  apprehending  it ;  for  we  only 
know  what  the  soul  must  by  what  it  does  apprehend. 
It  is  not  true,  then,  that  the  soul  is  such  as  only  to  per- 
ceive ideas. 

Even,  therefore,  if  the  first  premise  of  Descartes  be 
true,  his  second  is  false,  so  that  his  conclusion  does  not 
follow.  If  the  soul  is  the  whole  thinking  subject,  it  is 
not  true  that  its  nature  is  such  as  only  to  immediately 
perceive  ideas  ;  for  all  we  know  of  its  thinking  is  that, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  immediately  perceives  pliysical, 
tliou<^h  internal,  effects  on  the  nervous  system.  Thiidiing 
we  know  is  not  extension,  but  know  nothing  about 
thinking  to  prevent  it  perceiving  the  extended,  nor  any- 
thing about  the  psychical  to  prevent  it  perceiving  the 
physical.     Let  vision  be  purely  psychical,  white  seen  can 

*  Hamilton's  Mctaj;)hjj8ics,  Lect.  xxv.  p.  122. 


CHAP.    V. 


DESCARTES 


117 


still  be  physical.  Granted,  then,  that  the  subject  is  the 
soul,  it  is  a  7io?i  sequitur  that  it  perceives  only  psychical 
ideas. 

A  fortiori,  if  the  subject  is  the  man,  he  can  perceive 
the  physical  in  himself.  A  certain  conditional  plausi- 
bihty  is  given  to  the  idealistic  theory  of  the  sensible 
object  by  the  spiritualistic  theory  of  the  sentient  subject. 
Although  we  cannot  say  that  if  the  subject  is  purely 
psychical  the  object  is  psychical,  we  can  say  that  the 
object  is  not  psychical  unless  the  subject  is  purely  psychi- 
cal. But  if  the  body  is  a  factor  of  the  thinking  subject, 
there  no  longer  remains  any  plausibility  in  the  ideal 
theory  of  the  sensible  object.  The  physical  can  appre- 
hend the  physical,  the  extended  the  extended,  within 
the  nervous  system.  The  thinking  subject,  body  and 
soul,  does  apprehend  the  physical:  it  therefore  can. 
Wliat  we  apprehend  as  a  fact  is  better  known  than  what 
we  are  to  apprehend  it.  Kiiowable  objects  must  be 
explained,  not  denied,  by  knowing  subjects. 

Descartes  was  a  clear  and  distinct  writer;  he  was 
not  so  clear  and  distinct  a  thinker.  His  works  are 
full  of  confusion.  He  was  the  first  to  confuse  the 
object  with  the  operation  of  sense.  Hence,  when  he 
speaks  of  an  idea  of  white,  we  never  feel  quite  sure 
-whether  he  means  the  white  perceived  or  the  sensa- 
tion of  white.  Now,  if  the  subject  is  soul,  the  operation 
is  purely  psychical ;  and,  if  the  object  be  undistinguish- 
able  from  the  operation,  it  also  becomes  psychical :  if 
the  white  perceived  is  the  same  as  the  vision  of  white, 
and  this  be  psychical,  that  becomes  psychical.  But  we 
found  in  the  First  Part  that  the  white  seen  is  not  the  vision 
of  white,  the  sensible  object  is  not  the  operation  of  sensa- 
tion. Hence,  it  does  not  follow,  even  if  the  operation 
of  vision  be  psychical,  that  the  white  seen  is  psychical. 


118 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


A  further  confusion  was  necessary  before  Descartes 
could  call  a  sensible  object  an  idea.  Confusing  it  with 
a  sensation  would  only  have  enabled  him  to  call  it  a  sen- 
sation. But  why  an  idea  ?  Because  he  merged  sensati^^n 
in  conception.  There  are  two  kinds  of  simple  appre- 
hension :  sensation,  the  apprehension  we  have  of  an 
object  when  the  original  is  present ;  and  conception, 
when  the  original  is  absent  or  non-existent.  Aristotle 
had  clearly  distinguished  them  as  alad-qai^  and  <^ar- 
rao-ta,  and  their  ol)jects  as  aLo-Orjfxa  and  (pdvTao-fia.  But 
the  poverty  and  abstractness  of  modern  languages  and 
the  growth  of  conceptualism  obliterated  these  dis- 
tinctions, and  enabled  Descartes  first  to  confuse  the 
sensible  with  its  sensation,  and  then  the  sensation  with 
the  conception  or  idea.  Nothing  can  be  more  mislead- 
ing than  the  word  '  idea,'  because  it  may  signify  either 
tlie  conception  or  the  concept,  to  use  later  phraseology. 
But  Descartes  arrived  at  his  theory  that  the  sensible 
object  is  an  idea  by  a  fusion  of  sensible  object,  sensa- 
tion, conception,  and  concept. 

A  final  confusion  followed  the  rest.  Wherever  there 
is  no  distinction  between  object  and  operation,  as  in 
feeling,  there  is  none  between  the  operation  and  its  con- 
sciousness. Accordingly,  Descartes,  having  first  confused 
the  sensible  object  with  the  sensation  and  then  the  sen- 
sation with  the  idea,  having  no  object  left,  confused 
the  operation  of  sensation  with  its  consciousness.^  The 
white,  its  vision,  its  idea,  its  conception,  its  conscious- 
ness became  all  merged :  there  was  no  distinction  left 
between  sensible  object,  sensation,  idea,  conception,  and 
consciousness.  Thus  the  sensible  object  historically  be- 
came a  state  of  consciousness  by  a  series  of  confusions, 


'  Cf.  Princ.  i.  9. 


CHAP.   V. 


DESCARTES 


119 


from  which  mental  philosophy  has  never  quite  recovered 
itself. 

So  much  for  the  evidence  of  the  Cartesian  theory 
that  all  immediate  objects  are  ideas.  He  derived  it 
not  from  the  principle,  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  but  from  at  least 
four  hypotheses  : — 

(1)  The  subject  is  the  soul. 

(2)  The  soul  is  such  as  to  perceive  ideas. 

(3)  The  sensible  object  is  undistinguishable  from 
the  sensation. 

(4)  The  sensation  is  undistinguishable  from  the  idea. 

Not  one  of  these  hypotheses  is  true  ;  at  any  rate,  all 
are  uncertain.  But  if  any  one  of  the  hypotheses  is 
false,  it  vitiates  the  reasonin^p ;  and  if  anv  one  is  un- 
certain,  it  renders  the  reasoning  uncertain.  The  Car- 
tesian method  is  apparently  synthetic  demonstration, 
but  really  synthetic  hypothesis.  There  is  a  lesson  of 
psychological  method  to  be  derived  from  it.  We  can- 
not logically  start  with  the  subject,  and  from  its  sup- 
posed nature  deduce  the  immediate  and  mediate 
objects  of  knowledge ;  but  we  must  first  find  what  ob- 
jects the  subject  knows,  as  a  fact,  in  the  sciences,  then 
the  immediate  objects  of  sense,  and  finally  conclude  that 
the  nature  of  the  subject  is  such  that  it  can  know  what 
it  does  know.  The  method  must  be  not  synthetical  but 
analytical,  because  it  must  proceed  from  the  more  cer- 
tain to  the  less  certain,  not  from  hypotheses  to  facts,  but 
from  facts  to  hypotheses. 

We  have  not  yet,  however,  exhausted  the  Cartesian 
theory  of  ideas  as  the  immediate  objects  of  knowledge. 
Although  he  thought  that  all  sensible  objects  are  ideas, 
Descartes  was  well  aware  that  there  are  ideas  which 
are  not  sensible.     There  are,  according  to  him,  three 


/ 


120 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


sorts  of  ideas — innate,  adventitious,  and  fictitious. 
This  celebrated  theory  of  the  origin  of  ideas  has  at  all 
events  two  very  great  merits  :  first,  it  called  attention  to 
the  important  problem  of  the  origin  of  ideas  ;  secondly, 
under  the  head  of  innate  ideas,  it  recognises  ideas 
which  are  not  sensible.  He  remarks  that  '  the  philoso- 
phers of  the  schools  accept  as  a  maxim  that  there 
is  nothing  in  the  understanding  which  was  not  pre- 
viously in  the  senses,  in  which,  however,  it  is  certain 
that  the  ideas  of  God  and  of  the  soul  have  never 
been.'  ^ 

It  is  well  known  that  Descartes  repudiated  the 
theory  that  some  ideas  are  innate  in  the  sense  of  being 
always  present.  In  his  replies  to  the  objections  raised 
against  his  Meditations,  the  '  Eesponsiones  Tertia3 '  con- 
tain the  following  passage  : — '  Denique  quum  dicimus 
ideam  aliquam  nobis  innatam,  non  intelligimus  illam 
nobis  semper  observari,  sic  enim  nulla  prorsus  esset 
innata ;  sed  tantum  nos  habere  in  nobis  ipsis  facultatem 
illam  eliciendi.'  '^  This  doctrine  of  ideas,  innate  in  the 
sense  of  elicited  from  one's  own  faculty  of  thinking,  is 
developed  at  length  in  the  '  Notes  on  the  Programme 
of  Ee<?ius,'  ^  and  was  the  foundation  of  the  celebrated 
maxim  of  Leibnitz  :  '  Nihil  est  in  intellectu  quod  non 
prius  in  sensu  nisi  ipse  intellectus.'  By  innate  ideas 
Descartes  meant  ideas,  not  acquired,  like  adventitious 
ideas,  by  sense  from  external  objects,  nor  yet  inborn, 
but  capable  of  being  elicited  from  the  faculty  of  think- 
ing, which  is  supposed  to  be  endued  with  a  capacity  of 
conceiving  them. 

This  Cartesian  mystery  of  eliciting  ideas  from  the 
faculty  of  thinking  is  nothing  really  but  the  ordinary 


'  Discourse  on  Method,  Part  IV. 

3  Id.  pp.  184-6. 


Page  102  (ed.  1685). 


CHAP    V. 


DESCAPvTES 


121 


operations  of  consciousness  and  reasoning,  hidden  under 
a  fine-sounding  phrase.  It  is  quite  true  that  we  find 
certain  ideas  in  ourselves  which  have  never  been  in 
sense.  We  arrive  at  some  of  them,  such  as  that  of 
thought  and  that  of  truth,  not  from  sensation  but  from 
consciousness.  But  consciousness  is  a  kind  of  sense, 
and  ideas  derived  from  consciousness  of  oneself  are  not 
elicited  from  oneself,  but  apprehended  as  belonging  to 
oneself.  They  are,  as  Locke  afterwards  showed,  ideas 
of  reflection,  not  innate,  but  acquired  by  apprehending 
ourselves  performing  conscious  operations.  There  are, 
indeed,  other  ideas  of  the  insensible,  which  are  not 
acquired  either  by  sensation  or  by  consciousness.  We 
neither  see  God  nor  are  conscious  of  God  in  us.  Such 
ideas  also  are,  according  to  Descartes,  elicited  not  from 
sense,  but  from  our  faculty  of  thinking.  In  his  '  Notes 
on  the  Programme  of  Regius,'  after  disposing  of  tradi- 
tion and  observation,  he  thinks  himself  entitled  to  con- 
clude that  the  idea  of  God  is  innate  in  the  sense  of 
elicited  from  the  faculty  of  thinking.  But  there  is 
another  alternative — reasoning  from  sensation  and 
consciousness.  Lo^^ical  reasoning  is  an  indirect  ori^^^in 
of  insensible  ideas. 

When  Descartes  said  that  ideas  were  elicited  from 
the  faculty  of  thinking,  perhaps  he  had  some  obscure 
unanalysed  hint  of  ideas  generated  by  reasoning.  But, 
then,  such  ideas  are  not  innate,  but  acquired,  and  are 
the  most  deviously  acquired  of  all  ideas.  In  the  first 
place,  we  reason  from  sensation,  and  infer  that  there  are 
objects,  like  the  sensible,  but  insensible.  We  then  con- 
ceive an  idea  of  the  insensible.  This  is  plainly  the 
origin  of  the  idea  of  a  corpuscle,  which  is  an  idea 
neither  sensible,  nor  conscious,  nor  innate,  but  acquired 
by   reasoning   from  sense.     Secondly,  we  reason  from 


122 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   IT. 


sensation  and  consciousness,  and  infer  other  thinking 
beings.  For  example,  we  are  conscious  of  being  able  by 
reason  and  will  to  produce  good  effects.  By  reasoning 
from  sense  we  infer  the  goodness  of  nature.  By  com- 
binin<T^  these  evidences  we  infer  a  bein<?  who  reasons 
and  wills  to  produce  the  goodness  of  nature.  We  then 
conceive  an  idea  of  this  being  similar  to  ourselves,  but 
infinitely  more  perfect  in  reason  and  will.  This  is  at  least 
one  origin  of  the  idea  of  God,  which  is  neither  an  idea 
of  sensation,  nor  of  consciousness,  nor  innate,  but  ac- 
quired by  reasoning  from  sensation  and  consciousness. 

Before  a  theory  of  the  origin  of  ideas  can  be  ad- 
mitted two  conditions  of  hypothesis  must  be  satisfied. 
Other  hypotheses  must  have  been  eliminated  ;  and 
any  hypothesis,  which  without  going  beyond  know^n 
operations  explains  the  facts,  must  be  preferred  to  an 
hypothesis  which  supposes  an  unverified  power.  But 
the  theory  of  innate  ideas  is  imperfect  in  elimination 
and  in  verification.  It  shows  that  not  all  ideas  arise 
immediately  from  sensation,  but  it  fails  to  show  that 
the  rest  are  not  due  to  consciousness  and  reasoning, 
and  accordingly  the  unverified  power  of  eliciting  ideas 
must  yield  to  the  verified  powers  of  sensation,  conscious- 
ness, and  reasoning,  which  are  together  a  sufficient  ex- 
planation of  the  origin  of  ideas. 

We  have  now  all  the  immediate  data  of  knowledfje, 
and  their  origin,  according  to  Descartes.  They  are  the 
soul  known  as  subject,  and  its  ideas,  innate,  adventitious 
and  fictitious,  known  as  objects.  What  knowledge,  then, 
even  if  we  have  innate  ideas,  should  we  get  ?  What 
apprehension  of  reahty,  immediate  and  mediate  ?  We 
should  know  that  we  really  are  souls.  We  should  also 
know  that  we  really  apprehend  ideas.  But  what  else 
should   we  know  mediately  beyond  the   soul   and   its 


CHAP.    V. 


DESCARTES 


123 


ideas  ?  Descartes  replies :  from  our  ideas  we  should 
know  that  there  are  real  objects  beyond  them. 

Aristotle  had  distinguished  simple  and  complex  ap- 
prehension, conception  and  judgment,  and  had  pointed 
out  that  truth  and  falsity  arise  with  judgment.  As  long 
as  we  merely  apprehend  an  idea,  e.g.  of  a  man  or  a 
centaur,  we  express  no  belief  about  the  existence  of  an 
object.  But  when  we  judge  about  objects  we  appre- 
hend a  relation  of  combination  or  separation,  which,  in 
its  simplest  but  not  its  only  form,  is  a  relation  of  exist- 
ence or  non-existence  ;  e.g.  a  man  exists,  a  centaur  does 
not  exist.  Hence  our  judgment  may  be  either  true  or 
false  :  true,  if  it  agrees  with  a  real  relation  of  combina- 
tion or  separation ;  false,  if  it  does  not.  The  question 
is,  how  are  we  to  know  that  our  judgments  about  objects 
are  true?  How  are  we  to  know  that  there  is  a  real 
relation  ? 

Descartes,  though  he  confused  two  kinds  of  simple 
apprehension,  sensation  and  conception,  was  aware  of 
the  distinction  between  conception  and  judgment.  He 
also  saw  that  the  possibility  of  falsity  begins  with  judg- 
ments.^ But  he  thought  that  true  judgments  can  be 
derived  from  ideas  themselves,  by  their  own  inherent 
characteristics.  He  proposed  a  new  criterion  of  truth, 
and  a  new  method  of  forming  true  judgments  from 
ideas  themselves. 

In  the  first  place,  he  thought  that  the  mere  idea  of 
God  proves  God's  existence.  This  theory  he  applied  in 
two  arguments,  one  of  which  proceeded  from  the  idea 
of  necessary  existence.  The  mind,  he  says,  from  per- 
ceiving necessary  and  eternal  existence  to  be  comprised 
in  the  idea  which  it  has  of  an  all-perfect  Being,  ought 


Meditation  III. 


124 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  IT. 


CHAP.   V. 


DESCAllTES 


125 


manifestly  to  conclude  that  this  all-perfect  Being  exists.^ 
This  ontological  argument,  as  it  is  called,  which  has 
become  famous  from  the  criticisms  upon  it,  especially 
that  of  Kant,'^  and  from  its  revival  by  Hegel,^  is  a  most 
transparent  fallacy.  Descartes  surreptitiously  omitted 
the  word  '  idea.'  An  idea  only  comprises  ideas,  and 
our  idea  of  God  comprises,  not  necessary  and  eternal 
existence,  but  only  the  idea  of  necessary  and  eternal 
existence,  which  only  proves  that  the  idea  of  this  all- 
perfect  Being  exists. 

The  other  argument  proceeded  from  the  objective 
reality  of  an  idea ;  that  is,  according  to  the  proper 
meaning  of  '  objective,'  the  reality  of  an  idea  quatenus 
ohjicitur  intellectui.  This  argument  follows  the  former 
argument  in  the  Principles,^  but  is  stated  at  greater 
length  in  the  Third  Meditation.  Shortly,  it  comes  to 
this :  more  reality  cannot  be  produced  by  less  ;  the  idea 
of  God  has  more  objective  reality  than  the  actual,  or 
formal,  realit}^  of  a  finite  substance ;  therefore  it  cannot 
be  produced  by  a  finite  substance,  but  must  be  received 
from  God  Himself.  The  major  is  true  ;  the  minor  is 
false,  because  the  objective  reality  of  an  idea  is  always  less 
real  than  the  actual  reality  of  the  thinker,  and  therefore 
can  be  produced  by  him.  God  has  more  reality  than 
man  ;  the  idea  of  God  has  more  reality  than  the  idea 
of  man ;  but  man  has  more  reality  than  his  own 
idea  of  God.  We  can  therefore  retort  on  Descartes 
the  following  syllogism :  the  less  real  can  be  produced 
by  the  more  real ;  the  idea  of  God  is  less  real  than  the 
thinker ;  therefore  the  idea  of  God  can  be  produced  by 
the  man  who  thinks  it.  As  for  the  way  in  which  a 
man  produces,  not  God,  but  his  idea  of  God,  we  have 

'  Princ.  i.  14.  2  Critique,  pp.  364-70  (Bohn). 

^  Logic  of  Hegel  ^YaUace),  pp.  91  2.  *  i.  17-19. 


already  described  it.  He  produces  it,  not  by  the  bare 
idea  of  his  own  finite  substance,  but  by  reasoning  from 
nature  to  nature's  God,  and  then  forming  an  idea  of 
a  Being,  reasoning  and  willing  like  himself,  but  infi- 
nitely more  perfect.  Man  has  no  power  to  produce 
God ;  but,  by  reasoning  to  God's  perfect  existence,  he 
can  produce  his  very  imperfect  idea  of  God.  The  origin 
of  natural  theology  is  reasoning :  the  origin  of  the  idea 
of  God  is  rational  idealisation. 

Secondly,  conceding  the  reality  of  God,  though  not 
proved  by  these  two  arguments  from  ideas,  but  rather 
by  a  third  argument  which  he  adds  from  our  not  having 
made  ourselves,  let  us  proceed  to  the  further  use  of 
ideas  as  a  criterion  of  truth  by  Descartes.  He  accepted 
the  Christian  doctrine  that  God  is  not  the  cause  of  our 
errors.^  He  pointed  out  that  some  of  our  ideas  are 
clear  and  distinct,^  others  obscure  and  confused.  He 
concluded  that  those  ideas,  which  are  clear  and  dis- 
tinct, must  be  true,  otherwise  God  would  be  a  deceiver.^ 
In  short,  he  made  the  clearness  and  distinctness  of  ideas, 
backed  by  the  veracity  of  God,  a  criterion  of  truth,  by 
which  we  may  argue  from  ideas  to  objects  beyond 
them. 

By  this  internal  criterion  of  ideas,  he  supposed 
that  from  our  psychical  ideas  we  may  infer  a  physical 
world  ^ : — 

'  Although  we  are  all  sufiiciently  persuaded  of  the 
existence  of  material  things,  yet  since  this  was  before 
called  in  question  by  us,  and  since  we  reckoned  the 
persuasion  of  their  existence  as  among  the  prejudices 
of  our  childhood,  it  is  now  necessary  for  us  to  investigate 
the  grounds  on  which  this  truth  may  be  known  with 
certainty.     In  the  first  place,  then,  it  cannot  be  doubted 

'  Princ.  i.  29.  ^  j^^  i  45^  3  j^^  ^  30.  "*  Id.  ii.  1. 


/ 
\ 


126 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TAUT   IT. 


that  every  perception  we  have  conies  to  us  from  some 
object  different  from  our  mind  ;  for  it  is  not  in  our 
power  to  cause  ourselves  to  experience  one  perception 
rather  than  another,  the  perception  being  entirely 
dependent  on  the  object  which  affects  our  senses.  It 
may,  indeed,  be  matter  of  enquiry  whether  that  object 
be  God,  or  something  different  from  God  ;  but  because 
we  perceive,  or  rather,  stimulated  by  sense,  clearly  and 
distinctly  apprehend,  certain  matter  extended  in  length, 
breadth,  and  thickness,  the  various  parts  of  which  have 
different  figures  and  motions,  and  give  rise  to  the  sensa- 
tions we  have  of  colours,  smells,  pain,  &c.,  God  would, 
without  question,  deserve  to  be  regarded  as  a  deceiver, 
if  He  directly  and  of  Himself  presented  to  our  mind  the 
idea  of  tliis  extended  matter,  or  merely  caused  it  to  be 
presented  to  us  by  some  object  which  possessed  neither 
extension,  figure,  nor  motion.  For  we  clearly  conceive 
this  matter  as  entirely  distinct  from  God,  and  from  our- 
selves or  our  mind  ;  and  appear  even  clearly  to  discern 
that  the  idea  of  it  is  formed  in  us  on  occasion  of  objects 
existing  out  of  our  minds,  to  which  it  is  in  every  respect 
similar.  But  since  God  cannot  deceive  us,  for  this  is 
repugnant  to  His  nature,  as  has  been  already  remarked, 
we  must  unhesitatingly  conclude  that  there  exists  a 
certain  object  extended  in  length,  breadth,  and  thick- 
ness, and  possessing  all  those  properties  which  we  clearly 
apprehend  to  belong  to  what  is  extended.  And  this 
extended  substance  is  what  we  call  body  or  matter.' 

By  the  same  internal  criterion  of  ideas  he  thought 
that  he  could  infer  that  distinction  in  nature  which 
Locke  called  '  the  distinction  of  primary  and  secondary 
(qualities  '  ^ : — 

'  As  belonging  to  the  class  of  things  clearly  appre- 


Meditation  III. 


CHAP.  V. 


DESCARTES 


127 


hended,  I  recognise  the  following,  namely,  magnitude, 
or  extension  in  length,  breadth,  and  depth  ;  figure, 
which  results  from  the  termination  of  extension  ;  situa- 
tion, which  bodies  of  diverse  figures  preserve  with 
reference  to  each  other  ;  and  motion  or  change  of  situa- 
tion ;  to  which  may  be  added  substance,  duration,  and 
number.  But  with  regard  to  lights,  colours,  sounds, 
odours,  tastes,  heat,  cold,  and  the  other  tactile  qualities, 
they  are  thought  with  so  much  obscurity  and  confusion, 
that  I  cannot  determine  even  whether  they  are  true  or 
false ;  in  other  words,  whether  or  not  the  ideas  I  have 
of  these  qualities  are  in  truth  the  ideas  of  real  objects.' 

The  clearness  and  distinctness  of  our  ideas  are  facts 
of  our  consciousness  ;  but  we  are  also  conscious  that 
they  do  not  always  correspond  to  our  knowledge. 
Many  ideas  are  clear  and  distinct  where  the  objects 
are  known  to  be  unreal.  Nothing  can  be  clearer  or 
more  distinct  than  the  ideas  I  have  of  Achilles  and 
Agamemnon,  of  Ulysses  and  Nestor.  Am  I,  then,  to 
infer  that  these  Homeric  heroes  lived  in  the  flesh  ? 
Many  ideas  are  obscure  and  confused  where  the  objects 
are  known  to  be  real.  The  idea  of  the  earth  as  a  vast 
globe  revolving  round  the  vaster  sun  is  neither  clear 
nor  distinct.  Yet  the  earth  revolves  round  the  sun. 
Nor  do  the  degrees  of  truth  correspond  with  the 
degrees  of  clearness  and  distinctness.  My  ideas  of 
Hamlet  and  Macbeth  are  clearer  and  more  distinct  than 
my  ideas  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Leader  of  the 
Opposition  Am  I  to  infer  that  the  persons  are  also 
more  real?  I  have  proofs  to  prevent  such  an  inference, 
you  will  say.  But  that  is  to  introduce  another  criterion, 
over  and  above  the  clearness  and  distinctness  of  ideas. 

Ideas  are  clear  and  distinct  by  proximity  to  sense, 
as  well  as  by  accuracy  of  science :  hence,  as  science 


128 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


recedes  from  sense,  it  often  proves  insensible  objects 
to  exist,  of  wliicli  it  forms  but  obscure  and  confused 
ideas.  Science  assures  me  that  matter  consists  of  incon- 
ceivably small  particles  moving  with  inconceivable 
rapidity  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand  that  it 
extends  over  an  inconceivable  immensity  of  space.  These 
thinirs  are  known  to  exist.  Yet  the  ideas  of  them  are 
so  far  from  being  clear  and  distinct  that  I  cannot  be 
said  to  have  any  direct  ideas  of  them  at  all.  If  I  try  to 
form  an  idea  of  a  particle  in  a  drop  of  water,  I  divide  it 
and  divide  it,  but  the  division  baffles  my  conception. 
If  I  try  to  conceive  the  immensity  of  space,  I  enlarge 
my  idea  of  a  limited  space,  as  the  frog  tried  to  swell 
himself  out  to  the  size  of  the  ox,  and  with  much  the 
same  success.  Are  we  to  say  that  these  scientific  facts 
are  not  real,  because  we  have  but  obscure  and  indistinct 
ideas — or   rather   have   no   direct    ideas   of    them   at 

all? 

Again,  science  is  based  on  the  distinction  of  the 
apparent  and  the  real,  in  time  and  space,  in  bulk  and 
motion.  The  real  in  all  cases  is  regarded  as  more  truly 
real  than  the  apparent  ;  but  the  apparent  is  more 
clearly  and  distinctly  conceived.  My  idea  of  the  ap- 
parent sun  moving  apparently  over  the  apparent  earth 
is  clear  and  distinct :  my  idea  of  the  real  earth  moving 
really  round  the  real  sun  is  obscure  and  indistinct. 
Am  I  then  to  infer  that  the  sun  moves  over  the  earth, 
and  not  the  earth  round  the  sun  ?  Again,  the  ideas  of 
secondary  qualities  in  sense  are  as  clear  as,  if  not  clearer 
than,  the  ideas  of  primary  qualities.  For  example,  the 
idea  of  sensible  heat  is  as  clear  and  distinct  as  that  of 
sensible  extension.  The  difference  is  not  in  the  ideas, 
but  in  the  inferences  of  the  qualities ;  and  there  must 
be  some  other  ground  than  ideas,  which  are  equally 


CHAP.   V. 


DESCARTES 


129 


clear  and  distinct,  to  justify  the  differences  between  our 
inferences  of  insensible  heat  and  insensible  extension. 

To  say  that  God  does  not  deceive  us  is  to  raise  a 
false  issue.     He  does  not  deceive  those  who  use  sense 
and  reasoning  by  the  laws  of  logic.      But  we  should 
deceive  ourselves  if  we  were  to  follow  Descartes  and 
substitute  mere  ideas  for  the  logical  organs  of  truth. 
We  are  often  deceived  when  we  have  clear  and  distinct 
ideas.     We  are  deceived  about  the  bodily  locality  of 
our   sensations   and    the    externality   of  the   object  of 
sense,  about  the  reality  of  secondary  qualities,  about 
the  beautiful  and  about  the  good.     A  man  often  has 
a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  a  duty  which  is  no  duty. 
I  might  justify  any  wickedness,  if  I  allowed  myself  to 
argue,  I  have  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  the  rightness 
of  this  action,  and  God  will  not  deceive  me,  therefore 
it  is  right.     Tlie  Inquisition,  no  doubt,  had  a  clear  and 
distinct  idea  of  the  justice  of  punishing  heretics,  and  a 
belief  that  God  never  deceived  them :  on  the  Wic  of 
Descartes,  they  would  have  been  justified  in  punishing 
Galileo   as  a  heretic,  for   saying  that   the  earth   goes 
round  the  sun.     This  lazy  logic  of  ideas  would  justify 
any  arbitrary  conclusion,  and  defy  all  rational  criticism. 
For,  who  is  to  know  whether  or  not  one  has  clear  and 
distinct    ideas?      But    Descartes   lived   in   a   reaction 
against  logic. 

An  idea  is  an  apprehension  in  the  absence  of  an  ex- 
ternal object.  It  contains  no  opinion  whether  the  object 
is  only  absent  or  also  non-existent.  Its  clearness  and 
distinctness  depend  on  other  causes  besides  the  behef  of 
existence,  and  especially  on  the  proximity  of  the  idea  to 
sense.  Hence  conception  does  not  in  itself  guarantee 
the  existence  of  an  external  object.  Moreover,  we  are 
conscious  of  its  limits  :  everybody  knows  that  however 


130 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  ir. 


well  he  conceives,  lie  is  not  justified  in  judging  without 
further  evidence.  If  we  were  not  conscious  of  the 
frequent  disagreement  of  ideas  with  facts,  God  might 
have  been  a  deceiver  ;  but,  as  it  is,  He  does  not  deceive 
us  into  thinking  that  our  clear  and  distinct  ideas  con- 
form to  fiicts,  but,  on  the  contrary,  makes  us  conscious 
that  they  often  do  not,  and  gives  us  an  opportunity  of 
going  beyond  them  by  reasoning.  We  are  conscious 
that^'our  ideas  do  not  justify  judgments  of  existence 
without  rational  proof. 

But  the  words,  conception  and  idea,  are  so  vague 
that  they  often  get  confused  with  belief,  just  as  the 
inconceivable  is  often  confounded  with  the  incredible. 
Descartes  shows  traces  of  this  confusion,  in  the  very 
act  of  drawing  a  valuable  distinction  between  imagina- 
tion and  pure  intellection,  in  the  Sixth  Meditation  :— 

'  To  render  this  plain,  I  first  examine  the  difference 
which  there  is  between  imagination  and  pure  intel- 
lection. For  example,  when  I  imagine  a  triangle,  not 
only  do  I  understand  that  it  is  a  figure  comprehended 
by  three  lines,  but  at  the  same  time  I  intuite  those  three 
lines  as  formed  by  the  glance  of  my  mind  ;  and  this  is 
what  I  call  imagining.  But  if  1  wish  to  think  of  a 
chiliagon,  I  equally  well  understand  that  it  is  a  figure 
consisting  of  a  thousand  sides,  as  I  understand  that  a 
triangle  is  a  figure  consisting  of  three,  but  I  do  not  in 
the  same  way  imagine  those  thousand  sides,  or  intuite 

them  as  present.' 

Everybody  would  at  once  suppose  that  by  intellection 
he  simply  meant  the  belief  that  there  is  such  a  figure  as 
a  chihagon ;  ])ut,  if  we  look  a  few  lines  further  down, 
we  find  the  very  reverse.  He  says  that  'the  mind, 
which  understands,  turns  itself  in  a  way  towards  itself 
and  considers  one  of  the  ideas  which  are  in  it ; '  and  he 


CHAP.    V. 


DESCARTES 


131 


repeats  the  same  view  in  the  '  Responsiones  Quintsc.' 
According  to  Descartes,  then,  the  pure  intellection  that 
a  chiliagon  is  a  figure  consisting  of  a  thousand  sides  is 
a  consideration  of  ideas.  When  he  thus  merged  the 
conception  of  ideas  and  the  understanding  of  objects, 
no  wonder  he  thought  that  clear  and  distinct  ideas 
enable  us  to  know  objects  beyond  ideas.  But,  really, 
we  judge  very  clearly  that  a  chiliagon  is  a  figure  with 
a  thousand  sides,  but  we  conceive  a  very  obscure  idea 
of  so  many  sides,  if  we  can  be  said  to  have  any  direct 
idea  of  them  at  all.  Conception  is  not  co-extensive 
with  understanding.  The  criterion  of  truth  is  not  in- 
herent in  ideas. 

As  it  requires  something  more  than  clearness  and 
distinctness  of  ideas  to  know  ol>jects,  liow  do  we  know 
them?  How  do  we  know  when  our  iudf^ments  acrree 
with  them  ?  What  is  the  criterion  of  truth  ?  Objects 
are  twofold,  internal  and  external.  About  the  internal 
we  judge  immediately  by  sensation  and  consciousness, 
tlie  ol)jects  of  sensation  being  effects  of  external  objects 
on  the  nervous  system,  the  object  of  consciousness 
oneself  as  subject  thinking  in  the  widest  sense  :  about 
external  but  similar  objects  beyond  ourselves  we  judo-e 
from  sensation  and  consciousness  mediately  by  infer- 
ence. Truth  is  the  agreement  of  a  judgment  with  the 
sensible,  the  conscious,  or  the  inferred  from  the  sensible 
and  the  conscious,  on  the  logical  rule  that,  if  the 
premises  are  true,  the  conclusion  is  true.  The  criterion 
of  truth  is  double;  being  first  the  immediate  appre- 
hension of  the  sensible  and  tlie  conscious  within,  and 
tliereupon  the  mediate  apprehension  of  the  similar 
but  insensible  and  unconscious  without,  by  parity  of 
reasoning.  Reasoning  without  the  immediate  data  is 
mere  consistency,  upon  them  it  is  the  consistency  of 

K  2 


1; 


'19 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


truth.  Knowledge  is  tlie  apprehension  of  reahty,  imme- 
diately by  sensation  and  consciousness,  mediately  by 
logical  reasoning  therefrom.  To  know  by  reasoning 
requires  at  least  two  conditions  ;  sensible  data  and 
logical  consistency.  Whether  it  requires  more,  we  will 
decide,  when  we  come  to  Hume  and  Kant. 

As,  then,  we  know  objects  beyond  ideas,  not  by  the 
clearness  and  distinctness  of  these  ideas,  but  by  rational 
inference,  what  are  the  data  required  for  this  inference  ? 
This  question  is  the  crucial  test  of  the  Cartesian  philo- 
sophy, which  aspires  to  a  knowledge  of  things  through 
ideas.  Descartes  did  not  supply  adequate  data  to  infer 
the  knowledge  he  admitted.  Hence  his  philosophy 
ends  in  inconsequence.  We  have  already  seen,  in  the 
First  Part,  that  it  requires  like  data  to  prove  like  con- 
clusions, and,  therefore,  physical  data  to  prove  physical 
conclusions.  If  all  the  data  were  psychical,  physical 
objects  would  not  be  inferrible.  If  all  the  data  of 
a  man's  knowledge  were  his  soul  and  ideas,  he  could 
know  nothing  but  other  souls  and  ideas.  But  Descartes 
admitted.that  physical  objects  beyond  souls  and  ideas 
are  knowable.  The  data  of  knowledge,  then,  cannot 
all  be,  as  he  supposed,  a  soul  and  its  ideas. 

Descartes  was  a  man  of  sul)tle  genius,  retiring,  as  it 
were,  within  the  chamber  of  his  own  soul  to  survey  his 
own  ideas,  and  trying  to  think  wliat  they  could  reflect 
of  a  world  without.  Let  us  follow  him  into  tliis  retire- 
ment, and  imagine  ourselves  each  to  l)e  a  pure  soul 
contenq^lating  pure  ideas.  A  man  must  have  a  diffi- 
culty in  performing  this  feat,  because  he  neither  is  the 
one  nor  does  the  other.  He  cannot  rid  himself  of  his 
body,  nor  fail  to  contemplate  the  effects  on  his  nerves. 
Pliilosophers  take  advantage  of  this  superhuman  diffi- 
culty ;  feigning  a  psychical  man,  but  knowing  all  the 


CHAP.  V. 


DESCARTES 


time  that  each  of  us  will  add  the  physical  factor  and 
complete  his  human  being.  Hence  a  man  fails  to  realise 
the  extraordinary  consequences  that  follow,  if  he  really 
has  to  suppose  himself  to  be  a  disembodied  soul,  per- 
ceiving nothing  immediately  but  incorporeal  ideas. 
However,  let  me  try. 

I  should  not  be  able,  in  the  first  place,  to  infer  that 
the  body  is  a  material  cause  of  my  ideas,  nor  that  my 
ideas  are  an  efficient  cause  of  moving  the  body.  As  all 
the  causes  and  effects  immediately  perceived  by  me 
w^ould  be  my  psychical  soul  and  its  ideas,  all  those  that 
I  could  mediately  infer  would  be  psychical  souls  and 
ideas.  Now,  Descartes  asserted  the  heterogeneity  of  soul 
and  body,  but  not  exactly  their  incommunicabihty,  still 
less  the  non-existence  of  the  body.  His  view  was  that 
soul  and  body  are  in  contact  in  the  pineal  gland,  that 
the  motions  of  the  body  cause  ideas  and  ideas  voUtions, 
while  this  interaction  requires  the  concourse  or  assistance 
of  God.  This  hypothesis,  or  series  of  hypotheses,  is 
anatomically  false,  because  it  disturbs  nervous  continuity 
without  proving  any  connection  between  the  pineal 
gland  and  thinking.  Logically,  it  is  false  on  Cartesian 
principles,  not  merely  because  soul  and  body  are  sup- 
posed heterogeneous,  but  because  all  the  causes  and 
effects  immediately  perceived  being  supposed  psychical, 
a  physical  body  either  as  cause  or  effect  of  ideas  could 
not  be  inferred.  There  is  no  proof  that  Descartes  him- 
self ever  drew  this  conclusion,  though  involved  in  the 
Cartesian  theory.  He  knew  that  the  body  is  scientifi- 
cally inferred  to  be  cause  and  effect.  Consequently,  his 
theory  that  soul  and  ideas  are  all  the  data  of  inference 
must  be  false,  because  they  cannot  be  the  data  of  that 
scientific  inference. 

It  was  left  for  his  successors  to  draw  the  logical 


134 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   1DEALIS.M 


PART   II. 


conclusion  and  contradict  science.  The  Cartesian  Scliool 
denied  that  the  body  is  either  cause  or  effect  of  ideas. 
Instead,  Geuhnx  invented  occasionahsni,  or  the  hypo- 
tliesis  that  on  the  occasion  of  bodily  changes  God  calls 
forth  an  idea  of  perception  in  our  soul,  while  on  the 
occasion  of  an  idea  of  volition  in  our  soul  He  moves 
our  body  for  us.  Malebranche  developed  this  doctrine 
into  the  vision  of  all  things  in  the  Deity.  Leibnitz, 
rightly  characterising  occasionalism  as  a  perpetual 
miracle,  had  recourse  to  a  pre-established  harmony 
between  body  and  soul,  established  by  God  before  our 
creation.  But  the  pure  idealists  have  a  more  logical  way 
out  of  the  difficulty  than  any  of  the  Cartesians.  It  is 
that  no  body  is  known  to  exist  at  all.  If  all  immediately 
known  causes  and  effects  were  my  soul  and  its  ideas,  I 
should  liave  no  data  to  infer  a  physical  body,  much  less 
that  it  is  wound  up  like  a  clock  to  go  with  my  soul. 
Nevertheless,  Descartes  was  right  in  saying  that  I  have 
a  body,  whose  motions  science  proves  to  be  causes 
and  effects  of  thinking.  Therefore,  immediately  known 
causes  and  effects  are  not  all  my  soul  and  its  ideas,  from 
which  no  bodv  could  have  been  inferred. 

Secondly,  if  all  the  data  were  my  soul  and  its  ideas, 
and  I  could  somehow  or  other  infer  the  body,  at  any 
rate  I  could  not  infer  that  my  body  was  a  part  of 
myself.  How  should  I  know  that  I  have  a  body  ? 
Precisely  as  I  should  be  supposed  to  know  any  other 
external  object,  mediately  through  ideas.  I  should 
have  an  idea  of  warmth,  and  refer  it  to  a  fire ;  an  idea 
of  toothache,  and  refer  it  to  the  body.  But  if  I  knew 
my  body  in  this  indirect  manner,  I  should  not  regard  it 
any  more  than  the  fire  as  part  of  myself.  It  may  be 
objected  that  I  should  find  it  always  with  me.  But  so  I 
do  the  earth  and  the  atmosphere.     It  would  seem  with 


ClIAP.  V. 


DESCARTES 


1*^ 


no 


them  part  of  my  environment ;  not  a  part  of  me,  but 
only  my  nearest  and   dearest   companion.      Descartes 
vacillated  on  this  point.     When  he  is  deducing  the  con- 
sequences of  his  hypothesis,  he  says, '  I  am  the  mind  by 
which  I  am  what  I  am,  as  distinct  from  the  body.'  ^ 
When  he  is  saving  facts,  he  contradicts  his  hypothetical 
deductions.     '  Nature,'  he  says,  '  teaches  me  by  those 
senses  of  pain,  hunger,  thirst,  &c.,  that  I  am  not  only 
present  in  my  body  as  a  sailor  in  a  ship,  but  so  closely 
conjoined  with  it,  and,  as  it  were,  intermixed,  that  I 
compose  something  one  with   it ;  "^  and,  again,  '  it  is 
plainly  certain  that  my  body,   or  rather  myself  as  a 
whole,  so  far  as  I  am  composed  of  body  and  mind,  can 
be  affected  by  various  advantages  and  disadvantages 
from  surrounding  bodies.'     Quite  so  ;  but  he  has  given 
us    two   inconsistent   theories  of  personal  identity,  of 
which  the  first  is  false,  the  second  true,  but  quite  incon- 
sequent, if  I  am  a  soul  perceiving  my  own  ideas. 

If,  then,  I  steadily  suppose  myself  a  soul  perceiving 
its  ideas,  I  find  that  I  cannot  infer  my  own  body  to  be 
a  part  of  myself.  This  is  a  conclusion  so  impossible, 
so  absurd,  so  ludicrous,  yet  so  common  to  idealists,  that 
it  is  no  credit  to  modern  thought  to  have  tolerated  for 
so  long  a  time  hypotheses  from  which  it  logically  fol- 
lows. Eeally,  Descartes  was  right  in  inconsequently 
and  inconsistently  admitting  that  he  is  body  and  soul. 
But  the  admission  is  fatal  to  the  hypothesis  that  he  is 
a  soul,  and  to  the  hypothesis  that  the  objects  of  all  im- 
mediate perceptions  are  ideas.  If  I  perceived  nothing 
but  ideas,  I  could  not  know  my  body.  Since  I  do 
know  my  body,  I  must  perceive  something  else  but 
ideas.  The  truth  is,  I  know  my  body  in  four  ways : 
first,  I  am  conscious  of  it  as  a  factor  of  myself  as 

^  Discourse  on  Method,  Part  IV.  ^  MeJltation  VI. 


p» 


13G 


rSYCIIOLOGlCAL  IDEALISM 


PART  11. 


thinking  subject ;  secondly,  my  senses  perceive  my  own 
nervous  system  as  sensibly  affected,  although  I  have 
long  confused  this  sensible  object  with  the  external 
cause  I  infer;  thirdly,  from  one  part  of  my  body 
sensibly  affected  I  infer  another  part ;  e.g.  I  see  a  re- 
flection on  my  optic  nerve,  and  infer  that  it  represents 
my  hand ;  fourthly,  by  science,  founded  on  all  these 
evidences,  I  know  that  I  am  a  single  organism.  By 
combining  all  these  ways  of  knowing  my  body,  I  know 
it  better  than  anything  else,  and  to  be  a  part  of  myself. 

Having  feigned  myself  to  be  a  pure  soul  contem- 
plating pure  ideas,  I  could  not  infer  my  own  body,  or 
at  any  rate  not  as  part  of  myself.  But  could  I  infer 
any  external  body  ?  Descartes,  in  a  passage  already 
quoted,^  dwells  on  the  involuntariness  of  sensible  effects, 
and  many  of  the  idealists  have  relied  on  this  argument 
for  an  external  cause.  I  freely  admit  the  force  of  the 
argument.  But  what  sort  of  external  cause  ?  I  could 
infer  only  causes  similar  to  those  in  the  data.  Either 
by  sensation  or  by  consciousness,  or  by  both,  I  should 
apprehend  an  interaction  of  my  soul  and  ideas,  and 
of  my  ideas  among  themselves;  and  also  that  some 
of  my  ideas  are  involuntary ;  from  which  the  parity  of 
reasoning  would  then  allow  me  only  three  logical  alter- 
natives :  another  soul ;  this  would  be  Berkeley's  Divine 
Spirit :  a  cause  unknown  ;  this  would  be  Hume's  inex- 
pUcable  something :  another  idea ;  this  would  be  Hegel's 
absolute  idea. 

A  logical  ideahsm  would  further  conclude  that,  so 
far  from  being  known  to  be  a  physical  part  of  myself, 
interacting  with  my  soul  and  ideas,  my  body,  if  known, 
is  something  psychical,  and,  not  being  my  soul,  is  a 
system  of  my  ideas,  while  any  other  soul,  if  there  is 

*  Princ,  ii.  1. 


% 


\} 


CUkV.  V. 


DESCARTES 


137 


such  a  thinix,  must  follow  from  another  similar  system 
of  my  ideas.  Such  a  logical  deduction  escaped  Des- 
cartes, but  it  has  not  escaped  Mill,  who  only  sub- 
stitutes sensations  for  ideas  :  ^ — 

'  Whatever  sensation  I  have,  I  at  once  refer  it  to 
one  of  the  permanent  groups  of  possibilities  of  sensa- 
tion which  I  call  natural  objects.  But  among  these 
groups  there  is  one  (my  own  body)  which  is  not  only 
composed,  like  the  rest,  of  a  mixed  multitude  of  sensa- 
tions and  possibilities  of  sensation,  but  is  also  connected, 
in  a  peculiar  manner,  with  all  my  sensations.  Not  only 
is  this  especial  group  always  present  as  an  antecedent 
condition  of  every  sensation  I  have,  but  the  other 
groups  are  only  enabled  to  convert  their  respective 
possibilities  of  sensation  into  actual  sensations  by 
means  of  some  previous  change  in  that  particular  one. 
I  look  about  me,  and  though  there  is  only  one  group 
(or  body)  which  is  connected  with  all  my  sensations  in 
this  peculiar  manner,  I  observe  that  there  is  a  great 
multitude  of  other  bodies,  closely  resembling  in  their 
sensible  properties  (in  the  sensations  composing  them 
as  groups)  this  particular  one,  but  whose  modifications 
do  not  call  up,  as  those  of  my  own  body  do,  a  world  of 
sensations  in  my  consciousness.  Since  they  do  not  do 
so  in  my  consciousness,  I  infer  that  they  do  it  out  of 
my  consciousness,  and  that  to  each  of  them  belongs  a 
world  of  consciousness  of  its  own,  to  which  it  stands  in 
the  same  relation  in  which  what  I  call  my  own  body 
stands  to  me.' 

Now,  the  scientific  Descartes  knew  well  that  bodies 
are  neither  non-existent  nor  unknown,  neither  sensations 
nor  ideas.     He  admitted  that  involuntary  sensible  data 

*  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  pp.  244-5 
cf.  Lotze,  Metaphysics,  Book  III.  chap.  iv. 


138 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART    H. 


CHAP.    V. 


DESCARTES 


139 


enable  us  to  infer  physical  bodies  as  causes  beyond 
sense  and  conception  in  tlie  external  world,  that  these 
bodies  consist  of  insensible  particles,  that  the  external 
world  is  like  the  sensible  in  some  qualities,  unlike  in 
others,  and  that  the  modes  of  insensible  particles  pro- 
duce sensible  effects  on  our  bodies,  which  are  physical 
parts  of  ourselves ;  after  the  first  step,  proceeding 
logically  enough  from  inference  to  inference.  Let  us 
add  to  our  pre\'ious  quotations  one  passage  as  a  sample 
of  this  profound  scientific  spirit  : — 

'  But  to  the  insensible  particles  of  bodies,  I  assign 
determinate  fii^ures  and  magnitudes  and  motions,  as  if  I 
had  seen  them,  and  yet  I  confess  them  to  be  insensible  ; 
and  therefore  some  will  perhaps  ask,  whence  then  I 
recognise  them  such  as  they  are.  I  answer  that  I  first, 
from  the  simplest  and  most  known  principles,  whose 
knowledge  has  been  implanted  by  nature  in  our  minds, 
considered  generally,  what  could  be  the  principal  differ- 
ences among  the  magnitudes  and  figures  and  positions 
of  bodies,  insensible  only  on  account  of  their  smallness, 
and  what  sensible  effects  would  follow  from  those  various 
concourses.  And  then  when  I  noticed  some  similar 
effects  in  things  sensible,  I  considered  that  they  arose 
from  a  similar  concourse  of  such  bodies  ;  especially  since 
no  other  mode  of  explaining  them  seemed  capable  of 
being  excogitated.'  ^ 

But  the  psychological  Descartes  could  not  logically 
take  the  first  step.  He  had  supposed,  as  '  the  simplest 
and  most  known  principles,'  hypotheses  about  the 
subject  and  its  data,  which  never  could  have  been  the 
premises  of  such  a  science  of  bodies  and  their  insensible 
particles.  If  all  immediately  perceived  effects  and 
causes  had  been  soul  and  ideas,  there  would  have  been 

*  Princ.  iv.  203 


t 


no  primary  data  to  infer  bodies — not  even  one's  own 
body,  much  less  other  bodies,  and  their  corpuscles, 
whose  structures  and  motions  cause  sensible  effects  in 
one's  own  body.  But,  as  Descartes  admitted,  bodies  are 
known  and  inferred  from  sensible  data.  Therefore  the 
data  cannot  be  soul  and  ideas.  From  similars  dis- 
similars  cannot  be  inferred.  From  soul  and  ideas,  no- 
thing else  follows.  But  something  else  is  known  to 
science ;  therefore,  not  from  soul  and  ideas.  Physical 
bodies  and  corpuscles,  structures  and  motions,  require 
physical  data  of  sense. 

After  the  dogmatism  of  media3val  philosophy,  Des- 
cartes was  right  to  doubt.     He  was  right  also  in  begin- 
ning with  the  certain  fact  of  consciousness ;    I  think, 
therefore  am.     But,  at  the  same  time,  he  forgot  that 
there  are  other   facts   of  consciousness.      There  is  a 
universal  consciousness  of  the    thinking   subject,  but 
there  is  also  a  scientific  consciousness  that  the  thinking 
subject  knows  physical  objects.     Instead  of  this,  Des"^ 
cartes  substituted  the  hypothesis  that  the  thinking  sub- 
ject is  a  soul  which  perceives  ideas,  and  then,  in  defiance 
of  logic,  attempted  a  synthetical  deduction  from  this 
idealistic  hypothesis  of  psychical  data  of  sense  to  a  real- 
istic knowledge  of  physical  objects  of  science.     The  de- 
duction may  be  attacked  both  by  enstasis  and  elenchus  ; 
in  its  premises  and  in  its  conclusion.     On  the  one  hand, 
the  subject  is  not  purely  psychical,  and,  if  it  was,  would 
not  be  limited  to  psychical  data :  on  the  other  hand,  if 
the  data  were  psychical,  we  could  not  infer  physical 
objects  of  science,  which  are  admitted  by  Descartes,  and 
are  more  certain  than  any  hypothesis  of  the  nature  of 
the  subject  and  its  data.     Hence  the  hypothesis  of  soul 
and  ideas  must  be  surrendered,  because  the  thinking 
subject  is  not  the  soul  but  the  man,  because  sensible 


140 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  ir. 


141 


o])jects  are  not  ideas  but  pliysical  effects  on  tlie  nervous 
system,  and  because  soul  and  ideas  would  not  enable 
man  to  infer  pliysical  objects  of  science.  Descartes,  the 
original  genius  of  modern  idealism,  was  too  introspective. 
Of  himself  he  says,  '  Totos  dies  solus  in  hypocausto 
morabar,  ibique  variis  meditationibus  placidissime  vaca- 
bam.'^  This  seclusion  in  a  hot  room  is  an  admirable 
w\ay  of  distilling  thoughts,  provided  only  these  vapours 
of  the  heated  brain  can  be  condensed  into  a  knowled^fe 
of  the  outside  world. 

*  Diss,  de  MetJiodo,  ii. 


I 


CHAPTER  VI. 

LOCKE. 

Locke,  at  the  outset  of  the  '  Essay  concerning  Human 
Understanding,'  states  tliat  it  is  his  purpose  to  enquire 
into  the  original,  certainty  and  extent  of  human  know- 
ledge and  opinion,  without  troubling  himself  about  the 
essence  of  mind.^     Tliat  is,  he   rejects  the    Cartesian 
method  of  using  the  nature  of  the  thinking  subject  to  "" 
deduce  our  knowledge  ;  and  rightly,  because  it  was  a ' 
method  from  tlie  less  to  the  more  certain.    But  he  leaves 
the  Cartesian  deduction,   that  the  data  of  the  under-* 
standing  are  ideas,  simply  removes  the  hypothesis  from 
the  premises  to  the  conclusion,  and  nowhere  throughout 
gives  any  new  evidence  that  ideas  are  the  data  of  know-| 
ledge.    ITlie  hypothesis  of  the  soul  is  thus  replaced  by 
the  hypothesis  of  ideas,  as  a  principle.   -.JSTow,  there  had 
been  some  plausibility   in  tlie  argument — the    subject 
is  the  soul,  tlierefore  its  immediate  objects  are  ideas.t 
There  was  notliinghut  j^etitioprincipii  in  the  hypotliesis  — 

>the  immediate  objects  of  understanding  are  ideas,  *  Yet 
this  hypothesis  in  one  form  or  otlier  has  remained  ever 
since  Locke's  time  as  the  putative  principle  of  all  ideahsm. 
Many  a  philosopher,  wlio  has  with  Locke  recovered 
from  the  Cartesian  hypothesis  that  the  subject  is  soul, 
and  has  followed  Hume  in  correcting  Locke's  confusion 

of  sensations  and  ideas,  nevertheless  clings  to  the  hypo- 

^  Essay,  I.  1,  2. 


U2 


rSYCriOLOGlCAL   IDEALISM 


PART   If, 


thesis  that  all  immediate  objects  are  some  psychical  state 
or  other,  without  any  evidence,  whether  of  Cartesian 
deductions,  or  of  psychological  consciousness,  or  of 
natural  science. 

Locke,  having  begun  at  a  new  beginning,  pro- 
ceeds to  his  method,  which  is  as  synthetical  as  that  of 
Descartes  : — 

'  I  shall  pursue  this  following  method. 
h  First,  I  shall  inquire  into  the  orhjinal  of  those  ideas, 
notions,  or  whatever  else  you  please  to  call  them,  which 
a  man  observes,  and  is  conscious  to  himself  he  has  in 
his  mind;  and  the  ways  whereby  the  understanding 
comes  to  be  furnished  with  them. 

)f  Secondly,  I  shall  endeavour  to  show  what  knoiv- 
ledge  the  understanding  hath  by  those  ideas,  and  the 
certainty,  evidence,  and  extent  of  it. 

'  Thirdly,  I  shall  make  some  inquiry  into  the  nature 
and  grounds  of  faith  or  opinion,  whereby  I  mean  that 
assent  which  we  give  to  any  proposition  as  true,  of 
wdiose  truth  vet  we  have  no  certain  knowled<]^e.  And 
here  we  shall  have  occasion  to  examine  the  reasons  and 
degrees  of  assent'  ^ 

From  this  passage  we  can  see  how  vain  is  psycho- 
logical synthesis.  The  smallest  mistake  at  the  beginning 
vitiates  the  whole  procedure  and  every  consequence.  A 
man  is  here  said  to  be  conscious  of  having  ideas  in  his 
mind.  It  is  true  that  he  is  conscious  of  having  ideas. 
But  even  the  followers  of  Locke  himself  would  deny 
that  this  is  all  he  is  conscious  of.  Hume  would  say 
that  he  is  also  conscious  of  impressions,  and  Mill  would 
add  judgments.  Yet  to  a  philosophical  use  of  the  syn- 
thetic method  by  LockS^it  was  necessary  that  ideas  should 
be  all  the  materials  of  knowledge  ^  for  the  next  question 

*  E^say,  I.  1,  3. 


CHAP.  vr. 


LOCKE 


143 


is— what  knowledge  can  be  gained  by  ideas  ;  which  is 
a  false  issue,  if  ideas  are  not  the   whole  material  of 
knowledge.     But  as  they  are  not  the  whole,  it  is  not  to 
be  wondered  at  that,  in  the  sequel,(Locke   oscillates 
between  two  contrary   tendencies,    a  logical  but  false; 
reduction  of  knowledge  to  ideas,  and  an  illogical  but 
true  extension  of  it  to  things  beyond.  /  Moreover,  to 
inconsequence  he  adds  inconsistency.     He  tries  to  begin  ^ 
w^itli  an  understanding  of  ideas  and  end  with  a  know-/ 
ledge  of  things. 

The  fu'stfruits  of  idealistic  hypothesis  are  at  once 
manifest.\  Having  assumed  that  ideas  are  all  the  materials, 
he  consistently  assumes  that  they  are  all  the  objects  of 
understanding: : — ^ 

V  '  Thus  much  I  thought  necessary  to  say  concerning 
the  occasion  of  this  inquiry  into  human  understanding.  "" 
But  before  I  proceed  on  to  what  I  have  thought  on  this 
subject,  I  must  here,  in  the  entrance,  beg  pardon  of  my 
reader  for  the  frequent  use  of  the  word  idea,  which  he 
will  fmd  in  the  following  treatise.  It  being  that  term 
which,  I  think,  serves  best  to  stand  for  whatsoever  is 
the  object  of  the  understanding  when  a  man  thinks,  I 
have  used  it  to  express  whatever  is  meant  by  phantasm, 
7iotion,  species,  or  w^hatever  it  is  wliich  the  mind  can  be 
employed  about  in  thinking;  and  I  could  not  avoid 
frequently  using  it.'  ^  V 

These  words,  wliicli,  if  anywhere,  ought  to  have 
come  as  a  proved  conclusion  at  the  end,  occur  as  an 
undoubted  principle  at  the  entrance  of  the  Essay.  Tliey 
contain  a  double  hypothesis  ;  first,  that  ideas  are  the 
innnediate,  secondly,  that  they  are  all,  the  objects  of 
understanding,  and  therefore  of  knowledge.  The  first 
part  is  the  ideal  lu'pothesis  of  Descartes,  the  second  is 

*  Essay,  I.  1,  8. 


144 


rSYCIlOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


CHAr.   VT. 


LOCKE 


145 


Locke's  corollary.  It  is  a  logical  corollary,  not  however 
scientific,  but  hypothetical  from. an  hypothesis.  Three 
hypotheses  started  modern  idealism ;  the  subject  is 
psychical,  the  data  are  psychical,  the  objects  are 
psychical.     Never  was  such  a  gigantic  system  of  petitio 

principii. 

The  aftermath  of  idealistic  hypothesis  appears  at  the 
very  end  of  the  Essay.  After  adopting  the  Stoic  divi- 
sion of  the  sciences  into  physics,  ethics  and  logic,  he 
concludes  in  the  spirit  of  science,  but  in  utter  contra- 
diction of  his  original  hypothesis,  witli  the  following 

peroration  : — 

'  This  seems  to  me  the  first  and  most  general,  as  w^ell 
as  natural  division  of  the  objects  of  our  understanding. 
For  a  man  can  employ  his  thoughts  about  nothing,  but 
either  the  contemplation  of  things  themselves,  for  the 
discovery  of  truth,  or  about  the  things  in  his  own  power, 
which  are  his  own  actions,  for  the  attainment  of  his  own 
ends  ;  or  the  signs  the  mind  makes  use  of,  both  in  the 
one  and  the  other,  and  the  right  ordering  of  them  for  its 
clearer  information.  All  which  three,  viz.  things  as  they 
are  in  themselves  knowable ;  actions  as  they  depend  on 
us,  in  order  to  happiness ;  and  the  right  use  of  signs  in 
order  to  knowledge,  being  toto  ccelo  different,  they  seemed 
to  be  the  three  great  provinces  of  the  intellectual  world, 
wholly  separate  and  distinct  one  from  another.'  ^ 

In  the  same  chapter  he  has  already  told  us  what  he 
.  includes  under  things  and  signs.  On  the  one  hand,  by 
si<nis  he  means  ideas  and  words.^  On  the  other  hand, 
under  things,  he  includes,  as  objects  of  understanding, 
'  the  nature  of  things,  their  relations  and  their  manner 
of  operation  ; '  while  physics  is,  as  he  says,  '  the  know- 
ledge of  things,  as  they  are  in  their  own  proper  beings, 

'  Essay,  IV.  21,  5.  ^  lb.  IV.  21,  4 ;  cf.  IV.  5. 


I 


their  constitutions,  properties,  and  operations,  whereby 
I  mean  not  only  matter  and  body,  but  spirits  also.' ^ 
( He  finally  admits,  then,  that  things  and  ideas  are  toto 
ccelo  different,  that  not  ideas  but  things  and  their  rela- 
tions are  the  objects  of  physics  and  natural  philosophy, 
and^that  not  only  ideas,  but  also  things,  are  objects  of  ^ 
understanding,  knowledge,  and  science.  \  Which  was 
right,  the  original  hypothesis  of  ideas,  or  the  final  admis- 
sion of  things  ?  The  latter,  because  things  inconceiv- 
able but  not  incredible  are  objects  of  science.  Locke,  like 
Balaam,  came  to  curse,  but  went  away  blessing. 

To  return  to  the  original  hypotheses :  VCdie  conse- 
quence is  that  the  whole  emphasis  of  the  Essay  falls  on 
the  origin  of  ideas,\as  Locke  himself  admits  at  the  very 
beginning  of  the  Second  Book.^       'Every  man  being 
conscious  to  himself,  that  he  thinks,  and  that  which  his 
mind  is  applied  about,  whilst  thinking,  being  the  ideas 
that  are  there  : '  this  is  his  assumption  :    '  it  is  in  the 
first  place  to  be  inquired,  how  he  comes  by  them : '  this 
is  his  hypothetical  conclusion.     Meanwhile,  the  origin 
of  knowledge  is  postponed  till  the  Fourth  Book,  and  the 
Second  and  Fourth  Books  are  never  welded  together. 
[This  is  the  beginning  of  a  serious  evil  in  modern  philo- 
sophy, the  emphasis  laid  on  the  origin  of  ideas  in  pre- 
ference to  the  far  more  important  problem  of  the  origin 
^of  knowledge,  and  the  tendency  to  let  the  limits  of  ideas 
determine  tlie  extent  of  knowledge.     But  ideas  do  not 
dictate  knowledge  so  much  as  knowledge  dictates  ideas. 

Locke  begins  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  ideas  well  by  \ 
rejecting  innate  ideas.     No  doubt  most  of  his  objections  , 
touch  the  broader  form  of  inborn  ideas  rather  tlian  the 
elicited  ideas  of  Descartes.     But  they  have  the  merit  of 
pointing  out  that  many  ideas,  supposed  universal,  are  not 

'  Essay,  IV.  21,  2.  2  ^f.  also  L  1,  8. 


A' 


..\ 


» «1 


146 


rSYCIIOLOGlCAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


possessed  hy  savages,  and  Locke  in  tliis  respect  has  been 
confirmed  l)v  modern  travellers.^  Moreover,  lie  touches 
Descartes  himself,  when  he  shows  that  experience  has 
not  really  been  eliminated,^  and  that  consciousness,  or, 
as  he  usually  says,  reflection,  is  not  a  mystical  revela- 
tion, but  an  inner  sense.  As  sensation  apprehends  sen- 
sible objects  only  when  present,  so  consciousness  appre- 
hends one's  own  operations  only  when  one  performs 
them.  There  is  no  greater  source  of  error  in  philosophy 
than  the  confusion  of  the  intuitive  with  the  a  priori^  and 
of  the  conscious  with  the  pinnate.  ^Consciousness  is  an 
intuitive,  not  innate  nor  a  priori,  experience  of  oneself 
performing  operations.  '^ 

Locke  did  a  signal  service  in  showing  that  there  are 
two  kinds  of  sense,  sensation  and  reflection  : — ., 

'  Let  us  then  suppose  the  mind  to  be  as  we  say, 
white  paper,  void  of  all  characters,  without  any  ideas  ; 
how  comes  it  to  be  furnished  ?  Whence  comes  it  by 
that  vast  store,  which  the  busy  and  boundless  fancy  of 
man  has  painted  on  it,  with  an  almost  endless  variety  ? 
Whence  has  it  all  the  materials  of  reason  and  know- 
ledge ?  To  this  I  answer  in  one  word,  from  experience :  I 
in  that,  all  our  knowledge  is  founded ;  and  from  that  it 
ultimately  derives  itself.  COur  observations  employed 
either  about  external  semible  objects,  or  about  the  internal 
operations  of  our  minds,  perceived  and  reflected  on  by  our- 
selves, is  that  which  supplies  our  understandings  with  all 
the  materials  of  thinking.  These  two  are  the  fountains  of 
knowledge,  from  whence  all  the  ideas  we  have,  or  can 
naturally  have,  do  spring.'  ^     ^ 

Modern  criticisms  of  this  theory  often  turn  on  the 
comparison  of  the  mind  to  white  paper,  which  is  said  to 

^  Cf.  Moffat,  Missionary  Lahoicrs  in  South  Africa,  chap.  ix. 
■^  Cf.  Essay,  I.  2,  1 ;  II.  1, 1.  3  n,  i^  2. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


147 


be  inconsistent  with  evolution.    But  Locke  rather  over- 
looks  evolution   than   contradicts   it.     The    theory   of 
evolution  is  often  exaggerated.    It  shows  that  our  senses 
become  more  and  more  readily  adapted  to  apprehend 
their  objects  when  presented.     It  does  not  show  that 
they  ever  come  to  evolve  ideas  or  apprehend  anything  a 
priori.    Its  evidence  is  in  favour  not  of  a  priori  ideas,  but 
only  of  intuitive  perception.    For  example,  the  more  the 
senses  have  been  exposed  to  light  the  quicker  and  clearer 
they  have  apprehended  its  sensible  eflfects  when  presented ; 
by  its  action  a  special  sense  of  vision  has  been  gradually 
evolved  to  perceive  them ;  but  there  is  no  evidence  that 
at  last  vision  will,  of  itself,  without  light  being  presented, 
apprehend  sensible  light  a  priori.     Such  a^jump  from' 
light  presented  in  sense  to  light  constructed  by  sense  is 
not  proved  by  evolution,  but  arises  from  confusing  the 
intuitive  with  the  a  priori.     Evolution  has  shown  that 
we  hereditarily  tend  to  use  our  organs  better,  and  that 
by  use  the  organs  become  more  diflferentiated ;  but  it 
has  not  shown  that  they  ever  evolve  an  a  priori  idea. 
Now  Locke,  it  is  true,  overlooked  hereditary  adapta- 
tion ^but  he  was  quite  right,  and  would  be  right  to-day,^ 
in  resisting   a  priori   ideas,  in   saying  that  we  begin 
'  without  any  ideas,'  and  in  recognising  two  kinds^of 
sensitive  intuition,  sensation  and  reflection,  both  pre- 
sentative.  / 

The  really  vital  question  for  the  critic  of  the  Essay 
is^  a  question  seldom  asked.  vAll  knowledge  begins  \j 
with  sense  ;  'but  what  are  the_objects  of  sense  ?  Locke's 
answer  is,  ideas  ;  ideas  presented"^ to  both  senses ;  ideas 
of  sensation  and  ideas  of  reflection.  His  doctrine  of  ideas 
was  modelled  on  that  of  Descartes.  Perhaps  he  dis- 
tinguished sensation  from  conception  better  than  his  pre- 
decessor, but  he  left  the  consequences  of  the  Cartesian 


L  2 


148 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


r.VRT   II. 


confusion  of  these  operations  in  liis  doctrine  that  ideas 
are  the  objects  ahke  of  sensation  and  conception,  ^gain, 
he  followed  Descartes  in  confusing  object  and  operation, 
the  idea  and  its  perception.^  ^  The  object  of  sensation, 
then,  beinjx  rec^arded  as  an  idea,  tlie  idea  as  nothin^:^ 
but  its  perception,  and  tlie  perception  as  psychical,  it 
follows  that  the  object  of  sensation,  with  Locke  as  with 
Descartes,  becomes  a  psychical  result  in  our  minds,  dis- 
tinguished not  only,  as  it  should  be,  from  the  external 
object,  but  also  from  the  nervous  impression,  as  it  should 
not.  '  If  then,'  says  he,  in  speaking  of  the  ideas  of 
primary  qualities,  '  external  objects  be  not  united  to 
our  minds  when  they  produce  ideas  in  it,  and  yet  we 
perceive  their  original  qualities  in  such  of  them  as  singly 
fall  under  our  senses,  'tis  evident  that  some  motion 
must  be  therein  continued  by  our  nerves,  or  animal 
spirits,  by  some  parts  of  our  bodies,  to  the  brain,  or  tlie 
seat  of  sensation,  there  to  produce  in  our  minds  the 
particular  ideas  we  have  of  themJ  ^  Thus  the  ideal 
hypothesis  of  Descartes  was  accepted  by  Locke,  and 
without  further  evidence.  Moreover,  it  remains  to  this 
day  the  current  hypothesis,  with  the  sole  alteration  of 
idea  into  sensation.  But,  as  we  have  already  found,  the 
sensible  object,  though  internal,  is  not  the  sensitive  opera- 
tion. Even,  then,  if  the  sensation  were  a  purely  psychical 
operation,  it  would  not  follow  that  the  sensible  object 
is  either  a  psychical  sensation  or  a  psychical  idea. 

Locke  also  added  to  the  doctrine  of  ideas ;  and  his 
first  addition  was  the  sensible  idea  of  resistance.^  Des- 
cartes, with  his  mathematical  genius,  had  emphasised 
the  mathematical  qualities  of  body,  and  especially  exten- 
sion, by  which  he  defined  it.^   Locke  accepted  extension 

^  Essay,  II.  8,  8 ;  II.  10,  2 ;  II.  19,  1. 
2  I  J.  8,  12.  ='  II.  4.  4  Descartes,  Princ.  ii.  4. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


149 


and  the  sense  of  extension,  but  went  on  to  show  that 
resistance  is  also  necessary  to  body,  and  therefore  added 
a  sense  of  resistance.     But  he  spoilt  this  great  contri^ 
bution  to  the  philosophy  of  matter  and  sense  by  his 
theory  of  ideas.     If  I  perceived  nothing  but  sensations 
or  ideas,  I  should  perceive  only  a  sensation  or  an  idea  of 
resistance.     I  should  not  perceive  one  part  of  my  body, 
or  nervous  system,  resisting  another  ;  I  should  have  to 
infer  it.     But  there  would  be  no  data  for  the  inference, 
for  from  psychical  sensations  or  ideas  physical  resist- 
ance between  parts  of  a  body  would  not  follow.     The' 
sense  of  resistance,  therefore,  suj^phes  a  new  argument 
to  prove  that  the  real  object    of  sense  is    the  nervous 
system,  and  its  various  parts  resisting  one  another. 

Again,  Descartes  had  confined  the  ideal  theory  to"^ 
sensation;    he  had  allowed  a  direct  consciousness  of 
thinking.     Locke,  with  more  consistency  thougli  witli^ 
less  truth,  interposed  an  idea  not  only  between  outer"* 
sense  and  the   nervous    impression,  but  also  between 
inner  sense  audits  operations  ;|  so  that  the  direct  objects, 
are   ideas   of  sensation  and   ideas  of  reflection.     But^ 
Descartes  rightly   regarded   consciousness  as  a  direct 
apprehension  of  thinking ;  and  Locke,  instead  of  trans- 
ferring the  ideal  theory  to  consciousness,  should  have 
retracted  its  appHcation  to  sensation,  and  regarded  sen- 
sation as  a  direct  apprehension  of  the  nervous  impression. 
Thirdly,  Descartes    had   begun   by   saying,   'I  am 
conscious  that  I  think,  not  of  thinking.'     The  object  of 
consciousness  is  not  the  quality,  thinking,  but  a  thinking 
subject.     Inconsistently  with  this  truth,  when  he  came  to 
substance,  he  had  fancied  that  we  do  not  directly  per- 
ceive it,  but  '  from  perceiving  that  some  attribute  is 
present,  we  conclude  that  some  existing  thing,  or  sub 
stance  to  which  it  can  be  attributed,  is  also  necessarily 


150 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


151 


present ; '  ^  and  he  had  apphed  this  theory  both  to  soul 
and  body.  Locke  developed  this  hint  into  a  formal 
theory  that  we  perceive  the  simple  ideas  of  qualities, 
while  'we  accustom  ourselves  to  suppose  some  sub- 
stratum, wherein  they  do  subsist  and  from  which  they  do 
result,  whicli,  therefore,  we  call  substance'  ^  This  theory 
he  applied  to  body  and  spirit ;  and  from  him  has  de- 
scended the  ordinary  hypothesis  that  the  objects  of 
sense  and  consciousness  are  qualities,  while  substance 
is  inferred — without  data  to  infer  it. 

This  error  will  meet  us  again  in  this  chapter.  At 
present  it  will  he  sufficient  to  quote  a  passage  from 
another  part  of  Locke's  Essay :  V  Our  simple  ideas  have 
all  abstract  as  well  as  concrete  names :  the  one  whereof 
is  (to  speak  the  language  of  grammarians)  a  substan- 
tive, the  other  an  adjective  ;  as  whiteness,  white ; 
sweetness,  sweet.'  ^  This  is  the  well-known  logical  dis- 
tinction of  abstract  and  concrete,  but  its  consequences 
are  often  overlooked.  Locke,  for  instance,  forgot  to 
ask  in  which  meaning  he  should  call  a  simple  idea  an 
object  of  sense.  The  abstract  whiteness  is  a  quality  ; 
the  concrete  white  is  the  qualified.  Now,  nobody  ever 
saw  whiteness ;  the  object  of  vision  is  the  white,  the 
red,  &c.  Similarly,  the  object  of  taste  is  not  sweetness, 
but  the  sweet ;  and  so  on  with  all  sensible  objects. 
Universally,  then,  an  object  of  sense  is  never  a  quality, 
but  always  the  qualified  ;  and  a  quality  is  an  abstrac- 
tion ;  and,  though  we  may  sometimes  speak  of  perceiving 
it,  we  do  so  only  for  convenience.  But  the  qualified  is 
a  substance  ;  whiteness  and  sweetness  are  qualities,  but 
the  white  and  the  sweet  are  substances.  The  object  of 
sense,  therefore,  is  always  a  substance.  I  do  not  mean 
that  sense  perceives  a  whole  substance  at  once,  but  only 

*  Princ.  i.  52.  «  Essaij,  II.  23, 1.  ^  III.  8,  2. 


\ 


so  far  as  it  is  sensible  to  a  given  sense ;  sight  perceives 
a  substance  so  far  as  it  is  white  ;  taste  perceives  a  sub- 
stance so  far  as  it  is  sweet,  and  so  on.  Nor  do  I  mean 
an  external  substance,  for  I  am  a  substance,  consistino-. 
too,  of  an  immense  pluraHty  of  substances,  which  I  per- 
ceive so  far  as  they  are  sensibly  affected. 

These  conclusions  apply  both  to  outer  and  inner 
sense.     Li  sensation,  I  perceive  not  a  mere  quality,  nor 
a  whole  substance  at  once,  nor  an  external  substance  ; 
I  perceive  my  nervous  system,  not  so  far  as  it  is  ner- 
vous  structure    moving,  but   so  far  as  it  is   sensibly 
affected  in  different  parts,  the  optic  nerve  so  far  as  it  is 
visibly  white,  the  gustatory  nerve  so  far  as  it  is  sweet 
to  taste,  and  so  on.  Similarly  in  consciousness,  I  perceive, 
not  mere  thinking,  nor  the  whole  of  myself,  but  myself 
thinking,  in  the  manner  described  in  the  last  chapter^ 
^The  object  of  my  sensation  is  myself  as  a  physical  sub- 
stance sensibly  affected  ;  the  object  of  my  consciousness 
is  myself  as  a  thinking  substance. ^Descartes  rightly  said, 
'I  think.'     He  ought  not  to  have  deserted  this  prin- 
ciple.    Locke  ought  to  have  returned  to  it,  and  have 
apphed   it  from  consciousness   to  sensation.     Modern 
philosophy   ought   now   to   give   up    the  sensation  of 
quahties  and  inference  of  substance,  because  there  is  a 
direct  sensation  of  my  nervous  system  sensibly  affected, 
and  a  direct  consciousness  of  myself  thinking,  both  of 
which  are  senses  not  of  quahties,  but  of  the  quahfied. 
We  have  a  sense  of  substances,  in  order  to  infer  them. 

Locke's  complete  theory  is  that  all  sense  perceives  \ 
a  simple  idea.     Eeally,  sense  always  perceives  a  sub- 
stance quahfied.     It  is  doubtful  whether  the  substance,  / 
as  perceived,  is  ever  simply  quahfied;    for  instance, 
even  when  I  feel  simply  pained,  I  doubt  whether  I  do 
not  feel  pained  for  a  time.     But,  in  any  case,  I  do  not 


152 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


>- 


.     ^ 


perceive  anything  simple  in  tlie  sense  of  a  simple 
quality,  wliicli  is  only  simple  in  tlie  sense  of  abstract ; 
but  I  perceive  at  least  the  sim2:)ly  qualified.  Secondly, 
(I  do  not  perceive  anything  simple  in  the  sense  of  a  simple 
idea,  which  is  really  conceived,  \not  perceived^;  but  I 
perceive,  in  sensation,  my  nervous  system  sensibly 
affected,  and  in  reflection,  myself  thinking/AVTlie  object 
of  sensation,  and  the  object  of  consciousness,  so  far 
from  being  simple  ideas,  are  not  ideas  at  all.  {  They 
are  two  sets  of  materials  of  knowledge,  of  which 
neither  is  a  quality,  and  neither  is  an  idea,  but  each 
jL  sVibstance.  ^  Locke's  attempt  to  make  the  origin  of^^ 
ideas  determine  the  origin  of  knowledge  breaks  down 
at  the  very  outset  by  substituting  abstractions  for  con- 
crete data  of  sense. 

At  the  end  of  what  he  has  to  say  on  simple  ideas,^ 
Locke  comes  to  the  operations  which  he  supposes  to 
make  oJ,her"^ideas  out  of  them,  and  to  the  ideas  thus 
made.^  '  The*act^of  themind,' sayshe,  '  wherein  it  exerts^^ 
y  its  power  over  its  simple  ideas,  are  chiefly  these  three : 
(  First,  combining  several  simple  ideas  into  one  compound 
V  one,  and  thus  all  complex  ideas  are  made.  The  second,  is 
bringing  two  ideas,  whether  simple  or  complex,  together, 
and  setting  them  by  one  another,  so  as  to  take  a  view  of 
them  at  once,  without  uniting  them  into  one,  by  which 
way  it  gets  all  its  ideas  of  relations.  The  third,  is  separat- 
ing them  from  all  other  ideas  that  accompany  them  in 
their  real  existence.  This  is  called  abstraction,  and 
thus  all  its  general  ideas  are  made.'^  He  then  re- 
marks that  ideas,  juade  up  of  several  simple  ones  put 
together,  he  calls  complex  ;  such  as  are  beauty,  grati- 
tude, a  man,  an  army,  the  universe.  Next  he  divides 
complex  ideas  under  three  heads :  modes,  substances, 

>  Essaij,  IT.  2-11.    2 II.  11  scq.  to  the  end  of  the  Third  Book.   «  II.  12,  1. 


CHAP.    VI. 


LOCKE 


1r  ^ 


relations.     Complex  ideas  of  modes  are  ideas  of  affec- 
tions  of  substances,   subdivided   by  him  into  sinqjle, 
or    combinations    of    the    same    simple    idea,   e.g.    a 
dozen,  formed  of  units,  and  mixed,  or  combinations 
of  simple   ideas   of  several   kinds,    e.g.  beauty,  theft. 
Complex  ideas  of  substances  are  '  such  combinations  of  "^ 
simple  ideas  as  are  taken  to  represent  distinct  particular 
things  subsisting  by  themselves,  in  which  the  supposed, 
or  confused  idea  of  substance,  such  as  it  is,  is  always 
the  first  and  chief; '  ^  they  are  subdivided  into  ideas  of 
single  substances,  e.g.  a  man,  and  collective  ideas  of 
several    substances,   e.g.   an    army.      'The  last  sort  of\ 
complex  ideas,'  he  says,  '  is  that  we  call  relative,  which  * 
consists  in  the  consideration,  and  comparing  one  idea 
with  another,' 2  e.g.  father   and   son,  bigger  and  less, 
cause  and  effect.^     The  consideration  of  all  these  com- 
plex ideas  in  their  order  occupies  the  remainder  of  the 
Second  Book ;  while  that  of  abstract  ideas  follows,  alonir 
with  general  words,  in  a  general  treatment  of  language  . 
in  the  Third  Book.^  ^ 

The  whole  discussion  is  full  of  variety.     But  it  is        » 
vitiated  by  two  incurable  errors.     Li  the  first  place,\ 
the  objects  of  knowledge  are  complicated  with   their  J  \     * 
mere  ideas.     But  many  scientific  objects  are  known  to 
exist,  without  being  conceivable.    Secondly,  no  thorougli*^' 
analysis  is  attempted  of  the  three  acts  of  mind,  which 
are  supposed  to  be  the  sole  causes  capable  of  producing 
out  of  simple  ideas  all  other  ideas.     Locke  calls  them  r 
composition,  comparison  and  abstraction  ; '  making  the 
first  to  be  the  origin  of  all  complex  ideas  of  modes  and 
substances,  the  second  the  origin  of  all  complex  ideas 
of  relations,  the  third  the  origin  of  all  general  ideas. 


>  Essay,  II.  12,  G.  «  H.  12,  7. 

*  Cf.  II.  33,  19. 


'  II.  25,  2. 

»  n.  11. 


134 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  11. 


He  saw  tlie  foundation  of  these  operations  on  sense ;  but 
he  forgot  to  ask  their  relation  to  reason. 

After  sense,  we  conceive  particular  ideas  in  the 
reproductive  imagination,  and  general  ideas  by  abstrac- 
tion from  sense.  It  does  not  follow  that  all  jjeneral  ideas 
are  thus  formed ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  impossible  that  the 
idea  of  an  insensible  object  should  be  either  reproduced 
or  abstracted  from  sense,  in  which  it  has  never  been. 
Again,  we  may  compare  and  compound  ideas.  But  at 
the  same  time  we  also  judge  about  sensible  objects 
and  apprehend  their  relations.  In  judgment  we  use 
ideas,  particular  and  general.  But,  as  Mill  has  pointed 
out,^  we  also  judge  about  sensible  objects  in  order  to 
apprehend  their  relations.  I  am  in  pain;  this  is  a 
judgment  that  I,  who  am  real,  am  in  pain,  which  is 
real.  Now,  reasoning  starts  from  such  judgments  about 
the  relations  of  sensible  objects,  and  sometimes  by 
analogy,  sometimes  and  better  by  induction  and  deduc- 
tion, infers  rational  judgments,  no  longer  about  simple 
objects,  nor  about  ideas,  but  about  the  relations  of  real 
objects;  on  the  principle,  if  the  premises  are  true, 
the  conclusion  is  also  true.  That  is,  startingf  from 
judgments  of  sense,  we  infer  rational  judgments  on  evi- 
dence about  relations,  as  real  as  the  sensible  relations. 
Kor  is  this  all ;  as  I  showed  in  the  last  chapter,  reason, 
having  from  sensitive  concluded  rational  judgments, 
forms  indirect  ideas,  roughly  corresponding  to  the  objects 
inferred,  hke  to  the  ideas  of  sensible  objects  but  not 
the  same,  and  only  capable  of  being  made  by  reason. 
For  instance,  reason,  having  inferred  that  there  are 
particles  in  bodies,  causes  the  idea  of  a  corpuscle ;  a 
general  idea  of  corpuscles,  which  is  not  a  result  of  mere 
abstraction,  and  particular  ideas  of  this  or  that  cor- 

^  Mill,  Logic,  i.  5,  1. 


CHAP.    VI. 


LOCKE 


155 


puscle,  which  are  not  results  of  composition  and  com- 
parison of  ideas,  but  of  inference  from  judgment  to 
judgment.  Beyond  sense  and  imagination,  besides 
composition,  comparison  and  abstraction  of  ideas,  there 
are  also  judgments  of  sense  about  the  relations  of  sen- 
sible objects,  and  reasoning  from  these  judgments  to 
the  relations  of  insensible  objects,  producing  rational 
conceptions  of  ideas,  due  to  no  other  source  but  reason- 
ing. The  narrow  problem  of  the  origin  of  ideas  cannot 
be  separated  from  the  whole  problem  of  judgment, 
reasoning,  and  the  origin  of  knowledge. 

Locke,  in  the  Second  and  Third  Books,  saw  only 
one  side  of  thinking,  and  that  its  weakest  side  : 
imagination  and  abstraction,  comparison,  and  com- 
position, of  ideas  from  sense.  Eational  inference  of 
realities,  beyond  sense  and  ideas,  he  allowed  to  fade 
into  the  distance  of  the  Fourth  Book.  Consequently, 
he  found  only  the  direct  sources  of  ideas,  and  missed 
their  indirect  source  in  reason.  No  doubt  he  was  in- 
fluenced by  the  Cartesian  logic  of  his  day,  which  knew 
only  the  order — idea,  judgment,  reason.  But  there  is 
a  second  order — reason,  judgment,  idea.  As  soon  as 
judgment  begins  to  act  on  the  senses,  reason  begins 
with  it,  and,  never  stopping  except  to  sleep  and  rise 
again  refreshed,  constantly  forms  new  judgments  issuing 
in  new  ideas.  But  Locke  postponed  reasoning,  ignored 
rational  conception,  and  therefore  always  fell  short  even 
of  the  origin  of  ideas. 

Even  in  the  ideas  of  simple  modes,  the  very  simplest 
department  of  complex  ideas,  this  defect  is  noticeable. 
After  sensations  of  motion,  we  may  form  ideas  of  motion 
by  imagination;  and  the  ideas  of  simple  modes  of 
sensible    motion   by   composition.^      But   reason   also 

*  Essay,  II.  18,  1-2. 


150 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   IT. 


infers  simple  modes  of  inseiisiljle  motion  in  nature, 
such  as  electricity  and  magnetism,  cohesion  and  chemi- 
cal attraction,  which  were  never  in  sense,  and  frames 
indirect  ideas  of  these  motions.  Similarly,  we  may 
imagine  ideas  of  sensible  duration  and  extension, 
and  compound  ideas  of  these  simjjle  modes  ;  but  when 
Locke  goes  on  to  suppose  that  the  mind  extends  itself 
to  infinity  simply  by  repeating  these  ideas,  he  neglects 
the  rational  evidences  of  the  unbounded  nature  of  time 
^and  space.  Unless  men  had  thought  they  had  reason 
to  infer  infinity,  no  mere  repetition  of  ideas  of  the  finite 
would  ever  have  given  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  which  is 
always  accompanied  by  a  rational  inference  that  the  in- 
finite itself  is  beyond  any  idea  we  can  possibly  form 
of  it. 

The  mischievous  consequences  of  omitting  reason  in 
the  formation  of  ideas  are  best  seen  in  Locke's  doctrine 
of  mixed  modes  and  relations.  Without  reasoning,  mere 
composition  and  comparison,  as  soon  as  they  go  beyond 
sense,  would  produce  at  most  artificial  ideas,  the  va- 
garies of  imagination.  Consequently,  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  Locke  treats  the  ideas  of  mixed  modes  and 
relations,  which  he  supposes  to  be  formed  by  pure  com- 
position and  comparison  from  and  beyond  sense,  as 
artificial,  and  even  goes  so  far  as  to  contend  that  not 
merely  the  ideas,  but  mixed  modes  and  relations  them- 
selves, have  no  other  reality  but  what  they  have  in  the 
minds  of  men,  and  are  real  only  in  the  sense  of  being 
consistent,  not  in  the  sense  of  representing  real  things. 
This  paradox  is  a  serious  matter,  for  it  affects  the  reahty 
not  only  of  a  mixed  mode,  such  as  beauty,  or  a  rela- 
tion, such  as  father  and  son,  but  all  moral  modes  and 
relations.     It  reduces  morahty  itself  to  an  idea.^ 

'  Cf.  Essay,  II.  22,  2;  IL  25;  IL  30,  4-5  ;  11.  32,  10  ;  III.  4,  2;  III.  5. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


157 


But  obligation  is  a  mixed  mode,  which  is  real ;  theft 
drunkenness,  lying,  are  mixed  modes  which  are  only  too 
real,  and  the  conformity  of  morality  to  law  is  a  rela- 
tion, which  is  also  real,  though  perhaps  less  common ;  and 
the  complex  ideas  of  these  mixed  modes  and  relations 
are  not  artificial,  but  really,  though  inadequately,  corre- 
spond to  real  morality  and  immorahty.     We  may  admit 
that  morality  is   not  altogether  immutable;    it  is  not 
therefore  unreal.     We  may  admit  that  the  ideas  of  the 
beautiful,  of  the  good,  and  of  law,  are  differently  com- 
pounded in  ancient  and  modern  morals ;  they  are  not 
therefore   artificial.     We   may   admit    that   actions  of 
virtue  are  uncommon ;  but  virtue  is  not  an  idea.     By 
reasoning,  man   finds  out    the   moral  relations  suited 
partly  to  humanity  in  general,  and  partly  to  the  cir- 
cumstances  of  his    time.     By  rational  conception,  he 
apprehends  ideas  of  moral   relations,    immutable  'and 
mutable.     Happy  he  who  can  also  reahse  these  ideas, 
and  be 

Virtutis  verse  custos  rigidusque  satelles. 

There  is  even  a  certain  fashion  of  ideas,  which 
Locke  illustrates  by  the  Greek  idea  of  ostracism  and  the 
Eoman  idea  of  proscription.  But  these  ideas  were  not 
on  that  account  artificial :  they  represented  real  mixed 
modes  at  Greece  and  Eome  :  to  be  ostracised  or  pro- 
scribed was  anything  but  a  mere  idea.  The  Greeks  and 
Eomans  inferred  that  these  institutions  would  serve 
certain  purposes,  and  thus  both  established  the  real 
mixed  modes  and  represented  them  by  corresponding 
ideas.  The  modern  historian  from  his  evidence  infers 
that  these  mixed  modes  existed  in  the  past,  and  con- 
ceives the  ideas  in  the  present.  Similarly,  the  relation 
of  paternity  is  not  the  idea  of  that  relation,  nor  a  mere 
product  of  comparison.  It  is  a  real  relation  of  generation, 


158 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


which  from  sensible  data  we  infer  really  to  take  place, 
and  of  which  we  afterwards  form  an  idea,  rational  and  by 
no  means  artificial,  though  but  superficially  represent- 
ing the  actual  physical  process  of  propagation.  Mixed 
modes  and  relations,  and  their  ideas  beyond  sense,  are 
not  always  artificial  constructions  of  composition  and 
comparison  of  sensible  ideas ;  but  reasoning  from  judg- 
ments of  sense  discovers  real  mixed  modes  and  relations, 
and  then  forms  indirect  ideas,  really,  though  inade- 
quately, corresponding  to  these  realities,  in  science,  in 
art,  and  in  morals. 

The  fallacy  of  omitting  reason  again  appears  in 
Locke's  treatment  of  universals  in  the  Third  Book. 
He  thinks  that  the  sole  source  of  general  ideas  is  direct 
abstraction  from  sense.  The  consequences  he  draws  are 
tliat  all  classes  are  abstract  ideas,  that  no  real  essence 
is  knowable  beyond  ideas,  that  simple  ideas  are  unde- 
finable,  and  that  universal  truths  are  merely  the  agree- 
ments and  disagreements  of  our  abstract  ideas. ^  All 
these  consequences  would  follow  if  we  had  no  higher 
power  than  abstracting  general  ideas  from  particular 
sensible  objects.  All  classification  would  be  artificial. 
But  there  is  a  second  source  of  general  ideas.  Eeason, 
by  discovering  the  numerous  similarities  of  particulars, 
infers  real  kinds  or  natural  classes,  which  are  not  indeed 
eternal  but  as  constant  as  the  similarities,  and  thereby 
causes  new,  general,  often  very  indirect  ideas  repre- 
senting" these  real  classes,  but  not  identical  with  them ; 
e.g.  the  rational  general  idea  of  a  corpuscle.  Again, 
a  simple  idea  of  sensible  light  is  undefinable ;  but  light 
in  the  universe  is  not,  as  Locke  thinks,  undefinable. 
On  the  contrary,  optical  reasoning  proves  that  the  real 
essence    or   fundamental  similarity  on  which  its  pro- 

»  i;ssa//,lV.  3,  31;  IV.  12,  7. 


CHAr.   VI. 


LOCKE 


159 


perties  depend  is  an  astliereal  undulation,  and  defines 
it  accordingly.      Lastly,   whatever   M-e    may    think   of 
essences  and  definitions,  if  Locke's  theory  that  direct 
abstraction  is  the  sole  source  of  general  ideas,  and  that 
classes  are  abstract  ideas,  were  true,  it   would  follow 
that  all  uniformities  would   be   universal  relations  of 
abstract  ideas  ;  and  he  accepted  the  consequence ;  even 
the  variety  of  Locke's  mind  refusing  to  entertain  'a  con- 
ceptualism  of  classes  along  with  a  realism  of  natural 
laws.  If  ships  and  liquids  were  abstract  ideas,  the  laws  of 
flotation  would  be  universal  relations  of  abstract  ideas. 
These  laws,  however,  are  universal  relations  of  real  ships 
and  real  liquids,  inferred  by  reason.    Therefore   the 
classes  so  related  are  realities  beyond  abstract  ideas. 
Abstraction  of  ideas  from  sense  is  not  the  sole  source  of 
generality,   as  Locke  thought:   reason   infers   natural 
classes  and  laws,  and  indirectly  produces  general  ideas, 
not  identical  witli  them,  but  representing  them,  not  arti- 
ficially but  really,  though  inadequately. 

Curiously  enough,  Locke  himself  saw,  through  a  glass 
darkly,  the  interference  of  reason  in  the  origin  of"  one 
complex  idea,  that  of  substance.      If  sense  perceived 
simple  ideas  of  qualities,  and  composition  united  simple 
into  complex  ideas,    the   only  complex  ideas  we  could 
have  would  be  complex  ideas  of  qualities.     We  might 
have,    for  example,    a   complex    idea   of  a    combina- 
tion of  extension,  solidity,  motion,   thinking,  and  no- 
thing more.     But  Locke  saw  that  we  have  something 
more.     He,    therefore,    suddenly   introduced,    beyond 
sei  se  and  over  and  above  composition,  a  supposition  • 
and  says  that  '  not  imagining  how  these  simple  ideas 
can  exist  by   themselves   we   accustom    ourselves   to 
suppose   some   substratum,    wherein    they    do    subsist 
and   from  which    they    do  result;   which,    therefore 


IGO 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


we   call   substance.'  ^     Secondly,  lie  allowed    that    this 
supposition  causes  an  obscure  and  confused  idea  of  the 
supposed  but  unknown  support  of  qualities.     He  re- 
cognised two  such  suj^posed  and  conceived  substances : 
body,  the  suljstratum  to  those  simple  ideas  we  have 
from  without ;  and  spirit,  the  substratum  to  those  we 
have  from  within.'^     Finally,  he  regarded  both  these 
substances  as  unknown,  and  neither  of  their  ideas  as 
clear  and  distinct.     Nevertheless,  he  tliought  that  the 
ideas  of  substance  were  real  in  a  different  way  from  those 
of  other  complex  ideas.     The  complex  ideas  of  mixed 
modes  and  relations  were,  according  to  liim,  real  if  con- 
sistent ;  those  of  substances  real  onlv  if  a^^-reeinir  with 
things  without  us.^     It  is  the  supposition  of  existence, 
over  and  above  the  composition  of  ideas,  which  made 
him  allow  this   agreement  with  existence  to  ideas  of 
substances.      Inconsistent  as  this  supposition  is   with 
his   general    theory   of  the    composition    of    complex 
ideas,  it   is    nevertheless  the  truth,   though  in  a  very 
imperfect  shape.      Let  us  then  proceed  to  correct  it, 
by  showing  what  is  the  real  nature  of  this  inference, 
which  Locke  calls  a  supposition. 

It  is  true  that  external  substances  are  inferred.  But 
there  are  three  views  of  what  a  substance  is  inferred  to 
be.  Some  say  that  it  is  only  a  combination  of  qualities. 
But  qualities  are  abstractions  ;  and  a  body  is  not  ex- 
tension, solidity,  motion,  or  any  number  of  further 
abstractions,  combined,  but  the  extended,  solid,  movino- 
&c  Locke  went  to  the  opposite  extreme  of  supposino- 
a  sulistance  to  be  a  siil)stratura  or  kind  of  support  on 
wliich  the  qualities  rest,  and  tliis  is  the  ordinary  view, 
descended  indeed  from  the  compound,  or  'concrete,' 
substance  of  Aristotle,  composed  of  matter  and  form. 

«  Essay,  11.  23,  1.  «  See  II.  23,  1-  5.  '  II.  30,  4-5. 


cirAP.  VI. 


LOCKE 


161 


But  here  are  two  abstractions,  the  subject  abstracted 
Irom  the  qualities  and  the  qualities  from  the  subject 
If  a  body  ceased  to  be  extended,  solid  and  moving    it 
would  cease  to  be ;  there  would  be  no  substratum'  or 
support  left.     Hence  the  third  view,  that  a  substance  is 
a  qualified  subject,  the  extended,  solid,  movino-,  &c  •  in 
which  the  qualities  are  nothing  except  as  characterising 
the  subject,  and  the  subject  nothing  except  as  charac- 
terised by  tlie  qualities ;    from  which  subject  or  sub- 
stratum, qualities  or  attributes  are  opposite  abstractions, 
becondly,  external  substances  must  be  inferred  from 
similar  data.     To  infer  qualified  subjects  beyond  sense, 
there  must  be  qualified  subjects  in  sense.     If  the  data 
were  ideas,  we  could  only  infer  other   ideas.     If  the 
data  were  qualities,  we   could  only  infer  qualities.     A 
fortiori,  if  the  data  were  ideas  of  qualities  we  could 
never  infer  a  real   qualified   subject,  for  which  there 
would  be  no  analogue.     Therefore,  again  we  find  that 
Locke  s  sensible  data  were  false.     He  thought  that  by 
sense  y,e  perceive  simple  ideas  of  extension,  resistance 
or  solidity,  motion,  &c.,  and  then  without  rhyme  or 
reason  suppose  something  totally  different,  a  real  sup- 
port in  the    external   world.     Eeally,   sense  perceives 
qualified  subjects,  the  extended,  resisting,  moving,  &c 
within ;  hence  reason  infers  similar  extended,  resistin<T 
moving,  qualified  subjects  without.      It  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  muscular  sense  was  not  noticed  in  Locke's 
day ;  but  the  logic  of  reason   had  been  known  since 
Aristotle's  day,  and  he  ought  not  to  have  neglected  it. 

iliirdly,  substances  are  not  unknown  :  they  are  the 
only  things  that  are  known.     Everything  else  is  real 
and  IS  known,  only  so  far  as  it  belongs  to  substance  • 
and  although  qualities  are  abstracted  and  spoken  of  as 
real  and  known  for  mere  convenience,  what  is  really 

M 


162 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALLSM 


TART  II. 


known  in  matlieraatics  is  not  tlie  quality  of  extension, 
but  the  extended  ;  in  physics,  not  the  quaUty  of  gravity, 
but  the  gravitating ;  in  morals,  not  the  quahty  of  good- 
ness, but  the  good.    Substances  would  be  unknown,  and 
uninferred,  on  Locke's  data.   But  substances  are  known, 
because  sense  perceives  them  within,  and  reason  infers 
them  without,  by  parity  of  reasoning.     They  are  the 
data  and  conclusions  of  all  our  knowledge.     Sensation 
perceives  the  nervous  system  in  different  parts  as  sensibly 
white,    sweet,    extended,  moving,    &c.     Eeason   infers 
similar  physical  substances  or  bodies.   Science  goes  on  to 
infer  similar  corpuscles.    Nor  does  it  stop  till  it  infers  the 
body  of  the  universe.     Consciousness  perceives  myself 
as  thinking  subject,  partly  body,  partly  soul.     Eeason, 
from  the  signs  of  bodily  organs,  language,  actions,  and 
productions  of  others,  infers  similar  thinking  subjects. 
Natural  theology,   not  from    bodily  organs,    but    from 
physical  creations,  infers  God,  not  as  a  body,  but  as  a 
Creator.     All  this  is  knowledge  of  substance,  logically 
inferred   from  sensation  and  consciousness  ;    and  only 
because  the  objects  of  outer  and  inner  sense  are  sub- 
stances, can  reason  logically  infer  substances,  physical 
and  psychical.     It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  reason 
is  infallible  :  it  is  fallible  so  far  as  not  logical  from  sense. 
Nor  does  it  follow  that  we  know  substance  completely. 
We   begin  with  sense,  and  perceive  subjects  only  as 
sensibly  qualified.     Eeason  reveals  subjects  insensibly 
qualified.     But  we  never  know  the  whole  of  any  sub- 
stance whatever,  not  even  ourselves,  not  even  a  crystal 
which   we    seem  to  see  through   and   through.     This 
imperfection  of  human  knowledge  misleads  philosophers 
into  aornosticism.     But  the  truth  is,  sense  and  reason 
enable  us  to  know  substances  not  wholly  but  partially. 
Finallv,  the  knowled^-e  of  substance  creates  the  idea 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


163 


of  it.  The  original  ideas  are  derived  from  my  own  sub- 
stance. From  myself  as  sensible  I  derive  my  idea  of  a 
physical  subject ;  from  myself  as  conscious,  my  idea 
of  a  thinking  subject,  partly  physical,  partly  psychi- 
cal ;  from  both,  my  idea  of  a  quaUfied  subject.  But 
my  ideas  of  all  other  known  subjects  are  results  of 
reasoning,  which  first  infers  similar  subjects,  and  then 
forms  ideas  of  them.  Ideas  of  substance  are  right,  so 
far  as  they  correspond  to  really  known  substances 
sensible  and  inferred,  and  their  correctness  varies  in 
accordance  with  sense  and  reason.  They  are  clear, 
distinct,  and  adequate,  in  proportion  partly  to  their 
proximity  to  sense,  and  partly  to  the  extent  of  reasoning 
about  any  given  substance;  but  they  are  seldom  or 
never  adequate  to  what  is  known  of  a  substance. 

Locke,  though  inconsistent,  was  justified  in  allowing 
that  the  complex  ideas  of  substances  are  not  due  to 
mere  composition  of  simple  ideas;  and  he  ought  to 
have  made  the  same  admission  in  the  case  of  other 
ideas,  because  not  all  ideas  of  mixed  modes  are  due  to 
composition,  nor  all  ideas  of  relations  to  comparison, 
nor  all  general  ideas  to  abstraction.  He  was  justified 
in  allowing  that  we  infer  substance,  in  order  to  conceive 
the  idea  of  it,  beyond  ourselves.  He  w^as  justified  in 
allow^ing  that  ideas  of  substances  are  right,  so  far  as 
they  represent  real  objects.  But  he  was  unable  to 
found  a  philosophy  of  substance,  because,  in  the  first 
place,  he  failed  to  apprehend  that  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion both  perceive  substances  within  ;  secondly,  he  was 
accordingly,  but  falsely,  constrained  to  reduce  the  in- 
ference of  substances  without  to  a  mere  supposition — a 
supposition  without  any  data,  illogical,  and  impossible 
to  reason  ;  thirdly,  he  had  to  call  all  substances,  all 
qualified   subjects,  the   only   things    in    the  world  we 

H  2 


1G4 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALLSM 


TART   II. 


know,  unknown ;  and  all  ideas  of  substances  obscure 
and  confused,  when  really  the  clearest  and  distinctest 
ideas  we  have  are  those  of  stones,  waters,  houses,  plants, 
annuals,  cats,  dogs,  men  and  other  substances. 

There  are  many  sources  of  ideas.  Sensation  and 
reflection  are  not  directly  concerned  with  ideas,  as 
Locke  thought,  but  with  sensible  objects.  But  after 
sense,  reproductive  imagination  without  reasoning  con- 
ceives particular  ideas  of  the  objects  of  sense,  memory 
refers  the  ideas  to  their  objects,  and  abstraction  con- 
ceives general  ideas  of  the  objects  of  sense.  Eeasoning 
infers  insensible  objects  and  forms  their  ideas.  There  is 
a  rational  imagination  of  ideas.  Eational  ideas  of  known 
objects  are  not  artificial.  Locke  partly  saw  this  in  the 
case  of  substance.  But  the  ideas  of  modes  and  relations 
are  also  rational  and  correct,  so  far  as  they  agree  with 
modes  and  relations  properly  inferred  as  belonging  to 
external  substances.  While,  however,  rational  ideas  of 
the  insensible  are  not  artificial,  they  are  often  inade- 
quate ;  e.g.  of  a  corpuscle,  of  infinite  space  and  time, 
of  gravitation,  of  the  universe,  of  God.  Lastly,  the 
inventive  imagination  makes  artificial  ideas,  such  as 
those  of  a  centaur,  a  fairy,  '  The  Iliad,'  '  A  Midsummer 
Night's  Dream.'  But  it  has  never  yet  been  successfully 
analysed.  Perhaps  even  the  comparison  and  composi- 
tion of  artistic  imagination  are  founded  on  reasoning,  not 
to  the  actual  and  real,  but  to  the  possible  and  ideal. 

/  Let  us  now  suppose  that  Locke's  general  account  of 
the  origin  of  ideas  is  immaculate  and  superior  to  our 
objections,  that  sensation  and  reflection  perceive  simple 
ideas;  that  comparison,  composition  and  abstraction 
[are  the  three  acts  which  form  compound  ideas ;  and 
that  the  introduction  of  a  supposition  of  substance  was 
a  momentaiT  lapse  of  a  philosopher  from  the  consis- 


CIIAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


165 


tency  of  philosophy.  What  will  be  the  consequence  ? 
As  he  says  himself,  ideas  will  be  the  instruments  and 
materials  of  our  knowledge.^  Then,  by  parity  of  reason- 
ino-,  all  that  we  can  know  from  such  materials  will  be 
Other  ideas,  and,  as  he  has  said  himself,  ideas  will  be 
also  all  the  objects  of  our  understanding.^  Locke  you 
would  imagine  to  be  the  founder  of  pure  idealism.  We 
should  have  expected  him  to  go  on  to  show  that  every- 
thing^ in  the  world  of  science  is  an  idea.  At  the  end 
we  should  have  been  inclined  to  say — 

There  are  more  things  in  heaven  and  earth,  Horatio, 
Than  are  dreamt  of  in  your  philosophy. 

But  Locke  had  a  various,  though  not  a  logical  mind. 
He  was  a  student  of  Descartes ;  he  was  also  imbued 
with  the  English  devotion  to  nature.  From  the  former 
source  he  derived  the  theory  of  ideas,  from  the  latter 
the  reality  of  things.  (Locke,  after  assuming  that  all 
objects  of  understanding  are  ideas,  admitted  that  ex- 
ternal realities  exist.)  The  Essay  contains  an  undercur- 
rent of  ontology,  which  comes  up  first  in  the  famous 
distinction  of  primary  and  secondary  qualities,^  recog- 
nising external  qualities  as  real,  as  external  causes  of 
our  ideas  of  sensation,  and  even  as  externally  related 
as  cause  and  effect  to  each  other : — 

'  The  qualities  then  that  are  in  bodies,  rightly  con- 
sidered, are  of  three  sorts. 

'  First,   the    bulk,   figure,   number,   situation,    and 
motion  or  rest  of  their  solid  parts  ;  those  are  in  them, ! 
whether  we  perceive  them  or  no  ;  and  when  they  are 
of  that  size,  that  we  can  discover  them,  we  have  by 
these  ^iViidea  of  the  thing,  as  it  is  in  itself;  as  is  plain    / 
in  artificial  things  :  these  I  call  primary  qualities.  j 


\' 


0. 


Essay,  II.  33,  19. 


2  I.  1,  8. 


3  II.  8. 


IGG 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


'  Secondly^  the  power  that  is  in  any  body,  by  reason 
of  its  insensible  primary  qualities^  to  operate  after  a 
peculiar  manner  on  any  of  our  senses,  and  thereby  pro- 
duce in  us  the  different  ideas  of  several  colours,  sounds, 
smells,  tastes,  &c.  These  are  usually  called  sensible 
\qualities. 

'  Thirdly,  the  power  that  is  in  any  body,  by  reason 

of  the  particular  constitution  of  its  primary  qualities,  to 

/  make  such  a  change  in  the  hulk,  figure,   texture,  and 

motion  of  another  body,  as  to  make  it  operate  on  our 

senses  differently  from  what  it  did  before.     Thus  the 

^     sun  has  a  power  to  make  wax  white,  and  fire  to  make 

^       I  lead  fluid.     These  are  usually  called  powers.'  ^ 

The  same  undercurrent  of  ontology  reappears  in  the 
admission  of  substances,  and  real  essences,  though 
unknown.  It  becomes  most  marked  in  the  Fourth 
Book,  where  Locke  adds  to  all  his  other  entities,  one's 
own  existence,  the  existence  of  God,  and  the  existence 
of  other  things,  such  as  the  clippings  of  our  beards  and 
the  parings  of  our  nails.  Finally  it  springs  up  into  an 
elaborate  picture  of  the  insensible  universe  beyond  the 
reach  of  our  ideas. ^  It  is  a  dano^erous  thinsf  to  be 
an  unconscious  metaphysician.  Locke's  metaphysical 
theory  of  existence  is  quite  outside  his  psychological 
theory  of  ideas.  How  does  it  agree  with  his  logical 
theory  of  knowledge  ?  If  it  be  true  to  say,  that  beyond 
ideas  there  is  an  external  world  of  qualities,  real  and 
causal,  real  substances  and  real  essences,  my  own  ex- 
istence, God's  existence,  the  existence  of  bodies,  and  of 
insensible  corpuscles,  what  is  truly  said  by  a  philoso- 
pher, who  is  after  all  but  human,  must  be  known  to  a 
man.  What  then  does  Locke,  the  philosopher  who  says 
all  this,  say  about  the  knowledge  of  man  ? 

»  Essay,  II.  8,  23.  «  IV.  3,  24. 


CHAP.    VI. 


LOCKE 


167 


The  Fourth  Book,  which  is  on  knowledge  and 
opinion,  starts  with  a  theory  quite  consistent  with  the 
previous  Books,  on  the  origin  of  ideas  : — 

'  Since  the  mind,  in  all  its  thoughts  and  reasonings, 
hath  no  other  immediate  object  than  its  own  ideas 
which  it  alone  does  or  can  contemplate,  it  is  evident 
that  our  knowledge  is  only  conversant  about  'em. 

^  '  Knowledge  then  seems  to  me  to  be  nothing  but  the 
perception  of  the  connection  and  agreement,  or  disagree- 
ment and  repugnancy  of  any  of  our  ideas.  In  this  alone 
it  consists.'  ^ 

Locke  proceeds  to  divide  knowledge  into  intuition  \ 
and  reasoning.  He  says  that  '  sometimes  the  mind  per- 
ceives the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas 
immediately  by  themselves  without  the  intervention  of 
any  others :  and  this,  I  think,  we  may  call  intuitive  \ 
knowledge'  ^^  He  adds  that  '  when  the  mind  cannot  so 
brino-  its  ideas  too^ether,  as  by  their  immediate  com- 
parison,  and  as  it  were  juxtaposition,  or  application 
one  to  another,  to  perceive  their  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment, it  is  fain,  by  the  intervention  of  other  ideas  (one 
or  more,  as  it  happens),  to  discover  the  agreement  or 
disasfreement,  which  it  searches  :  and  this  is  what  we 
call  Reasoning.'  ^  Afterwards,  he  writes  a  whole  chapter  ^  "" 
on  Eeason,  in  which  he  again  defines  it  as  the  percep- 
tion of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas  by 
intermediate  ideas.  At  the  same  time  he  rejects  the 
syllogism,  although  the  process  which  combines  two 
extremes  by  the  intervention  of  a  middle  is  clearly  the 
same  process  as  his  own.  But  the  main  point  to  be 
observed  is  that,  according  to  him,  jjeasoning  begins 
with  an  intuitive  perception  of  the  relation  of  ideas 


1  IV.  1,  1-2. 
3  IV.  2,  2. 


2  IV.  2,  I. 
^  IV.  17. 


168 


rSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   11. 


and  ends  with  a  mediate  perception  of  tlie  relations  of 
ideas,  yv 

A   theory   of   reasoning   such   as   this   must    con- 
fine all  reasoned  knowledge,  and  therefore  all  science, 
to  relations   of  ideas.     This   actually   is   his   view  of 
mathematics  and  morals.     '  I  doubt  not,'  he  says,  '  but 
it  will  be  easily  granted,  that  the  knowledge  we  have  of 
mathematical  truths  is  not  only  certain,  but  real  know- 
ledge ;  and  not  the  bare  empty  vision  of  vain  insignifi- 
cant chimeras  of  the  brain  :  and  yet,  if  we  will  consider, 
we  shall  find  that  it  is  only  of  our  own  ideas.'  ^     He 
says  the  same  of  moral  knowledge,  which  he  also  holds 
to  be  as  certain  as  mathematics.^     I  admit  that  if  all 
objects  of  reasoning  are  ideas,  mathematical  knowledge 
is  only  of  our  ideas.     But,  in  this  case,  it  is  not  of  the 
bulk,  figure,  number,  structure  and  motion  of  bodies 
and  particles,  which  Locke  himself  recognises  beyond 
our  ideas.     Sir  Isaac  Newton,  then,  must  have  been 
wrong  in  saying  that  all  the  particles  of  matter  gravi- 
tate to  one  another  with  a  force  varying  inversely  to 
the  square  of  the  distance  ;  for  he  was  pretending  to  a 
mathematical   knowledge  of  the  motions  of  particles 
beyond   ideas.     What  a   curious   contretemps,  that   in 
1687  Newton  should  discover  to  mankind  the  Mathe- 
matical  Principles    of    Natural   Philosophy   in    every 
particle  of  matter,  and  in  1690  Locke  should  pubHsh 
an  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding  to  prove 
that  the  knowledge  of  mathematical  truths  is  only  of 
our  own  ideas ! 

We  are  relieved  from  further  criticism  of  this  pure 
ideaHsm,  however  logical,  because  Locke  himself  deserts 
it  for  reahsm,  however  hypothetical.  At  first  he  delibe- 
rately confines  all  knowledge  to  the  perception  of  the  re- 


^  Essay,  IV.  4,  6. 


IV.  4,  7. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


169 


lations  of  ideas,  and  throughout  applies  these  limits  strictly 
to  mathematics  and  morals.     But  all  of  a  sudden  he  in- 
troduces us  to  a  knowledsre  of  real  thino's  in  other  de- 
partments  of  knowledge,  and,  as  it  were,  writes  a  second 
essay  on  another  human  understanding.     The  manner  in 
which  he  makes  this  abrupt  transition  is  highly  instruc-       . 
tive.     Having  defined  knowledge  to  be  only  conversant    /    \  ^ 
about  ideas,  and  to  be  nothing  but  the  perception  of 
the  agreement  and  disagreement  of  ideas,^  he  reduces  |  j 
these  agreements   and  disagreements  of  ideas  to  fourj 
sorts — identity  or  diversity,  relation,  coexistence,  and 
real  existence.^     The  knowledge  of  the  first  three  sorts 
proceeds  consistently  enough,  when  suddenly,  without 
any  previous  preparation,  much  less  argument,  he  lays 
down  the  followino^  do(]fma  : — 

'  Fourthly.  The  fourth  and  last  sort  is  that  of  actual 
real  existence  agreeing  to  any  idea.'  ^ 

On  his  original  hypothesis  that  ideas  are  all  the 
objects  of  understanding,  on  his  theory  of  the  origin  of 
ideas  in  the  Second  Book,  on  his  definition  of  know- 
ledge in  the  very  same  chapter  of  the  Fourth  Book,  he^ 
ought  to  have  said,  the  knowledge  of  the  idea  of  actual ! 
real  existence  agreeing  to  any  idea.     But  just  as  Des-'' 
cartes  passed  from  the  idea  of  God's  existence  to  His 
existence,  so  Locke  passed  from  the  knowledge  of  the 
idea  of  existence  to  the  knoAvled^^e  of  existence  aofreeinir  '■< 
to  any  idea.     But  while  Descartes  had  been  inconse- 
quent, Locke  to  inconsequence  added  inconsistency  ;  he^ 
had  begun  by  saying  that  all  objects  of  imderstanding        \ 
are  ideas  ;  he  afterwards  admitted  a  knowledge  of  '  exist-        ' 
ence  agreeing  to  any  idea.' 

He  afterwards  divides  this  knowledge  of  existence 
into  three  departments — an  intuitive  knowledge  of  our 

»  IV.  1,  1-2.  2  IV.  1,  3.  s  IV.  1,  7. 


170 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


own  existence,  a  demonstrative  knowledge  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  God,  a  sensitive  knowledge  of  objects  present  to 
the  senses,^ — and  devotes  a  chapter  to  eacli.^  In  Locke's 
philosophy,  all  three  ought  to  have  been  knowledges 
of  ideas ;  they  are  knowledges  of  the  real  and  actual 
existence  of  things.  Again,  the  Fourth  Book  presents 
us  with  two  theories  of  a  proposition  to  support  this 

^  inconsistency.  First,  he  divides  propositions  into  two 
kinds  ;  mental,  wherein  ideas,  and  verbal,  w^herein  words, 
the  signs  of  our  ideas,  are  put  together.^  Afterwards,  he 
says  that  there  are  two  sorts  of  propositions ;  one,  con- 
cerning the  existence  of  anything  answerable  to  an  idea, 
and  the  other,  concerninfy  the  a<?reement  or  disaofree- 
ment  of  our  abstract  ideas.^     I  am  not  referrincf  to  all 

^  these  places  to  criticise  Locke  for  inconsistency,  which 
is  a  weakness  of  human  nature,  a  w^eakness  even  of 
philosophers,  w^ho  are  but  men,  and  an  amiable  weak- 
ness, because  one  of  two  contradictories  must  be  true. 
My  object  is  rather  to  show  that  Locke  at  last  came  to 
the  truth,  that  not  all  objects  of  knowledge,  of  proposi- 
tions, of  understanding  are  ideas.    But  there  is  a  further^ 
question.  How  do  we  know  these  actual  existences  ?  or,  to  ? 
use  Locke's  own  phrase,  '  How  shall  the  mind,  when  it    ' 
perceives  nothing  but  its  own  ideas,  know  that  they  / 
agree  with  things  themselves  ? '  ^ 

The  intuitive  knowledge  of  our  own  existence  is 
settled  in  a  single  section,  short  but  significant,  in  which 
he  gives  up  his  original  theory  that  we  perceive  nothing 
but  ideas  : —       • 

'  As  for  our  own  existence,  we  perceive  it  so  plainly, 
and  so  certainly,  that  it  neither  needs,  nor  is  capable  of 
any  proof.    For  nothing  can  be  more  evident  to  us  than 


1  Essay,  IV.  3,  21 ;  IV.  9,  2. 
^  lY.  11,  13. 


2  IV.  9-11.  • 
'  IV.  4,  3. 


»  rv.  5,  5. 


CHAP.  VI. 


LOCKE 


17). 


our  own  existence.     I  tJdnk,  I  reason,  I  feel  pleasure  or    ^^ 
pain  :  can  any  of  these  be  more  evident  to  me  than  my 
owai  existence  ?     If  I  doubt  of  all  other  things,  that 
very  doubt  makes  me  perceive  my  own  existence,  and 
w411  not  suffer  me  to  doubt  of  that.     For  if  I  know  I 
feel  pain,  it  is  evident  I  have  as  certain  perception  oi  ^  L^ 
my  own  existence  as  of  the  existence  of  the  pain  I  feel : 
or  if  I  know  I  doubt,  I  have  as  certain  perception  of  the 
existence  of  the  thing  doubting  as  of  that  thought  which 
I  call  doubt.     Experience   then  convinces  us  that  ive^ 
have  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  our  own  existence,  and  an  I 
internal  infallible  perception  that  we  are.     In  every  act 
of  sensation,  reasoning  or  thinking,  we  are  conscious  to 
ourselves  of  our  own  being ;  and,  in  this  matter,  come 
not  short  of  the  highest  degree  of  certainty!  ^ 

This  passage  breathes  the  very  spirit  of  Descartes. 
Cogito,  ergo  sum.  I  am  conscious  that  I  am  a  thinking 
subject.  This  is  the  fact  that  never  ought  to  have  been 
deserted.  Descartes  deserted  it  for  an  inference  of 
substance,  and  Locke  followed  him  out  of  the  right  path, 
but  he  had  to  come  back  to  it  after  all.  Consciousness 
reveals  to  me  not  thoughts  but  a  thinker.  This  con- 
sciousness is  indeed  inconsistent  with  the  previous  state- 
ments of  Locke  ;  first,  that  reflection  perceives  the  ideas 
of  operations,  whch  is  two  removes  from  consciousness  ; 
secondly,  that  there  is  a  supposition  of  a  substance  as 
unknown  substratum  to  those  operations,  which  would 
be  a  baseless  inference  from  data  containing  nothing  but 
ideas  of  operations.  Nevertheless,  the  direct  conscious- 
ness of  our  existence  is  the  fact.  How  then  is  it  that  it 
is  constantly  disappearing  out  of  philosophy,  not  only 
in  the  seventeenth,  but  also  in  the  succeeding  centuries  ? 
Because  philosophers  are  perpetually  confusing  abstract 

^  IV.  9,  3. 


172 


rsYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


and  concrete,  for<fettInif  tliat  tliouizlits  are  abstract 
qualities  but  the  thinker  the  real  being,  and  thus 
concluding  that  consciousness  and  reflection  reveal 
thoughts,  leaving  the  subject  to  inference  and  supposi- 
tion, when  really  consciousness  and  reflection  tell  me 
that  I  am  a  thinking  subject,  from  which  I  infer  other 
thinking  subjects. 

Unfortunately,  in  another  part  of  the  Essay,  Locke 
had  exaggerated  the  truth,  I  am  conscious  that  I  am  a 
person,  a  thinking  intelligent  being,  into  the  falsity,  I 
am  that  very  consciousness.'  But  in  the  first  place, 
I  am  conscious  that  I  perform  numerous  operations 
besides  the  operation  of  being  conscious,  that  I  am  a 
sensible,  remembering,  reasoning,  desiring,  willing  sub- 
ject ;  consciousness  therefore  itself  tells  me  that  I  am 
more  than  itself.  Secondly,  it  is  not  my  only  source  of 
information  about  myself.  I  am  conscious  that  I  am 
partly  body  thinking,  but  I  also  indirectly  observe  my 
body.  I  reason  from  my  consciousness  and  observa- 
tions, and  infer  that  I  am  a  permanent  substance, 
w^hen  I  am  asleep  as  well  as  when  I  am  awake,  when  I 
am  conscious  and  when  I  am  unconscious.  Thirdly, 
consciousness  is  interrupted  ;  if  I  were  consciousness  I 
should  have  an  intermittent  existence.  Finally,  Locke 
has  confused  the  causa  cognoscendi  with  the  causa  essendi. 
OConsciousness  is  necessary  to  tell  me,  I  am  a  person ; 
but  it  does  not  make  me  a  person  ;  this  am  I  made  by 
being  a  permanent  substance,  partly  body  and  partly 
soul,  capable,  when  awake,  of  reasoning,  and  therefore 
of  the  status  of  a  rational  being. 

At  the  end  of  Butler's  '  Analogy,'  the  Dissertation  on 
Personal  Identity  contains  an  excellent  statement  of  its 
relation  to  consciousness,  as  follows  : — 

^  Essay,  II.  27,  9  seq. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


173 


'  But  though  consciousness  of  what  is  past  does  thus 
ascertain  our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet  to  say 
that  it  makes  personal  identity,  or  is  necessary  to  our 
being  the  same  persons,  is  to  say  that  a  person  has  not 
existed  a  single  moment,  nor  done  one  action,  but  what 
he  can  remember,  indeed  none  but  what  he  reflects 
upon.  And  one  should  really  think  it  self-evident  that 
consciousness  of  personal  identity  presupposes,  and 
therefore  cannot  constitute,  personal  identity  ;  any  more 
than  knowledge,  in  any  other  case,  can  constitute  truth, 
which  it  presupposes.' 

Locke,  then,  is  right  in  saying  that  consciousness! 
is  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  oneself,  wrong  in  saying  ( 
thpt  it  is  oneself.     Not  from  the  false  identification  of^ 
self  and  consciousness,  but  from  the  consciousness  of 
self,  that  is,  from  the  intuitive  knowledge  we  have  of  our 
own  existence,  as  cogitative  beings,  Locke  deduces  our 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a  God  by  an  argument, 
which    is    an    extension    of  the     third    argument   in 
the  'Principia   Philosophias '    of  Descartes.^     A   finite'*^ 
thinking  subject  requires  an  infinite  thinking  subject 
to    create    it.      Yes,  but    this    argument    holds    only  , 
if  we  are  conscious  of  ourselves  as  thinking  subjects. 
God  is  not  an  idea,  and  consequently  cannot  be  inferred 
from  mere  ideas.      Thus,  if  Locke  had  clung  to  his 
ideas  of  reflection,  he  could  not  have  proved  a  God  : 
the  consciousness,  not  of  mere  thoughts,  but  of  a  think- 
ing subject,  is  necessary  to   natural   theology.      Simi- 
larly, it  is  necessary  to  infer  any  other  thinking  subject 
but  myself.     If,  then,  I  were  conscious  only  of  ideas  of 
operations,  and  even  if  I  were  conscious  directly  of 
operations,  I  could  not  infer  thinking  subjects,  and  I 
could  not  infer  God.    The  object  of  consciousness,"there- 

^  IV.  10 ;  cf.  Descartes,  Princ.  i.  20. 


V 


174 


rSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


fore,  is  not  opsrations,  still  less  tlieir  ideas,  but  thinking 
subjects.  Here  again,  too,  we  find  that  not  all  objects, 
and  not  all  data,  of  understanding  are  ideas.  Locke 
was  obliged  to  surrender  his  theory  of  ideas  in  order  to 
prove  his  own  existence,  the  existence  of  others,  the 
existence  of  God. 

Next,  we  come  to  what  Locke  calls  our  sensitive 
knowledge  of  objects  presented  to  our  senses.  Here, 
with  Cartesian  inconsequence,  he  tried  to  maintain  his 
theory  of  ideas,  and  yet  show  how  we  know  external 
realities,  or  originals,  by  inference.  Li  the  Fourth 
Book  he  returns  to  this  point  again  and  again.  He 
begins  by  proposing  this  problem.  \'  There  can  be 
nothincr  more  certain,'  he  savs,  '  than  that  the  idea  we 
receive  from  an  external  object  is  in  our  minds.  But 
whether  there  be  any  thing  more  than  barely  that 
idea  in  our  minds,  whether  we  can  thence  infer  the 
existence  of  any  thing  without  us,  which  corresponds 
to  that  idea^  is  that,  whereof  some  men  think  there  may 
be  a  question  made  ;  because  men  may  have  such  ideas 
in  their  minds,  when  no  such  thing  exists,  no  such 
objects  affect  their  senses.'  ^  He  answers  the  question  by 
saying  that  a  man  is  conscious  of  a  different  perception 
when  he  looks  on  the  sun  by  day  and  thinks  on  it  by 
night,  and  concludes  that  this  is  a  knowledge  not  intuitive 
nor  demonstrative,  but  sensitive.  Again,  he  divides 
the  problem  by  simple  ideas  and  complex  ideas  of  sub- 
stance ;  and  argues  that,  in  the  first  place,  simple  ideas, 
which  the  mind  can  by  no  means  make  to  itself,  must 
necessarily  be  the  product  of  things  operating  on  the  mind 
in  a  natural  way,  and  that  the  idea  of  whiteness  in  the 
mind  answers  that  power  which  is  in  any  body  to  produce 
it  there  ;  ^  and,  in  the  second  place,  the  reality  of  our 

1  E9say,  IV.  2,  14.  -  IV.  4,  4. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


175 


knowledge  of  substances  is  founded  on  our  complex 
ideas  of  them  being  such  as  are  made  up  of  such  simple 
ones  as  have  been  discovered  to  coexist  in  nature.^ 
Finally,  he  devotes  to  the  knowledge  of  objects  without 
us  a  chapter,^  in  which  he  contends  that  its  certainty  is 
as  great  as  we  are  capable  of  concerning  the  existence 
of  anything  but  oneself  and  God,  and  that  it  deserves 
the  name  of  knowledge.  He  adds  four  arguments  to 
the  preceding  :  first,  that  those  who  want  the  organs  of 
sense  want  the  ideas  of  that  sense  ;  secondly,  that  some- 
times I  cannot  avoid  the  having  those  ideas  produced 
in  my  mind ;  thirdly,  that  many  of  these  ideas  are  pro- 
duced with  pain,  which  afterwards  we  remember  with- 
out offence;  fourthly,  that  our  senses  in  many  cases 
bear  witness  to  the  truth  of  each  other's  report.  Finally,  V 
he  falls  back  on  the  practical  argument  that  we  have  at 
all  events  a  knowledge  of  the  external  world  by  the 
happiness  and  misery  we  receive  from  it.  The  whole  of 
these  arguments  are  summed  up  in  this  one :  I  have 
ideas  of  sensation,  which  I  do  not  produce  myself ;  I 
infer  that  they  are  produced  by  external  bodies.  It  is 
the  Cartesian  argument  from  the  passivity  or  involun- 
tariness  of  sensations  and  ideas. 

Locke's  admission  of  the  reality  and  knowledge  of 
external  bodies  is  right  and  honest,  but  completely 
destructive  of  his  original  hypothesis  of  the  objects 
and  data  of  understanding.  It  is  true,  as  he  admits, 
that  we  know  external  bodies.  But  this  admission  de- 
stroys his  original  doctrine  that  knowledge  is  always 
concerned  with  ideas.  Again,  it  is  true,  as  he  admits, 
that  we  know  bodies  by  inference.  But  this  destroys 
his  doctrine  that  reasoning  begins  and  ends  with  ideas. 
Both  admissions  also  destroy  his  original  doctrine  that 


/ 


»  IV.  4,  12. 


-  IV.  11. 


176 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


ideas  are  all  tlie  objects  of  understanding.  It  is  also 
true,  as  lie  says,  tliat  we  infer  external  bodies  from  the 
passivity  of  sensation.  But  is  it  true  that  we  could 
have  drawn  this  inference  from  sensible  data,  if  sensa- 
tion liad  been  a  perception  of  nothing  but  ideas  ?  This 
is  what  Locke  makes  no  attempt  to  prove.  It  is  con- 
tradictory to  his  own  logic.  Like  Descartes,  he  recog- 
nised that  real  truth  is  the  agreement  of  our  propo- 
sitions with  external  reality.^  But  unlike  Descartes,  he 
lias  given  up  any  special  criteria  of  truth.  The  vera- 
city of  God  he  uses  only  for  revelation  ;  '^  and  regards 
the  inherent  clearness  and  distinctness  of  ideas  not  as 
positive  criteria,  but  only  as  conditions  of  truth.^  The 
consequence  is  that  he  has  no  organon  except  the 
rules  of  reasoning ;  and  he  is  aware  that,  as  the  data  of 
reasoning  are,  according  to  him,  ideas  with  their  agree- 
ment and  disagreement,  so  the  cc»nclusions  are  logically 
confined  to  the  agreement  and  disao^reement  of  ideas.''* 
Yet  he  expects  us  also  to  believe  that  reasoning  starting 
with  ideas  of  sensation  can  be  logically  extended  to  ex- 
ternal bodies. 

All  logic  demands  that,  as  are  the  data,  so  are  the 
conclusions.  I  find  that  some  of  the  sensible  objects 
I  perceive  are  passive.  I  have  a  right  to  infer  some 
other  cause.  But  I  must  by  parity  of  reasoning  infer  a 
cause  similar  to  those  already  known.  Now,  what  data 
does  Locke  supply  me  ?  Granting  him  every  advantage 
and  all  his  inconsistencies,  I  should  have  ideas  of  sensa- 
tion and  reflection,  and  compound  ideas  from  the  Second 
Book  :  from  the  Fourth  Book,  I  should  have  conscious- 
ness of  myself,  and  a  demonstration  of  other  thinking 
subjects,  and  of  God.   These,  ex  hypothesis  are  aU  the  data. 


'  Essay,  IV.  5. 
3  IV.  2,  15. 


2  IV.  16,  14. 
*  IV.  17, 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


177 


direct  and  indirect,  at  the  very  best.  What  would  be 
the  logical  inference  ?  I  could  infer,  from  the  passivity 
of  sense,  that  it  resulted  either  from  other  ideas,  or  from 
other  thinking  subjects,  or  from  God.  I  could  not,  being 
without  bodily  data,  infer  that  it  resulted  from  external 
bodies.  Locke  saw  the  importance  of  the  passivity  of 
sense,  but  forgot  the  rules  of  logic. 

Newton  and  Locke  were  contemporaries.  What, 
then,  was  Locke's  attitude  to  natural  philosophy  ?  He 
recognised  its  discoveries,  and  especially  the  corpus- 
cular philosophy  revived  by  Bacon,  developed  by  Des- 
cartes, and  brouglit  to  its  perfection  by  Newton.  We 
have  followed  him  in  his  '  little  excursion  into  natural 
philosophy '  ^  to  distinguish  primary  and  secondary 
qualities.  He  there  admits  the  existence  of  corpuscles, 
real  qualities,  primary  and  secondary,  thougli  insensible, 
and  real  powers  between  qualities,  e.g.  the  power  of  fire 
to  make  lead  fluid.  There  is  no  fault  to  find  here 
except  with  his  definition  of  a  quality  as  '  a  power  to 
produce  any  idea  in  our  mind.'  ^  ^  A  quality  is  really  a 
characteristic  of  a  subject  or  substance.  It  has  various 
powers,  and  among  them  the  occasional  power  of  affect- 
ing our  senses.  For  instance,  motion  is  a  characteristic  ^ 
of  every  corpuscle,  and  has  a  power  of  affecting  every 
other  corpuscle,  and  sometimes  of  affecting  human  senses 
in  the  way  of  sensible  motion,  light,  heat,  sound,  and  so 
forth.  But  to  define  it  by  its  sensible  power,  would  be 
to  convert  a  very  occasional  accident  into  the  essence  of 
motion,  forgetting  that  there  are  myriads  and  millions 
of  motions  which  come  nowhere  near  the  earth,  much 
less  man,  and  are  not  powers  of  producing  any  ideas  in 
his  mind. 

Locke    defined    quality   by   a   separable   accident. 


'  II.  8,  22. 


II.  8,  8. 


N 


178 


rSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


Hence  also  a  mistake  in  his  definition  of  a  secondary 
quality  as  a  power  of  an  insensible  primary  quality 
to  produce  in  our  senses  a  sensible  idea.  This  is  only 
an  occasional  and  accidental  power ;  and  a  secondary 
quality  is  a  specific  modification  of  a  primary  quahty, 
which  exists  whether  it  produces  a  sensible  effect  or 
not.  Thus  heat  is  a  mode  of  motion  transferred  from 
star  to  star,  and  before  the  origin  of  animals  much  of 
it  was  exhausted  without  having  the  power  of  produc- 
ing sensible  heat  With  these  corrections,  Locke  ex- 
presses the  scientific  distinction  of  primary  and  second- 
ary qualities  in  the  universe.  He  fully  recognises  the 
existence  of  that  part  of  insensible  nature,  which  I  have 
called  the  imperceptible,  to  distinguish  it  from  the  in- 
sensible but  inferentially  perceptible  originals  of  sensible 
objects.  He  recognises  corpuscles  as  well  as  masses,  the 
particles  of  this  paper  as  well  as  the  paper. 

But  when  he  came  to  give  these  imperceptible  cor- 
puscles a  place  in  the  human  understanding,  he  began 
to  vacillate.  In  the  Fourth  Book,  he  distinguishes 
knowledge  and  opinion,  as  respectively  the  perception 
and  tlie  presumption  of  agreements  and  disagreements 
of  ideas,  as  certain  and  probable.  Strictly,  he  could  put 
natural  philosophy  in  neither,  because  he  admitted  that 
it  was  not  about  ideas,  but  things.  But  the  alternative 
to  which  he  leaned  was  to  draw  the  line  between  know- 
ledge and  opinion,  exactly  between  the  paper  and  its 
particles,  between  the  mass  and  the  corpuscle,  between 
the  perceptible  and  the  imperceptible  ;  and,  therefore,  to 
call  the  first  inferences  from  sense  knowledge,  and  the 
subsequent  inferences  of  science  opinion.  On  the  whole, 
according  to  him,  knowledge^  includes  mathematics  and 
morals  because  they  are  about  ideas,  knowledge  of  self 

»  Essay,  IV.  3,  5 ;  IV.  10,  6  ;  IV.  11,  9  ;  IV.  11,  13. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


179 


l^because  it  is  intuition,  knowledge  of  God  because  it  is 
demonstration  from  this  intuition,  and  knowledge  of  ex- 
ternal originals  directly  inferred  from  sense:  here  ends) 
knowledge.  In  opinion  falls  natural  philosophy.  Why  ? 
Because  the  further  from  sense  the  less,  he  thought,  our 
knowledge.  Because  we  are  not  capable  of  the  ideas 
of  things  so  remote  and  minute,  and  this  defect,  as  he 
thought,  keeps  us  in  ignorance  of  the  things.  Because 
we  merely  make  experiments  which  are  not  science 
Because  we  can  only  guess  and  probably  conjecture, 
use  hypothesis  and  analogy.  '  Analogy,'  says  he,  '  in 
these  matters,  is  the  only  help  we  have,  and  'tis  from 
that  alone  we  draw  all  our  grounds  of  probabihty.  Thus 
observing  that  the  bare  rubbing  of  two  bodies  violently 
one  upon  another,  produces  heat  and  very  often  fire 
itself,  we  have  reason  to  think  that  what  we  call  heat 
and  fire  consists  in  a  violent  agitation  of  the  imper- 
ceptible minute  parts  of  the  burning  matter  :  observing 
likewise  that  the  different  refractions  of  pellucid  bodies 
produce  in  our  eyes  the  different  appearances  of  several 
colours ;  and  also  that  the  different  ranging  and  laying 
the  superficial  parts  of  several  bodies,  as  of  velvet, 
watered  silk,  &c.,  does  the  hke,  we  think  it  probable 
that  the  colour  and  shining  of  bodies,  is  in  them  nothing 
but  the  different  arrangement  and  refraction  of  their 
minute  and  sensible  parts.'  ^  But  knowledge  of  these 
insensible  qualities  he  denies.  He  doubts  'that  how 
far  soever  human  industry  may  advance  useful  and 
experimental  philosophy  in  physical  things,  scientijical 
w^ill  still  be  out  of  our  reach ; '  ^  and  he  suspects  that 
'natural  philosophy  is  not  capable  of  being  made  a 

'    science.'  ^     Yet  this  very  Locke  winds  up  his  Essay  by 

1  IV.  IG,  12  ;  cf.  IV.  3,  16  ;  IV.  3,  24-end  ;  IV.  6 ;  IV.  12,  9-13. 
2  IV.  3,  26.  3  IV.  12,  10. 

N  2 


180 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


V 


a  triple  division  of  science,  one  of  wliicli  is  Physics  / 
or  Natural  Philosophy,  the  knowledge  of  things.^ 

It  is  a  matter  of  deep  regret  that  Locke  should  have 
written  thus  of  natural  philosophy  in  the  very  time  of 
Newton.  There  is  some  truth  in  what  he  says,  but 
marred  by  exaggeration.  There  is  a  huge  abyss  of 
ignorance,  but  it  is  not  altogether  an  incurable  igno- 
rance. Much  of  what  is  called  science  is  opinion,  but 
fresli  evidences  convert  opinion  into  science.  Because 
there  are  probabilities  in  natural  pliilosophy,  it  does  not 
follow  that  there  is  nothing  certain.  We  cannot  have 
a  perfect  knowledge  of  nature,  but  we  can  know  some- 
tliing  without  knowing  everything.  We  cannot  always 
discover  real  essence,  but  there  is  a  knowledge  of  co- 
existences and  causes,  of  the  conservation  and  correlation 
of  physical  forces,  as  in  electricity  and  magnetism,  with- 
out always  knowing  their  essences.  Locke  rightly  saw 
that  there  is  more  of  the  universe  unknown  than  known, 
and  much  which  is  only  opined ;  but  he  lost  sight  of 
the  main  fabric  of  science.  By  the  mere  elimination  of 
chance  such  a  concatenation  of  laws  cannot  but  be  true. 

Locke  was  ignorant  of  the  logic  of  science.  The 
two  greatest  men  of  science  in  his  own  country  were 
Bacon  and  Newton,  of  whom  the  former  had  shown 
that  there  is  an  experimental  science  of  nature,  the 
latter  that  natural  science  is  capable  of  physical  deduc- 
/tions  from  mathematical  principles.  But  Locke,  hke 
Hobbes,  was  silent  about  Baconian  induction,  and 
oblivious  to  everything  except  the  old  method  of  intui- 
tion and  demonstration,  which  suits  mathematics,  but 
not  the  whole  of  natural  philosophy.  Everything  out- 
side demonstration,  he  calls  hypothesis  and  analogy. 
He  did  not  recognise  the  variety  of  method,  the  ana- 

»  Essay,  IV.  21. 


CHAP.  \i. 


LOCKE 


181 


logia  demonstrationum  pro  natura  suhjecti,  desiderated 
by  Bacon.  He  did  not  see  that  the  corpuscular 
philosophy  is  made  independent  of  tliis  hypothesis  and 
that  analogy,  by  many  different  evidences  in  many 
different  departments — gravity,  Hght,  heat,  sound,  elec- 
tricity, magnetism,  chemical  attraction,  nervous  and 
muscular  motion — all  of  which  point  to  corpuscles,  their 
motions,  according  to  Newton's  laws,  their  modifications 
constituting  secondary  qualities,  their  convertibihty 
and  indestructibility  as  motion.  He  did  not  recognise 
that  there  is  a  circumstantial  evidence,  which  in  law  is 
sufficient  to  hang  a  man,  in  nature  sufficient  to  prove  a 
fact;  and  an  approximate  certahity,  by  accumulation 
of  evidence,  ever  indefinitely  approaching  absolute 
necessity. 

But  his  greatest,  though  characteristic,  blunder  was 
his  attempt  to  carry  inference. beyond  sense  to  the  ex- 
ternal original  inferentially  perceptible  and  tlien  stop 
short ;  to  allow  us  to  know  the  paper  and  not  the  par- 
ticle, the  mass  and  not  tlie  molecule.      Such  a  logic 
is  arbitrary.     If  insensible  modes  of  primary  quahties 
are  truly  said  to  be,  as  Locke  allows,  then  they  are 
knowable.     The  same  laws  of  reasoning  which  enable 
us  to  infer  from  sensible  effects  an  external  cause,  en- 
aljle  us  from  that  cause  to  infer  another  cause,  and  so  on 
till  we  have  completely  explained  facts  of  sense  by  laws 
of  science.     If  it  were  not  so,  how  could  science  correct 
ordinary  knowledge  ?     Ordinary  knowledge   infers  an 
external  object,  like  in  secondary  as  well  as  primary 
quahties.     Science  declares  that  the  external  world  is 
like  in  primary  but  not  in  secondary  qualities  to  the 
sensible  effect.     But  if  the  former  is  knowledge  and  the 
latter  opinion,  by  the  first  principle  of  method  ordinary 
knowledge,  as  more  certain,  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  less 


182 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


certain  science  ;  so  that  the  ordinary  man  is  right  in 
his  theory  of  external  hght  and  heat,  and  the  natural 
philosopher  wrong  !  Locke's  line  between  knowledge  and 
science  gives  the  ordinary  man,  with  his  inference  of 
bodies,  knowledge,  but  the  scientific  man,  with  his 
inference  of  corpuscles,  opinion.  He  elevates  ordinary 
above  scientific  knowledge,  which  is  absurd. 

There  is  a  standing  difference  between  natural  and 
mental  philosophy,  and  Locke  has  done  much  to  pro- 
duce it.  He  would  make  theology  and  morals  not  only 
sciences,  which  they  are,  but  more  scientific  than  natural 
philosophy,  and  tells  man,  w^hose  real  function  is  to 
know  all  and  do  all,  that  his  proper  business  is  his  moral 
duties  and  his  future  state. ^  Newton  had  just  written 
the  '  Optics '  and  the  '  Principia,'  but  Locke's  theory  of 
science  would  reduce  these  works  to  mere  opinions. 
The  whole  history  of  science  is  against  him.  On  the 
foundation  of  Newton's  mechanics  of  motion  has  been 
gradually  reared  a  system  of  science  which  has  eventually 
revealed  to  us  the  insensible  and  imperceptible  causes 
of  our  sensations  in  the  external  world.  On  the 
other  side  stand  the  mental  philosophers,  pliilosophantes 
secundum  sensum,  considering  primarily  their  sensations 
and  ideas,  and  with  difficulty  extending  their  thoughts 
even  to  the  external  originals,  then  gazing  stupidly  at  the 
perceptible  world,  and  never  dreaming  that  they  have  to 
explain  the  knowledge  of  imperceptible  nature.  Locke's 
hypothesis  that  we  have  a  sensitive  knowledge  from 
ideas  of  objects  presented  to  sense,  a  mathematical  and 
moral  science  of  ideas,  and  an  uncertain  opinion  of  the 
physical  universe,  undervalues  natural  philosophy.  It 
immediately  produced  the  false  attitude  of  Berkeley  and 
Hume  towards  nature,  but  it  has  affected  the  whole 

»  Essay,  IV.  12,  11. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


183 


/  * 


course  of  mental  philosophy,  which  has  unduly  neglected 
the  problem  of  knowledge,  presented  to  it  by  natural 
philosophers.  Hence,  while  natural  philosophy  has 
shown  that  the  insensible  is  the  causa  essendi  of  the  sen- 
sible, mental  philosophy  has  never  yet  shown  how  the 
sensible  is  the  causa  cognoscendi  of  the  insensible. 

But  let  us  suppose  that  the  whole  fabric  of  science 
is  opinion,  the  whole  imperceptible  world  unknown. 
Yet  it  is  at  least  an  object  of  understanding  and  reason- 
ing, because,  as  Locke  himself  says,  '  not  but  tliat  it  is 
the  nature  of  the  understanding  constantly  to  close  with 
the  more  probable  side,'  ^  and,  as  he  admits,  reason  may 
end  either  in  certainty  or  in  probability,  either  by 
demonstration  or  an  argumentum  ad  judicium.^  This 
being  so,  imperceptible  probabilities  are  objects  of 
understanding  and  reason,  but  are  not  all  ideas  ;  there- 
fore not  all  objects  of  understanding  and  reason  are 
ideas. 

Nor  could  they  be  reasoned  from  ideas  as  their  data. 
This  want  of  consequence  brings  us  to  another  defect  in 
Locke's  theory  of  primary  and  secondary  qualities ;  his 
false  view  of  their  sensible  aspect.  In  his  opinion,  as 
external  they  are  powers,  as  sensible  they  are  ideas. 
But  they  are  neither  mere  powers  nor  mere  ideas. 
If,  as  sensible,  they  were  ideas,  we  could  not  logi- 
cally infer  insensible  primary  qualities,  which  are  ad- 
mitted not  to  be  ideas,  yet  inferrible.  Therefore,  even 
as  sensible,  primary  and  secondary  qualities  are  not 
ideas,  but  physical  qualities  in  sense,  from  which  to  infer 
physical  qualities  beyond.  So  universally,  the  inference 
of  imperceptible  corpuscles  with  real  qualities  and 
powers  beyond  sense,  even  if  only  probable,  could  not 
be  drawn  from  mere  ideas  of  sensation.     The  natural 


1 IV.  20,  12. 


2 IV.  17. 


184 


rSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


philosophy  of  the  physical  world,  whether  it  be  know- 
ledge or  opinion,  demands  physical  data  of  sense. 
r  How  came  Locke,  having  said  that  '  whatsoever  the 
mind  perceives  in  itself  or  is  the  immediate  object 
of  perception,  thought,  or  understanding,  that  I  call 
idea^  ^  immediately  to  conclude  real  primary  qualities  of 
matter  ?  Through  the  Cartesian  habit  of  surreptitiously 
passing  from  the  idea  to  the  thing,  and  his  own  supposi- 
tion of  a  bastard  sensation  of  the  thinj?.  His  one  arsfu- 
ment  for  the  reality  of  primary  qualities  is  that  they  are 
'  such  as  sense  constantly  finds  in  every  particle  of  matter, 
which  has  bulk  enough  to  be  perceived.'  ^  But  according 
to  him  sense  is  of  ideas.  All  then  he  could  consistently 
say  would  have  been  that  primary  qualities  are  such  as 
sense  constantly  finds  in  the  idea  of  every  particle  of 
the  idea  of  matter,  which  has  the  idea  of  bulk  enough 
to  be  perceived.  But  this  consistency  with  his  hypothesis 
would  not  have  proved  the  fact  of  the  material  reality 
of  primary  qualities  beyond  ideas.  At  the  same  time, 
his  lapse  into  a  direct  sense  of  matter  is  of  interest, 
because  it  is  a  distinct  anticipation  of  intuitive  realism. 
It  exhibits  the  constant  tendency  of  the  philosopher  to 
relapse  into  the  ordinary  man,  and  to  fancy  he  directly 
perceives  the  external  thing,  or,  using  the  inaccurate  ter- 
minology of  modern  psychology,  after  contending  that 
what  we  are  conscious  of  is  subjective  affections,  to  sup- 
pose a  consciousness  of  objective  existence.  As  Locke 
tried  to  bridge  over  the  gulf  from  ideas  of  sensation  to 
qualities  by  a  kind  of  bastard  sensation  of  qualities, 
so  his  modern  followers  try  to  bridge  the  gulf  from 
subjective  affections  of  consciousness  to  objective  exist- 
ence by  an  undefinable  consciousness  of  objective  exist- 
ence.    But  it  is  certain  that  sensation  perceives  not  the 

'  ^ssrty,  II.  8,  8.  2  II.  8,  9. 


CHAP.   VI. 


LOCKE 


185 


. 


# 


external  thing,  but  its  internal  effect ;  and  the  only  way 
in  which  we  can  reach  external  qualities  of  things  is  not 
by  sense  but  by  inference  from  adequate  internal  data, 
which  cannot  be  mere  ideas,  nor  any  psychical  states  of 
subjective  consciousness.  ^ 

The    '  Essay    concerning    Human    Understanding ' 
begins  by  assuming  that  all  objects  of  understanding, 
as  well  as  all  data  of  sense,  are  ideas  :  it  ends  by  ad- 
mitting that  things  beyond  ideas  are  objects  of  under- 
standing, reasoning,  science.     The  end  is  better  than  ^ 
the  beginning,  though  the  conclusion  does  not  follow 
from  the  premises.     External  bodies  are  properly  in- 
ferred   by   ordinary   men,    as    Locke    admitted;    and 
imperceptible  corpuscles  and  their  qualities  are  known, 
with  more  certainty  than  he  admitted,  by  men  of  science. 
Therefore,  in  the  first  place,  not  all  objects  of  under- 
standing, reasoning,  science,  are  ideas.     Secondly,  the 
data  of  sense  are  neither  ideas  of  sensation  nor  external 
qualities  of  matter,  but  internal  effects  on  the  nervous 
system,   sensibly  quahfied   as   extended,  moving,  hot, 
coloured,  and  by  other  primary  and  secondary  qualities. 
From  internal,  ordinary  knowledge  infers  external,  sub- 
stances.    From  these  again  science,  correcting  ordinary 
knowledge,   infers  imperceptible    corpuscles,    qualities 
primary  and  secondary  as  the  modifications  of  primary 
powers  exerted  between  those  corpuscles,  and  powers 
of  affecting  our  senses.     Locke's  '  Essay '  throughout,  to 
make  it  thoroughly  correct,  consistent,  and  consequent, 
would  need  two  fundamental  alterations  : — 

1 .  Some  objects  of  understanding  are  physical  things. 

2.  Some  data  of  sensation  are  physical  effects  on 
the  nervous  system. 


r-y>- 


yo^' 


V 


18G 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  IT. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


BERKELEY. 


The    two    plillosopliers    hitherto    discussed    assumed 
hypotheses,  but   admitted  facts,  and  tried  to  explain 
them.     Descartes  assumed  that  ideas  are  the  data  of 
sense,  but  admitted  the  knowledge  of  physical  objects, 
and  broke   down  on  the  inconsequence   of  reasoning 
from  psychical  data  in  the  premises  to  physical  objects 
-  in  the  conclusion.     Locke  made  the  same  assumption, 
the  same  admission,  and  the  same  failure.     But  he  went 
further   into  hypothesis,  and   to  inconsequence  added 
inconsistency.  ^He    assumed   that   ideas  are   not  onlyA 
all  the  data  but  also  all  the  objects  of.  understand-   I 
ing,^and  then  admitted  that  physical  objects  are  also 
objects  of  understanding.)    The  admission  is  true,  and 
therefore,   while    it   contradicted,    also   destroyed   the 
double   hypothesis.     We   now  come  to  a  philosopher 
who,    accepting    the   whole  ideal   hypothesis,  i<^nsist- 
ently  denied  facts    Vj3erkeley  assumed,  with  Descartes, 
that  ideas  are  the  data,  and  with  Locke,  that  they  are 
the  oyects,  of  human  knowledge,  and  consistently,  but 
falsely,  deduced  man's  ignorance  of  a  physical  world. 

The   'Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,'   after   an 
Introduction  on  Abstract  Ideas,  begin  in  the  following 

manner  : —  M| 

'  It  is  evident  to  any  one  who  takes  a  survey  of  the^"^ 
objects  of  human  knowledge,  that  they  are  either  ideas 


\CHAP.   VII./ 


BERKELEY 


187 


actually  imprinted  on  the  senses,  or  else  such  as  are 
perceived  by  attending  to  the  passions  and  operations 
of  the  mind,  or  lastly,  ideas  forme'd  by  help  of  memory 
and  imagination,  either  compounding,  dividing,  or 
barely  representing  those  originally  perceived  in  the 
aforesaid  ways.  By  sight  I  have  the  ideas  of  hght  and 
colours  with  their  several  degrees  and  variations.  By 
touch  I  perceive,  for  example,  hard  and  soft,  heat  and 
cold,  motion  and  resistance,  and  of  all  these  more  or 
less  either  as  to  quantity  or  degree.  Smelling  furnislies 
me  with  odours,  the  palate  with  tastes,  and  hearing 
conveys  sounds  to  the  mind  in  all  their  variety  of  tone 
and  composition.  And  as  several  of  these  are  observed 
to  accompany  each  other,  they  come  to  be  marked  by 
one  name,  and  so  to  be  reputed  as  one  thing.  Thus, 
for  example,  a  certain  colour,  taste,  smell,  figure  and 
consistence  having  been  observed  to  go  together,  are 
accounted  one  distinct  thing,  signified  by  the  name 
"  apple."  Other  collections  of  ideas  constitute  a  stone,  a 
tree,  a  book,  and  the  like  sensible  things  ;  which,  as 
they  are  pleasing  or  disagreeable,  excite  the  passions  of 
love,  hatred,  joy,  grief,  and  so  forth.'  ^ 

Here  are  most  of  the  errors  in  the  Second  and  Third 
Books  of  Locke's  Essay  accepted  as  principles.  With- 
out proof,  ideas  alone  are  supposed  to  be  perceived; 
ideas  of  quahties  without  a  quahfied  subject,  and 
ideas  of  operations  without  a  thinking  subject.  Eeason- 
■ing  from  the  data  of  sense  to  their  causes  is  entirely 
postponed  in  favour  of  representing,  compounding  and 
dividing  ideas.  Ideas,  simple  or  complex,  are  consist^ 
ently  declared  to  be  all  the  objects  of  human  knowledge. 
But  these  so-called  principles  are  mere  hypotheses.^ 
There  is  not  one  word  of  proof  that  either  the  data  or 

*  Princ.  i. 


•• » 


188 


rsYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


the  objects  of  Immau  knowledge  are  ideas.  Locke,  not 
human  nature — and  not  even  tlie  whole  of  Locke — was 
the  oracle  of  Berkeley. 

Berkeley,  however,  being  a  less  various  but  a  more 
logical  thinker  than  Locke,  w^as  truer  to  the  data  of  his 
predecessor.  Locke,  as  we  found,  having  assigned 
comparison,  composition  and  abstraction  as  the  three 
acts,  which  form  new  ideas  from  sense,  suddenly,  and 
without  any  justification,  introduced  a  fourth  act  of 
supposition,  which  is  a  kind  of  reasoning,  to  account 
for  our  idea  of  substance.  Berkeley  avoided  the  after- 
thought, and,  at  the  same  time,  the  truth,  that  reason 
does  intervene  in  the  formation  of  ideas  from  sense. 
Adhering  to  Locke's  first  thoughts,  he  perceived  that 
what  his  predecessor  had  allowed  about  other  complex 
ideas  equally  applied  to  complex  ideas  of  substances. 
If  we  start  from  ideas  of  sensation,  such  as  those  of 
colour,  taste,  smell,  figure  and  consistence,  and  merely 
compound  these  ideas,  we  can  construct  a  collection  of 
ideas  and  account  it  one  distinct  thing,  called  an  apple ; 
but  we  cannot,  without  introducing  a  qualified  physical 
substance  into  sense,  and  restoring  its  privileges  to 
reason,  either  perceive  or  infer  an  external  physical 
substance.  Berkeley  thus  reduces  Locke  to  logic  ;  nor* 
lias  mental  philosophy  ever  recovered  this  purely  hypo- 
thetical theory  of  substance. 

Berkeley  also  made  an  important  correction  in  one 
of  Locke's  three  acts,  abstraction.  Locke  had  supposed 
that  we  can  form  a  perfectly  abstract  idea  of  a  triangle, 
which  is  '  neither  equilateral,  equicrural,  nor  scalenon, 
but  all  and  none  of  these  at  once.'  ^  Berkeley  devoted 
the  Litroduction  of  the  '  Principles '  to  a  criticism  of  this 
modern  conceptualism,  and  founded  modern  nominalism. 

»  Essay,  IV.  7,  9. 


CHAP.   VII. 


BERKELEY 


189 


He  denied  that  he  could  abstract  or  conceive  separately 
qualities  which  cannot  exist  separately,  or  form  a 
general  notion  in  Locke's  sense. ^  He  admitted  that 
he  could  consider  a  figure  merely  as  triangular,  without 
attending  to  its  particular  qualities,  but  not  form  an 
abstract  general  inconsistent  idea  of  a  triangle.^  Simi- 
larly, Hume  afterwards  said,  that  all  general  ideas  are 
nothing  but  particular  ones  annexed  to  general  terms^^ 
The  essential  truth  at  the  bottom  of  this  theory  is 
that  abstraction  is  only  a  kind  of  attention.  But,  as 
often  happens,  one  extreme  view  begets  another.  We 
cannot  rise  to  a  purely  abstract  idea,  nor  need  we  fall 
to  a  purely  particular  idea  ;  we  cannot  form  an  idea  of 
triangle  in  general,  nor  need  we  think  of  a  single 
triangle.  We  can  frame  a  general  idea  of  a  miscella- 
neous assemblage  of  similar  individuals.^  Secondly, 
the  point  about  classes  is,  not  what  we  conceive,  but 
what  we  infer  and  know.  But,  while  correcting 
Locke's  exaggeration  of  abstraction,  Berkeley  left  its 
independence  of  reasoning.  Tlie  consequence  is  that, 
according  to  him,  the  limit  of  generalisation  would  be 
some  single  simple  idea  or  some  single  collection  of 
simple  ideas  of  sense  viewed  generally.  This  narrow- 
ness pervades  his  whole  pliilosopliy.  There  is,  indeed, 
such  a  simple  abstraction  of  ideas  from  sense,  as  we  ad- 
mitted in  the  last  chapter.  But  reason,  at  the  same 
time,  starts  from  sense  and  first  infers  classes  of  in- 
sensible objects,  and  then  constructs  general  ideas  of 
them  in  the  rational  imagination.  Finally,  this  rational 
imagination  of  general  ideas  accompanies  a  rational 
abstraction ;  like  direct  abstraction,  attention,  but  atten- 
tion to  objects  of  reason.     We  can  abstract,  in  the  sense 


*  Princ.  Introduction,  x. 
3  Treatise,  i\  §  7. 


^  Id.  xvi. 

'  Cf.  Mill,  Logic,  iv.  2,  1. 


190 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


of  attending  to,  an  insensible  object,  not  apart  from  the 
qualities  which  belong  to  it,  but  apart  from  the  quality 
of  being  sensible,  which  does  not  belong  to  it.  The  idea 
of  an  object  will  indeed  contain  some  sensible  qualities, 
and  usually  some  visible  colour.  But  having  inferred  tliat 
the  invisible  object  is  coloured  only  in  the  sense  of  reflect- 
ing aethereal  undulations,  by  abstraction  I  consider  the 
object  as  so  qualified,  without  attending  to  it  as  visibly 
coloured.  In  short,  I  know  by  scientific  reasoning  that 
o])jects  exist  apart  from  merely  sensible  qualities,  and 
I  can  attend  separately  to  their  existing  apart.  Berke- 
ley fell  into  the  error  of  postponing  inference  about 
classes,  and  therefore  of  limiting  abstraction  to  direct 
formation  of  ideas  from  sense.  Eeally,  there  are  objects 
known  by  sense,  and  objects  known  from  sense  by 
reason ;  and  there  is  an  abstraction  from  sense,  and  an 
abstraction  from  reason,  though  in  both  cases  the  ab- 
straction is  but  attention  to  sensible  and  rational  objects 
of  knowledge. 

According  to  Berkeley,  tlien,  starting  from  the 
Second  and  Third  Books  of  Locke's  Essay,  &,11  the  objects 
of  human  knowledge  are  ideas  of  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion, and  the  collections  of  ideas  made  out  of  them  by 
memory  and  imagination,  to  which  he  reduced  abstrac- 
tion of  ideas,  and  without  reasoning  about  causes.)  But 
it  is  im]>ossible  for  errors  to  remain  perfectly  logical. 
Though  he  had  just  said  tliat  all  objects  known  to  us  are 
ideas,  he  proceeds,  like  Locke,  dogmatically  to  assert 
tliat  a  thinking  subject  exists  : — 

'  But  besides  all  the  endless  variety  of  ideas  or  objects 
of  knowledge,  there  is  likewise  something  which  knows 
or  perceives  them,  and  exercises  divers  operations,  as 
willing,  imagining,  remembering  about  them.  Tliis 
perceiving  active  being  is  what  I  call  77iind,  spirit,  soul, 


CHAP.    VII. 


BERKELEY 


191 


or  myself.     By  which  words  I  do  not  denote  any  one  of 
my  ideas,  but   a   thing  entirely   distinct   from   them, 
wlierein  they  exist,  or  which  is  the  same  thing,  whereby 
they  are  perceived ;  for  the  existence  of  an  idea  con-  f 
sists  in  being  perceived.'  ^ 

Berkeley  was  dogmatic,  but  right,  in  asserting  the  \ 
existence  of  himself;  but  he  w^as  wrong  in  calling  this 
thinking  subject  a  thing  entirely  distinct  from  his  ideas,/ 
and  in  supplying   no  data  for   his   knowledge   of   it. 
I   am   a   thinker,    from   whom     the    subject   and    the 
thoughts  are  opposite  abstractions.    But,  in  spite  of  his 
criticism  of  abstract  ideas,  Berkeley  had  already  fol- 
lowed Locke's  Second  Book  in  supposing  all  the  objects 
of  reflection  to  be  mere  ideas  of  operations.     The  ques\ 
tion  then  arises,  how  he  could  possibly  know  that  he 
was  also  a  thinking  subject.     Locke  had  said  that  the  ^ 
thinking   subject     is    a   matter   of    mere    supposition. 
Berkeley  went  a  stage  further :  he  said  that  '  it  cannot 
be  of  itself  perceived,  but  only  by  the  effects  which  it 
produceth.'^     But  there  are  several  difficulties  in  al- 
lowing  him    to    take    this    view    on  his    hypotheses. 
In  the  first  place,  if  it  is  true,  there  is  something  which 
is  known,  though   indirectly,  without  being  an  idea  ; 
tlierefore,  not  all  objects  of  understanding,  but  only  all 
objects  of  sense,  will  be  ideas.    Secondly,  if  all  the  objects 
of  sensation  and  reflection  were  ideas  of  sensible  qualities 
and  ideas  of  operations,  as  he  supposes,  the  whole  of 
these  data  would  contain  no  subject,  not  of  course  a 
physical  nor  even  a  psychical  subject,  and  nothing  like 
a  subject,  for  a  subject  is,  as  Berkeley  admits,  not  an 
idea ;  therefore,  no  subject,  even  no  psychical  subject, 
could  be  logically  inferred.     We  must  choose,  therefore, 
between  the  original  data  and  the  illogical  conclusion. 


*  Princ.  ii. 


^  Id.  xxvii. 


102 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


(  But  Berkeley  was  riglit  in  admitting  the  existence  and 
knowledge  of  a  thinking  subject.  Therefore,  the  data 
of  sensation  and  reflection  cannot  be  mere  ideas.  Even 
if  not  sensation,  at  least  reflection  must  be  perception 
of  myself  as  a  thinking  subject,  from  which  I  infer 
other  thinking  subjects,  and  God  Himself.. J 

Berkeley  ought  to  have  returned  to  Descartes,  and 
begun  with  the  consciousness,  '  I  think.'  But,  although 
he  saw  that  we  cannot  abstract  what  cannot  exist  sepa- 
rately, he  was  so  enthralled  by  Locke  that  he  began  by 
supposing  that  (we  perceive  ideas  of  qualities  and  ideas 
of  operations,  when  we  cannot  even  abstract  these  ob- 
jects except  in  the  sense  of  attending  to  them  in  their 
subjects.  ,  The  idea  of  colour  and  the  idea  of  willing 
are  as  much  abstractions  as  the  idea  of  a  tiiangle.^  We 
really  perceive,  by  sensation,  at  least,  the  coloured,  and 
by  consciousness,  at  least,  the  willing.  vBut  Berkeley, 
like  Locke,  began  all  sense  with  abstract  ideas  of 
qualities  and  operations.  ^  Tliough,  unlike  Locke,  he  saw 
that  he  could  derive  no  physical  subject  from  the 
former,  he  illogically  thought  he  could  derive  a  thinking 
subject  from  the  latter  ideas,  although,  like  Locke,  he 
had  no  data  for  a  logical  sequence  from  the  conscious 
ideas  of  operations  to  the  thinking  subject. 

Curiously  enough,  he  ended,  like  Locke,  in  after 
all  returning  to  Descartes,  and  in  admitting,  '  I  know  j 
or  am  conscious  of  my  own  being.'  ^  This  admis-  ' 
sion  that  I  am  conscious  of  myself  is  quite  incon- 
sistent with  the  original  hypothesis  that  I  perceive  ideas 
of  operations  directly,  and  the  subsequent  corollary 
that  I  perceive  myself  only  indirectly  by  my  effects. 
Nevertheless,  the  admission  is  true,  and  the  hypothesis 
and  its  corollary  false.     I  cannot  infer  a  thinking  sub- 

^  Hylas  and  Philonous,  Third  Dialogue. 


criAP.  VII. 


BERKELEY 


193 


ject  from  mere  operations.  I  am  not  conscious  of 
operations,  still  less  of  ideas  of  operations— an  abstrac- 
tion, two  removes  from  the  truth.  I  am  conscious  of 
myself,  as  thinking  subject. 

But  Berkeley  involved  his  admission  of  a  thinking 
subject  with   another   hypothesis.      He   accepted   the 
Cartesian  transition  from  self  to  soul  without  a  word  of 
proof.^    As  I  have  already  shown,  I  am  not  conscious  of 
this  identification,  I  am  conscious  of  the  very  reverse. 
The  combined  evidence  of  consciousness,  observation, 
and  reasoning  teaches  me  that  I  am  a  man  thinking 
partly  by  my  body  and  partly  by  my  soul.  (But,  you 
will  say,  Berkeley  was  a  theologian,  who,  knowing  that 
God  is  a  spirit,  rightly  inferred  that  man  is  a  spirit. 
The  answer  is  that  man  is  not  God.)    It  is  true  that 
there  is  a  resemblance,  but  there  is  also  a  difference. 
When  I  infer  that  there  are  other  men,  I  observe,  by 
direct  inference  from  sense,  two  sorts  of  signs,  bodily 
organs  and  physical  works,  from  both  of  which  I  infer 
a  man  like  myself,  body  and  soul.     But  God  only  offers 
me  one  of  these  signs,  His  works  of  nature,  but  no  signs 
of  a  body.     Hence  I  have  a  right  to  infer  that  He  is 
similar  to  myself,  so  f^ir  as  He  by  intelligence  and  will 
produces  works  of  order,  beauty,  and  goodness,  similar 
to  those  of  man,  but  I  have  no  right  to  infer  either  that 
He,  like  man,  is  also  a  body,  or  that  man,  like  Him,  is  a 
pure  spirit.     Nor  have  I  a  right  to  infer  that — 

All  are  but  parts  of  one  stupendous  whole, 
Whose  body  nature  is,  and  God  the  souL 

(^Nature  is  to  God  as  works  are  to  man ;  and  as  a  man's 
body  is  not  his  works,  so  neither  is  nature  the  body  of 
God. ;  '  Hie  omnia  regit,'  says  Newton  ^  about  the  Deity, 

^  Princ.  ii. 

2  Newton,  Princijpia,  Lib.  III.  Scholium  Generale  {sub  fin.). 

O 


194 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


'  non  ut  aniraa  mimdi,  sed  ut  universorum  dominus.' 
God  has  no  body  ;  for  how  could  He  have  a  body  pro- 
portionate to  His  infinite  intelHgence  and  vdll,  and  show- 
it  not  ?     God,  then,  is  a  spirit ';  man  is  not. 

Now,  it  is  true  that  God,  for  a  time,  gave  a  bodily 
sign,  when  He  took  upon  Himself  a  body  and  made 
Himself  man.  But  the  incarnation  of  Christ  is  a  verv 
proof  of  the  difference  between  God  and  man.  Christ 
ceased  to  be  a  pure  Spirit,  became  flesh,  and  dwelt 
among  us.  Berkeley  cannot  explain  this  union  of  the 
Divine  and  the  human  in  Christ.  God  is  a  spirit ;  but^ 
if  man  is  also  a  spirit,  what  is  the  incarnation  ?  / 
Berkeley's  only  logical  answer  would  be  the  gratuitous 
hypothesis  that  Christ  took  upon  Himself  certain  ideas, 
called  the  human  body.  But  Christ  had  the  ideas  already 
from  eternity.  What  He  wanted  was  the  very  body,  re- 
presented by  those  ideas,  for  a  time.  There  is  nothing 
for  it,  but  that  God  is  a  spirit,  and  Christ  took  upon 
himself  a  body  and  became  man,  and  man  is  both  body 
and  spirit  in  one.  The  idealistic  hypothesis  that  I  am 
a  spirit  is  inconsistent  both  with  philosophy  and  with 
Christianity.  Yet  in  our  own  time  a  false  philosophy 
of  man  as  a  purely  spiritual  subject  is  supposed  to  be 
a  justification  of  Christian  theology. 

Berkeley,  in  the  Introduction  and  the  first  two  sec- 
tions of  his  '  Principles,'  furnished  himself  with  his  pre- 
mises. They  are  anticipations  of  human  nature,  mainly 
derived  from  Descartes  and  Locke,  with  an  occasional 
assumption  of  his  own.  Let  it  be  granted,  from  Des- 
cartes, that  the  thinking  subject,  myself,  is  a  mind, 
spirit,  soul.  Let  it  be  granted,  from  Locke's  Second 
Book,  that  not  only  all  data,  but  all  objects  of  know- 
ledge, are  simple  ideas  of  sensation  and  reflection, 
and  ideas  compounded  by  memory  and   imagination. 


CHAr.    VII. 


BERKELEY 


195 


without  taking  any  notice  of  reasoning;  and  let  us 
avoid  Locke's  inconsistency  of  supposing  an  external 
physical  substance  beyond  a  collection  of  ideas,  and  his 
error  of  purely  abstract  ideas.  Let  the  premises,  which 
he  owes  to  Descartes  and  Locke,  be  granted  to  Berke- 
ley, without  his  proving  them.  What  follows  ?  Why, 
the  purely  hypothetical,  fairly  logical,  wholly  synthetic 
deduction  from  false  and  unproved  hypotheses,  known 
as  the  Berkeleian  philosophy.  He  who  is  foolish  enough 
on  the  mere  authority  of  this  doctor  to  swallow  the 
hypotheses,  like  pills,  will  find  that  the  deductions  will 
purge  him  of  all  knowledge  beyond  spirit  and  ideas. 

Berkeley  begins  his  deductions  by  explainhig  the  * 
existence  of  what  he  calls  sensible  things,  and  denying 
that  what  he  calls  unthinking  things  exist  except  as 
perceived  : — '  The  table  I  write  on,  I  say,  exists,  that 
is,  I  see  and  feel  it ;  and  if  I  were  out  of  my  study  I 
should  say  it  existed,  meaning  thereby  that  if  I  was  in 
my  study  I  might  perceive  it,  or  that  some  other  spirit  ^ 
actually  does  perceive  it.  There  was  an  odour,  that  is, 
it  was  smelled ;  there  was  a  sound,  that  is  to  say,  it  was 
heard ;  a  colour  or  figure,  and  it  was  perceived  by  sight 
or  touch.  This  is  all  that  I  can  understand  by  these 
and  the  like  expressions.  For  as  to  what  is  said  of  the 
absolute  existence  of  unthinking  things  without  any 
relation  to  their  being  perceived,  that  seems  perfectly 
unintelligible.  Their  esse  is  percipi^  nor  is  it  possible 
that  they  should  have  any  existence  out  of  the  minds 
of  thinking  beings  which  perceive  them.'  ^ 

So  far  as  this  argument  follows  from  its  premises  it 
is  hypothetically  unanswerable.  The  esse  of  ideas  is 
per  dpi ;  if,  then,  all  objects  of  human  knowledge  are 
ideas,  their  esse  will  be  percipi ;  and  again,  an  unthink- 

*  Princ.  iii. 

0  2 


196 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


ing  tiling,  which  is  not  an  idea,  will  not  be  humanly 
known  to  exist.     Berkeley  was  entitled  to  these  liypo- 
thetical   conclusions.      But   his    argument  conceals    a 
further  false  hypothesis,  namely,  that  what  is  unknown  ^ 
by  man  to  exist,  being  unintelligible   to  him,  is  non- 
existent ;  from  which  he  concluded  that  a  purely  un- 
thinking thing  is  not  only  unknown  by  man,  but  also 
non-existent.     Tims  to  hypotlieses  and  hypothetical  de- . 
duction  Berkeley  added  dogmatism.     He  dogmatically^ 
asserted  the  existence  of  mind  and  the  non-existence    / 
of  matter. 

The  importance  of  the  deductions  which  immediately 
follow  consists  in  their  entire  omission  of  reasoning 
from  the  data  of  sense  to  their  causes,  and  its  conse- 
quences, when  combined  with  Locke's  premises. 
Houses,  mountains,  rivers,  and,  in  a  word,  all  sensible 
objects,  are  supposed  to  have  a  separate  existence. 
Now,  says  Berkeley,  they  are  what  we  perceive  by  sense, 
and  what  we  perceive  are  ideas  or  sensations ;  therefore 
they  are  ideas  or  sensations.^  He  adds  that  it  is  only 
the  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas  which  makes  us  dis- 
tinguish the  existence  of  sensible  objects  from  their 
being  perceived.^  But  it  is  not  true  that  a  house  is 
a  sensible  object  which  we  perceive  by  sense ;  sense 
perceives  only  a  sensible  effect  of  an  external  house, 
which  is  inferred  by  reasoning,  and  can  be  distinguished 
from  the  sensible  effect  by  the  attention  of  abstraction. 
But  it  is  true  that  if  we  choose  to  omit  reasoning  about 
causes,  and  suppose  that  sense  perceives  ideas  or  sen- 
sations, the  only  house  we  should  know  would  be,  not 
the  house  now  inferred,  but  only  what  we  should  then 
perceive,  a  mere  collection  of  ideas  or  sensations,  in- 
capable of  being  abstracted  from  being  perceived. 


*  Princ.  iv. 


2  Id.  V. 


CHAP.  VII. 


BERKELEY 


197 


This  strict  though  liypothetical  logic  from  Locke's 
Second  Book  removed  Berkeley  into  another  arena  of 
philosophy.     Descartes   and   Locke   had  admitted  the 
existence    and  knowledge  of  an    external   world,  not 
merely  psychical  but  also  physical ;  that  a  house  is  an 
external  object  causing  our  ideas  ;  and,  in  accordance 
with  the  representative  theory,  that  perception  presents 
ideas  but  represents  external  objects.     Berkeley,  agree- 
ing both  with  Descartes  and  Locke  in  the  perception  of 
ideas,  but  aware  tliat  neither  philosopher  suppHed  data 
from  whicli  to  infer  an  external  object,  and  following 
Locke  in  postponing  reasoning  about  it,  logically  con- 
cludes that  the  external  object  and  the  sensible  object 
are  one,  and  that  in  perceiving  an  idea  or  sensation,  we 
are  perceiving  not  a  sensible  effect  of  an  external  house, 
but  the  house  itself.      His  pure  idealism  produced  the 
metaphysical  theory  that  objects,  supposed  to  be  ex- 
ternal, are  nothing  but  ideas  or  sensations  in  the  mind,  ^ 
and  the  psychological  theory  of  a  presentative  percep-  ' 
tion  of  ideas  or  sensations,  representing  nothing. 

Having  hypothetically  deduced  that  the  esse  of  all 
objects  known  to  man  is percipi,  and  that  what  are  called 
external  objects  are  really  ideas  or  sensations,  Berkeley 
proceeds  to  the  conclusion  that  *  all  the  choir  of  heaven 
and  furniture  of  the  earth  ;  in  a  word,  all  those  bodies 
which  compose  the  mighty  frame  of  the  world,'  exist    ' 
in  my  mind,  or  in  that  of  some  created  spirit ;  or  else 
subsist  in  the  mind  of  some  eternal  spirit. ^     This  con- 
clusion also  follows  from  the  premises.     If  all  objects 
of  knowledge  are  ideas,  and  ideas  subsist  in  the  mind  of 
some  spirit,  it  follows  necessarily  that  the  whole  known 
world  subsists   in  the  mind  of  some  spirit.      So  far, 
indeed,  as  the  human  spirit  goes,  we  could  only  speak 

^  Princ.  VI. 


198 


rSYCIlOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


of  tlie  Avliole  known  world.  We  saw  above  that  Berke- 
ley, while  speaking  even  of  nian,^  denied  the  existence 
of  wluit  was  not  an  object  of  human  knowledge.  He 
now  corrects  this  defect  by  the  addition  of  the  eternal 
spirit,^  to  whom  whatever  exists  is  known,  while  what  is 
not  known  does  not  exist.  Of  the  Divine  spirit  at  least 
Berkeley  could  say,  whatever  exists  is  an  object  of  His 
knowledge  ;  if,  then,  all  objects  of  knowledge  are  ideas, 
and  ideas  subsist  in  the  mind  of  a  spirit,  whatever  exists 
subsists  in  the  mind  of  the  eternal  spirit  of  God.  Even 
so,  however,  it  might  be  objected  that,  if  ideas  are  the 
objects  of  human,  it  does  not  follow  that  they  are  the 
only  objects  of  Divine  knowledge.  But  in  Berkeley's 
'  Principles  '  there  is  a  perpetual  equivoque  between  the 
sensible  ideas  of  man  and  the  intellectual  ideas  of  God. 
/  '  From  what  has  been  said  it  follows  that  there  is 
I  not  any  other  substance  than  spirit ; '  this  is  the  next 
hypothetical  consequence.^  It  is  an  immediate  corol- 
j  lary.  If  there  were  only  man,  the  only  known  substance 
would  be  spirit,  but  add  God  and  it  would  follow  that 
the  only  existing  substance  is  spirit,  so  that  there  remains 
no  unthinking  substance.^  Berkeley  further  proceeds  to 
deduce  this  denial  of  matter  from  the  hypothesis  of 
ideas.  He  is  perfectly  logical.  Ideas  cannot  exist  in 
an  unthinking  substance  ;  if  then  sensible  qualities  were 
ideas,  there  would  be  no  unthinking  substance  or  substra- 
tum of  those  ideas  or  quahties.^  Again,  he  warns  us 
against  those  who  maintained  that,  though  unthinking 
substance  is  not  the  substratum  of  sensible  ideas,  ideas 
are  nevertheless  the  copies  or  resemblances  of  unthinking 
substance.  '  I  answer,'  he  says, '  an  idea  can  be  like  no- 
thinix  but  an  idea.'  ^     This  memorable  sentence  marks 


*  Princ.  iii.  ^  Id.  vi.  ^  Id.  vii. 

5  Id.  «  Id.  viii. 


Id. 


CHAP.   VII. 


BERKELEY 


199 


the  return  of  the  logic  of  reasoning  into  mental  philo- 
sophy. Berkeley  at  this  point  begins  to  think  about 
reasoning,  though  too  late  ;  for  he  had  already  fixed  the 
objects  of  knowledge  without  it.  But  he  thinks  about 
it  as  a  logician,  and  gives  the  answer  to  the  illogical 
attempt  of  Descartes  and  Locke  to\^first  enclose  man 
within  psychical  ideas,  and  then,  without  any  clue  in  the 
data,  expect  him  to  discover  physical  objects.  In  the 
case  of  physical  substances,  if  the  data  of  inference  were 
sensible  qualities  as  ideas,  we  could  infer  a  similar  col- 
lection of  qualities  as  ideas  ;  if  they  were  qualities  with- 
out beinsT  ideas,  we  could  infer  a  similar  combination  of 
qualities ;  but  in  neither  case  could  we  infer  a  physical 
substance,  for  which  we  should  have  no  analogue  in 
sense.  ^ 

This  rigorous  logic  from  Locke's  hypotheses  of  ideas 
enabled  Berkeley  to  destroy  Locke's  theories  of  material 
substance  and  its  primary  qualities  at  a  blow : — 

'  Some  there  are  who  make  a  distinction  betwixt 
primary  and  secondary  qualities :  by  the  former,  they 
mean  extension,  figure,  motion,  rest,  solidity  or  impene- 
trability, and  number;  by  the  latter  they  denote  all 
other  sensible  qualities,  as  colours,  sounds,  tastes,  and  so 
forth.  The  ideas  we  have  of  these  they  acknowledge  not 
to  be  the  resemblances  of  anything  existing  without  the 
mind  or  unperceived  ;  but  they  will  have  our  ideas  of 
the  primary  qualities  to  be  patterns  or  images  of  things 
which  exist  without  the  mind,  in  an  unthinking  sub- 
stance which  they  call  matter.  By  matter,  therefore,  we 
are  to  understand  an  inert,  senseless  substance,  in  which 
extension,  figure,  and  motion  do  actually  subsist.  But 
it  is  evident,  from  what  we  have  already  shown,  that 
extension,  figure  and  motion  are  only  ideas  existing  in 

*  Cf.  Princ.  xxxvii. 


r~ 


200 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


tlie  mind,  and  that  an  idea  can  be  like  nothing  but 
another  idea,  and  that  consequently  neither  they  nor 
their  archetypes  can  exist  in  an  unperceiving  substance. 
Hence  it  is  plain,  that  the  very  notion  of  what  is  called 
matter  or  corporeal  substance  involves  a  contradiction 
in  it.'  1 

Yes  ;  if,  and  only  if,  qualities  as  sensible  are  ideas, 
an  idea  is  like  nothing  but  another  idea,  and  therefore 
we  could  infer  no  external  qualities  of  matter ;  neither 
insensible  primary  qualities  like  primary  qualities  as 
sensible,  nor  insensible  secondary  qualities  as  modifi- 
cations of  primary  qualities  and  causes  of  secondary 
qualities  as  sensible.  Now,  matter  is  nothing  without 
qualities  ;  therefore,  we  could  not  infer  matter  at  all. 
The  argument  is  quite  logical,  if  we  once  admit  with 
Locke,  that,  as  sensible,  all  qualities  are  ideas.  If  with 
modern  idealists  we  should  substitute  sensations,  it 
would  equally  follow  that  we  could  infer  no  insensible 
qualities  of  matter,  and  therefore  no  matter  at  all. 

Berkeley  added  a  second  argument  to  prove  that  all 
qualities  exist  only  as  ideas  in  the  mind  and  not  in 
matter  and  its  particles  : — 

'  They  who  assert  that  figure,  motion  and  the  rest 
of  the  primary  original  qualities  do  exist  without  the 
mind  in  unthinking  substances,  do  at  the  same  time 
acknowledge  that  colours,  sounds,  heat,  cold,  and  such- 
like secondary  qualities,  do  not,  which  they  tell  us  are 
sensations  existing  in  the  mind  alone,  that  depend  on 
and  are  occasioned  by  the  different  size,  texture,  and 
motion  of  the  minute  particles  of  matter.  This  they 
take  for  an  undoubted  truth  which  they  can  demonstrate 
beyond  all  exception.  Now  if  it  be  certain  that  those 
original  qualities  are  inseparably  united  with  the  other 

•.  *  Princ.  ix. 


CHAP.  VII. 


BERKELEY 


201 


sensible  qualities,  and  not,  even  in  thought,  capable  of 
being  abstracted  from  them,  it  plainly  follows  that  they 
exist  only  in  the  mind.  But  I  desire  any  one  to  reflect 
and  try  whether  lie  can,  by  any  abstraction  of  thought, 
conceive  the  extension  and  motion  of  a  body  without  all 
other  sensible  qualities.  For  my  own  part,  I  see  evi- 
dently that  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  frame  an  idea  of  a 
body  extended  and  moved,  but  I  may  withal  give  it 
some  colour  or  other  sensible  quality  which  is  acknow- 
ledged to  exist  only  in  the  mind.  In  short,  extension, 
figure,  and  motion,  abstracted  from  all  other  qualities, 
are  inconceivable.  Where,  therefore,  the  other  sensible 
qualities  are  there  must  these  be  also,  to  wit,  in  the 
mind,  and  nowhere  else.'  ^j:^ 

This  argument  does  not  touch  Locke,  so  far  as  it 
depends  on  the  admission  that  secondary  qualities  are 
mere  sensations ;  for  Locke  said  that,  as  sensible,  they 
are  ideas,  and,  as  external,  powers.  But  it  touches 
later  theories  of  secondary  qualities,  realistic  and 
idealistic.  It  is  true  that  if  secondary  qualities  are 
sensations,  primary  qualities,  as  sensible,  will  also  be 
sensations,  from  which  no  external  quality,  and  there- 
fore no  matter,  could  be  inferred.  Moreover,  the  argu 
ment  is  interesting  as  another  instance  of  Berkeley's  re- 
duction of  the  external  to  the  sensible.  He  saw  that  on 
the  conjoint  hypothesis  that  sense  perceives  qualities  as 
sensations,  with  abstraction  of  ideas,  but  without 
reasoning  to  causes^  we  should  only  be  able  to  infer  and 
attend  to  qualities,  primary  and  secondary,  as  they  are 
fused  in  sensation.  Hence  his  followers  invariably  re- 
gard primary  and  secondary  qualities  merely  as  various 
kinds  of  sensations,  and  not  as  external  qualities. 

By  this  series  of  hypothetical  arguments  Berkeley 

1  Princ.  X. 


202 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


^ 


arrived  at  the  following  conclusions  :  all  subjects  are 
spirits  and  all  objects  ideas  of  spirits.  This  absolute 
universality  logically  applies  only  to  the  eternal  spirit. 
As  far  as  the  human  spirit  goes,  Berkeley's  conclusions, 
so  far  as  they  are  logical,  must  be  put  in  a  more 
moderate  form.  If  there  are  spirits,  and  all  objects  of 
knowledge  are  ideas,  then  all  known  subjects  are  spirits 
and  all  known  objects  are  ideas ;  a  physical  subject  of 
qualities  is  not  known  to  exist,  and  qualities,  primary 
and  secondary,  are  known  as  ideas  or  sensations  in  our 
minds,  but  are  not  known  to  be  external  qualities  of 
physical  subjects,  bodies  and  corpuscles,  in  an  external 
world.  What,  then,  is  to  become  of  the  minute  particles 
of  matter,  their  latent  sizes,  textures,  and  motions ;  to 
say  nothing  of  their  priority,  and  their  production  of 
our  sensations  ?  What,  again,  are  the  causes  of  the  ideas 
or  sensations  in  the  mind  of  a  human  spirit  ?  Berkeley, 
like  Locke,  at  last  found  himself  face  to  face  with  the 
problem  of  reasoning  to  causes.  Given  ideas  of  spirits 
as  all  the  data  and  objects  of  knowledge,  wdiat  causes 
can  reason  infer  ? 

We  might  feel  tempted  now  to  say  that  Berkeley, 
having  the  universe  of  Divine  ideas,  as  it  were,  in  his 
grasp,  would  at  once  say  that  the  external  world  of 
bodies,  their  corpuscles,  and  their  qualities,  which  the 
natural  philosopher  has  discovered  to  be  the  insensible 
causes  of  sensible  qualities,  even  a3ther  and  its  motions, 
are  Divine  ideas,  by  which  the  Deity  produces  the  sen- 
sations of  man.  But  Berkeley  no  more  than  the  modern 
Berkeleian  resorts  to  this  Hegelian  alternative.  He 
precluded  himself  from  taking  it,  both  by  his  identifica- 
tion of  the  external  w^ith  the  sensible  object,  and  by 
his  doctrine  of  the  inactivity  of  ideas.  As  the  former 
deprived  him  of  the  external  world  as  a  distinct  object, 


CHAP.    VII. 


BERKELEY 


203 


SO  the  latter  prevented  him  from  regarding  insensible  | 
causes  as  ideas.  '  All  our  ideas,'  says  he,  '  sensations,  ) 
or  the  things  which  we  perceive,  by  whatsoever  names 
they  may  be  distinguished,  are  visibly  inactive  ;  there 
is  nothing  of  power  or  agency  included  in  them,  so 
that  one  idea  or  object  of  thought  cannot  produce  or 
make  any  alteration  in  another.'  ^  So  far  from  resolving 
insensible  scientific  causes  into  Divine  ideas  acting  on  us, 
he  uses  the  theory  of  the  inactivity  of  ideas  to  deny  in- 
sensible scientific  causes.  '  Whence,  it  plainly  follows,' 
he  concludes, '  that  extension,  figure,  and  motion  cannot 
be  the  cause  of  our  sensations.  To  say,  therefore,  that 
these  are  the  efiects  of  powers,  resulting  from  the  con- 
figuration, number,  motion,  and  size  of  corpuscles,  must 
certainly  be  false.'  ^ 

Berkeley,  having  decided  that  the  cause  is  not  the 
qualities  of  corpuscles,  proceeded  to  infer  that  it  is  the 

spirit  of  God : — 

'  We  perceive  a  continual  succession  of  ideas,  some 
are  anew  excited,  others  are  changed,  or  totally  disap- 
pear. There  is,  therefore,  some  cause  of  these  ideas 
whereon  they  depend,  and  which  produces  and  changes 
them.  That  this  cause  cannot  be  any  quality  or  idea, 
or  combination  of  ideas,  is  clear  from  the  preceding 
section.  It  must,  therefore,  be  a  substance  ;  but  it  has 
been  shown  that  there  is  no  corporeal  or  material 
substance.  It  remains,  therefore,  that  the  cause  of 
ideas  is  an  incorporeal  active  substance  or  spirit.'  ^ 

Berkeley,  Hke  Descarles  and  Locke,  saw  that  there  is 
an  involuntariness  in  our  sensations  which  requires 
some  cause.  They  might  have  all  stopped  there,  and 
said  that  the  nature  of  the  cause  is  unknown;  but 
they  were  too  philosophical  to  be  agnostics.     Descartes 


^  Princ.  XXV. 


Id. 


^  Id.  xxvi. 


204 


rSYCnOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


CHAP.  VII. 


BERKELEY 


205 


and  Locke,  however,  were  not  logical  enougli  to  see 
what  cause  could  be  inferred  from  their  data ;  but 
guided  by  real  facts  rather  than  by  their  theories 
illogically  supposed  that,  without  anything  physical  in 
the  data,  we  could  infer  a  physical  cause.  Berkeley, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  the  first  of  the  psychological 
idealists  to  see  that  the  data  and  objects  of  knowledge 
must  determine  the  inference ;  so  that,  if  the  data  and 
objects  are  mind  and  ideas,  when  we  find  ideas  in 
sensation,  which  are  due  neither  to  one's  own  ideas  nor 
to  one's  own  mind,  we  cannot  infer  a  corporeal  or 
material  substance,  but  must  infer  that  the  cause  is 
either  other  ideas  or  another  mind.  He  had  elimi- 
nated other  ideas  by  his  doctrine  of  the  inactivity 
of  ideas.  There  remained  another  mind.  Now,  proceeds 
he,  though  we  are  conscious  of  being  able  to  produce 
some  ideas  by  will,  yet  the  ideas  of  sense  have  not 
a  like  dependence  on  our  will ;  there  is  therefore  some 
other  will  or  spirit  that  produces  them,  and  in  an  order 
which  proves  that  this  cause  is  the  spirit  of  God.^  Thus, 
the  solution,  which  was  suggested  by  Descartes,  as  a 
possible  alternative  in  his  'Principia  Philosophise,' ^  and 
which  ought  to  have  been  taken  by  Locke  in  the 
Fourth  Book  of  his  Essay,  when  he  had  deserted  mere 
ideas  in  favour  of  an  intuition  of  oneself  and  a  demon- 
stration of  God,  was  at  length  adopted  by  Berkeley  in 
his  '  Principles.'  If  all  the  data  are  ideas  and  minds, 
created  and  eternal,  and  if  ideas  are  inactive,  the  only 
ogical  conclusion  is  that  the  sensible  ideas  of  created 
minds  are  direct  imprints  of  the  eternal  Spirit  of  God. 
'^  This  logical  conclusion  of  psychological  idealism, 
evaded  by  Descartes  and  Locke,  was  accepted  by 
Berkeley,  wdtli  all  its  hypothetical  consequences.     As 


Ki 


*  Princ.  xxviii.-xxx. 


^  Descartes,  Princ.  ii.  1. 


usual,  he  felt  the  double  edge  of  his  weapon,  and  was 
prepared  not  only  with  what  is,  but  with  what  is  not. 
On  the  one  hand,  he  concluded  that  God  is,  and  on  the 
other  hand,  that  matter  is  not,  the  cause  of  our  sensa- 
tions.^ Secondly,  he  concluded  that  '  the  set  rules  or 
established  methods,  wherein  the  mind  we  depend  on 
excites  in  us  the  ideas  of  sense,  are  called  the  laws  of 
nature.'  ^  Thirdly,  he  concluded  that  God  is  not  merely 
the  prime  cause,  but  the  immediate  and  sole  cause  of 
sensible  effects,  setting  aside  second  causes,  such  as  the 
sun  and  the  motion  of  bodies  : — 

'And  yet  this  consistent  uniform  working,  which 
so  evidently  displays  the  goodness  and  wisdom  of  that 
governing  spirit,  whose  will  constitutes  the  laws  of 
nature,  is  so  far  from  leading  our  thoughts  to  him,  that 
it  rather  sends  them  a-wandering  after  second  causes. 
For  when  we  perceive  certain  ideas  of  sense  constantly 
followed  by  other  ideas,  and  we  know  that  it  is  not 
of  our  own  doing,  we  forthwith  attribute  power  and 
agency  to  the  ideas  themselves,  and  make  one  the  cause 
of  another,  than  which  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  and 
unintelligible.  Thus,  for  example,  having  observed 
that  when  we  perceive  by  sight  a  certain  round  luminous 
figure,  we  at  the  same  time  perceive  by  touch  the  idea 
or  sensation  called  heat ;  we  do  from  thence  conclude 
the  sun  to  be  the  cause  of  heat.  And  in  like  manner 
perceiving  the  motion  and  collision  of  bodies  to  be 
attended  with  sound,  we  are  inclined  to  think  the  latter 
an  effect  of  the  former.'^ 

Finally,  he  presents  us  with  his  complete  theory  of 
real  things,  when  second  causes  have  been  expunged  :^ — 

'  The  ideas  imprinted  on  the  senses  by  the  author  of 
nature  are  called  real  things ;  and  those  excited  in  the 

*  Berkeley,  Princ.  xxvi.        ^  Id.  xxx.        ^  jj^  xxxii.        ■*  Id.  xxxiii. 


206 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART   11. 


CHAP.   VII. 


H) 


BERKELEY 


207 


imagination,  being  less  regular,  vivid  and  constant,  are 
more  properly  termed  ideas  or  images  of  things,  which 
they  copy  and  represent.  But  then  our  sensations,  be 
they  never  so  vivid  and  distinct,  are  nevertheless  ideas, 
that  is,  they  exist  in  the  mind,  or  are  perceived  by  it, 
as  truly  as  the  ideas  of  its  own  framing.  LTlie  ideas  of 
sense  are  allowed  to  have  more  reality  in  them,  that 
is,  to  be  more  strong,  orderly  and  coherent  than 
the  creatures  of  the  mind  ;  but  this  is  no  argument 
that  they  exist  without  the  mindji  They  are  also  less 
dependent  on  the  spirit,  or  thinking  substance  which 
perceives  them,  in  that  they  are  excited  by  the  will  of 
another  and  more  powerful  spirit ;  yet  still  they  are 
ideas,  and  certainly  no  idea,  whether  faint  or  strong, 
can  exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind  perceiving  it.' 

This  passage  marks  a  turning-point  in  the  history  of 
idealism.  Hitherto,  the  line  between  ideas  of  sensation 
and  ideas  of  conception  had  not  been  so  carefully 
drawn  as  that  between  all  ideas  and  the  physical 
realities  which  cause  them.  Now,  Berkeley,  having 
deduced  the  destruction  of  physical  realities,  while  still 
preserving  the  hypothesis  that  ideas  are  the  objects  of 
sensation,  was  puzzled  to  find  some  boundary  between 
the  real  and  the  ideal.  He  drew  it  between  the  ideas  of 
sensation  and  the  ideas  of  imagination,  partly  by  their 
vividness  and  faintness,  but  mainly  because  the  former 
are  directly  produced  by  God.  Hence,  he  identified 
sensible  ideas  with  real  things,  at  the  same  time  explain- 
ing that  they  are  after  all  only  ideas. 

Sensible  ideas  he  declared  to  be  his  rerum  natura} 
He  even  admitted  corporeal  substances,  'taken  in  the 
vulgar  sense  for  a  combination  of  sensible  qualities,'  not 
'  in  the  philosophic  sense  for  a  support  of  accidents  or 

*  Princ.  xxxiv. 


\ 


qualities  without  the  mind.'  ^  So  sure  was  he  that  sensible 
ideas  are  the  real  things,  that  he  even  said  that '  we  are  fed 
and  clothed  with  these  things  which  we  perceive  im- 
mediately by  our  senses ; '  that  is,  by  sensible  ideas.^ 
Thus  did  he  reduce  reality  to  ideas  imprinted  on  our 
senses  by  God  without  the  intervention  of  physical 
causes,  sense  to  the  presentation  of  sensible  ideas  repre- 
senting no  external  bodies,  and  knowledge  to  collections 
of  ideas  inferring  no  external  cause  except  God.  *  He 
took  the  show  of  sense  for  the  nature  of  things,  and 
thought  that,  if  the  veil  were  uplifted,  we  should  see 
nothing  but  God. 

This  doctrine  of  reality,  much  more  logical,  but 
also  far  narrower  than  that  of  Descartes  and  Locke,  is 
the  transition  to  Hume's  distinction  of  impressions  and 
ideas,  and  has  ended  in  the  ordinary  sensationalism  of 
modern  Berkeleians,  such  as  Mill,  who  do  not  indeed  say 
that  God  is  the  direct  cause  of  our  sensations,  but  give  up 
the  problem  and  leave  sensations  in  mid-air,  nor  doo-ma- 
tise  about  all  reality  but  confine  themselves  to  known 
reality,  in  other  respects  differing  in  nothincr  but  ter- 
minology from  Berkeley.     The  fundamental  character  of  ^ 
Berkeleianism  is  the  theory  that  everything  real  is  either) 
my  sensations  and  combinations  of  sensations,  or  those  / 
of  other  minds.     '  I  do  not  believe,'  says  Mill,  '  that  the  -^ 
real  externality  to  us  of  anything,  except  other  minds, 
is  capable  of  proof.'  ^ 

It  is  often  said  that  Berkeley  is  unanswerable,  in  his 
final  position  that  the  real  world  consists  of  ideas  im- 
printed on  our  senses,  not  by  nature,  but  by  the  spirit 
of  God.     He  cannot  be  answered  by  the  hypothetical 

1  Princ.  xxxvii.  2  j^  xxxviii. 

3  Examination  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophij,  chap,  xi.,  note, 
8ub  fin. 


208 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISxM 


PART   II. 


realism  of  cosmotlietical  idealists,  such  as  Descartes  and 
Locke  and  their  modern  successors,  because  they  start 
knowledge,  like  Berkeley,  with  nothing  but  psychical 
data,  from  which  nothing  but  the  psychical  could  be 
inferred,  and  only  suppose  it  to  infer  physical  causes, 
by  bad  logic.  Berkeley  was  the  first  logician  of  idealism. 
Cosmothetic  idealism  is  an  inconsequence,  which  must 
end  in  pure  idealism  at  last. 

Again,  he  cannot  be  answered  by  intuitive  realism, 
because  it  rests  on  the  false  identification  of  the  sensible 
and  external  world  by  common  sense,  instead  of  appealing 
to  the  distinction  of  the  sensible  effect  from  the  external 
cause  by  science.  It  is  no  use  to  knock  the  stick  on  the 
ground,  when  Berkeley  resolves  the  ground  and  the  stick 
into  ideas,  and  the  agent  into  a  spirit.  It  is  no  answer 
to  assert  that  the  things  immediately  perceived  are  real 
things  ;  for  Berkeley  admits  it,  but  says  that  they  are 
also  sensible  ideas  or  sensations.^  It  is  no  answer  to 
oppose  a  presentative  perception  of  apples  and  houses 
to  a  philosopher,  who  agrees  but  rejoins  that  the  things 
presented  are  only  collections  of  ideas.  If  Berkeley  is 
equal  to  the  intuitive  realist  on  the  ground  of  common 
sense,  he  is  superior  on  the  ground  of  science  and  philo- 
sophy. The  intuitive  realist  supposes  that  the  real  world 
directly  perceived  is  external ;  science  shows  that  it  is 
within ;  Berkeley  adds  that  it  is  within  the  mind.  The 
intuitive  reahst  supposes  that  a  secondary  quahty  is 
directly  perceived  as  a  mere  sensation  in  the  mind,  a 
primary  quality  as  a  real  quahty  in  the  external  world ; 
Berkeley,  in  a  far  more  philosophic  spirit,  shows  that 
they  are  directly  perceived  in  the  same  manner,  for,  as 
sensible  it  is  impossible  to  separate  extension,  figure  and 
motion  from  other  sensible  qualities.     Both  confuse  two 

*  Frinc.  xxxiii.  scq.;  Hylas  and  Philonous,  Third  Dialogue,  sub  Jin, 


CHAP.    VII. 


BERKELEY 


209 


realities,  distinguished  by  science,  the  sensible  and  the 
external ;  but,  if  this  common  confusion  could  be  over- 
looked, it  would  be  more  scientific  to  make  the  real 
object  of  immediate  perception,  with  Berkeley,  entirely 
internal,  than,  with  intuitive  realism,  partly  internal  and 
partly  external — as  if  I  could  perceive  the  light  of  a 
candle  within  me,  and  its  extension  in  the  outside  world. 

The  truth  is  that  idealists  and  realists  have  had  too 
many  errors  in  common  with  Berkeley  to  answer  him. 
Idealists  share  his  error  that  the  data  are  ideas,  realists 
that  the  real  world  is  the  object  of  immediate  j)ercep- 
tion.  All  of  them,  also,  confine  themselves  too  much 
to  perceptible  bodies,  to  the  neglect  of  imperceptible 
corpuscles.  Within  that  narrow  circle  Berkeley  has 
no  difficulty  in  resolving  apples  and  houses,  and  even 
mountains  and  rivers,  into  sensible  ideas.  But  we  must 
turn  the  corner  of  pure  idealism.  The  question  is  not 
what  it  makes  of  the  sensible  and  the  perceptible,  but 
what  it  does  with  the  imperceptible.  The  true  contra- 
dictory instance  against  Berkeley's  position  is  the 
natural  philosophy  of  the  imperceptible  world  of  cor- 
puscles, which  cause,  but  are  not,  and  cannot  be  inferred 
from,  sensations  or  sensible  ideas.  This  is  the  answer  of 
physical  realism.     Let  us  proceed  to  its  details. 

In  one  way  God,  in  another  way  nature,  causes  our 
sensations.  There  are  two  opposite  extremes  to  be 
avoided — the  substitution  of  nature  for  God,  and  that 
of  God  for  nature :  the  former  the  temptation  of  the 
natural  philosopher,  the  latter  that  of  the  natural 
theologian.  The  natural  philosopher  prolongs  the 
chain  of  physical  causes,  until  at  last  he  feels  tempted 
to  believe  that  he  has  expelled  intelligence  from  nature, 
and  say,  '  I  have  swept  the  universe  with  my  telescope 
and  cannot  find  God.'     Tli£  natural  theologian,  dazzled 


210 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


by  the  universal  cause,  is  apt  to  neglect  the  subordinate 
agency  of  physical  causes,  and  forget  nature  in  the  love 

of  God. 

Natural  philosophy  is  limited  by  the  nature  of  its 
evidence.  God  is  inferred  by  combining  the  evidence  of 
outer  and  inner  sense ;  but  natural  philosophy  reasons 
only  from  sensation  and  observation,  without  conscious- 
ness and  reflection.  Of  itself,  nature  can  neither  prove 
nor  disprove  a  deity.  Even  within  its  own  limits  natural 
philosophy  is  limited.  Evolutionists,  for  example,  have 
Ibeen  more  successful  in  dealing  with  organisms  than  in 
the  far  larger  problem  of  the  inorganic  world.  Evolution 
consists  in  the  differentiation  of  homogeneous  matter. 
Now  differentiation  invariably  requires  one  of  two  condi- 
tions :  either  one  efficient  cause  must  act  on  different 
materials,  as  when  the  same  kind  of  motion  produces 
molar  motion  in  one  body  and  molecular  in  another  ;  or 
different  efficient  causes  must  act  on  one  kind  of  material, 
as  when  different  lengths  of  undulation  produce  sensible 
heat  or  sensible  light  in  the  nervous  system.  Both 
alternatives  presuppose  difference  ;  the  former  difference 
in  the  patient,  the  latter  difference  in  the  agent.  There 
is  no  known  instance  of  one  kind  of  cause  acting  on 
one  kind  of  material  and  producing  different  kinds  of 
effects.  Hence,  if  we  suppose  matter,  absolutely  homo- 
geneous, universally  diffused,  and  reciprocally  acting  in 
its  various  parts,  it  would  contain  no  difference  either 
of  agent  or  patient  to  produce  the  different  effects  of 
actual  nature  ;  but  all  its  particles,  at  equal  distances, 
would  exert  all  forces  equally  in  all  directions,  and 
produce  an  exact  balance,  with  no  differences  whatever. 
The  theory  of  evolution,  therefore,  is  no  explanation  of 
the  beginnings  of  difference.  But  given  a  pre-existing 
difference,  even  of  two  groups  of  particles  with  dif- 


CHAP.   VII. 


BERKELEY 


211 


ferent  arrangements  of  their  primary  qualities,  how- 
ever slight,  evolution  is  the  further  differentiation, 
not  of  the  absolutely,  but  of  the  relatively  homo- 
geneous into  the  more  heterogeneous,  arising  from 
different  structures  acted  on  by  one  kind  of  agent,  or 
different  agents  acting  on  one  kind  of  structure,  or 
different  agents  acting  on  different  structures,  and  so  on 
ad  infinitum,  not  a  parte  ante,  but  a  parte  post.  There 
must,  however,  be  something  else  to  cause  an  original 
difference  in  things.  But  limited  as  natural  philosophy 
is  within,  it  is  still  more  limited  from  without.  Having 
only  reasoning  from  outer  sense  and  observation,  it  dis- 
covers physical  causes ;  but  it  cannot  tell  what  else  they 

may  be. 

Natural  theology  now  steps  in,  to  supplement  sensa- 
tion by  consciousness,  observation  by  reflection,  and  to 
reason  from  both  outer  and  inner  sense.     To  observa- 
tion, a  workman  and  a  product  have  the  mere  appear- 
ance of  cause  and  effect;  but  when  we  add  conscious 
reflection,  we  infer  that  he  is  an  artist  using  means  to  an 
end  ;  and,  when  we  observe  again  a  similar  work,  we  still 
infer  an   artist.     So  from  His  work,  natural  theology 
infers  a  Divine  Architect  of  nature,  establishing  the 
original  difference  of  things,  and  developing   further 
differences,  by  using  physical  causes  of  effects  as  means 
to  ends.     '  Omnia  quae  agunt  in  virtute  primi  agentis 
at^unt.'     When  science  shows  that  evolution  develops 
living  organs,  this  is  no  reason  why  this  very  evolution 
should  not  be  a  Divine  means  of  producing  fresh  life. 
The  growth  of  a  tree  has  not  been  regarded  as  inconsis- 
tent with  Divine  agency  ;   why,  then,  should  not  Divine 
power  be  exercised  in  the  whole  growth  of  the  world  ? 
On  the  other  hand,  the  natural  theologian  must  not 
foro-et  that,  after  all,  the  existence  of  nature  must  be 

P2 


212 


rSYClIOLOGlCAL  IDEALISM 


PARI   II. 


more  certain  than  that  of  God,  and  that,  indeed,  without 
the  order  of  nature  the  main  part  of  the  evidence  for  a 
God  disappears.  If  God  is  the  inteUigent  cause,  most 
certainly  the  means  used  are  physical  causes.  Ali 
attempts  to  argue  that  because  God  is  the  cause  of  all 
effects,  insensible  motions  are  not  causes,  or  that  there 
can  be  no  evolution,  must  fail,  because  nothing  is  more 
surely  established  than  the  powers  and  laws  of  motion. 
To  convert  God  from  an  Intelligent  Will  using  physical 
means  into  the  direct  and  sole  cause  of  every  effect, 
even  to  the  threshold  of  our  senses,  is  the  greatest 
danger  that  can  befall  natural  theology,  which  must 
then  yield  to  the  laws  of  the  communication  and  conser- 
vation of  motions. 

No  reconcihation  of  theology  and  science  will  be 
found  superior  to  that  of  Bacon,^  which  admits  too  of 
being  perpetually  enlarged  with  every  physical  dis- 
covery :  God  having  made  nature  uses  it  as  a  means ; 
the  more  physical  causes,  the  more  means  at  His  com- 
mand ;  the  more  elaborate  and  indirect  the  physical 
process,  the  more  subtle  the  Divine  Architect;  who, 
having  estabUshed  a  difference  in  corpuscular  structure, 
uses  the  evolution  of  one  particle  acting  on  another  as 
His  further  process  of  differentiation  and  His  most  in- 
genious plan  ;  and  natural  philosophy  is  always,  how- 
ever unconsciously,  prolonging  the  chain  of  physical 
causes  to  the  throne  of  God.  '  Sic  Dei  sapientia  effulget 
mirabilius,'  says  Bacon,  'cum  Natura  aliud  agit,  Provi- 
dentiaaliud  elicit,  quam  si  singulis  schematibusetmotibus 
naturalibus  Providentias  characteres  essent  impressi.' 

Berkeley  for  nature  substituted  God.  By  his  hypo- 
theses and  logical  deductions  he  was  compelled  to  say 

^  De  Augmentis  Scientiarum,  iii.  4,  sicb  fin.    (Ed.  Ellis  and  Spedding, 
Tol.  i.  p.  570.) 


CHAP.    VII. 


BERKELEY 


213 


that  ideas  are  imprinted  on  our  senses,  not  by  the  in- 
sensible motions  of  physical  substances,  but  by  the 
direct  agency  of  God  Himself.  Instead  of  an  Intelligent 
Agent,  using  nature  as  the  means  to  produce  effects  on 
our  senses,  God,  w^ithout  the  intervention  of  insensible 
nature,  thus  becomes  the  direct  and  sole  cause  of  every 
sensible  effect.  '  There  is  God,  then,  and  no  nature,  but 
the  nature  of  man.  The  good  bishop  flattered  himself 
that  he  was  thus  serving  the  cause  of  his  rehgion.  But 
how  different  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Bible !  In  the 
beginning  God  created  the  heavens  and  the  earth ;  and, 
only  after  nature,  man.  This  is  the  meeting-point  of 
religion  and  science. 

In  substituting  God  for  nature,  and  denying  second 
causes,  Berkeley  not  only  falsified  religion  but  also 
contradicted  science.  He  said  that  God  is,  but  nature 
is  not,  the  cause  of  our  sensations.  His  followers  have 
deserted  his  theory  of  religion,  but  they  have  supplied 
no  adequate  theory  of  science.  Any  mental  philoso- 
pher, w^ho  says  that  real  things  are  our  sensible  ideas  or 
sensations,  whether  he  says  that  they  are  produced  by 
God,  with  Berkeley,  or,  with  the  modern  Berkeleian, 
gives  up  the  knowdedge  of  the  causes  of  our  sensa- 
tions, in  either  case  he  is  following  Berkeley  in  rejecting 
the  positions  of  natural  philosophy  that  the  external 
sun  is  the  cause  of  sensible  heat,  that  the  motion  and 
collision  of  particles  of  air  insensibly  proceed  till  at  last 
they  produce  sensible  sounds,  and  that  imperceptible 
corpuscles,  with  their  configuration,  number,  motion, 
and  size,  cause  our  sensations.^ 

Psychological  idealism  had  gradually  brought  mental 
philosophy  into  this  state  of  paradox  by  the  very  poverty 
of  its  data.  Descartes  was  a  scientific  genius,  labouring  to 

^  Cf.  Princ.  xxv.,  xxxii.  ■      . 


214 


rSYCEIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


bring  a  narrow  mental  into  harmony  witli  a  wider  natural 
philosophy.  Locke, beginning  to  feel  the  difficulty, depre- 
ciated natural  philosophy,  because  he  could  not  explain 
it.  Berkeley,  logically  deducing  the  vanity  of  the 
attempt  at  explanation,  boldly  wrote  a  polemic  against 
the  natural  philosophy  of  corpuscles  and  their  motions.^ 
This  sad,  but  inevitable,  defect  is  generally  omitted  or 
extenuated  by  historians  of  philosophy.  But  Berkeley 
himself  was  well  aware  what  were  the  logical  conse- 
quences of  ideahsm.  One  passage  from  his  polemic  will 
be  sufficient : — 

'  Some  have  pretended  to  account  for  appearances 
by  occult  qualities,  but  of  late  they  are  mostly  resolved 
into  mechanical  causes ;  to  wit,  the  figure,  motion, 
weight,  and  such-hke  qualities  of  insensible  particles  : 
whereas,  in  truth,  there  is  no  agent  or  efficient  cause 
than  spirit,  it  being  evident  that  motion,  as  well  as  all 
other  ideas,  is  perfectly  inert.  (See  sect,  xxv.)  Hence 
to  endeavour  to  explain  the  production  of  colours  or 
sounds  by  figure,  motion,  magnitude,  and  the  hke, 
must  needs  be  labour  in  vain.  Accordingly,  we  see  the 
attempts  of  that  kind  are  not  at  all  satisfactory.'  ^ 

But  we  have  seen,  since  Berkeley's  time,  a  sure 
progress  in  the  natural  philosophy  of  mechanical 
causes.  A  striking  contrast  to  the  passage  just  quoted 
may  be  found  in  the  following  quotation  from  Professor 
Tyndall's  '  Fragments  of  Science  '  ^  : — 

'The  domain  in  which  this  motion  of  light  is 
carried  on  lies  entirely  beyond  the  reach  of  our  senses. 
The  waves  of  light  require  a  medium  for  their  forma- 
tion and  propagation  ;  but  we  cannot  see,  or  feel,  or 
taste,  or  smell  this  medium.  How,  then,  has  its  exist- 
ence   been    established?      By   showing   that,   by   the 


*  JPrinc.  ci.  sej. 


^  Id.  cii. 


»  Pp.  72-3. 


CHAP.   VII. 


BERKELEY 


215 


assumption  of  this  wonderful  intangible  either,  all  the 
phsenomena  of  optics  are  accounted  for,  with  a  fulness, 
and  clearness,  and  conclusiveness  which  leave  no  desire 
of  the  intellect  unsatisfied.     When  the  law  of  gravi- 
tation  first   suggested  itself  to   the  mind  of  Newton, 
what  did  he  do  ?     He  set  himself  to  examine  whether  it 
accounted  for  all  the  facts.     He  determined  the  courses 
of  the  planets  ;  he  calculated  the  rapidity  of  the  moon's 
fall  towards  the  earth  ;  he  considered  the  precession  of 
the  equinoxes,  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tides,  and  found 
all  explained  by  the  law  of  gravitation.     He  therefore 
regarded  this  law  as  established,  and  the  verdict  of 
science    subsequently   confirmed   his  conclusion.      On 
similar,  and,  if  possible,  on  stronger  grounds,  we  found 
our  belief  in  the  existence  of  the  universal  aether.     It 
explains  facts  far  more  various  and  complicated  than 
those  on  which  Newton  based  his  law.     If  a  single  phae- 
nomenon    could   be   pointed   out   which   the  aether^  is 
proved  incompetent  to  explain,  we  should  have  to  give 
it  up ;  but  no  such  phienomenon  has  ever  been  pointed 
out.     It  is,  therefore,  at  least  as  certain  that  space  is 
filled  with  a   medium,  by  means  of  which  suns  and 
stars  diffuse  their  radiant  power,  as  that  it  is  traversed 
by  that  force  which  holds  in  its  grasp,  not  only  our 
planetary  system,  but  the  immeasurable  heavens  them- 
selves.' 

Berkeley's  idealism  is  unscientific.  From  this  point 
we  must  retrace  our  steps  by  the  method  of  analysis. 
By  the  falsity  of  the  consequences  we  must  destroy  the 
original  hypotheses  and  find  the  real  data  of  reasoning 
from  sense  to  science.  By  a  chain  of  logic,  he  had  hypo- 
thetically  deduced  that,  if  all  objects  of  human  know- 
ledge are  ideas,  derived  from  outer  and  inner  sense,  and 
by  "the  help  of  memory  and  imagination  variously  com- 


210 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALLSM 


PART  ir. 


pounded  into  collections  of  ideas,  in  the  minds  of  created 
\  \^  spirits,  then  such  a  spirit  will  be  able  to  infer  nothing 
but  ideas  and  spirits,  and  to  conclude  that,  if  all  ideas 
are  inactive,  our  sensible  ideas,  which  are  passive  and 
not  caused  by  our  ov»^n  will,  must  be  imprinted  on  our 
senses  by  the  will  of  the  eternal  spirit  of  God  ;  so  that 
real  things,  as  distinguished  from  mere  ideas  of  imagina- 
tion, will  be  the  sensible  ideas  directly  imprinted  on  our 
senses  by  Divine,  w^ithout  the  intervention  of  physical 
causes.  Now,  the  flaw  in  this  chain  is  in  its  last  link, 
in  the  logical  but  false  rejection,  with  which  it  ends,  of 
the  bodies,  corpuscles,  and  mechanical  causes,  discovered 
by  natural  philosophy. 

What  is  corpuscular  science  ?  In  brief,  there  are 
bodies  insensible  and  imperceptible,  or  corpuscles.  They 
possess  primary  qualities,  various  species  of  which  are 
secondary  qualities ;  especially,  they  possess  motion,  a 
primary  quality,  wliose  secondary  species  are  undula- 
tions of  either,  vibrations  of  air,  &c.,  and  which  also  exists 
in  various  forms,  such  as  cohesion,  gravitation,  chemi- 
cal attraction,  electricity,  magnetism,  &c.  Corpuscles 
have  innumerable  similarities  and  uniform  relations  or 
laws  of  nature,  and  especially  the  laws  of  motion 
and  of  the  causation  of  motion  by  motion.  They 
are  also  the  particles  of  masses,  or  larger  bodies,  which 
are  partly  inorganic  and  partly  organic.  Among  organ- 
isms are  bodies  containing  nervous  systems,  w^hich 
consist,  like  other  masses,  of  corpuscles  having  the 
various  motions  of  bodies  in  general  and  a  peculiar  ner- 
vous motion,  combined  with  muscular  motion.  Lastly, 
some  of  the  other  bodies,  among  their  innumerable  pro- 
cesses of  cause  and  effect,  produce  in  nervous  systems 
sensible  effects,  such  as  sensible  motion,  sensible  heat, 
&c.     Such  are  the  objects  of  corpuscular  science. 


CHAP.    VIT. 


BERKELEY 


217 


Corpuscular  science  destroys  Berkeley's  idealism  in 
his  logical  conclusion  from  his  original  hypotheses.    He 
denied  second  causes ;  but  motions  producing  motions 
are  second  causes.     He  said  that  God's  will  is  the  sole 
cause   of  sensible   effects  ;    but   corpuscular   motions, 
acting  on  the  corpuscles  of  the  nervous  system,  also 
produce  sensible  heat,  colour,  sound,  &c.     If  God  is 
the  prime  cause,  nature  is  the  second  cause,  by  means 
of  which  He  acts  on  man.    He  said  that  the  rules  wherein 
God  excites  in  us  the  ideas  of  sense  are  the  laws  of 
nature.     But  the  uniform  relations  of  corpuscular  mo- 
tions among  themselves  are  an  immense  system  of  law^s, 
compared  with  which  the  laws  of  their  action  on  the 
nervous  system  and  the  senses  are  but  a  diminutive 
fraction.     What  account  would  it  be  of  the  universal 
law  of  gravitation,  of  every  particle  to  every  particle 
in  the  universe,  to   say  that   it   is  merely   a   rule   to 
excite  in  us  the  sensible  idea  or  sensation  of  weight  ? 
God,  then,  is  not  the  only  cause,  but  under  Him  nature 
is  also  the  cause  and  law  of  sensible  effects.      Again, 
Berkeley  said  that  sensible  ideas  imprinted  on  sense  by 
God  are  the  real  things,  and  external  bodies  are  not : 
the  Berkeleian  says  the  same  thing  of  sensations,  only 
without  dogmatism  about  the  sole  causation   of  God 
and  about  the  absolute  non-existence  of  external  bodies. 
But  the  natural  philosopher  knows  that  external  bodies 
are   not  sensations,  but  the  causes  of  sensations  and 
sensible  ideas.     For  example,  the  gravitations  of  par- 
ticles are  not  sensations,  but  are  the  known  causes  of 
sensible  weight  being   felt  by   us.     Therefore,   so   far 
from  being  non-existent,  or  so  far  from  not  being  known 
to  exist,  external  bodies  and  their  motions  are  known 
to  exist  as  causes  of  sensible  effects.    To  the  Berkeleian, 
then,  we*nust  answer,  not  all  known  realities  are  sensa- 


218 


rSYCnOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


CHAP.   TIT. 


BERKELEY 


219 


tions ;  to  Berkeley  liiraself,  not  all  realities  are  sensible 
ideas  imprinted  on  our  senses  by  the  Author  of  our 
bein^T ;  but  some  known  realities  are  external  bodies  and 
their  qualities  producing  sensible  effects  in  us.  There 
is  a  known  world  of  real  bodies,  intervening  between 
God  and  man,  and  used  by  God  as  a  means  to  cause 

effects  in  our  senses. 

Corpuscular  science  destroys  Berkeleian  idealism  not 
only  in  its  hypothetical  conclusions  but  also  in  its 
ori<nnal  hypotheses  of  the  objects  and  data  of  human 
knowledge.  Insensible  corpuscles  and  their  qualities  are 
not  our  ideas,  but  the  causes  of  our  ideas.  They  are  objects 
of  natural  philosophy,  which,  in  the  hands  of  Newton 
and  his  successors,  is  a  kind  of  knowledge.  Therefore, 
not  all  objects  of  knowledge  are  ideas,  and  some  of  the 
objects  are  corpuscular  causes  of  our  ideas.  Again,  if 
the  original  data  were  ideas,  these  corpuscular  causes 
could  not  be  inferred,  as  Berkeley  logically  showed. 
But  they  are  scientifically  inferred  by  natural  philo- 
sophy. Therefore,  neither  the  original  objects  nor  the 
original  data  are  mere  ideas.  Corpuscular  science  deals 
double  death  to  logical  idealism. 

/^Berkeley  had  logically  deduced  from  his  hypothesis 
(jbhat  all  qualities  are  only  sensible  ideas.     But  natural 
philosophy  has  shown  that  insensible  corpuscles  have 
the  primary  quality  of  insensible  motion,  obeying  various 
laws,  and  that  insensible  modes  of  corpuscular  motion 
are  the  secondary  qualities  of  light,  heat,   and  sound 
in  the  universe.     Sir  Isaac  Newton  showed  that,  beyond 
the  sensible  resistance  or  weight  which  we  feel,  there  is 
an  insensible  gravitation  nf  particles  which  pervades 
the  universe,  which  connects  parts  of  bodies  inaccessible 
to  our  senses,  and  which,  in  one  of  its  myriad  appli- 
cations,  causes  bodies   to   feel  heavy  in   our   hands. 


'  'i 


^ 


Qualities,  then,  primary  and  secondary,  are  known  in 
natural  philosophy  to  belong  to  external  bodies,  as  well 
as  cause  sensible  effects  in  us.  Moreover,  their  range  in 
the  insensible  world  of  science  is  infinitely  more  extensive 
than  their  perception  by  sense.  Qualities,  therefore, 
are  not  mere  sensible  ideas  or  sensations,  but  are  mainly 
the  external  characteristics  of  masses  and  corpuscles  in 
nature.  But,  again,  external  quahties  of  bodies  could 
not  be  inferred  from  sensible  ideas  of  minds.  There- 
fore, quahties,  even  as  sensible,  are  not  sensible  ideas. 
Berkeley  was  compelled  by  the  logic  of  his  ideahsm  to 
reduce  all  qualities  to  sensible  ideas,  but  he  was  doubly 
wrong  in  point  of  fact.  Primary  and  secondary  quahties, 
as  known  to  corpuscular  science,  are  neither  reducible 
to,  nor  inferrible  from,  sensations  or  sensible  ideas. 

Again,  from  Locke's  hypothesis  that  sense  always 
perceives  ideas  of  quahties,  Berkeley  consistently  de- 
duced that  we  cannot  suppose  an  unthinking  substance,^ 
that  Locke's  substratum  is  an  abstraction,  hke  materia 
prima,^  and  that  the  only  known  substance  is  a  combina- 
tion of  sensible  quahties,  or  ideas,  with  which  we  are 
fed  and  clothed.^  But  are  these  conclusions  true  and 
scientific?  The  matter,  known  to  natural  science,  is 
durable,  extended,  moving,  causing  and  receiving  mo- 
tion ;  it  is  not,  indeed,  also  something  else  distinct  from 
being  these  things ;  nor,  however,  is  it  mere  duration, 
extension,  motion,  causation,  and  reception  of  motion, 
distinct  but  combined.  In  other  words,  matter  or  body 
is  not  the  abstract  substrate  supposed  by  Locke,  nor 
the  equally  abstract  combination  of  quahties  substituted 
by  Berkeley,  but  a  quahfied  subject,  characterised 
by  a  number  of  qualities.     Now,  besides  all  this,  it  is 

1  Princ.  vii.  ^  Id.  xi.,  xvi. 

^  Id.  xxxvii.-xxxviii. 


220 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   TI. 


not,  tlioudi  it  sometimes  causes,  a  collection  of  sensible 
ideas.  A  drop  of  water  contains  tlie  particles  enume- 
rated in  tlie  first  page  of  this  essay;  but  the  sensible 
effect  of  it  on  any  of  my  senses,  and  the  ideas  I  after- 
wards form  of  it,  do  not  contain  anything  of  the  kind, 
and  are  totally  incapable  of  containing  such  a  number 
of  units  of  any  kind,  which  are  only  inferred  by  reason. 
If  there  are  so  many  particles  in  a  drop  of  water,  how 
many  in  a  river,  and  how  many  in  the  ocean  ?  The 
truth  is,  that  an  analysis  of  a  substance  into  particles  is 
not  a  division  of  the  sensible  object,  sensation,  or  sensible 
idea,  but  of  the  external  object  inferred.  Corpuscles, 
then,  are  a  proof  of  external  bodies.  Hence  it  follows 
that  known  substances  are  not  abstract  substrates  of 
qualities,  nor  abstract  collections  of  qualities,  nor  still 
more  abstract  ideas  of  collections  of  ideas  of  qualities, 
Imt  qualified  subjects,  some  of  which  are  thinking  and 
partly  psychical,  others  unthinking  and  entirely  phy- 
sical. Again,  as  physical  substances  are  not  qualities 
nor  ideas,  so  neither  could  they  be  inferred  from  such 
data.  If  sense  never  perceived  anything  but  spiritual 
sensations  or  sensible  ideas  or  qualities,  science  could  ^  -j^' 
not  infer  durable,  extended,  moving  bodies  containing  '* ' 
corpuscles.  But  these  substances  are  the  very  subjects 
of  the  laws  of  motion  and  gravitation.  It  follows,  then, 
that  the  data  of  sense  from  which  they  are  inferred  are 
not  mere  qualities,  still  less  sensations,  least  of  all 
ideas,  but  the  nervous  substance  sensibly  quahfied. 

To  return  at  last  to  Berkeley's  first  principle.  He 
said  that  all  the  objects  of  human  knowledge  are  ideas 
imprinted  on  the  senses,  or  else  such  as  are  perceived 
by  attending  to  the  operations  of  the  mind  or  collections 
of  these  ideas.  This  supposed  principle  is  a  false 
hypothesis  containing  two  fundamental  errors  ;  an  error 


CHAP.   VII. 


BERKELEY 


221 


about  objects  known,  and  an  error  about  objects  per- 
ceived. The  insensible  and  imperceptible  corpuscles 
discovered  by  natural  philosophers  are  not  ideas  of  any 
of  these  kinds,  though  they  are  causes  of  them.  Not 
all  the  objects  of  human  knowledge,  then,  are  ideas. 
Secondly,  if  the  objects  imprinted  on  the  senses  were 
ideas,  the  insensible  corpuscles  (^ould  not  have  been 
inferred.  Not  all  the  objects  of  human  perception,  then, 
are  ideas.  Insensible  imperceptible  corpuscles  are 
physical  objects  of  knowledge  inferred  from  physical 
data  of  sense.  Similarly  their  esse  is  not  percipi,  as  it 
would  be  if  they  were  ideas.  The  esse  of  ideas  of  sen- 
sation is  percipi.  The  esse  of  a  sensible  object  is  p^r- 
cipi  by  sense.  An  accident  of  the  esse  of  an  external 
body,  e.g.  water,  is  percipi  by  inference.  But  the  esse 
of  an  imperceptible  corpuscle,  e.g.  in  a  drop  of  water, 
is  not  percipi  ait  all. 

Berkeley,  by  a  confusion  of  esse  and  percipi,  adopted 
a  presentative  theory  of  perception,  like  the  intuitive 
realists ;  by  a  confusion  of  the  sensible  object  with  a 
sensible  idea,  his  presentative  theory  is  not  realistic 
but  idealistic  ;  by  a  confusion  of  the  sensible  and  the  real, 
it  is  a  theory  that  we  present  sensible  ideas  as  the  real 
things.^  He  recurs  again  to  this  theory,  as  the  very 
kernel  of  his  philosophy,  at  the  end  of  the  Third 
Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous  : — 

'  Phil.  I  do  not  pretend  to  be  a  setter-up  of  7iew 
notions.  My  endeavours  tend  only  to  unite  and  place 
in  a  clearer  light  that  truth,  which  was  before  shared 
between  the  vulgar  and  the  philosophers ;  the  former 
being  of  opinion,  that  those  things  they  immediately  per- 
ceive are  the  real  things ;  and  the  latter,  that  the  things 
immediately  perceived   are  ideas  which  exist  only  in  the 

*  Cf.  Princ.  iv. 


222 


rSYCllOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


mind.     Which  two  notions  put  together  do,  in  effect, 
constitute  the  substance  of  what  I  advance.' 
I        Each  one  of  the  propositions  in  this  theory  is  false. 
First,  the  things  we  immediately  perceive  are  real  things, 
but  not  the  real  things.     There  is  an  immense  multi- 
tude of  real  things   known   to   science,   but    not   im- 
mediately perceived.     The   apple,  the  table,  the  house, 
the  river,  the  mountain,   cause  sensible  effects,  which 
are  real  enough ;  but  they  are  external  bodies  whose  cor- 
puscles are  known  to  have  a  Uke  but  different  structure 
from  that  of  the  sensible  effects  ;  the  particles  of  a  table 
are  not  the  particles  of  my  hand  lying  on  it,  nor  of  my 
tactile  nerves,  still  less  of  the  operation  of  sensation. 
Secondly,  the  things    immediately   perceived   are   not 
i^eas^'which  exist  only  in  the  mind.     It  is  true  that 
they  are  within  me,  and  here  is  Berkeley's  superiority 
over  the  intuitive  realist.     But,  apart  from  the  absence 
of  direct  evidence  that  the  hard,  or  hot,  or  heavy  felt 
is  an  idea  within  my  mind  ;  if  it  were  so,  I  could  never 
infer  the   bodies   and  corpuscles,  which,    as   we  have 
found,  are  too  well  established  in  natural  philosophy  to 
be  any  longer  denied.     Therefore,  things  inmiediately 
perceived  are,  not  ideas  which  exist  only  in  the  mind, 
but  bodily  effects  of  bodies  on    the   nervous   system. 
Lastly,  Berkeley  wishes  us  to  draw  the  conclusion  that 
Ideas  which  exist  in  the  mind  are  the  real  things,  and 
that  physical  objects  are  not  real  things.     His  premises 
to  prove  it,  however,  are  both  false  ;  for,  as  w^e  have  seen, 
the  things  immediately  perceived  are  neither  the  real 
things,  nor  ideas.     Hence  his  syllogism  only  proves  that 
ideas  are  real  things,  and  some  real  things  are  ideas ; 
which  is  true  enough,  but  also  consistent  with  other  real 
things.     Now,  corpuscular  science  proves  bodies  which 
are  real  things  in  the  external  world  ;  and,  to  infer  thejv- . 


CHAP.  VII. 


BERKELEY 


logic  requires  bodily  data,  which  are  real  things  in  the 
nervous  system.  Other  real  things,  then,  are  known 
and  perceived,  besides  ideas. 

Berkeley's  idealism — and  we  may  add  all  Berkele- 
ianism— 'is  false,  metaphysically,  psychologically,    and 

logically : — 

1.  His   metaphysical  theory  of  existence   is  false,  \ 
because  not  all  real  things  are  sensible  ideas  whose  sole 
cause  is  God  ;    but  some  reahties   are   known  to   be 
physical  causes. 

2.  His  psychological  theory  of  immediate  perception 
is  false,  because  we  immediately  perceive  neither  sen- 
sible ideas,  nor  sensations,  nor  the  real  things,  but  real 
physical  effects,  representing  real  physical  causes.         ^ 

3.  His  logical  theory  of  reasoning  is  false,  because 
from  the  first  he  prefers  imagination  and  memory  of 
ideas  to  reasoning  about  causes,  and  reasoning  synthe- 
tically from  hypotheses  to  reasoning  analytically  from 

facts. 

Berkeley  omitted  nature,  between  sense  and  God. 
Starting  from  Locke's  hypothesis  of  the  objects  of  know- 
ledge, he  rejected  discoveries  of  natural  philosophy, 
when  he  ought  to  have  preferred  the  latter  to  the  former. 
He  ought  to  have  gone  still  further,  and  surrendered 
not  only  Locke's  hypothesis  of  the  objects,  but  also  the 
hypothesis  of  Descartes  that  the  data  of  knowledge  are 
psychical  ideas.  When  Newton  had  shown  what  could 
be  done  in  natural  philosophy,  mental  philosophy  should 
have  reformed  its  data  to  explain  his  discoveries.  But 
how  seldom  philosophers  realise  that  their  theories  of 
man  ou<dit  to  explain  a  Shakespeare,  a  Bacon,  a  Newton  ! 
To  infer  the  Newtonian  philosophy,  the  senses  of  man 
must  perceive,  not  ideas  of  qualities,  but  various  parts 
of  the  physical  substance  of  the  nervous  system  sensibly 


v^ 


224 


rSYCIlOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


qualified  as  durable,  extended,  moving,  as  well  as  sound- 
ing, heated,  coloured  ;  from  wliich  even  an  ordinary  man 
infers  insensible  bodies,  a  scientific  man  tlieir  imper- 
ceptible corpuscles  and  motions  and  laws.  If  all  objects 
of  human  knowledge  were  ideas  of  spirit,  man  could 
infer  nothing  but  spirit  and  ideas.  But  the  antecedent 
is  an  hypothesis,  for  which  Berkeley  had  no  authority 
except  Descartes  and  Locke:  the  consequent  is  false, 
being  contradictory  to  corpuscular  science  :  therefore, 
the  antecedent  hypothesis  is  also  false,  because  from 
true  premises  it  is  not  possible  to  draw  a  false  conclu- 
sion. The  real  world  includes,  between  the  sensible 
^and  the  supernatural,  the  natural  world  of  msensible 
bodies  and  imperceptible  corpuscles,  which  are  physical 
objects  of  scientific  knowledge  inferrible  only  from 
physical  data  of  human  sense.  Such  is  the  answer  of 
physical  realism. 


225 


CHAPTEE  VIII. 
Berkeley's  theory  of  vision. 

In  ansvering  the  objections  which  might  be  made 
against  his  '  Principles,'  Berkeley  refers  to  his  '  Essay 
towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision '  as  follows  :— 

'  Thirdly,  it  will  be  objected,  that  we  see  things 
actually  without  or  at  a  distance  from  us,  and  which 
consequently  do  not  exist  in  the  mind,  it  bemg  absurd 
that  those  things  which  are  seen  at  the  distance  of 
several  miles  should  be  as  near  to  us  as  our  own 
thoughts.  In  answer  to  this,  I  desire  it  may  be  con- 
sidered, that  in  a  dream  we  do  oft  perceive  things  as 
existing  at  a  great  distance  off,  and  yet  for  all  that, 
those  things  are  acknowledged  to  have  their  existence 

only  in  the  mind. 

'  But  for  the  fuller  clearing  of  this  point,  it  may  be 
worth  while  to  consider,  how  it  is  that  we  perceive  dis- 
tance and  things  placed  at  a  distance  by  sight.     For 
that  we  should  in  truth  see  external  space,  and  bodies 
actually  existing  in  it,  some  nearer,  others  farther  off, 
seems  to  carry  with  it  some  opposition  to  what  hath 
been  said,  of  their  existing  nowhere  without  the  mmd. 
The  consideration  of  this  difficulty  it  was,  that  gave 
birth  to  my  "  Essay  towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision," 
which  was  published  not  long  since.  Wherein  it  is  shown 
that  distance  or  oi^tness  is  neither  immediately  of  itself 
perceived  by  sight,  nor  yet  apprehended  or  judged  of 
^  Q 


226 


rSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


by  lines  and  angles,  or  anything  tliat  liatli  a  necessary 
connexion  with  it :  but  that  it  is  only  suggested  to  our 
thouf^hts  by  certain  visible  ideas  and  sensations  attend- 
in^T  vision,  which  in  their  own  nature  have  no  manner 
or  simiUtude  or  relation,  either  with  distance,  or  things 
placed  at  a  distance.  But  by  a  connexion  taught  us 
by  experience,  they  come  to  signify  and  suggest  them 
to  us,  after  the  same  manner  that  words  of  any  language 
su^^est  the  ideas  they  are  made  to  stand  for.  Insomuch 
that  a  man  born  bhnd,  and  afterwards  made  to  see, 
would  not,  at  first  sight,  think  the  things  he  saw,  to  be 
without  his  mind,  or  at  any  distance  from  him.  See 
sect.  xli.  of  the  forementioned  treatise. 

'The  ideas  of  sight  and  touch  make  two  species, 
entirely  distinct  and  heterogeneous.  The  former  are 
marks  and  prognostics  of  the  latter.  That  the  proper 
objects  of  sight  neither  exist  without  the  mind,  nor  are 
the  images  of  external  things,  was  shown  even  in  that 
treatise.  Though  throughout  the  same,  the  contrary  be 
supposed  true  of  tangible  objects :  not  that  to  suppose 
that  vulgar  error,  was  necessary  for  estabhshing  the 
notions  therein  laid  down  ;  but  because  it  was  beside  my 
purpose  to  examine  and  refute  it  in  a  discourse  concern- 
incT  vision.  So  that  in  strict  truth  the  ideas  of  sight, 
when  we  apprehend  by  them  distance,  and  things  placed 
at  a  distance,  do  not  suggest  or  mark  out  to  us  things 
actually  existing  at  a  distance,  but  only  admonish  us 
what  ideas  of  touch  will  be  imprinted  in  our  minds  at 
such  and  such  distances  of  time,  and  in  consequence  of 
such  and  such  actions.  It  is,  I  say,  evident  from  what 
has  been  said  in  the  foregoing  parts  of  this  treatise,  and 
in  section  cxlvii.  and  elsewhere  of  the  Essay  concerning 
Vision,  that  visible  ideas  are  the  language  whereby  the 
governing  spirit,  on  whom  we  depend,  informs  us  what 


CFAP.   VIII. 


BEIIKELEYS   THEORY  OF  VISION 


227 


tangible  ideas  he  is  about  to  imprint  upon  us,  in  case 
we  excite  this  or  that  motion  in  our  own  bodies.  But 
for  a  fuller  information  on  this  point,  I  refer  to  the 
Essay  itself.'  ^ 

Here  we  find  from  Berkeley's  own  words  that  he 
had  more  than  one  object  in  writing  the  '  Theory  of 
Vision.'  It  is  an  essay  half  physical,  half  psychological, 
and  this  doubleness  of  purpose  has  ever  since  clung  to 
the  subject.  On  the  one  hand,  he  wanted  to  destroy 
the  exaggerations  introduced  by  mathematicians  into 
optics,  by  showing  that  the  eye  is  not  fitted  to  see  any- 
thing, and  therefore  not  any  lines  and  angles,  beyond 
itself;  on  the  other  hand,  he  wanted  to  support  the 
idealistic  theory,  which  he  had  already  conceived,  and 
shortly  intended  to  publish  in  the  '  Principles,'  by  show- 
ing that,  whereas  we  do  not  see  things  without,  we  do  see 
visible  ideas  and  sensations.  In  its  first  purpose,  the 
main  thesis  of  the  '  Theory  of  Vision '  is  a  great  optical 
discovery,  though  exaggerated ;  in  its  second  purpose, 
it  is  an  excellent  disproof  of  intuitive  realism,  but  no 
l^roof  at  all  of  psychological  idealism.  Perhaps  no 
treatise  has  ever  evinced  such  a  singular  compound  of 
genius  and  confusion.  The  effect  both  of  its  truth  and 
its  falsity  persists  to  this  very  day,  especially  in  the 
hypothesis  of  '  local  signs.' 

What  does  Berkeley  prove  about  the  sense  of  vision  ? 
He  divides  the  subject  into  four  parts — distance,  magni- 
tude, situation,  and  the  difference  between  sight  and 
touch.^  On  the  first  point,  he  says  that  '  distance  being 
a  line  directed  endwise  to  the  eye,  it  projects  only  one 


'  Princ.  xlii.-xliv. 

^  Theory,  i.  Distance  is  discussed  in  i.-li. ;  Magnitude,  lii.-lxxxvii. ; 
Situation,  Ixxxviii.-cxx. ;  The  difference  between  sight  and  touch,  cxxi. 
to  end. 

q2 


228 


rSYCIlOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  IT. 


point  in  the  fund  of  the  eye,  which  ponit  remanis 
invariably  the  same,  whether  the  distance  be  longer  or 
shorter '  ^    This  proves,  according  to  hun,  that  we  do 
not  see  distance  at  all,  but  really  that  we  do  not  see 
remote  distance,  in  depth  or  the  third  dimension,  verti- 
cally from  the  eye.     As  he  says  elsewhere,  we  see  no 
solidity  or  profundity.^    On  the  second  point,  he  shows 
that  we  do  not  see  the  real  magnitude,  greater  and 
smaller,  of  an  external  object.     '  Thus,  for  instance,'  he 
very  properly  remarks,    'the  very  same  quantity  or 
visible  extension,  which  in  the  figure  of  a  tower  doth 
sucrcrest  the  idea  of  a  great  magnitude,  shall  in  the  figure 
ofTman  suggest  the  idea  of  much  smaller  magmtude. 
On  the  third  point,  he  reUes  on  the  hiverted  image  in 
vision  to  show  that  we  do  not  see  the  real  situation,  as 
hi.rh  and  low,  of  external  objects.    On  the  fourth  point, 
he^'makes  the  instructive  remark  that  there  is  no  vision 
of   resistance,"  and  he  has  brought  out  more  clearly 
than  any  of  his  predecessors  that '  there  is  no  one  self- 
same numerical  extension  perceived  both  by  sight  and 
touch,"  and  that  '  we  never  see  and  feel  one  and  the 

same  object.' " 

This  conclusion  is  the  great  stumbling-block  to  the 
ordinary  man,  who  has  so  overlaid  sense  with  inference, 
and,  we  may  add,  had  so  many  visible  pictures  of  his 
hand  and  other  members  visibly  touching  visible  objects, 
all  within  his  sense  of  vision,  that  he  finds  himself  almost 
incapable,  even  when  he  becomes  a  philosopher,  of 
realising  to  himself  that  he  is  really  seeing  one  set  of 
objects  within  the  retina  and  feeling  another  within  the 
tactile  nerves,  while  he  infers  an  external  object  in  re- 


1   Theory,  ii. 
3  lb.  Ivii. 
^  lb.  cxxi. 


2  lb.  cxxxv.,  cliv. 
*  lb.  cxxxv. 
^  lb.  xlix. 


CHAP.  VIII.        BERKELEY'S   THEORY  OF  VISION 


229 


lation  to  both.  Nevertheless,  Berkeley  verified  the  pre- 
vious scientific  discovery  of  the  distinction  between  ex- 
ternal and  sensible  objects  by  his  new  discovery  of  the 
invisibility  of  remote  distance.  Since  we  do  not  see 
distance  in  the  third  dimension  from  the  eye,  we  cannot 
see,  but  only  infer,  a  remote  object.  The  visible  object 
might,  indeed,  still  be  an  object  touching  the  eye ;  but 
even  this  hypothesis  is  negatived  by  the  further  study 
of  the  nervous  system. 

What  did  Berkeley  not  prove  about  the  sense  of 
vision  ?  On  the  very  first  point,  while  he  proved  that  we 
do  not  see  remote  distance  he  did  not  prove  that  we  do 
not  see  distance  at  all.  He  did  not  prove  that  we  do 
not  see  a  surface  painted  on  the  retina,  with  its  distances. 
There  are  three  dimensions  of  extension  or  space;  in 
each  there  is  distance — distance  from  point  to  point  of 
a  line,  from  line  to  line  of  a  surface,  from  surface  to 
surface  of  a  sohd  :  in  eacli  dimension  the  parts  or  places, 
which  are  distant,  are  out  of  one  another.  Now  what 
he  proved  was  that  there  is  no  vision  of  the  third 
dimension,  not  that  there  is  none  of  the  other  two  ;  that 
there  is  none  of  distance  in  depth,  not  that  there  is 
none  of  distance  in  length  and  width ;  that  there  is  none 
of  outness  in  the  external  world,  not  that  there  is  none 
of  outness  of  parts  on  the  surface  painted  on  the  retina  ; 
that  there'  is  none  of  solid,  not  that  there  is  none  of 
superficial  extension ;  that  there  is  none  of  distance 
endwise  to  the  eye,  not  that  there  is  none  of  space  and 
its  distances  within  the  eye.  In  short,  he  concluded 
more  than  he  proved.  '  It  is,'  he  says,  '  I  think,  agreed 
by  all,  that  distance,  of  itself  and  immediately,  cannot 
be  seen.'  ^  It  is  still  agreed  by  present  psychologists  ; 
but  we  want  something  more  than  agreement  to  prove 

^  Theory,  ii. 


230 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALLSM 


PART   II. 


that,  because  remote  distance  is  not  seen,  therefore  no 
distance  can  be  seen.  '  From  what  we  have  shown,'  he 
says,  'it  is  a  manifest  consequence  that  the  ideas  of  a 
space,  outness,  and  things  placed  at  a  distance,  are  not, 
strictly  speaking,  the  object  of  sight;  they  are  not 
otherwise  perceived  by  the  eye  than  by  the  ear.'  ^  But 
he  had  proved  only  that  we  do  not  see  external  things 
placed  at  a  distance  and  their  outness  in  space.  It  still 
remained,  and  remains  even  now,  to  be  proved  that  the 
space,  the  outnesses,  and  the  distances,  within  the  sur- 
face of  the  picture  painted  on  the  retina,  are  not  objects 
of  sight. 

Therefore,  he  did  not  prove  that  we  have  no  vision 
of  space.  He  vacillated ;  sometimes  allowing,  some- 
times denying  that  the  extended  is  visible,^  and  finally 
deciding  that  '  what  we  strictly  see  are  not  solids,  nor 
yet  plains  variously  coloured  ;  they  are  only  diversity 
of  colours.'  ^  But  the  same  evidence,  which  proves  that 
we  do  not  see  solid  distance,  proves  that  we  do  see  a 
plain,  with  its  superficial  extension  and  the  distances  on 
its  surface.  '  There  is,  at  this  day,'  as  he  says  himself, 
'  no  one  ignorant  that  the  pictures  of  external  objects 
are  painted  on  the  retina^  or  fund  of  the  eye.'  ^  He  began 
then  with  the  external  object  and  the  retina.  Very  well ; 
but  what  is  the  external  object,  and  what  the  retina? 
Both  of  them  have  surfaces.  Undoubtedly  the  former 
reflects  what  the  mathematician  abstracts  as  rays,  but 
what  the  physicist  knows  to  be  undulations,  which  ulti- 
mately impress  the  terminations  of  nervous  fibres  in  the 
retina  of  the  eye.  We  do  not  see  the  sides  of  these 
rays  or  undulations  :  hence  we  do  not  see  distance  in 
the  third  dimension.     But  we  do  see  the  imprints  of 


*  Theory,  xlvi. 

'  lb.  clviii. 


'^  Cf.  ib.  xliii.,  xlv.-xlvi.,  xlviii.,  civ. 
*  Ib,  Ixxxviii. 


CHAP.  Till.         BERKELEY'S   THEORY   OF  VISION 


231 


their  ends.  Now,  in  the  first  place,  the  end  of  any  wave 
of  £ether,  however  small,  is  a  surface ;  in  the  second 
place,  the  end  of  every  single  optic  fibre  is  a  surface ; 
thirdly,  as  a  fact,  no  one  undulation  of  aether  ever 
reaches  the  eye  alone  ;  and,  fourthly,  no  one  nervous 
fibre  is  excited  alone,  but  the  whole  retinal  surface  by 
a  whole  undulatory  surface  of  aether.  Though,  there- 
fore, the  visible  i3icture  painted  on  the  retina  by  the 
external  world  is  not  itself  solid,  it  is  painted  by 
the  surface  of  one  solid  on  the  surface  of  another. 
Not  remote  distance,  but  superficial  extension  is 
visible. 

It  is  unscientific  in  the  extreme  to  arbitrarily  select 
one  part  of  the  optical  evidence  and  reject  the  rest,  or  to 
see  through  the  mathematical  abstractions  of  the  line 
and  the  angle,  and  then  to  confuse  mathematical  points 
with  the  extended  ends  of  physical  objects.  This  is  the 
mistake  of  Berkeley.  He  knows  that  the  rays  of  light 
are  not  mathematical  lines,  yet  he  says  at  the  opening 
and  often  repeats,  what  has  been  repeated  after  him 
again  and  again  ad  nauseam  to  the  present  day,  that  a 
point  is  presented  to  the  retina.  Nothing  of  the  kind  ; 
it  is  not  a  point,  but,  to  say  the  very  least,  a  physical 
ray's  extended  end,  which  is  a  surface,  presented  to  the 
extended  end  of  another  physical  object  which  is  a 
surface,  the  end  of  a  nervous  fibre.  There  is,  no  doubt, 
a  mi7iimum  visihile,  which  may  be  coextensive  with  the 
end  of  a  nervous  fibre  ;  but  it  is  not  a  point,  it  is  a 
surface.  The  whole  point-to-point  theory  of  vision  is 
nothing  but  a  mathematical  abstraction  converted  into 
a  physical  reality. 

It  is  true  that  the  retina  itself  may  not  be  sensible ; 
but  whatever  part  of  the  optic  nerve  or  of  the  brain 
itself  is  first  sensible,  that  part  is  a  surface.     It  is  true, 


232 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PAKT  IT. 


again,  that  we  have  admitted  a  psychical  element  in 
sensation,  but  we  can  only  interpret  its  object  by  con- 
sciousness, observation,  and  reasoning.  We  have  seen 
the  verdict  of  the  two  latter  evidences  :  every  physical 
part  without  and  within  us  has  a  surface.  Now,  what 
does  consciousness  of  vision  say  ?  Why,  I  cannot  help 
being  conscious  that  I  am  at  this  moment  seeing  an 
extended  surface.  I  confuse  this  picture  within,  I 
admit,  with  what  I  infer  without;  but  the  scientific 
distinction  between  the  external  and  the  sensible  only 
shows  that  I  was  wrong  in  the  supposition  of  the  exter- 
nality or  remote  distance  of  the  sensible,  not  that  I  was 
wron^  in  being  conscious  that  I  see  an  extended  sur- 
face,  a  plain  variously  coloured.  The  whole  evidence, 
scientific  and  conscious,  is  in  favour  of  the  visible 
object  being  like  a  painting,  or  still  more  like  a  picture 
in  a  camera  obscura,  flat  to  sense,  inferred  by  a  complex 
process  of  reasoning  to  represent  an  external  solid, 
but  confused,  by  a  long-standing  association,  with  the 
external  solid  itself. 

Again,  on  the  second  point,  Berkeley  proved  that  we 
do  not  see  the  real  magnitude  of  an  external  object. 
That  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not  see  the  magnitude 
of  the  visible  object  impressed  on  the  retina,  nor  why  it 
also  should  not  be  a  real  magnitude,  though  distinct 
from  external  magnitude.  On  this  point,  again,  he 
vacillated.  First  he  admits  a  size  of  things  seen,  that 
they  grow  greater  and  smaller,  and  that  there  is  not 
only  a  tangible  but  a  visible  magnitude ;  then  he  says 
that  visible  extension,  though  immediately  perceived,  is 
nevertheless  little  taken  notice  of;  and  finally  contends 
that  the  ideas  of  visible  magnitude  are  equally  fitted  to 
bring  into  our  minds  '  the  idea  of  small  or  great,  or  of 
no  size  at  all  of  outward  objects,'  like  the  words  of  a 


CHAr.    VTII. 


BERKELEY'S   TIIEOEY   OF   VISION 


'^    language.^      The   truth  is,  that   we   see   an  extended 
coloure'd  plain,  as  we  have  already  said.     We  are  not 
able  to  alter  its  whole  size  on  a  single  retina,  because 
the  whole  retina  is  used  at  once  ;  and  this  is  a  great 
point  of  difference  from  touch,  wherein  we  use  a  finger, 
a  hand,  or  our  whole  body  to  touch  at  pleasure.     The 
only  variation  we  can  get  in  the  size  of  the  whole 
picture  is  the  difference  of  magnitude  between  the  area 
of  a  single  retina,  and  the  whole  field  of  vision  covered 
by  bothVes.     Usually,  however,  both  eyes  are  used  at 
once,  when  the  visible  picture  has  a  single  fixed  mag- 
nitude.    But  the  parts  of  it  have  very  varying  degrees 
of  magnitude  ;  for  example,  the  black  spot  made  by  a 
blot  of  ink  covers  a  trifling  amount  of  the  retinal  mag- 
nitude, compared  with  that  impressed  by  ^  the   white 
paper  before  me.     Hence  within  a  single  visible  magni- 
tude, fixed  on  the  retina,  we  see  all  sorts  of  sizes  of  the 
parts  not  behind  but  beside  one  another,  some  greater, 
others  smaller,  and  therefore  having  various  relations  of 
size  to  the  whole  retinal  picture.     It  is  on  this  sensation 
of  varying  degrees  of  magnitude  of  the  parts  relatively 
to  the  fixed  magnitude  of  the  whole  of  the  superficial 
picture  on  the  retina,  that  the  wonderful  subtlety  of  the 
sense  of  sight  is  founded.    In  itself,  this  vision  of  magni- 
tude within  a  magnitude  carries  us  no  further ;  but  A 
when  alUed  with  data  of  other  senses,  it  becomes  the 
basis  of  countless  inferences  about  external  size.     For 
example,  the  sight  of  Snowdon,  when  I  am  in  the  open 
air,  is  smaller  than  the  sight  of  my  own  room,  when  I 
am  indoors ;  but  knowing  in  other  ways  the  real  size  of 
Snowdon  and  of  my  room,  I  can  from  sight  measure  the 
relative  sizes  of  parts  of  each  in  a  way  possible  to  no 
other  sense.     There  is  another  element  in  the  vision  of 

*  Theory,  xxviii.,  1.,  liv.,  Ixi.,  Ixiv. 


234 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


size  about  which  we  must  be  careful.  We  see  the 
magnitude  of  the  parts  relatively  to  the  whole  retinal 
magnitude.  There  are  minima,  beyond  which  this  de- 
duction of  visible  parts  cannot  go,  supposed  to  be  con- 
nected with  the  distinction  of  nervous  fibres.  But,  as  I 
said  before,  a  minimuin  visihile  is  not  a  point  but  an  ex- 
tended end,  like  the  end  of  a  pencil.  Secondly,  it  is 
tempting,  with  Berkeley,  to  conclude  that  the  minimum 
is  always  the  same  size  in  vision.^  But  it  is  not  at  all 
impossible  that  the  parts  impressed  on  adjacent  nervous 
fibres  may  not  be  always  visibly  distinct.  In  looking  at 
an  object  of  a  single  colour,  as  a  white  leaf  of  a  book, 
we  do  not  so  carefully  distinguish  small  parts  as  when 
the  object  is  very  varied,  as  in  reading  the  printed 
matter.  The  minimum,  impressed  on  each  fibre,  may  be 
always  the  same,  and  yet  the  minima,  distinctly  visible, 
greater  or  smaller  according  to  the  intensity  and  variety 
of  the  excitations.  On  the  whole,  then,  there  is  a  visible 
magnitude  of  the  picture,  always  of  the  same  size,  deter- 
mined by  the  retina  ;  visible  parts,  greater  and  smaller, 
in  reference  to  the  whole  size  ;  minima  visibilia,  beyond 
which  vision  cannot  go,  but  to  which,  perhaps,  it  does 
not  in  every  act  of  vision  reach. 

On  his  third  point,  Berkeley  proved  that  we  do  not 
see  the  real  situations  of  external  objects  and,  in  especial, 
that  we  do  not  see  which  is  up  and  which  down,  but 
an  inverted  image.  He  did  not  prove  that  sight  sees 
no  places  in  its  inverted  picture  ;  nor  has  any  of  the 
many  philosophers,  who  have  strangely  attacked  visible 
places,  ever  disproved  them.  Berkeley,  as  before, 
vacillated :  he  first  denied  them  and  then  admitted 
them.  He  first  says  that  a  blind  man  returned  to  sight 
'would  not  at  first  think  that  anything  he  saw  was 

^  Theory,  Ixxx. 


v<y 


CHAP.   VIII. 


BERKELEY'S   THEORY   OF  VISION 


235 


high  or  low,  erect  or  inverted.'  ^  Afterwards,  he  says 
that '  we  denominate  any  object  of  sight,  high  or  low,  in 
proportion  as  it  is  more  or  less  distant  from  the  visible 
earth.'  ^  The  latter  is  the  truth.  In  the  visible  flat 
extended  picture,  of  a  constant  retinal  magnitude,  we 
not  only  see  some  parts  greater  and  some  smaller,  but  also 
some  in  one  place,  some  in  another,  though  all  inverted. 
Nor  is  there  any  occasion  to  suppose  that  the  image  is 
ever  re-inverted.  It  includes  images  of  our  own  body 
and  of  the  earth.  From  the  data  of  touch,  we  infer 
that  our  feet  are  down  towards  the  earth's  centre,  and  our 
heads  erect  as  away  from  it ;  next,  we  find,  over  and 
over  again,  that  these  inferred  objects,  in  this  order, 
have  in  the  visible  picture  various  parts  corresponding 
to  them,  in  a  corresponding  order — one  part  for  the 
earth,  another  for  our  feet,  another  for  our  heads  :  con- 
sequently, from  this  combined  evidence  of  touch  and 
sio-ht,  we  do  not  see  but  infer  that  the  part  of  the  retinal 
image  answering  to  the  head  represents  up,  and  the  part 
corresponding  to  the  feet  represents  down,  and  so  on 
with  all  other  visible  places. 

On  the  fourth  point,  Berkeley  proved  that  we  do 
not  see  and  feel  the  same  object,  and  that  the  visible 
picture  is  numerically  distinct  from  the  tactile  impres- 
sion produced  by  the  same  external  object;  e.g.  my 
retinal  picture  of  the  paper  before  me  is  in  my  optic 
nerve,  my  tactile  impression  in  my  nerves  of  touch. 
But  he  asked  the  further  question  whether  they  are  also 
specifically  distinct,  or  whether  there  is  anything  in 
common,  or  similar,  in  the  visible  object  and  the  tangible 
object.  After  having,  though  in  the  vacillating  manner 
already  stated,  admitted  in  the  visible  picture  a  visible 
extension,  visible  magnitude  greater  and  smaller,  and 


'  Theo'f'i/i  xcV( 


2  lb.  cxi. 


236 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


visible  situations  liigli  or  low  in  relation  to  visible  earth, 
he  answered  the  question  by  denying  that  there  is  any- 
thinfT  common  to  sifyht  and  touch.  The  true  answer  is 
that  his  previous  admissions  were  better  than  his  final 
theory.  Vision  sees  a  picture  visibly  extended  in  the 
above-mentioned  ways  :  touch  feels  a  tangible  imprint 
extended  in  the  same  ways.  The  visible  and  tangible 
objects,  so  far  as  the  former  is  coloured  and  the  latter 
heated,  are  dissimilar ;  so  far  as  the  former  is  in  the 
optic  and  the  latter  in  the  tactile  nerves  they  are  not 
numerically  the  same ;  but,  so  far  as  they  are  both  ex- 
tended, they  are  similar.  Aristotle  was  right  in  dis- 
tinguishing special  and  common  sensibles,  and  in  assign- 
ing the  extended  both  to  sight  and  to  touch. ^  Locke 
was  right  in  repeating  the  distinction.^  Berkeley  was 
wrong  as  well  as  inconsistent  in  rejecting  it.  But  his 
rejection  has  infected  the  whole  subsequent  course  of 
the  science  of  vision,  the  metaphysics  of  space,  and  the 
psychology  of  sense. 

Berkeley's  theory  contains  a  double  paradox.  In 
the  first  place,  he  supposed  that  we  see  no  visibly  ex- 
tended object,  when  all  he  had  proved  is  that  we  see 
no  visibly  remote  object.  He  used  the  action  of  the 
external  object  on  the  retina,  to  prove  that  we  do  not 
see  a  line  endwise,  but  a  point ;  and  then  discarded  it 
when  it  would  also  prove  that  we  do  not  see  a  point 
but  a  surface  broadwise  presented  to  the  retina.^  He 
had  no  definite  idea  of  what  is  meant  by  distance.  He 
evidently  confused  it  at  first  with  the  third  dimension 
of  space. ^  Afterwards,  he  saw  that  there  is  a  visible 
distance  between  interjacent  visible  points.^  But  he 
never  fairly  faced  the  fact  that  distance  is  the  interval 


*  De  Anima,  ii.  6. 

^  Theory,  clvii. 


lb.  ii. 


^  Locke,  Essay,  ii.  5. 
^  lb.  cxii. 


CHAP.  VIII.        BERKELEY'S   THEORY  OF  VISION 


237 


between  any  places,  that  there  is  a  distance  in  length 
and  width,  as  well  as  in  depth,  and  that,  though  distance 
in  depth  is  invisible,  distance  in  both  the  other  dimen- 
sions is  visible.  He  coolly  rejected  the  constant  appeal 
of  the  geometer  to  visible  figures.^  He  supposed  a 
person  without  touch  but  with  sight,  and  asked  what 
kind  of  geometry  he  would  produce  ;  a  useless  question, 
because  man  is  an  animal,  and  an  animal  without  touch 
impossible.  This  supposititious  seeing  geometer  would 
have  certain  limits,  as  Berkeley  says :  first,  he  would 
have  no  sense  of  a  solid,'^  which  requires  distance  in 
the  third  dimension  ;  secondly,  he  would  have  no  sense 
of  resistance,  which  requires  touch.^  He  would,  there- 
fore, infer  no  external  world.  But  he  would  have  a 
sense  of  an  extended  plain  with  its  distances,  the  mag- 
nitudes of  its  parts,  and  the  situations  of  its  places.  He 
would,  therefore,  see  a  plain,  and  on  that  plain  the 
outnesses  of  the  parts  to  one  another,  and  their  distances 
from  one  another  in  length  and  width.  He  would  have 
a  sense,  not  a  science,  of  space.  Yet  Berkeley  denied  all 
these  consequences  of  his  previous  admissions,  assuming 
that  an  object  presents  a  point  endwise  to  the  eye.  In 
short,  throughout  the  '  Essay,'  the  same  merit  is  con- 
stantly vitiated  by  the  same  defect,  the  discovery  of 
tlie  invisibility  of  remote  distance  confused  with  the 
assumption  of  the  invisibility  of  extended  space. 

In  the  second  place,  he  constantly  asserts  that  what 
we  strictly  see  are  not  solids,  nor  yet  plains  variously 
coloured  ;  they  are  only  diversity  of  colours.^  He  then 
defies  us  to  assign  any  similitude  between  the  visible 
and  the  tangible,  and  concludes  that  the  objects  of 
vision  are  not  similar   to    external  objects,  but   mere 

^  Theory,  cl.  scq.  ^  lb.  cliv.  *  lb.  cxxxv. 

*  lb.  xliii.,  Ixv.,  ciii.,  cxxix.-cxxx.,  cliii.-clviii. 


238 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


signs,  like  words  ;  so  that  '  the  proper  objects  of  vision 
constitute  an  universal  language  of  the  Author  of 
nature.'^  Meanwhile,  all  he  has  proved  is,  that  we 
do  not  see  remote  distance  in  the  third  dimension. 
Secondly,  he  has  forgotten  his  constant  admission  that 
we  see  visible  extension,  visible  magnitude,  visible 
situations.  Thirdly,  he  is  plainly  under  the  dominion 
of  the  abstraction  of  qualities.  He  says  very  truly  that 
we  can  neither  abstract  the  idea  of  visible  extension 
from  colour,  nor  that  of  colour  from  visible  extension. 
But  the  extraordinary  thing  is,  that  he  thinks  this 
argument  proves,  not  that  we  see  something  coloured 
and  extended,  but  that  we  see  colour,  not  extension.^ 
He  is  evidently  under  the  dominion  of  this  simple 
fallacy :  colour  is  not  extension ;  what  we  see  is  colour ; 
therefore  it  is  not  extension.  But  in  reality,  though 
colour  is  not  extension,  what  is  coloured  can  be  also 
extended  ;  what  we  see  is  a  picture  at  once  coloured  and 
extended,  and  that  is  the  reason  why  we  cannot  separate 
colour  and  visible  extension,  but  only  attend  the  more 
to  colour,  or  the  more  to  visible  extension  in  the  self- 
same picture.  Hence,  the  visible  object  is  not  an 
arbitrary  sign,  but  similar  to  the  tangible  object  felt, 
and,  we  may  add,  to  the  external  object  inferred,  in 
extension.  The  visible  figure  in  geometry  is  not,  in- 
deed, the  object  of  the  science,  but  it  is  the  best  illus- 
tration of  the  object  to  the  sense  and  imagination  of  the 
n-eometer.  The  visible  object  is  not  like  a  word,  and 
vision  not  hke  a  language,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
like  what  is  signified,  but  the  former  is  the  sensible 
object,  and  the  latter  the  sense,  most  correspondent  to 
the  extended  external  world,  though  not  the  most 
direct  way  of  inferring  it.     In  short,  vision  sees  the 

'  Theory,  cxlvii. ;  cf.  li.,  Ixiv.-lxv.,  cxliii.  ^  lb.  cxxx. 


CHAP.    VIII. 


BEliKELEYS   THEORY   OF  VISION 


239 


visibly  extended,  touch  feels  the  tangibly  extended, 
reason  infers  the  externally  extended ;  and  all  three 
objects  are  similar,  though  not  the  same,  in  extension. 

So  far,  we  have  seen  how  brilliant,  and  how  delu- 
sive, was  Berkeley's   discovery   of  the   invisibility   of 
remote  distance,  in  its  physical  aspect.      But,  as    we 
said  above,  he  wrote  the  '  Theory  of  Vision '  also  in  a 
psychological  interest.     He  certainly  proved  in  it  that 
we  do  not  see  an  object  at  a  distance ;  and  it   is   a 
curious  problem  that,  after  this  discovery,  the  intuitive 
realists  should  have  advanced  their  hypothesis  that  we 
immediately  perceive  the  external  world.     The  reason 
is  that  Berkeley  buried  his  discovery  under  such  a  heap 
of  errors,  that  we  can  hardly  be  surprised  if  the  truth 
for  a  time  lay  hid.     He  found  out  that  we  do  not  see 
depth,  and  confirmed  the  theory  that  we  do  not  see 
anything  without.     But  he  also  proceeded  to  infer  that 
we  do  not  see  visible  space,  but  only  various  colours. 
Not  content  with  this  double  paradox,  he  proceeded  to 
another,  which  was  indeed  a  main  object  of  the  '  Essay ; ' 
namely,  that  we  see  only  visible  ideas,  visible  ideas  of 
colours.  There  is  no  better  instance  of  the  extraordinary 
way  in  which  the  assumption  of  idealism  is  made  in  books 
of  philosophy,  than  its  sudden  appearance  in  the  '  Theory 
of  Vision.'      After  he  has  concerned  himself  with  the 
external  objects,  and  the  rays  of  light,  and  the  retina 
of  the  eye,  we  suddenly  find  ourselves  transplanted  into 
quite  a  new  world  with  the  words :  '  It  is  evident  that 
when  the  mind  perceives  any  idea,  not  immediately  and 
of  itself,  it  must  be  by  the  means  of  some  other  idea.'  ^ 

The  invisibility  of  distance  in  the  third  dimension 
proves  that  we  do  not  see  external  objects  at  a  distance 
from  the  eye.     The  propagation  of  undulations  to  the 

*  Theory,  ix. 


240 


rSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


/ 


retina  and  the  consequent  nervous  motion  prove  that 
we  do  not  see  external  objects  at  all.  But  neither 
evidence  proves  that  we  see  something  not  merely 
within  ourselves,  but  also  within  our  minds,  or  that  the 
visible  object  is  a  visible  idea.  Berkeley,  however,  falls 
into  this  ordinary  idealistic  non  seguitur,  without  any 
evidence,  either  physical  or  psychological,  throughout 
the  '  Theory  of  Vision.'  For  instance,  he  says  that  '  a 
man  born  blind,  being  made  to  see,  would,  at  first,  have 
no  idea  of  distance  by  sight ;  the  sun  and  stars,  the 
remotest  objects  as  well  as  the  nearer,  would  all  seem 
to  be  in  his  eye,  or  rather  in  his  mind.'  ^  Similarly, 
he  assumes  it  as  agreed  on  all  hands  that  colours  are 
not  without  the  mind,  from  which,  of  course,  it 
would  follow  that  neither  is  visible  extension.^  He 
even  uses  the  mere  assumption  that  what  is  in  the  eye 
is  in  the  mind  to  argue  that,  as  the  objects  of  sight 
do  not  exist  without  the  mind,  the  pictures  painted  on 
the  bottom  of  the  eye  are  not  the  pictures  of  external 
objects!^  Meanwhile,  the  evidences,  which  are  all 
drawn  from  the  way  in  which  external  objects  affect 
the  retina,  prove  that  there  is  a  variously  coloured 
picture  produced  in  the  camera  ohscura  of  the  eye  upon 
the  retina,  but  prove  absolutely  nothing  at  all  about 
visible  ideas  within  the  mind. 

Let  us  now  shortly  resume  what  Berkeley  proved 
and  did  not  prove  about  vision  as  a  sense.  We  see  no 
remote  distance,  no  real  magnitude,  and  no  real  situa- 
tions of  external  objects  ;  no  solidity,  no  resistance,  no 
protrusion  ;  no  outness  of  the  world  in  external  space : 
this  is  what  he  proved.  He  vacillated  about  visible 
extension,  and  finally  concluded,  but  did  not  prove,  that, 
'what  we  strictly  see    are  not  solids,  nor   3^et  plains 

^  Theory,  xli. ;  cf.  xcv.  -  lb.  xliii.  ^  lb.  cxvii. 


CHAP.  VIII.  BERKELEY'S   THEORY    OF  VISION 


241 


variously  coloured ;  they  are  only  diversity  of  colours.' 
Nor  did  he  prove  that  the  visible  object  is  not  on  the 
retina,  nor  in  the  optic  nerve,  but  is  a  visible  idea  in 
the  mind  :  this  is  a  petitio  principii  committed  very  early 
in  the  '  Essay.'  ^  Consequently,  he  did  not  prove  that 
vision  is  a  universal  language,  and  that  visible  objects  are, 
like  words,  mere  signs  of  extended  objects  without  bein^r 
extended.  The  same  optical  evidence,  which  proves 
that  we  do  not  see  remote  distance  endwise,  proves 
that  we  do  see  the  extended  imprinted  broadwise  on  the 
retina  of  our  eyes.  Tlie  visible  picture,  with  distances 
not  endwise  but  broadwise,  magnitudes  of  parts,  and 
situations  of  places,  though  numerically  different,  is 
specifically  similar  to  the  tangible  imprint,  and  to 'the 
inferred  original  of  both,  in  physical  extension. 

But  while  Berkeley's  psychological  interest  was  en- 
ticing him  to  resolve  optical  effects  into  visible  ideas, 
his  physical  discovery  was  at  the  same  time  forcing 
him  to  recognise  external  objects  to  cause  them.     At 
the  very  outset  he  admits  the  existence  of  a  distance 
projecting  an   effect  on   the  eye.'^      In  the  sequel,  he 
allows  that  '  the  object  which  exists  without  the  mind 
and  is  at  a  distance  '  is  different  from  the  visible  object,^ 
the  former  remaining  the  same  while  the  latter  alters 
according  to  the  remoteness  of  the  eye  from  the  external 
ol)ject.      He  talks  of  our  advancing  forward  to  it  so 
many  paces  or  miles.^     He  considers  that  it  affects  not 
only  our  bodies  but  even  our  minds.     '  We  reo-ard,'  he 
says,  '  the  objects  that  environ  us  in  proportion  as  they 
are  adapted  to  benefit  or  injure  our  own  bodies,  and 
thereby  produce  in  our  minds  the  sensations  of  pleasure 
and  pain.'  ^   No  realist  requires  more  admissions.    Given 
only  the  eye,  and  all  the  universe  follows,  bathed  through- 

1  Theory,  ix.         "^  lb.  ii.  ^  lb.  Iv.  ^  j^.  ^ly.         s  i^  jj^^ 


/ 


242 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II' 


out  its  mass  and  its  molecules  in  tliat  light  which  is  re- 
flected from  external  bodies  on  the, retina  of  the  eye. 
Optics  requires  external  bodies  to  reflect  and  a  sentient 
body  to  receive  light.  As  soon  as  Berkeley  becomes  a 
natural  philosopher,  he  deserts  the  pure  idealism  of 
his  '  Principles,'  and  admits  between  God  and  the  ideas 
within  our  minds  the  intervention  of '  unthinking '  objects 
projecting  effects  on  the  retina  and  causing  visible  ideas. 

Nevertheless,  he  proceeded  to  misinterpret  the  ex- 
ternal object.  In  the  '  Principles,'  with  much  consist- 
ency though  with  no  truth,  he  emphatically  denies  that 
any  sensible  object,  any  primary  or  secondary  quality, 
is  anything  but  an  idea  within  the  mind.  But  in  the 
'Essay,'  while  he  thought  that  visible  objects  are 
ideas  within  the  mind,  he  identified  the  external  and 
the  tangible,  and  supposed  that  tangible  objects  exist 
without  the  mind.  '  For,'  says  he,  '  all  visible  things 
are  equally  in  the  mind,  and  take  up  no  part  of  the 
external  space  ;  and  consequently  are  equidistant  from 
any  tangible  thing,  which  exists  without  the  mind.'  ^ 
This  view,  which  is  entirely  inconsistent  with  the 
ideahsm  of  the  'Principles,'  is  curiously  like  intuitive 
realism.  But  even  if  it  were  possible  that  colour  and 
extension  could  be  wholly  separated  in  this  manner,  at 
any  rate  the  identification  of  tangible  and  external  ex- 
tension is  a  confusion  of  effect  and  cause.  Eeally,  the 
externally  extended  object  is  the  common  original  of 
the  visible  and  the  tangible  objects,  both  of  which  are 
w^ithin  ourselves. 

Berkeley's  identification  of  the  external  and  the 
tanc^ible  led  him  into  two  false  consequences.  In  the 
first  place,  it  led  him  to  deny  any  common  cause  of 
sif^ht  and  touch.     '  It  is  a  mistake,'  he  says,  '  to  think 

o 

*  Tlieory,  cxi. ;  cf.  Iv. 


CHAP.  Tin. 


Y5ERKELEY'S  THEORY  OF  VISION 


243 


the  same  thing  affects  both  sight  and  touch.     If  the 
same  angle  or  square  which  is  the  object  of  touch  be 
also  the  object  of  vision,  what  should  hinder  the  blind 
man,  at  first  sight,  from  knowing  it  ? '  ^     It  is  true  tliat 
the  square  felt  and  the  square  seen  are  not  the  same : 
one  is  in  the  tactile,  the  other  in  the  optic  nerves.     It 
is  true,  also,  that  a  blind  man,  when  first  restored  to 
sight,  would  have  a  difficulty  in  comparing  them.     But 
this  is  no  proof,  and  it  is  not  true,  that  the  external 
square   object   which    causes    the    tangible    square    is 
different  from  the  square  which  causes  the  visible  square. 
Trafalgar  Square  is  one  object,  though  it  is  one  thing  to 
look  at  it  and  another  to  walk  round  it.     It  is  the  same 
crystal  which  presses  the  hand  and  dazzles  the  eye  of 
the  natural  philosopher,  though  the  modes  of  motion, 
by   which   it   gravitates    towards    the    hand,   and   by 
which   it   reflects    undulations    towards   the   eye,    are 
different.     Otherwise,  science  would  be  impossible,  for 
it  would  never  be  concerned  with  one  and  the  same 
object.      Secondly,  the  identification   of  the   external 
and  the  tangible  led  Berkeley  into  a  paradoxical  theory 
of  the  ol^ject  of  geometry.     He  proved,  in  the  end  of 
the    '  Theory   of  Vision,'    that    '  neither   abstract   nor 
visible  extension  makes  the  object  of  geometry.'  ^     But, 
by  a  false   disjunctive  judgment,   he  thought  himself 
entitled  to  conclude  that  the  object  of  geometry  is  there- 
fore tangible  extension.      This  conclusion  entailed  the 
corollary  that  a  geometrical  square  is  really  a  tangible 
square,  and  is  not  even  represented  by  a  visible  square, 
which,  according  to  him,  has  four  parts  rather  than  four 
sides.^  But  who  ever  heard  of  a  geometer  feeling  a  square 
rather  than  looking  at. one?     Through  his  confusion  of 
the  external  and  the   tangible,  Berkeley  has  entirely 


'  Theory,  cxxxvi. 


^  lb.  clix. 


*  Cf.  ib.cxli.-cxlii. 
R  2 


244 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


CHAP.   VI 11. 


BERKELEY'S   THEORY   OF  VISION 


245 


overlooked  the  real  square  of  the  geometer,  which  is 
neither  an  abstract  idea  nor  visible  nor  tangible,  but  an 
object  of  reasoning,  capable  of  being  partially  repre- 
sented by  a  tangible  square,  much  better  by  a  visible 
square,  but  perfectly  by  neither.  In  elementary  geo- 
metry, a  geometrical  figure  is  better  represented  by 
sight  than  by  touch;  even  sight  fails  adequately  to 
represent  more  complicated  figures,  such  as  a  chiliagon, 
while  in  the  geometry  of  infinites  a  polygon  with  infinite 
sides  is  a  pure  object  of  reasoning. 

But  Berkeley's  confusion  of  external  and  tangible 
objects  needs  no  further  criticism,  for  having  published 
it  in  1709,  he  retracted  it  in  1710.  In  his  'Essay 
towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision,'  it  was  put  forward 
as  the  explanation  of  the  external  object,  considered  by 
geometry,  and  required  by  optics.  In  his  '  Princii^les,'  ^ 
he  calls  it  himself  a  '  vulgar  error.'  But  he  at  once  flew 
to  the  opposite  error,  and  confused  the  tangible  object 
with  a  tangible  idea;  falsely  identifying  the  physical 
with  the  psychical,  and  logically  but  falsely  resigning 
the  external  object  altogether.  At  the  same  time,  he 
insinuated  that  this  oscillation  between  intuitive  realism 
and  psychological  idealism  made  no  difference.  In 
reality,  it  spoilt  his  theory  of  external  objects  in  both 
books.  In  the  'Essay,'  his  confusion  of  the  external 
and  tangible  concealed  from  him  that  the  external 
object  is  the  common  original  of  touch  and  of  vision, 
distinct  from  the  objects  of  both.  In  the  'Principles,' 
his  confusion  of  the  tangible,  as  well  as  the  visible, 
with  ideas  made  him  omit  the  external  object  altogether. 
Althou<^h  the  object  at  a  distance  directing  a  line  end- 
wise  to  the  eye  had  been  the  foundation  of  his  discovery 
of  the  invisibility  of  remote  distance,  he  now  proceeded, 

*  Prmc.  xliv.,  quoted  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter. 


I 


I 


in  defiance  of  the  science  of  optics,  to  make  visible  as 
well  as  tangible  ideas  effects  of  '  the  governing  spirit,' 
with  not  a  single  word  about  external  objects  without 
our  minds.  At  the  price  of  the  physical  truth  of 
the  '  Essay  '  he  saved  the  psychological  idealism  of  the 
'  Principles.' 

•  Berkeley,  in  the  '  Principles,'  is  a  logical  idealist ; 
but  Berkeley,  in  his  works,  is,  like  Locke,  two  philo- 
sophers in  one.  On  the  one  hand,  take  the  '  Theory  of 
Vision.'  Here  he  is  Locke,  with  his  admissions.  In 
the  same  somewhat  half-hearted  way  he  recognises  the 
external  objects  of  science :  he  has  an  undercurrent  of 
ontology  :  he  is  a  cosmothetic  idealist  in  visible  ideas 
which  he  supposes  to  be  projected  by  external  objects, 
and  an  intuitive  realist  in  tangible  objects  which  he 
supposes  to  be  externally  felt,  as  Locke,  after  limiting 
sensation  to  ideas,  had  supposed  primary  qualities  with- 
out to  be  objects  of  a  kind  of  bastard  sensation.  On  the 
other  hand,  take  the  '  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge.' 
Here  he  is  Locke,  reduced  to  logic.  He  sees  that  mind 
and  ideas  end  in  mind  and  ideas,  and  that  if,  as  Locke 
himself  had  at  first  said,  ideas  are  all  the  objects  of 
knowledge,  then,  as  Locke  ought  to  have  concluded, 
not  unthinking  body  but  the  Divine  Mind  is  the  only 
external  cause. 

But  Berkeley's  optics  were  superior  to  his  psychology. 
We  must  appeal  from  the  '  Principles '  to  the  '  Theory 
of  Vision.'  '  There  is,'  says  he  in  the  latter  treatise, '  no 
one  ignorant  that  the  pictures  of  external  objects  are 
painted  on  the  retina  or  fund  of  the  eye.' ^  Then, 
these  external  objects  are  not  tangible,  nor  visible, 
nor  sensible  at  all,  but  are  causes  of  sensible  objects, 
or,  as  Berkeley  would  say,  of  ideas.     Not  all  objects 

*  Theory,  Ixxxviii. 


24G 


rSYCIIOLOGlCAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


of  knowledge,  then,  are  sensible  ideas.  Again,  these 
external  objects,  whose  pictures  are  painted  on  the 
retina,  are  not  God,  and  yet  are  causes  of  sensible 
effects.  God,  then,  is  not  the  sole  cause.  In  short, 
optics  require,  between  God  and  our  ideas,  an  intervening 
nature.  The  scientific  admissions  of  tlie  'Theory  of 
Vision'  are  sufficient  to  destroy  the  pure  idealism  of 
the  '  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge.' 

Besides  the  optical  discovery  of  the  invisibility  of 
remote  distance,  the  psychological  hypothesis  that  we 
see  visible  ideas,  and  the  ontological  recognition  of  the 
existence  of  an  extended  world  without  the  mind  falsely 
confused  with  the  tangible  object,  the  'Theory  of 
Vision'  finally  contains  a  logical  speculation  on  the 
origin  from  vision  of  our  knowledge  of  the  extended 
beyond  vision.  Like  the  main  thesis,  this  speculation 
contains  much  that  is  true,  and  especially  that  we  do 
not  see  but  infer  an  external  world.  It  is  also  most 
suggestive,  and  in  fact  was  the  first  hint  of  the  hypo- 
thesis that  association  may  be  an  account  of,  or  rather 
a  substitute  for,  the  origin  of  knowledge.  But  it  does 
not  in  the  least  explain  the  knowledge  of  extended 
objects  in  the  external  world,  required  by  optics  and 
admitted  by  Berkeley.  We  must  not  be  led  away  by 
the  appearance  of  simplicity,  but  keep  steadily  before 
us  the  known  facts  to  be  explained,  and  by  them  test 
tlie  hypothesis. 

We  do  not  see  remote  distance :  we  do  judge  and 
infer  it  from  sight :  this  is  the  essential  truth  in  Ber- 
keley's theory.^  The  question  is,  how  this  judgment  and 
inference  are  made.  He  answers  that  when  the  mind 
perceives  any  idea  not  immediately  and  of  itself,  it  must 
be  by  the  means  of  some  other  idea  :  ^  distance,  then, 


*   Theory,  iii. 


2  lb.  IX. 


CHAP.   Mil. 


BERKELEY'S   THEORY  OF  VISION 


247 


is  suggested  to  the  mind  by  the  mediation  of  some 
otherldea,  which  is  itself  perceived  in  the  act  of  seeing.^ 
He  finds  three  ideas,  which  arise  according  to  the 
different  distances  of  objects :  the  first,  the  lessening  or 
widening  the  intervals  between  the  pupils  of  our  eyes, 
attended  with  a  sensation ;  '^  the  second,  the  more  or 
less  confused  appearance  ;  the  third,  the  prevention  of 
this  confusion  by  straining  the  eye,  with  its  sensation.^ 
These  are  the  ideas  which  he  thinks  wiU  suggest  the 
idea  of  the  distance  of  the  external  object ;  not  that 
there  is  any  natural  or  necessary  connection  of  those 
ideas  with  distance,  but  that  there  is  an  habitual  or  cus- 
tomary connection  between  these  ideas  and  the  idea  of 

distance.'^ 

This  process  impUes  that  the  idea  of  distance  itself 
has  been  acquired  in  some  other  way.  This  way, 
according  to  Berkeley,  is  touch  combined  with  motion. 
He  gives  the  whole  process  in  the  following  passage  :— 

'  Having  of  a  long  time  experienced  certain  ideas 
perceivable  by  touch,  as  distance,  tangible  figure,  and 
sohdity,  to  have  been  connected  with  certain  ideas  of 
sight,  I  do  upon  perceiving  those  ideas  of  sight,  forth- 
with conclude  what  tangible  ideas  are,  by  the  wonted 
ordinary  course  of  nature,  like  to  follow.  Looking  at 
an  object  I  perceive  a  certain  visible  figure  and  colour,^ 
with  some  degree  of  faintness  and  other  circumstances, 
which  from  what  I  have  formerly  observed,  determine 
me  to  think,  that  if  I  advance  forward  so  many  paces 
or  miles,  I  shall  be  affected  with  such  and  such  ideas  of 

touch.'  ^ 

This  process,  by  which  visible  ideas  suggest  tangible 


*  lb.  xxvii. 


1  Theory,  xvi.  ^  lb.  xvi. 

4  Of.  ib.  xxviii.  with  the  above  sections. 

^  Note  this  admission  of  visible  figure  as  weU  as  colour. 


« Ib.  xlv. 


248 


rSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


ideas  of  distance,  is  what  is  ordinarily  called  association. 
Berkeley  describes  this  operation  with  great  clear- 
ness. '  That  one  idea,'  he  says,  '  may  suggest  anotlier 
to  the  mind,  it  will  suffice  that  they  have  been  observed 
to  go  together,  without  any  demonstration  of  the  ne 
cessity  of  their  co-existence,  or  without  so  much  as 
knowing  what  it  is  that  makes  them  so  co-exist.'  ^  There 
is  such  an  operation,  and  its  recognition  was  not  new 
in  philosophy.  Plato  and  Aristotle,  Hobbes  and  Locke 
were  aware  of  it.  Aristotle,  for  instance,  says  that  we 
recollect  from  what  is  similar  or  contrary  or  con- 
tiguous.^ But  what  was  new  in  Berkeley's  '  Theory  of 
Vision '  was  the  hypothesis,  afterwards  developed  by 
Hume,  that  this  process  of  recovering  ideas  is  some- 
times the  analysis  of  what  we  call  knowing  objects.  The 
ordinary  man,  when  he  uses  his  eyes,  supposes  that  he 
knows,  nay  sees,  that  there  is  an  external  object  at  a 
distance  from  him.  Berkeley  tells  him  that  he  is  really 
letting  visible  ideas  suggest  to  him  tangible  ideas  of 
distance  ;  that  is  all. 

There  is  a  negative  value  in  Berkeley's  analysis.  It 
is  greatly  superior  to  the  ordinary  supposition  that  we 
see  a  distant  object.  Berkeley,  though  he  exaggerated 
when  he  said  that  we  do  not  see  any  distances  at  all, 
showed  conclusively  that  we  do  not  see  but  infer  a 
distant  object  in  the  external  world.  It  is  also 
superior  to  the  supposition  of  '  Descartes  and  others '  ^ 
that  we  infer  the  distance  of  objects  from  the  angles 
they  make  with  our  eyes.  Berkeley  disposed  of  this 
'  humour  of  making  one  see  by  geometry,'  when  he 
showed  that  the  lines  and  angles  between  the  external 
objects  and  the  eyes  are  as  invisible   as   the  external 


Theory,  xxv. 


"^De  Mem.  2  =  451  B,  18-20. 
'  Theory,  iv.  not 


CHAP.  viir. 


BEIIKELEY'S  TIIEOl.Y   OF  VISION 


249 


objects  themselves.^  Mathematical  opticians  had  fallen 
into  the  blunder  of  supposing  that  lines  and  angles, 
known  only  to  themselves  by  science,  are  sensible  data 
which  ordinary  men  use  in  vision  to  infer  an  external 

world. 

There  is  also  positive  information  in  Berkeley's 
analysis.  It  contributed  some  new  truths  on  the  senses. 
In  the  first  place,  about  sight ;  he  did  not  indeed  show 
that  there  is  no  vision  of  space,  but  he  did  show  that 
it  is  in  a  way  unnecessary.  He  called  attention  to  the 
scientific  observation  of  the  misfortune  of  the  blind, 
who  have  no  eyes,  yet  feel  and  infer  space.  Again,  his 
remark,  that  no  resistance  is  perceived  by  sight,  con- 
tains the  true  reason  why  from  sight  alone  we  could 
not  infer  an  external  world,  and  therefore  must  appeal 
to  touch  and  motion.  Lastly,  though  it  is  not  the  case, 
it  is  possible  that  sight  might,  like  hearing,  or,  at  any 
rate,  like  language,  contain  no  apprehension  of  extension, 
and  yet  enable  us,  when  combined  with  a  sense  of  exten- 
sion, to  infer  an  extended  object.  On  the  whole,  he  has 
not  shown  that  the  visible  object  is  not  an  extended 
picture ;  but  he  has  shown  that,  whatever  the  visible 
object  is,  we  can  know  an  extended  object  in  the 
external  world  without  it,  and  not  by  it  alone. 

Secondly,  he  has  the  great  merit  of  having  hinted, 
however  imperfectly,  at  what  is  now  called  the  muscular 
sense.  When  he  speaks  of  '  the  motion  of  his  body 
which  is  perceivable  by  touch,'  ^  though  he  may  be  ex- 
aggerating  its  connection  with  touch,  he  is  recognising  a 
sense  of  motion.  He  also  caw  that  in  vision  there  is 
something  more  than  seeing.  What  he  calls  '  lessening 
or  widening  the  intervals  between  the  pupils,'  which  is 
'  attended  with  a  sensation,'  is  the  convergence  or  diver- 


1  Theory,  iv.,  xii.,  lii.-liii. 


2  lb.  xlv. 


250 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


geiice  of  tlie  optic  axes  by  the  internal  and  external 
recti  muscles,  with  their  muscular  sense.  When  he 
speaks  of  the  confused  appearance  caused  by  objects 
brought  too  close  to  the  eye,  and  of  preventing 
the  appearances  growing  more  confused  '  by  straining 
the  eye,'  and  of  its  sensation,^  he  is  pointing  towards 
the  increase  of  the  convexity  of  the  crystalline  lens,  for 
the  more  rapid  convergence  of  rays  from  near  objects  to 
the  retina,  by  the  action  of  the  cihary  muscle,  with  its 
muscular  sense.  He  also  refers  to  the  movements  of 
the  eyes  up  and  down,  to  the  right  and  left,  which  are 
performed  by  the  four  recti  muscles.^  In  none  of  these 
cases  did  he  analyse  the  muscular  movements  or  assign 
them  a  distinct  muscular  sense.  Nevertheless,  he  called 
attention  to  movement,  to  the  sense  of  movement  in 
touch,  and  to  the  sense  of  some  kind  of  action  in  siijht, 
connected  with  the  knowledge  of  extension. 

At  the  same  time,  these  great  achievements  are 
quite  consistent  with  equally  great  blunders  about  our 
senses,  of  which  there  are  two,  at  opposite  extremes. 
On  the  one  hand,  he  underrates  the  efficacy  of  vision 
when  he  tends  to  confine  it  to  visible  ideas  of  colour ; 
on  the  other  hand,  he  exaggerates  the  efficacy  of  touch 
when  he  tends  to  extend  it  to  external  objects.  Eeally, 
the  former  is  the  vision  of  the  extended  in  the  optic 
nerves,  the  latter  is  the  feeling  of  the  extended  in  the 
tactile  nerves.  However,  these  errors  do  not  touch  the 
exact  question  before  us.  Whatever  else  it  may  be, 
the  object  of  vision  is  certainly  not  the  external  object 
at  a  remote  distance.  Now,  the  question  is  whether, 
when  we  say  that  there  is  such  an  external  object,  cor- 
responding to  what  we  see,  we  are  only  letting  visible 
ideas  suggest  tangible  ideas  of  remote  distance. 


'  Theory,  xxi.-xxvii. 


^  lb.  xcvii.-xcviii. 


CHAP.   VIII. 


BERKELEY'S  THEORY    OF   VISION 


251 


t  ' 


In  solving  this  problem,  two  concessions  must  be  at 
once  made.  In  the  first  place,  from  vision,  being  no 
sense  of  resistance,  we  do  not  infer  the  external  world 
directly,  but  only  indirectly  through  touch  and  motion. 
Secondly,  visible  ideas  do  suggest  tangible  ideas,  and 
other  ideas  also  for  that  matter,  by  the  customary  tie 
of  association,  which  is  a  real  fact  of  human  nature. 
But  we  must  also  ask  ourselves  whether  this  suggestion 
is  all  that  happens.  If  so,  we  should  only  have  the 
ideas ;  w^e  should  not  infer  that,  over  and  above  the 
ideas,  the  object  seen  corresponds  to  an  extended  object 
in  the  external  world.  For  example,  at  this  moment, 
my  vision  of  the  white  would  suggest  my  tangible  idea 
of  the  extended  ;  but  I  should  not  infer,  as  I  really  do, 
that  over  and  above  the  tangible  idea  there  is  an  ex- 
tended paper  in  an  external  world,  corresponding 
both  to  the  object  of  touch  and  the  object  of  sight. 
Berkeley  substituted  the  suggestion  of  ideas  for  the 
inference  of  external  objects. 

Even  in  the  '  Theory  of  Vision,'  in  spite  of  having 
admitted  the  existence  of  the  external  object,  and  its 
action  on  the  retina,  Berkeley  partly  accepted  the 
consequence.  '  Sitting  in  my  study,'  he  says,  '  I  hear 
a  coach  drive  along  the  street;  I  look  through  the 
casement  and  see  it ;  I  walk  out  and  enter  into  it ;  thus 
common  speech  wou'd  incline  one  to  think,  I  heard,  saw, 
and  touch'd  tlie,  same  thing,  to  wit,  the  coach.  It  is 
nevertheless  certain,  the  ideas  intermitted  by  each  sense 
are  widely  different,  and  distinct  from  each  other ;  but 
having  been  observed  constantly  to  go  together,  they 
are  spoken  of  as  one  and  the  same  thing.'  ^  Similarly, 
he  afterwards  says  that,  though  the  objects  are  different, 
as  they  are  called  by  the  same  name,  he  will,  to  avoid 

*  Theory,  xlvi. 


252 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


tediousiiess  and  singularity  of  speech,  speak  of  them  as 
belonjrinf]^  to  one  and  the  same  thine. ^ 

(DO  o 

Now,  it  is  quite  true  that  tlie  audible,  visible,  and 
tangible  are  different  objects,  and  also  that,  if  nothing 
happened  except  that  ideas  of  the  audible  and  visible  sug- 
gested ideas  of  the  tangible,  no  real  identification  could 
take  place.  But  something  further  does  take  place.  Ii 
the  first  place,  when  I  hear  something  sounding  in  m; 
auditory,  see  something  coloured  in  my  optic,  and  feel 
something  hard  in  my  tactile  nerves,  and  have  often  ex- 
perienced these  sensible  objects  in  a  similar  order,  I  infer 
that  there  is  one  external  object,  which  is  the  common 
original  of  these  sensible  objects  on  any  given  occasion. 
Secondly,  I  call  this  common  original  by  one  and  the 
same  name,  '  coach,'  because  I  infer  it  to  be  one  tliinof. 
It  is  true  that  I  have  an  habitual  tendency  to  confuse  the 
one  external  object  with  the  several  and  different  audi- 
tory, visible  and  tangible  objects  within  me.  But  it  is 
not  true  that  there  is  no  identity  but  an  identity  of 
name.  There  is  an  identical  external  object,  the  coach, 
which  I  infer,  and  wdiich  I  can  disengage  from  the  con- 
fusion with  its  different  sensible  results,  by  means  of 
science.  Now,  if  the  auditory,  visible  and  tangible 
objects  had  been  mere  ideas  in  my  mind,  and  if  these 
ideas  merely  suggested  one  another,  I  could  never  have 
inferred  the  one  external  object,  and  it  is  most  im- 
probable that  I  should  have  even  called  the  different 
ideas  by  one  name.  But  I  do  infer  one  external  object, 
and  am  justified  by  optics  and  other  sciences  connected 
with  the  senses.  Therefore,  in  the  first  place,  the  pro- 
cess of  this  inference  of  one  external  object  cannot  be  a 
mere  suggestion  of  difierent  ideas  ;  and  secondly,  the 
data  of  this  inference  of  an  external  object  cannot  be 

*  Theory,  Iv. 


CHAP.  Tin. 


BERKELEY'S   THEORY   OF   VISION 


;53 


auditory,  visible  and  tangible  ideas.  In  reality,  from 
physical  data  in  the  several  nerves,  I  infer  one  physical 
coach,  and  give  it,  not  them,  one  name. 

In  the  '  Theory  of  Vision,'  however,  Berkeley  did 
not  fully  realise  the  consequence  of  reducing  the  infer- 
ence of  external  objects  to  the  suggestion  of  tangible 
ideas,  because  he  combined  this  association  of  ideas 
wdth  an  intuitive  touch  of  external  objects.  Hence, 
later  on,  he  says  of  a  man,  that  '  when  he  has  by 
experience  learned  the  connexion  there  is  between 
the  several  ideas  of  sight  and  touch,  he  will  be  able, 
by  the  perception  he  has  of  the  situation  of  visible 
things  in  respect  of  one  another,  to  make  a  sudden 
and  true  estimate  of  the  situation  of  outward  tangible 
things,  corresponding  to  them.  And  thus  it  is,  he 
shall  perceive  by  sight  the  situation  of  external 
objects,  which  do  not  properly  fall  under  that  sense.'  ^ 
Such  an  estimate  would  require  the  impossible  iden- 
tification of  tangible  ideas,  tangible  objects,  and  out- 
ward things.  But,  in  the  first  place,  touch  does  not 
feel  the  outward  thing.  Secondly,  a  visible  idea 
suggests  a  tangible  idea,  but  not  a  tangible  object. 
Thirdly,  what  we  really  do  is  to  estimate  the  situation 
not  of  a  tangible  idea,  nor  of  a  tangible  object,  but  of 
an  outw^ard  thing  corresponding  on  the  one  hand  to  the 
tangible,  on  the  other  hand  to  the  visible,  object  within 
ourselves.  We  cannot  bolster  up  the  association  of 
ideas  by  an  intuitive  touch  of  outward  things. 

In  the  '  Principles,'  w4ien  he  had  retracted  the  con- 
fusion of  the  external  and  the  tangible,  and  the  intuitive 
touch  of  the  external,  the  consequence  of  supposing 
that  the  inference  from  vision  is  nothing  but  an  associa- 
tion of  ideas  came  out  in  its  simple  nakedness.     He 

^  lb.  xcix. 


254 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


r.ABT   II. 


\ 


then  saw  that,  in  this  case,  ideas  of  sight  only  admonish 
us  what  ideas  of  touch  will  be  imprinted  on  our  minds, 
and  do  not  mark  out  to  us  things  actually  existing  at  a 
distance.^  I  freely  admit  that  Berkeley  was  right  in 
retracting  the  tangible  intuition  of  the  external  world, 
and  that  if  we  start  with  visible  ideas,  and  by  the 
suggestion  of  ideas  let  these  visible  suggest  tangible 
ideas,  and  have  no  tangible  intuition  of  extended 
objects  in  the  external  world,  we  shall  begin  and  end 
in  ideas.  But  we  do  not  end  in  ideas.  His  own  optics 
require  that  we  know  external  objects,  and  that  no  one 
is  ignorant  of  their  painting  pictures  on  the  retina  of 
the  eye.  His  hypothesis  of  the  suggestion  of  ideas  does 
not  account  for  the  knowledge  of  their  causes.  It  is, 
therefore,  false. 

The  cause  of  Berkeley's  error  was  that  neglect  of 
logical  inference  which  made  its  appearance  in  the 
Second  Book  of  Locke's  '  Essay,'  and  led  to  the  postpone- 
ment of  reasoning  to  all  kinds  of  lesser  powers.  Like 
Locke,  Berkeley  was  aware  of  the  difference  between 
association  and  reasoning.^  But,  like  Locke,  he  kept  in 
the  background,  and  to  the  last,  reasoning,  the  one  power 
which  will  be  heard  and  will  not  wait.  Hence,  in  the 
'  Principles,'  he  supposes  that  ideas  suggest  ideas,  until 
reason  at  last  infers  a  God.  Hence,  in  the  '  Theory  of 
Vision,'  he  substitutes  for  inference  a  false  touch  of  out- 
ward things  and  an  imperfect  suggestion  by  visible  of 
tansfible  ideas.  He  overlooks  in  both  the  human,  thouofh 
complex,  inference  of  an  external  extended  object 
which  causes  both  sight  and  touch. 

The  '  Theory  of  Vision  '  contains  the  discoveries  of 


'  Princ.  xliv.,  quoted  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter. 
^  Cf.  Locke,  Essay,  ii.  33, 13 ;    Berkeley,  The    Theory  of  Visual 
Language  Vindicated,  §  42. 


CHAP.  Yin. 


BERKELEY'S   THEORY   OF  VISION 


zoo 


the  invisibility  of  remote  distance,  and  of  the  combina- 
tion  of  siffht  and  touch  with  a  sense  of  motion.  It  is 
a  very  good  answer  to  those  who  say  that  we  see  the 
external  world ;  though  even  they  could  retort  on 
Berkeley  that  he  says  himself  that  we  feel  it.  It  is  no 
answer  to  those  who  say  that  we  know  the  external 
world.  It  is  a  good  answer  to  those  who  say  that  we 
infer  it  directly  from  sight  by  lines  and  angles,  or  by 
any  other  direct  inference,  from  sight,  which  feels  no  re  - 
sistance.  But  it  is  no  answer  to  those  who  say  that  we 
infer  an  external  extended  world  first  from  the  resistance 
felt  in  the  senses  of  touch  and  motion,  and  then  from 
the  correspondence  in  extension  between  inferred,  tan- 
gible, and  visible  objects.  Finally,  Berkeley's  '  Theory 
of  Vision '  contains  two  fundamental  errors  of  omis- 
sion :  the  first,  that  there  is  no  vision  of  an  extended 
object  within  ;  the  second,  no  inference  of  an  extended 
object  without,  common  to  our  senses  of  sight  and 
touch. 


256 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


CHAPTEE  IX. 


HUME. 


The  academical  or  sceptical  philosophy  of  Hume  admits 
of  being  summarised  as  follows.  '  All  the  perceptions 
of  the  mind  are  impressions  and  thoughts  or  ideas.^) 
^11  our  ideas  or  more  feeble  perceptions  are  copies  of 
our  impressions  or  more  lively  ones.^/  Association  is  a 
principle  of  connection  which,  by  resemblance,  con- 
tiguity or  causation,  on  the  appearance  of  a  perception 
sucTcrests  thoucfhts  or  ideas .^  All  the  objects  of  human^ 
reason  or  inquiry  may  naturally  be  divided  into  two 
kinds,  to  wit,  Relations  of  Ideas  and  Matters  of  Fact.  Of 
the  former  kind  are  the  sciences  of  geometry,  algebra, 
and  arithmetic,  and,  in  short,  every  affirmation  which 
is  either  intuitively  or  demonstratively  certain.^  The 
oricfin  of  our  beUefs,  i.e.  vivid  ideas,  of  matters  of 
fact,  is  experience  of  a  constant  conjunction  of  impres- 
sions, and  association  which,  from  this  constant  con- 
junction, begets  such  a  connection  in  the  imagination 
that,  on  the  appearance  of  the  antecedent,  we  have  the 
idea,  i.e.  behef,  of  the  consequent  and  of  their  connection/ 
as  cause  and  effect.^  vfhe  mind  has  never  anything 
present  to  it  but  the  perceptions,^  and  cannot  possibly 
reach  any  experience  of  their  connection  with  objects. 
The  supposition  of  such  a  connection  is,  therefore,  with- 


^  Inquiry,  §  2. 
♦  lb.  ^  4. 


•  lb.  »  lb.  §  3. 

•■^Ib.  §§  4  7,  esp.  §7,  Part  IL 


CHAP.   IX. 


HUME 


257 


out  any  foundation  in  reasoning.^  The  great  subverter 
of  Pyrrhonism,  or  the  excessive  principles  of  scepticism, 
is  action.'^  There  is,  indeed,  a  more  initigated  scepticism, 
or  academical  philosopliy,  which  may  be  both  durable 
and  useful,  and  which  may,  in  part,  be  the  result  of  this 
Pyrrhonism  or  excessive  scepticism,  when  its  undistin- 
guished doubts  are,  in  some  measure,  corrected  by 
common  sense  and  reflection.^ 

/The  point  of  this  academical  philosophy  is  that  man 
has  the  faculties  to  receive  impressions  and   conceive 
ideas  or  thoughts;  and  by  association  to  make  vivid 
ideas    of    causation,  which    are    his    only    beHefs   on  ^ 
matters  of  fact ;  but  not  by  reasoning  to  infer  exter- 
nal objects.y^  Hume  pubhshed  it  twice  over,  first  in  the 
'  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,'  afterwards  in  the  '  Inquiry 
concerning  Human  Understanding.'-  The  earlier  work  is 
more  elaborate,   containing  in  the  First  Part  a  fuller 
discussion  of  the  origin  of  ideas,  modelled  on  the  Second 
Book  of  Locke's  '  Essay,'  but  with  the  stress  laid  on  asso- 
ciation ;  in  the  Second  Part,  a  theory  of  the  apprehen- 
sions of  time  and  space,  which  hardly  appears  at  all  in 
the  later  work  ;  in  the  Third  Part,  a  longer  but  less 
elegant  exposition  of  his  theory  of  association  as  the 
origin  of  the  belief  in  causation;  and  in  the  Fourth 
Part,  a  long  discussion  of  the  apprehension  of  objects, 
answering  to  the  last  section  of  the  '  Inquiry,'  but  com- 
prising a  sceptical  theory  of  substances,  both  material 
and  thinking,  which  he  afterwards  omitted  but  by  no 
means  retracted  in  his  later  work.     Since  the  '  Treatise ' 
was  published  when  the  author  was  a  young  man  of 
twenty-seven,  the  '  Inquiry '  ten  years  later  in  the  prime 
of  Hfe,  the  impartial  critic  must  dwell  mainly  on  the  more 


^  Inquinj,  §  12,  Part  I.  ^  j^  §  ^g,  Part  II. 

3  lb.  §  12,  Part  III. 


^ 


S 


258 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


mature  work ;  especially  as  in  his  account  of  '  My  own 
Life '  Hume  savs  himself,  '  I  had  been  guilty  of  a  very 
usual  indiscretion  in  going  to  the  press  too  early  '-a 
useful  warning  to  youthful  philosophers.  Nevertheless, 
the  essence  of  both  '  Treatise'  and  '  Inquiry '  is  the  same  : 
it  is  a  reduction  of  man  to  mere  perceptions.  Berkeley 
had  attacked  natural  science :  it  remained  for  Hume  to 
attack  the  human  intellect.  But  we  must  take  care  not 
to  be  argued  out  of  our  wits. 

Hume's  philosophy  is  founded  on  the  following 
distinction  of  perceptions  into  impressions  and  ideas, 
which  he  identifies  with  thoughts  :— 

'  Here,  therefore,  we  may  divide  all  the  perceptions 
of  the  mind  into  two  classes    or    species,   which    are 
distinguished  by  their  different  degrees   of  force   and 
vivacity.      The  less  forcible  and  Uvely  are  commonly 
denominated  thoughts  or  ideas.     The  other  species  want 
a  name  in  our  language,  and  in  most  others  ;  I  suppose, 
because  it  was  not  requisite  for  any,  but  philosophical 
purposes,  to  rank  them  under  a  general  term  or  appella- 
tion.    Let  us,  therefore,  use  a  little  freedom  and  call 
them  impressions ;  employing  that  word  in  a  sense  some- 
what different  from  the  usual.     By  the   term  impres- 
sions, then,  I  mean  all  our  more  lively  perceptions, 
where  we  hear,  or  see,  or  feel,  or  love,  or  hate,  or 
desire,  or  will.    And  impressions  are  distinguished  from 
ideas, 'which  are  the  less  Uvely  perceptions,  of  which  we 
are  conscious,  when  we  reflect  on  any  of  those  sensa- 
tions or  movements  above  mentioned.'  ^ 

The  distinction  between  impressions  and  ideas  is  an 
important  discovery,  or  rather  re-discovery.  Aristotle 
had,  in  the  '  De  Anima,'  carefully  distinguished  between 
cesthemata,  or  the  objects  in  sense  when  an  external  ob- 
ject is  present,  and  phantasmata,  or  their  relics  in  the 

1  Inquiry,  §  2. 


CHAP.   IX. 


HUME 


259 


imagination  when  the  external  object  is  absent.      But, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  Descartes  afterwards  confused 
the  object  of  sensation  and  conception  under  the  name 
'  idea,'  and  Locke  and  Berkeley  had  followed  him.     So 
long  as  it  was  admitted  that  some  external  object  is 
also  known,  this  confusion  liad  no  very  serious  conse- 
quences;  for  the  reduction  of  sense  to  a  purely  psy- 
chical object  at  all  was  a  fcir  more  fundamental  error 
than  the  reduction  of  this  psychical  object  to  an  idea. 
But  when  it  began  to  be  doubted  whether  any  external 
object  could  be  known,  it  then  became  a  serious  ques- 
tion, how  we  can  distinguish  an  adventitious  idea  im- 
printed on  the  senses  from  a  fictitious  idea  generated  by 
the  imagination. 

Berkeley  felt  this  difiiculty,^  and  got  over  it  partly 
by  supposing  that  adventitious  are  more   vivid  than 
factitious   ideas,  but   mainly    by   his  theory  that  the 
former   are   directly  inspired    by   God.      Now,  Hume 
doubted   our   knowledge    of    any   cause    of    our   per- 
ceptions, natural  or  spiritual.     Moreover,  he  saw  that 
'  the  word  idea  seems  to  be  commonly  taken  in  a  very 
loose  sense  by  Locke  and  others,  as  standing  for  any  of 
our  perceptions,  our  sensations  and  passions,  as  well  as 
thoughts.'^      In  these  circumstances,  he   revived   the 
ancient  distinction  of  cesthema  and  phantasma    under 
the  new  names   'impression'  and  'idea,'  yet  without 
resorting  either  to  matter  or  to  God.     As  he  says  in  the 
'  Treatise,'  '  By  the  term  of  "  impression,"  I  would  not  be 
understood  to  express  the  manner  in  which  our  lively 
ideas  are  produced  in  the  soul,  but  merely  the  percep- 
tions themselves.'  ^    Consequently  he  had  to  look  out  for 
some  fresh  criterion  to  distinguish  the  thing  as  well  as 
the  term,  and  found  it  in  the  liveliness  of  an  impres- 

^  Princ.  xxxiii.         2  jnqidnj,  §  2,  note.         ^  Treatise,  i.  §  1,  note. 

s   2 


2G0 


I'SVCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


sion  as  contrasted  with  an  idea.  In  tlie  'Elietoric,' 
Aristotle  had  described,  without  meaning  to  define, 
imagination  as  a  kind  of  weak  sense.^  Hobbes  had 
exalted  this  description  into  a  definition — '  Imagination 
being  (to  define  it)  conception  remaining,  and  by  little 
and  little  decaying  from  and  after  the  Act  of  Sense."  ^ 
Berkeley  had  made  faintness  a  partial  test  of  an  idea  of 
imagination:  Hume  exalted  it  into  the  sole  criterion, 
and  committed  himself  to  the  consequences.  'The 
most  lively  thought,'  says  he,  'is  still  inferior  to  the 
dullest  sensation.' 

The  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  more  distinction 
between  sense  and  imagination  than  between  vivid  and 
faint  perceptions,  or  states  of  consciousness,  as  they 
now  call  them,  has  become  a  favourite  with  modern 
idealists,  simply  because  they  have  destroyed  the  real 
criterion  afforded  by  the  presence  and  absence  of  exter- 
nal objects.  But  there  is  a  difference  in  kind  between 
sense  and  imagination,  of  which  '  different  degrees  of 
force  and  vivacity'  furnish  no  adequate  criterion.  The 
faintest  impressions  would  be  undistinguishable  from 
the  most  vivid  ideas.  This  objection  Hume  had  noticed 
himself  in  the  'Treatise,'  and  tried  to  evade  it ; — 

'The  common  degrees  of  these  are  easily  distin- 
guished :  though  it  is  not  impossible  but,  in  particular 
instances,  they  may  very  nearly  approach  to  each  other. 
Thus,  in  sleep,  in  a  fever,  in  madness,  or  in  any  very 
violent  emotions  of  soul,  our  ideas  may  approach  to  our 
impressions :  as,  on  the  other  hand,  it  sometimes  hap- 
pens that  our  impressions  are  so  faint  and  low,  that  we 
cannot  distinguish  them  from  our  ideas.  But,  notwith- 
standing this  near  resemblance  in  a  few  instances,  they 

1  Ar.  Bhet.  i.  11  =  1370  A,  28. 

^  Hobbes,  Human  Nature^  chap.  iii.  §  1. 


CHAP.   IX. 


HUME 


201 


are  in  general  so  very  different,  that  no  one  can  make  a 
scruple  to  rank  them  under  distinct  heads,  and  assi^m 

to 

to  each  a  peculiar  name  to  mark  the  difference.'  ^ 

The  conclusion  of  this  passage  exhibits  a  common 
practice  of  trying  to  get  round  a  contradictory  instance. 
It  is  true  that,  on  the  whole,  the  livelier  would  be  dis- 
tinct from  the  fainter  perceptions,  but  there  would  still 
be  a  margin  between  the  lively  and  the  faint,  which,  in 
the  absence  of  any  other  criterion,  it  would  be  arbitrary 
to  place  among  either  impressions  or  ideas.  But  there 
is  a  still  more  fatal  objection :  some  ideas  are  Hvelier 
than  impressions,  and  would  have,  by  the  bare  criterion 
of  hvely  and  faint,  to  change  places  with  them.  Yet 
Hume,  to  save  his  theory,  has  to  say  that  '  all  ideas, 
especially  abstract  ones,  are  naturally  faint  and  ob- 
scure,' while  '  all  sensations,  either  outward  or  inward, 
are  strong  and  vivid.'  ^  But  abstract  ideas  of  mathe- 
maticians are  often  brighter  than  their  concrete  impres- 
sions, as  in  the  case  of  the  mathematician  who  in  a  fit 
of  abstraction  held  the  egg  in  his  hand  while  he  boiled 
his  watch.  Ideas  of  men  in  disease  are  often  so  vivid 
as  to  be  mistaken  for  impressions.  The  artistic  imagina- 
tion is  sometimes  stronger  than  ordinary  sensation,  as 
Handel,  on  being  asked  how  he  wrote  the  'Hallelujah 
Chorus,'  said,  '  I  did  see  all  heaven  before  me,  and  the 
great  God  Himself.' 

This  superior  vividness  of  imagination  is  finely  de- 
scribed by  Addison  : — 

'  Words,  when  well  chosen,  have  so  great  a  force  in 
them,  that  a  description  often  gives  us  more  lively  ideas 
than  the  sight  of  things  themselves.  The  reader  finds  a 
scene  drawn  in  stronger  colours,  and  painted  more  to 
the  life  in  his  imagination,  by  the  help  of  words,  than 

^   Treatise,  i.  §  1.  2  inquiry,  §  2. 


2G: 


•7 


rSYCTIOLOGlCAT.   IDEALISM 


PART  IT. 


CHAP.   II. 


HUME 


2G3 


by  an  actual  survey  of  the  scene  which  they  describe. 
In  this  case  the  poet  seems  to  get  the  better  of  nature ; 
he  takes,  indeed,  the  handskip  after  her,  but  gives  it 
more  vigorous  touches,  heightens  its  beauty,  and  so  en- 
livens the  whole  piece,  that  the  images  which  flow  from 
the  objects  themselves  appear  weak  and  faint,  in  com- 
parison of  those  that  come  from  the  expressions.'  ^ 

Hume,  in  distinguishing  impressions  and  ideas, 
rightly  restored  the  word  '  idea  '  to  its  original  sense, 
from  which  Descartes  had  perverted  it  in  making  it 
stand  for  all  our  perceptions.  But  he  tried  to  put  new 
wine  into  old  bottles.  The  Aristotelian  distinction  of 
impressions  and  ideas  does  not  accord  with  Hume's 
distinctions  of  vivid  and  faint  perceptions,  and  can  only 
be  explained  by  the  Aristotelian  criterion  of  the  pre- 
sence and  absence  of  an  external  object,  which  was 
repugnant  to  Hume's  philosophy.  Sensation  is  the  ap- 
prehension of  an  object  presented  to  the  senses  repre- 
senting an  external  object;  while  hallucination,  or 
'subjective  sensation,'  is  a  similar  apprehension  pro- 
duced by  pressure  on  a  sensory  nerve :  imagination  is 
the  apprehension  of  an  idea  representing  a  sensible 
object  or  something  similar  to  it  and  inferred  from  it. 
But  the  presentations  of  sense  are  often  less  vivid  than 
the  afterthoughts  of  fancy. 

Hume's  second  point  is  the  empirical  doctrine  that 
impressions  are  the  originals  of  all  our  ideas,  which,  as 
before,  he  identifies  with  our  thoughts :  — 

'But  though  our  thought  seems  to  possess  this 
unbounded  liberty,  we  shall  find,  upon  a  nearer  exami- 
nation, that  it  is  really  confined  within  very  narrow 
limits,  and  that  all  this  creative  power  of  the  mind 
amounts  to  no  more  than  the  faculty  of  compounding, 

»  Sjjecfator,  No.  416. 


1 1  _ 
1 1  ii 


transposing,  augmenting,  or  diminishing  the  materials 
afforded  us  by  the  senses  and  experience.  Wlien  we 
think  of  a  golden  mountain,  we  only  join  two  consistent 
ideas,  gold  and  7nountain,  with  which  we  were  formerly 
acquainted.  A  virtuous  horse  we  can  conceive ;  be- 
cause, from  our  own  feehng,  we  can  conceive  virtue ; 
and  this  we  may  unite  to  the  figure  and  shape  of  a 
horse,  which  is  an  animal  familiar  to  us.  In  short,  all 
the  materials  of  thinking  are  derived  either  from  our 
outward  or  inward  sentiments :  the  mixture  and  com- 
position of  these  belongs  alone  to  the  mind  and  will : 
or,  to  express  myself  in  philosophical  language,  all  our 
ideas  or  more  feeble  perceptions  are  copies  of  our  im- 
pressions or  more  lively  ones.'  ^ 

The  conclusion  of  this  passage  is  a  neat  summar}^  of 
the  argument  in. the  Second  Book  of  Locke's  'Essay.' 
Sense  is  the  source  of  ideas,  however  indirect  the  i:)rocess 
of  their  formation.  Locke  had  disposed  of  innate  ideas.^ 
As  Hume  puts  it, '  all  our  impressions  are  innate,  and  our 
ideas  not  innate,'  ^  meaning  that  the  former  are  intuitive 
and  the  latter  derivative.  But  when  we  are  told  that 
all  our  ideas  are  copies,  direct  or  indirect,  of  our  im- 
pressions, several  questions  present  themselves.  First, 
what  are  those  impressions  which  have  to  be  the  ori- 
ginals of  all  ideas  ?  Secondly,  what  are  the  processes 
which  enable  us  to  copy  tlie  original  impressions  ? 
Thirdly,  what  are  the  ideas  and  thoughts  which  we  are 
able  to  reach  ?  We  shall  have  to  ask  ourselves  about  our 
impressions,  our  processes,  our  ideas,  and  our  thoughts. 

What  are  impressions  ?  It  is  surprising  how  little 
Hume  condescends  to  tell  us  on  this  subject,  incom- 
parably the  most  important  in  his  philosophy.  In  the 
'Treatise'  he  says  that '  the  examination  of  our  sensations 

^  Inquiry^  §  2.  ^  Cf.  Treatise,  iii.  §  14.         '  Inquiry^  §  2,  note. 


264 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


belongs  more  to  anatomists  and  natural  pliilosopliers 
than  to  moral ;  and,  therefore,  shall  not  at  present  be 
entered  upon.'  ^  It  never  is  entered  upon  in  the 
'  Treatise ' ;  and  in  the  '  Inquiry '  all  that  is  said  on  the  sub- 
ject is  that  impressions  are  more  vivid  than  ideas,  that 
they  are  the  origin  of  ideas,  that  there  are  impressions 
of  sensation  and  impressions  of  reflection,  and  that  in 
all  cases  the  mind  has  never  anything  present  to  it 
but  perceptions,  which  are  either  impressions  or  ideas. 
We  are  left  to  gather  that  the  sensible  object  of  the 
impression,  being  a  mere  quality  not  distinct  from  the 
operation,  is,  in  short,  the  im2)ression  itself.  Bare  ab- 
stract impressions  are  the  data  of  Hume's  empiricism. 
But  it  is  one  thincr  to  admit  that  knowledsje  besfins  with 
sense,  another  to  assume  that  it  besrins  with  a  sense  of 
impressions. 

When  we  reflect  that  these  impressions  are  deliber- 
ately stated  to  be  the  premises  of  all  our  conclusions  by 
a  philosopher  who  truly  says  that  '  one  mistake  is  the 
necessary  parent  of  another,'  the  omission  of  an  exami- 
nation of  sensation  strikes  us  with  the  greatest  surprise. 
But  when  we  consider  that  all  the  idealists  have  taken 
their  data  of  sense  with  the  same  coolness,  the  wonder 
ceases.  As,  to  begin  with,  Descartes  had  attempted  no 
formal  proof  that  a  soul  must  perceive  ideas,  while 
Locke  and  Berkeley  simply  accepted  the  hypothesis 
that  it  does  perceive  ideas,  so  Hume  assumed  that  the 
mind  has  never  anything  present  to  it  but  perceptions, 
and  so,  after  him,  Kant  begged  that  the  matter  of  sense, 
and  Mill  begged  that  the  information  which  the  senses 
give  us  concerning  objects,  is  our  sensations.^ 

^   Treatise,  i.  §  2. 

^  Cf.  Hume,  Inquiry,  §  12  ;  Kant,  Critique  (ed.  Hartenstein,  pp.  33, 
55-6 ;  Meiklejohn's  translation,  Bohn),  pp.  1,  21 ;  Mill,  Examination  of 
Hamilton's  Philosophy,  chap.  ii. 


CHAP.  IX. 


HUME 


205 


In  order  to  correct  Hume's  theory  of  impressions, 
and  his  followers'  theory  of  sensation,  it  is  necessary  to 
repeat,  what  we  have  already  proved,  that  sense  appre- 
hends neither  itself  nor  abstractions.  It  is,  in  the  first 
place,  always  an  operation  of  a  subject  apprehending 
an  object,  internal,  but  not  identical  with  the  operation. 
Secondly,  its  object  is  always  a  qualified  substance, 
internal  but  not  resolvable  into  abstract  qualities. 
Thirdly,  when  it  is  outer  sense,  sensation,  and  sensi- 
tive observation,  the  substance  apprehended  is  the  ner- 
vous substance  sensibly  qualified  in  different  parts  as 
coloured,  heated,  &c.  Fourthly,  when  it  is  inner  sense, 
consciousness  and  conscious  reflection,  the  substance 
apprehended  is  the  thinking  subject,  body  and  soul. 
An  impression  without  a  substantial  subject  and  object 
is  an  abstraction,  never  perceived,  never  known,  with 
difficulty  made  an  object  of  attention.  A  man  is  a  sub- 
stantial subject  impressed  with  a  substantial  object,  and 
can  be  conscious  of  himself  being  so  impressed,  as  well 
as  conceiving,  reasoning,  and  performing  other  opera- 
tions. 

Hume's  theory  of  impressions,  when  corrected  by 
being  converted  from  the  abstract  into  the  concrete, 
contains  the  valuable  point,  too  often  neglected,  that, 
even  without  judgment,  a  man's  simple  sensation  of  the 
white,  or  the  hot,  is  a  beginning  of  knowledge,  and  no 
mere  abstraction.  Nay,  as  we  saw  in  the  first  part  of 
this  essay,  we  can  even,  trace  knowledge  to  a  still  simpler 
origin.  I  begin  to  know  when  I  feel  pained  or  pleased  ; 
not,  be  it  remembered,  when  there  is  pain  or  pleasure, 
which  are  afterthoughts.  My  first  act  of  knowledge  is 
having  a  simple  feeling  in  the  concrete :  my  second  act 
of  knowledge  is  having  a  simple  sensation  of  a  sensible 
obiect  in  the  concrete. 


2GG 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II, 


There  are  two  ways  of  criticising  Hume's  theory  of 
impressions.  The  wrong  criticism  is  to  accept  it  as  a 
complete  account  of  sensation,  conclude  that  pure  sensa- 
tion is  an  abstraction  which  never  occurs  in  conscious- 
ness, and  yet  assume  these  very  abstractions  to  be  the 
elements  of  a  psychological  synthesis.^  Those  who  take 
this  view  are  too  much  tarred  with  the  brush  of  Hume. 
A  pure  sensation,  or  impression  in  Hume's  terminolog}^ 
is  an  abstraction ;  but  so  far  from  being  an  element  of 
knowledge,  it  is  a  subsequent  result  of  concentration  on 
the  mere  operation  of  knowing,  to  the  neglect  of  sub- 
ject and  object,  and  is  only  put  for  the  real  elements  of 
knowledge  by  a  convenient  form  of  speech.  The  right 
(criticism  is  to  point  out  that  Hume  substituted  the  after- 
abstraction  of  sensation  for  the  data  of  sense  and  the 
elements  of  knowledge,  w^liich  are  always  a  substantial 
subject  sensibly  perceiving  substantial  objects  within 
jhe  nervous  system  and  consciously  perceiving  himself. 
There  is  no  such  a  thing  in  rerum  naturci  as  an  im- 
pression and  a  consciousness,  which  are  merely  ab- 
stracted post  rem,  but  there  is  such  a  thing  as  man 
impressed  with  an  object  and  man  conscious  of  himself. 
Sensation  and  consciousness,  in  this  concrete  shape,  are, 
moreover,  not  only  the  real  elements  of  knowledge,  but 
are  themselves  knowledge  ;  for,  as  Aristotle  saw,  though 
sense  is  not  science  {iino-TTJfiT]),  on  the  other  hand  it  is 
knowledge  (yraicrts). 

Next,  we  come  to  the  association  of  ideas,  thus  de- 
scribed by  Hume  : — 

'  It  is  evident  that  there  is  a  principle  of  connection 
between  the  different  thoughts  or  ideas  of  the  mind,  and 
that,  in  their  appearance  to  the  memory  or  imagination, 

*  Cf.  Wiindt,  Phijsiologisclie  Psychologie,  ii.  196. 


CHAP.    IX. 


HUME 


207 


they  introduce  each  other  with  a  certain   degree    of 
method  and  regularity.'  ^ 

He  also  assigned  three  principles  of  connection  among 
ideas,  namely,  resemblance,  contiguity  in  time  or  place, 
and  cause  or  effect ;  for  examjile,  a  picture  leads  our 
thoughts  to  the  original ;  the  mention  of  one  apartment 
in  a  building  suggests  a  discourse  concerning  the  others  ; 
and  if  we  think  of  a  wound,  we  can  scarcely  forbear 
reflecting  on  the  pain  which  follows  it.'^  Such  is  the 
association  of  ideas  on  these  three  principles  ;  a  pro- 
cess, which  Hume  did  not  exactly  substitute  for  all 
reasoning,  for  he  regarded  mathematics  as  intuitive  and 
demonstrative,  and  founded  morals  on  sympathy  and 
reason  ;  Init  which  he  did  make  the  substitute  for 
reason  in  all  matters  of  causation,  the  organ  of  natural 
philosophy,  and,  after  sense,  the  main  origin  of  our 
ideas,  which  in  the  passage  just  quoted  are,  for  the 
third  time,  identified  with  our  thoucrhts. 

Association  of  ideas  is  a  vei^a  causa :  this  is  the 
great  advantage  of  Hume  over  Kant.  We  are  conscious 
that  when  we  have  been  sensible  of  two  objects  together, 
and  have  a  sensation  or  idea  of  one,  we,  in  consequence, 
have  the  idea  of  the  other :  we  are  not  conscious  that 
w^e  have  an  a  priori  idea,  or  any  other  apprehension  of 
an  object  which  we  have  not  apprehended  beforehand, 
either  immediately  or  mediately.  The  simplest  way,  in 
which  this  conscious  suggestion  of  ideas  acts,  is  when 
simple  feelings  or  sensations  and  their  ideas  introduce  the 
ideas  of  one  another.  That  is  not  a  bad  instance  m ven 
by  Hume ;  the"  idea  of  a  w^ound  suggests  the  idea  of 
pain.  The  conditions  of  such  a  simple  sensitive  associa 
tion,  as  we  may  name  it,  are,  first,  simple  feelings  or 
sensations  occurring    together  ;    secondly,  their  being 

'  Inquiry,  §  3.  ^  lb. 


268 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISxM 


PART   II. 


repeated  together ;  thirdly,  imagination,  or  the  power  of 
conceiving  ideas ;  fourthly,  the  appearance  of  one  of 
the  feelings  or  sensations,  or  of  one  of  their  ideas  ;  and 
finally,  the  association  itself,  which  consists  in  the  con- 
sequent introduction  of  the  idea  of  the  other  feeling  or 
sensible  object. 

A  question  may,  indeed,  be  raised,  which  is  evaded 
by  Hume  and  by  many  of  his  disciples.  Need  we  only 
have  had  the  original  impressions  together,  or  must 
we  have  also  perceived  their  relation,  or  the  relation 
of  their  objects  ?  For  example,  must  we  have  been 
sensible  not  only  of  the  wound  and  of  the  pain,  but  also 
that  the  wound  was  cause  of  the  pain,  before  it  would 
suggest  the  idea  of  the  pain  ?  Hume,  starting  as  he 
did  from  simple  impressions,  would  no  doubt  have 
answered  this  question  in  the  negative.  He  would  pro- 
bably have  been  right ;  and,  moreover,  he  was  aware  of 
the  reason,  which  is  the  anatomical  connection  of  the 
parts  of  the  nervous  system,^  though  how,  if  everything 
we  know  is  perceptions,  he  could  know  about  the  nervous 
system,  which  is  the  material  cause  of  these  perceptions, 
he  did  not  vouchsafe  to  explain.  The  unconscious  con- 
nection of  nervous  centres,  e.g.  between  those  which 
control  the  contraction  of  the  iris  and  those  which  act 
on  the  ciliary  muscle  to  increase  the  convexity  of  the 
crystalline  lens  in  the  eye,  the  facts  of  automatic  action 
in  general,  and  those  of  unconscious  cerebration  in  par- 
ticular, make  it  exceedingly  probable,  notwithstanding 
the  difficulty  of  isolating  such  a  fact  in  consciousness, 
that  when  a  connection  has  been  set  up  between  ner- 
vous centres,  through  two  simple  sensations  repeatedly 
occurring  together,  then  the  occurrence  of  one  will,  by 
an  association  founded  on  the  nervous  connection,  in- 

*  Treatise,  ii.  §  5  ;  cf.  Locke,  Essay,  ii.  33,  6. 


CHAP.    IX. 


HUME 


269 


troduce  the  idea  of  the  other,  without  our  having  ever 
perceived  that  the  two  sensations  or  their  sensible 
objects  were  connected.  In  accordance  also  with  that 
gradation  of  animal  faculties  first  noticed  by  Aristotle, 
it  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  some  animals,  which 
have  got  beyond  feeling  and  simple  sensation  to  the 
phantasy  of  imagination,  may  possess  this  simple  sensi- 
tive association  of  ideas,  wdiich  also,  through  the  power 
of  ideas  over  passions  and  passions  over  movements, 
may  be  the  guide  of  their  lives. 

It  is  a  very  different  question  how  far  simple  sensa- 
tion, ideation,  and  association  would  carry  a  man  on  the 
path  of  rational  life.  All  association  of  ideas  is  an  act 
of  reproductive  imagination.  It  merely  reproduces  the 
idea  of  something  already  known  somehow  or  other. 
We  shall  find,  in  the  sequel,  that  as  knowledge  widens 
association  widens  with  it.  But  at  present  we  are  deal- 
ing with  the  simplest  kind  of  association  from  simple 
sensations,  which  is  also  the  onlv  kind  which  Hume 
formally  recognises.  Now,  his  doctrine  is  that  when  we 
have  had  simple  impressions  together,  ideas  are  their 
copies,  and  association  introduces  these  ideas  by  the 
laws  of  connection  among  the  impressions.  This  can 
only  mean  that  association  reproduces  the  idea  of  an 
object  already  sensible;  for  example,  if  having  been 
hurt  I  felt  pain,  being  hurt  again  will  reproduce  the 
idea  of  the  f)reviously  felt  pain. 

An  idea  of  a  previously  felt  pain  is  quite  a  different 
thing  from  the  idea  of  a  similar  pain  not  yet  felt ;  the 
former  represents  a  previous  impression,  the  latter  a 
future  impression;  the  former  is  an  object  of  simi}le 
reproductive,  the  latter  of  simj^jle  productive  imagina- 
tion. Now,  simple  sensitive  association  reproduces  in 
the  present  the  idea  of  a  particular  pain  already  actually 


270 


rSYCIlOLOGlCAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


felt  in  the  past ;  but  neither  Hume  nor  any  of  his  dis- 
ciples has  shown  that  it  will  perform  the  very  different 
operation  of  producing  the  similar  but  new  idea  of  a 
similar  but  new  pain  to  be  possibly  felt  in  the  future. 
Here  is  the  Umit  of  association :  it  always  reproduces 
the  idea  of  something  already  apprehended  :  never  pro- 
duces the  idea  of  something  not  yet  apprehended.  I 
have  been  hurt  and  felt  pain  :  I  am  now  hurt ;  I  imagine 
the  ideas  of  previous  pain  when  I  was  hurt;  I  also 
imagine  the  idea  of  a  pain  now  to  follow  the  hurt,  but 
not  yet  felt.  Association  reproduces  the  former  ideas  ; 
and  w^hy?  Because  the  particular  impressions,  of 
which  the  particular  ideas  are  copies,  have  occurred 
tof^ether.  But  this  reproductive  act  w^ill  not  of  itself 
produce  the  latter  idea,  the  impression  of  which  has 
never  occurred  at  all.  Association  from  simple  im- 
pression reproduces  particular  ideas  of  particular  ob- 
jects previously  sensible  :  it  does  not  produce  a  particu- 
lar idea  even  of  a  single  particular  object,  not  yet  sen- 
sible ;  a  fortiori,  it  is  powerless  to  generate  a  general 

idea. 

Huiie's  critic  must  constantly  keep  before  him  the 
question — Is  all  the  reasoning  of  the  natural  philosopher 
nothing  but  a  reproduction  of  sensible  ideas  by  simple 
association  ?  This  question  brings  us  to  Hume's  main 
point,  that  while  all  mathematical  reasoning  is  a  process 
from  intuition  through  demonstration  to  relations  of 
ideas,  all  reasoning  about  facts  is  a  process  from  ex- 
perience of  constant  conjunction  of  impressions  through 
association  to  ideas,  i.e.  beliefs,  of  cause  and  effect.  The 
discussion  of  this  complicated  theory  compels  the  con- 
sideration of  many  points  :  belief  or  judgment  and  reason- 
ing or  inference,  intuition  and  demonstration,  causation 
and  our  knowledge  of  cause  and  effect.     Judgment  and 


CUAT.    IX. 


HUME 


271 


reasoning  alone  almost  require  a  logic.  I  propose  to 
confine  myself  to  these,  leaving  the  remaining  points 
for  subsequent  discussion.  We  must  not  leave  the  most 
precious  of  all  man's  gifts  to  be  stolen  from  him  without 
striking  a  blow.  What  was  wanted,  and  is  still  a  de- 
sideratum, is,  not  a  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason,  but  a 
Vindication  of  Loo^ical  Eeasoninof. 

'  Nature,'  says  Hume,  '  by  an  absolute  and  uncon- 
trollable necessity,  has  determined  us  to  judge,  as  well 
as  breathe  and  feel.'  ^     He  saw  the  importance  of  judg- 
ment or  belief.  He  also  set  himself,  both  in  the  '  Treatise' 
and  in  the  '  Inquiry,'  ^  to  '  examine  more  accurately  the 
nature  of  this  behef.'     But  in  both  cases  he  adopted  the 
same  extraordinary  paradox,  that,  as  impression  is  only  a 
more  vivid  perception  than  an  idea,  so  a  belief  is  only  a 
more  vivid  idea  than  a  fiction.       '  I  say  that  belief  is  no- 
tliingbut  a  more  vivid,  lively,  forcible,  firm,  steady  con- 
ception of  an  object  than  what  the  imagination  alone  is 
ever  able  to  attain  ' :  such  is  Hume's  definition  of  belief.'^ 
Why  did  he  fall  into  this  extraordinary  confusion  of 
simple  and  complex  apprehension,  of  conception  and 
judgment,  of  an  idea  and  a  belief?      Because,  wantincr 
to  derive  all  beliefs  from  association,  and  being  aware 
that  association  terminates  in  ideas,  there  was  nothino- 
for  it  but  to  reduce  beliefs  to  vivid  ideas.     He  cut  his 
coat  according  to  his  cloth— in  a  thoroughly  ideahstic 
style  of  tailoring.     '  Whenever,'  he  says,   '  any  object 
is  presented  to  the  memory  or  senses,  it  immediatelv, 
by  the  force  of  custom,  carries  the  imagination  to  con- 
ceive that  object  which  is  usually  conjoined  to  it ;  and 
this  conception  is  attended  with  a  feeling  or  sentiment 
different  from  the  loose  reveries  of  the  fancy.     In  this 

*  Treatise,  iv.  §  1.  ^  n,  j-j  ^  7  .  j^j^^^j^^^  §  ^ 

^  Inquiry,  §  5,  Tart  II. 


272 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALTS.M 


TART  ir. 


consists  the  wliole  nature  of  belief. '  ^  All  lie  really 
shows  is  that,  if  association  is  the  origin  of  beUefs,  they 
would  be  mere  ideas ;  but  he  does  not  prove  that  they 
are  so.  It  was  to  prepare  for  this  confusion  of  concep- 
tion and  belief,  that  he  had  said  first  that  all  percep- 
tions are  impressions  and  ideas  or  thoughts,  that  all 
ideas  or  thoughts  are  copies  of  impressions,  and  that 
association  is  a  principle  of  connection  of  ideas  or 
thoughts ;  as  if  all  thought  were  ideas  and  ideas  our 

only  thoughts ! 

Judgment,  or  belief,  is,  like  conception,  an  appre- 
hension, but  not  like  it  in  being  the  apprehension  of  an 
idea ;  nor  can  any  accumulation  of  epithets  added  to  a 
conception  make  it  a  judgment.  Judgment  is  the 
apprehension  of  a  relation.  Hume  entirely  missed  this 
point,  by  which  judgment  is  differentiated  from  all  con- 
ception whatever.  He  was,  no  doubt,  much  deceived 
by  the  conceptuahstic  theory  of  relation  in  Locke's 
'  Essay.'  But  Locke,  though  he  had  confused  relations 
}^^ith  their  ideas  in  the  Second  Book,  changed  his  key 
when  he  came  to  the  Fourth  Book,  and  regarded  judg- 
ments as  perceptions  of  the  agreement  and  disagreement 
of  ideas,  without  resolving  these  relations  into  ideas,  as 
strict  consistency  would  have  demanded.  It  should  be 
noticed  that  this  differentia  of  judgment  holds  even 
when  the  things  related  are  ideas;  when  I  judge  that  a 
dragon  is  a  serpent  breathing  flame,  I  have  only  ideas  of 
a  dragon  and  of  such  a  fiery  serpent,  but  I  judge  that 
the  ideas  actually  have  the  relation  of  identity,  which  I 
can  express  in  a  proposition  by  the  copula,  is.  Locke, 
then,  might  at  least  have  taught  Hume  that  a  judgment 
perceives,  not  mere  ideas,  but  the  agreement  and  dis- 
agreement of  ideas.     But,  as  usual,  the  Second  Book 

*  Inquiry,  §  5,  Part  II. 


CHAP.  IX. 


HUME 


273 


attracted   philosophers   to  the  neglect   of  the  Fourth 
Book  of  Locke's  '  Essay.' 

But  though  Locke's  theory  of  judgment  is  wider 
than  Hume's,   it  is  not  adequate;   not  all  judgments 
apprehend  relations  of  ideas  ;  for  some  judgments  appre- 
hend relations  of  sensible  objects.     This  point  has  been 
excellently  made  by  Mill,  the  logician  of  the  school  of 
Locke  and  Hume,    in  his  '  Logic,'  when   he  says  that 
'  beheving  is  an  act  which  has  for  its  subject  the  facts 
themselves,  though  a  previous  mental  conception  of  the 
facts  is  an  indispensable  condition.     When  I  say  thaT 
fire  causes  heat,  do  I  mean  that  my  idea  of  fire  causes 
my  idea  of  heat  ?     No  ;  I  mean  that  the  natural  pha^no- 
menon,   fire,    causes    the   natural    phasnomenon,  heat. 
When  I  mean  to  assert  anything  respecting  ideas,  I  give 
them  their  proper  name  ;  I  call  them  ideas  ;   as  when  I 
.  say  that  a  child's  idea  of  a  battle  is  unlike  the  reality.'  ^ 
Hence,  Mill's  'Logic'  recognises  judgments  of  relations^ 
between  phasnomena    as  well  as  between   ideas,  from 
which  the  founder  of   the  modern    distinction  of  im- 
pressions and  ideas  could  hardly  have  escaped.      Not 
that  even  Mill's  analysis  is  adequate.     In  the  first  place, 
Mill's  list  of  judgments  is  incomplete;  there  are  judg- 
ments of  relations  between   sensible   objects,  between 
ideas,  between    insensible,  and  between   imperceptible 
objects,  judgments  of  sense,  of  conception,  of  inferential 
perception,  and  of  transcendental  inference ;  secondly, 
even  if,  so  far  as  judgments  are  premises,  conceptions 
may  be  their  conditions,  so  far  as  they  are  conclusions, 
the  judgment  is  often  the  condition  of  the  conception, 
as  when  we  infer  a  corpuscle,  and   then  conceive  it. 
But  for  our  present  purpose  it  is  sufficient  that,  as  Mill 
says,  there  are  judgments  of  relations  between  phseno- 

'  Mill,  Logic,  i.  5, 1 ;  cf.   also  Exa7n.  of  Hamilton's  Phil.  chap,  xviii. 


274 


rSYCTIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PAKT  II. 


mena,  sensible  objects,  the  objects  of  simple  impressions. 
Such  a  judgment  is  not  an  apprehension  of  a  relation 
of  ideas,  much  less  an  idea  of  a  relation. 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  distinguish  judgments 
from  ideas  by  Hume's  admissions.  In  the  first  place, 
he  reco<^niises  relations,  reducing  them  in  the  '  Treatise '  ^ 
to  seven  general  heads  :  resemblance,  identity,  those  of 
space  and  time,  quantity  or  number,  degrees  of  qualit}^ 
contrariety,  and  cause  or  effect ;  and,  in  both  '  Treatise ' 
and  'Inquiry,'  admitting  the  relations  of  resemblance, 
contif^uity,  and  sequence  of  impressions,  on  which  asso- 
ciation is  founded.  There  are,  then,  relations  to  be 
Judged.  Secondly,  he  held  that  mathematics  are  con- 
cerned with  relations  of  ideas,  and  unwarily  admits 
Locke's  doctrine  that  a  mathematical  proposition  ex- 
resses  a  relation.^  Thirdly,  and  most  curiously,  in  the 
very  chapter  in  which  he  had  defined  belief  as  an  idea 
made  vivid  by  association,  he  goes  on  to  allow  that, 
when  a  picture  introduces  the  idea  of  a  friend,  the 
association  presupposes  a  belief  in  the  friend's  exist- 
ence. '  We  may  observe,'  says  he, '  that  in  these  pha^no- 
mena  the  belief  of  the  correlative  object  is  always 
presupposed  ;  without  which  the  relation  would  have, 
no  effect.  The  influence  of  the  picture  supposes  that  we 
believe  our  friend  to  have  once  existed.'  W\\^i  can  this 
belief  in  a  friend's  existence  be,  according  to  Hume, 
except  Mill's  apprehension  of  a  relation  of  phnenomena 
or  impressions?  And  are  not  there  such  beliefs,  not 
only  of  existence,  but  also  of  the  other  relations  of 
ph^enomena,  mentioned  by  Mill — coexistence,  sequence, 
resemblance,  even  if  not  of  causation  ? 

Hume  would,  perhaps,  reply  that  we  have  a  vivid 
idea  of  the  relation  between  our  friend  and  his  exist- 


-  Treatise,  i.  §  5. 


Inquiry,  §  4, 


CHAP.    IX. 


HUME 


275 


ence,  in  which  the  belief  consists.  It  is  true  that  we 
have  such  an  idea.  But,  in  truth  and  in  Hume's  philo- 
sophy, this  idea  must  be  copied  from  an  impression  ; 
there  must,  therefore,  be  a  prior  impression  of  the  re- 
lation between  our  friend  and  his  existence,  in  which 
the  belief  consists.  We  first  judge  of  a  relation  and 
then  conceive  the  idea  of  it,  in  consequence  of  the 
judgment — an  important  source,  by  the  way,  of  complex 
ideas  of  relation. 

If  the  judgment  were  merged  in  the  mere  idea  of 
the  relation,  it  could  not  be  distinguished  from  fictitious 
ideas   of  relation.     Hume,  indeed,  tries  to  distinguish 
'  ideas  of  the  judgment '  from  fictions  of  the  imagination 
by  his  usual  criterion  of  vivacity,   contending,  for  in- 
stance, that  '  these  ideas  take  faster  hold  of  my  mind 
than  ideas  of  an  enchanted  castle.'  ^     This  may  be  true 
ofWalpole's  '  Castle  of  Otranto.'  But  Hume  wrote  before 
the  appearance   of  Scott's   historical   romances,    after 
which  he  could  not  have  failed  to  see  that  the  mere 
idea  of  a  relation   in  belief  is   often  very  inferior   in 
vivacity  to  the  idea  of  a  relation  in  fiction.     There  are 
few  scenes  in  history  so  vividly  painted  in  my  imagina- 
tion as  my  idea  of  Quentin  Durward  conducting  the 
Countess   Isabelle  out  of  France  to  Liege,    and  from 
Liege  into  Burgundy.     But,  in  spite  of  the  force  of  the 
idea,  I  do  not  beheve  in  the  relation,  and  why  not? 
Because  I  do  not  judge  or  apprehend  that  the  relation 
ever  occurred,    and  only   conceive  the   idea   of  it   in 
imagination,  stimulated  by  the   genius  of  Sir  Walter 
Scott. 

Belief,  then,  is  not  conception :  a  judgment  is  not 
an  idea,  but  the  apprehension  of  a  relation.  Now,  what 
is  the  relation  of  judgments  to  association?    According 


^ 


^  Inqiiinj,  §  5 ;  cf.  Treatise,  iii.  §  7. 


T  2 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


276 

to  Hume,  all  of  them  are  its  results ;  only,  however,  if 
they  are  nothing  but  ideas,  because  the  association  of 
ideas  terminates  in  ideas.     Well,  as  no  judgment  is  au 
idea,  not  one  judgment,  not  even  one  which  apprehends 
a  relation  of  ideas,   is  a  result  of  association,  which 
never  can  give  an  apprehension  of  a  relation.    Secondly, 
a  judcrment  which  apprehends  a  relation  of  sensible  ob- 
jects,''such  as,  I  am  hurt  and  feel  pained,  cannot  be  an 
effect  of  association,  because  the  judgment  signifies,  in 
Hume's  language,  a  relation  of  two  impressions,  while 
in  association,  even  when  that  which  suggests  is  an  im- 
pression, that  which  is  suggested  is  an  idea,  and  because 
the  judgment  is  prior  to  any  association  in  which  one 
of  the  two  impressions  suggests  the  idea  of  the  other 
Thirdly,  those  judgments  which  apprehend  relations  of 
objects  not  now  in  sense  are  not  results  of  association, 
because  they  are  not  ideas,  and  are  not  concerned  with 

ideas.  .  .        f 

»  Hence  association  is  not  an  adequate  origin  ot 
"memory  and  expectation,  which  are  judgments  of  the 
past  and  of  the  future.  Memory,  according  to  Hume,  is 
a  more  vivid  idea.  But  ideas  of  fancy  are  often  more 
vivid  than  those  of  memory.  Memory  contains  an 
idea,  but  it  is  a  judgment  that  the  idea  represents  a 
previously  apprehended  object.  Now  association  can 
reproduce  the  idea,  but  not  produce  the  judgment  of 
memory.  Still  less  is  expectation  a  result  of  associa- 
tion. It  contains  an  idea,  but  is  a  judgment  that  the 
object  will  or  may  be  apprehended.  When  the  idea 
represents  an  object  already  apprehended,  as  in  the 
case  of  memory,  association  reproduces  the  idea,  but 
does  not  produce  the  judgment  of  the  object  expected. 
When,  as  in  expectation,  the  idea  represents  an  object 
similar  to  previously  apprehended  objects,  but  not  itself 


CHAT.  IX. 


HUME 


277 


3^et  apprehended,  association  does  not  even  produce  the 
idea  of  the  expected  object ;  for,  as  we  found  before, 
association  only  reproduces  ideas.     History  and  predic- 
tion are  not  results  of  association,  because  they  consist 
of  judgments,  because  their  objects  have  never  been  in 
sense,  because  their  ideas  are  ideas  of  insensible  objects. 
A  fortiori,  science,  an  apprehension  of  laws,  or  similar 
relations   between  an   indefinite  number   of  insensible 
objects,  cannot  be  a  result  of  association.     The  associ- 
ation of  ideas  could  not  make   us  conceive  the  idea, 
much  less  judge  that  the  cities  of  the  plain  once  existed, 
which  we  never  saw ;  nor  that  the  earth  will  one  day 
be  too  cold  for  habitation,  when  we  shall  not  be  alive 
to  see  that  day ;    nor  that  all  fluids  propagate  their 
motions  equally  in  all  directions,  which  we  judge  to 
be  universal,  but  cannot  perceive,  nor  conceive  univer- 
sally.    The  association  of  ideas  does  not  produce  the 
judgments  of  history,  prediction,  and  science.    In  short, 
judgments  are  apprehensions   of  present   relations   in 
objects  of  sense,  of  past  relations  in  memory  and  his- 
tory, of  future  relations  in  expectation  and  j^rediction, 
of  universal  relations  in  science,  which,  not  being  ideas, 
are  not  results  of  association,  but  of  sense  and  reasoning. 
Association  of  ideas  reproduces  an  idea  ;  it  does  not 
produce  an  idea  :  it  neither  produces  nor  reproduces  a 
belief.     How,   then,  do  we  get  these  beliefs  or  judg- 
ments ?     That  is  the  whole  question.     How  does  judg- 
ment apj^rehend  present  relations  of  objects  in  sense  ? 
That  is  the  first  and  fundamental  question,  never  faced 
by  Hume.    I  have  admitted  that,  when  his  abstractions 
have  been  interpreted,  he  was  right  in  saying  that  we 
have  simple  impressions  in  the  sense  of  simply  feeling 
pleased  and  pained,  simply  perceiving  sensible  objects, 
the  white,  the  hot,  &c.,  and  simply  being  conscious  of 


A 


278 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART    II. 


ourselves  operating,  feeling,  seeing,  touching,  &c.  These 
are  simple  acts  of  knowledge.  A  simple  sensation  re- 
quires, indeed,  a  subject  apprehending  an  object,  and 
must  not  be  resolved  into  a  mere  abstraction.  It  does 
not  follow  that  it  contains  a  conscious  judgment  of  the 
relation  of  sul^ject  and  object,  as  some  philosophers 
suppose.  It  requires  also  to  be  different  from  other 
sensations,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  Hobbes — 
'  Idem  sentire  et  non  sentire  ad  idem  recidunt.'  It  does 
not  follow  that  it  contains  a  sense  of  discrimination. 
When  light  is  presented  to  my  retina,  by  simple  sensa- 
tion, I  see  a  visible  object  in  my  optic  nerve,  without 
judging  its  relation  to  myself,  or  to  other  sensible  objects, 
and  so  far  as  I  see  it,  know  it.  But  though  I  have 
simple  sensations  or,  as  Hume  calls  them,  impressions, 
without  judgment,  yet  I  also  judge  of  the  relations  of 
sensible  objects.  Hume  rightly  recognised  simple  sensa- 
tion, wrongly  ignored  sensitive  judgment. 

The  source  of  sensitive  judgment  is  synthetic  sense. 
Unless  I  actually  had  a  sense  of  the  succession  of  l)eing 
hurt  and  being  pained  I  could  not  judge  that  the 
succession  occurred.  Moreover,  there  is  a  synthetic 
sense  of  other  relations,  on  which  sensitive  judgment 
is  founded,  of  the  relations  enumerated  in  Hume's 
'  Treatise,'  of  the  relations  regarded  in  his  '  Inquiry '  as 
necessary  to  association,  of  the  relations  truly  regarded 
by  Mill  in  his  '  Logic '  as  part  of  the  very  import  of  a 
judgment  and  a  proposition.  Hume  should  have  dis- 
tinguished two  kinds  of  impressions,  simple  and  syn- 
thetic ;  impressions  of  sensible  objects  and  impressions 
of  relations  of  objects.  'Like  simple  tastes  and  smells, 
or  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,'  as  Professor  Huxley 
says,  '  they  are  ultimate  irresolvable  facts  of  conscious 
experience ;   and,  if  we  follow  the  principle  of  Hume's 


CHAP.   IX. 


HUME 


279 


nomenclature,  they  must  be  called  {mpressicms  of  rela- 
tion. But  it  must  be  remembered  that  they  differ  from 
the  other  impressions,  as  requiring  the  pre-existence  of 
at  least  two  of  the  latter.'  ^  In  this  way,  when  two  sen- 
sible objects  are  presented  to  us,  we  are  sensible  of  their 
succession,  their  coexistence,  their  similarity,  and  so 
forth. 

The  first  point  to  notice  about  this  sense  of  a  rela- 
tion is,  that  as  the  sensible  objects,  so  the  sensible  rela- 
tions, are  not  external  but  internal,  yet  not  psychical. 
When  I  feel  a  tangible  effect  in  my  tactile  nerves,  pro- 
duced by  laying  my  arms  on  a  table  containing  paper, 
cloth,  pens,  &c.,  I  feel  several  tangible  objects  coexisting 
with  one  aliother  within  my  tactile  nerves.  Secondly, 
this  sense  of  a  relation  is  as  presentative  as  any  simple 
sense,  and  does  not  construct  relations  but  apprehends 
them,  when  they  are  present,  between  the  sensible  ob- 
jects. In  a  word,  the  immediate  apprehension  of  a  re- 
lation is  not  a  psychological  synthesis  of  abstract  sensa- 
tions, but  a  synthetic  sense  of  sensible  objects.  In  the 
books  of  idealists,  sensation  is  an  abstraction  from  a 
substantial  subject  peiceiving  a  substantial  object  of 
sense  ;  and  synthesis  is  a  second  abstraction,  founded  on 
the  first,  from  the  receptivity  of  a  sensible  relation.  But 
in  reality  there  are  two  apprehensions  by  a  subject  of 
sensible  objects,  both  equally  sensitive  ;  first,  simple 
sensations  of  particular  objects,  and  secondly,  synthetic 
sensations  of  particular  relations  of  particular  objects. 
There  are  also  two  kinds  of  experience :  the  first,  a  sum 
of  simple  sensations,  e.g.  of  being  pained  ;  the  second, 
a  sum  of  synthetic  sensations,  e.g.  of  being  pained  at 
repeated  blows  in  a  fight. 

Curiously  enough,  Hume  over  and  over  again  men- 

*  Professor  Huxley,  Hume,  chap.  ii. 


280 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


tions  instances  of  synthetic   sense   and   synthetic  ex- 
perience intervening  between   impression   and   associ- 
ation,  yet   without   formal    acknowledgment.     In   the 
'Treatise,'  he  says  that  'when  both  the  objects    are 
present  to  the  senses  along  with  the  relation,  we  call 
this  perception  rather  than  reasoning  ;  nor  is  there  in 
this  case  any  exercise  of  the  thought,  or  any  action, 
properly  speaking,  but  a  mere  passive  admission  of  the 
impressions  through  the  organs  of  sensation.'  ^     Again, 
in  speaking  of  the  data  of  the  idea  of  causation,  he 
says  :   '  The  nature  of  experience  is  this :  We  remem- 
ber to  have  had  frequent  instances  of  the  existence  of 
one  species  of  objects ;  and  also  remember,  that  the 
individuals  of  another  species  of  objects  have  always 
attended  them,  and  have  existed  in  a  regular  order  of 
contiguity  and  succession  with  regard  to  them.     Thus 
we  remember  to  have  seen  that  species  of  object  we  call 
flame,  and  to  have  felt  that  species  of  sensation  we  call 
heat.     We  likewise  call  to  mind  their  constant  conjunc- 
tion in  all  instances."^     In  the  'Inquiry'  we  find  pas- 
sages   close    together,   one    implying   synthetic   sense 
followed  by  another  implying  synthetic  experience  : — 
'  Suppose  a  person,  though  endow^ed  with  the  strongest 
faculties  of  reason  and  reflection,  to  be  brought  on  a 
sudden  into  this  world  ;  he  would,  indeed,  immediately 
observe  a  continual  succession  of  objects  and  one  event 
following   another.    .    .    .   Suppose  again  that   he  has 
acquired  more  experience,  and  has  lived  so  long  in  the 
world  as  to  have  observed  similar  objects  or  events  to  be 
constantly  conjoined  together ;  what  is  the  consequence 
of  this  experience  ?     He  immediately  infers  the  exist- 
ence of  one  object  from  the  appearance  of  the  other.'  ^ 


^  Treatise,  iii.  ^  2. 


lb,  iii.  §  6  ;  cf.  §  8. 


^  Inquiry,  §  5,  Part  I. 


CHAP.   IX. 


HUME 


281 


Similarly,  in  a  well-known  passage,  he  says  :  '  All 
events  seem  entirely  loose  and  separate.  One  event 
follows  another,  but  we  never  can  observe  any  tie 
between  them.  They  seem  conjoined,  but  never  con- 
neded:  ^  Whatever  Hume  may  say  about  impressions, 
he  constantly  admits  an  immediate  observation  and  ex- 
perience of  any  relations,  short  of  connection  ;  when  he 
says  that  events  seem  loose  and  separate,  he  does  not 
mean  that  they  seem  quite  isolated ;  and  he  allows  a 
power  of  apprehending  constant  conjunction,  though 
without  causation,  prior  to  association.  How  then 
could  he  refuse  to  call  this  sensitive  apprehension  of  a 
relation  belief,  or  contend  that  such  a  sensitive  belief  is 
a  result  of  association  ? 

Thus  we  find  that  belief  or  judgment  is  not  an  idea, 
but  an  apprehension  of  a  relation  ;  and  not  a  result  of 
association,  but  originally  derived  from  a  synthetic  sense 
of  relations.      What  are  the    consequences?      In  the 
first  place,  synthetic  sense  and  judgment  are  not  asso- 
ciations, because  the  objects  related  are  both  sensible ; 
neither  is  an  idea  ;  and  one  does  not  suggest  the  other, 
but  their  relation  is  presented.      Secondly,   synthetic 
sense,  experience,  and  judgment  having  apprehended  a 
relation  in  particular  instances,  cause  a  complex  idea  of 
the  relation  ;  thus  forming  a  source  of  ideas  unnoticed 
by  Locke  and  his  followers.     Thirdly,  although  simple 
sensations  and  experiences  sometimes,  by  the  anatomical 
connection  of  their  nervous  centres,  without  any  judg- 
ment of  their  relation,  produce  an  association  of  ideas  ; 
nevertheless,  in  an  animal  capable  of  judgment,  it  more 
frequently  happens  that  synthetic  sense,  experience,  and 
judgment  apprehend  the  relation  of  the  sensible  objects, 
and^'cause  an  association  of  the  ideas  of  the  objects  and 

1  Inquiry,  §  7,  Part  II. 


282 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


of  tlieir  relation,  wliicli  I  propose  to  call  synthetic  sen- 
sitive association.  In  these  cases,  so  far  from  associa- 
tion prodncing  belief,  belief  produces  association.  For 
example,  I  judge  that  one  object  follows  another  in  my 
senses,  and  when  one  appears  again,  I  consequently 
have  not  only  the  idea  of  the  other,  but  also  the  idea  of 
their  sequence,  which  I  could  not  get  from  simple  sensi- 
tive association.  Here,  perhaps,  is  another  stopping 
place  in  animal  intelHgence.  Fourthly,  synthetic  sense 
and  experience  of  relations,  being  the  sources  of  sensi- 
tive and  empirical  judgments  without  association,  supply 
the  orii^inal  evidences  of  reasonin^]^  without  association. 
The  want  of  a  formal  recognition  of  synthetic  sense,  at 
the  very  time  he  was  accumulating  instances  of  its 
action,  concealed  from  Hume  the  true  sources  of  reason- 
ing, and  its  independence  of  association. 

The  problem  of  inference  or  reasoning  hinges  on  two 
questions;  the  origin  of  new  judgments,  and  the  origin 
of  new  ideas.  We  have  achieved  some  of  the  data  for 
solving  this  problem;  by  showing  that  we  have  judg- 
ments of  synthetic  sense  to  start  with,  that  no  judgment 
is  an  idea,  and  that  association,  in  reproducing  ideas  of 
objects  already  sensible,  does  not  produce  an  idea  of  an 
object  not  yet  sensible,  and  does  not  produce  a  judgment 
at  all.  These  data  of  themselves  indicate  a  difference 
between  the  association  of  ideas  and  the  inference  of 
judgments,  and  also  point  to  an  origin  of  ideas  other  than 
association.  Eeason  starts  directly  from  judgments  of 
synthetic  sense,  and,  without  passing  through  associa- 
tion, infers  judgments,  issuing  in  rational  ideas. 

'  Man,'  says  Hume,  '  is  a  reasonable  being  ;  and,  as 
such,  receives  from  science  his  proper  food  and  nourish- 
ment.' ^     Hume  did  not  deny  reasoning,  nor  resolve  it 

^  Inquiry,  §  1. 


CHAP.  IX. 


HUME 


283 


all  into  association.     He  had  no  general  theory  on  the 
subject ;  and  this  is  one  of  the  weaknesses  of  his  philo- 
sophy.    But  he  admitted,  in  mathematics,  a  species  of^ 
reasoning,  not  only  distinct  from  association,  but  even 
consisting  of  demonstration  from  intuition.    However,  in^ 
spite  of  his  distinction  of  impressions  and  ideas,  in  the 
spirit   of  Locke,  he   thought   that   this   mathematical 
reasoning  is  limited  to  the  relation  of  ideas.     The  point 
of  his  polemic  against  reason  was  that  it  never  reaches 
matters  of  fact.     He  wanted  to  prove  that  judgments 
of  fact,  being  mere  ideas,  are  mere  products  of  associa- 
tion.     He    failed,   because  judgments    are   not   ideas, 
because  association  does  not  produce  ideas  niucli  less 
judgments,  and  because  reasoning  from  sensitive  judg- 
ments produces  rational  judgments  of  fact,  and  rational 
ideas.     In  this  part  of  his  philosophy  he  shows  a  re- 
markable spirit  of  inquiry,  and  as  remarkable  a  power 
of  missing  the  pohit  of  difference  between  one  operation 

and  another. 

All  conclusions  about  facts,  he  thought,  are  about 
cause  and  effect,  all  conclusions  about  cause  and  effect 
are  from  experience.  '  Wkcvt;  he  asks,  '  is  the  founda- 
tion of  all  conclusions  from  experience  ? '  'I  want,'  he 
says,  '  to  learn  the  foundation  of  this  inference.'  ^  '  All 
inferences  from  experience,  therefore,  are  effects  of 
custom,  not  of  reasoning  : '  ^  this  is  the  starting-point  of 
his  answer.  '  All  our  reasonings  concerning  matters  of 
fact  are  founded  on  a  species  of  analogy,  which  leads  us 
to  expect  from  any  cause  the  same  events  which  we  have 
observed  to  result  from  similar  causes  : '  ^  this  is  his  in- 
terpretation of  customary  inference.  This  interpretation 
was  required  for  his  main  point,  that  customary  infer- 

1  Inquiry,  §  4,  Part  II.  '  lb.  §  5,  Part  I. 

3  lb.  §  9  ;  cf.  §  5,  Part  I. 


284 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


ence  is  the  same  as  the  association  of  ideas  ;  for  analogy 
suppUes  the  inference  most  hke  the  association  of  ideas. 
'  When  a  sword,'  he  says,  '  is  levelled  at  my  breast,  does 
not  the  idea  of  wound  and  pain  strike  me  more  strongly 
than  when  a  glass  of  wine  is  presented  to  me,  even 
though  by  accident  this  idea  should  occur  after  the 
appearance  of  the  latter  object?  But  what  is  there  in 
tliis  whole  matter  to  cause  such  a  strong  conception, 
except  only  a  present  oljject  and  a  customary  transition 
to  the  idea  of  another  object,  which  we  have  been 
accustomed  to  conjoin  with  the  former?  This  is  the 
whole  operation  of  the  mind  in  all  our  conclusions 
concerning  matter  of  fact  and  existence.'^  That  is, 
judgments  are  strong  conceptions,  and  inferences  are 
analogies,  which  are  associations  of  ideas. 

Analogous  inference  is  like  synthetic  association  in 
data.  Both  start  with  the  same  synthetic  experience, 
which,  in  Hume's  example,  is — 

Swords  levelled  at  me  have  already  pained  me  ; 

This  sword  is  like  previous  swords. 

This  synthetic  experience  sets  up  three  processes:  (i) 
this  sword,  being  like  previous  swords,  reproduces  the 
idea  of  having  been  already  pained ;  (2)  the  combina- 
tion of  the  two  sensitive  judgments  produces  the  new 
judgment  that  this  sw^ord  may  possibly  pain  me ;  and 
(3)  this  new  judgment  produces  the  idea  of  being 
possibly  pained.  Of  these  processes,  the  first  is  associa- 
tion of  ideas,  the  second  is  analogous  inference,  the 
third  is  analogous  conception.  Now,  analogous  infer- 
ence is  further  like  synthetic  association  in  process. 
Both  are  customary  processes  in  obedience  to  certain 
laws ;  the  laws  of  association,  and  the  law  of  analogy. 

*  Inquiry,  §  4,  Part  II. 


CHAP.  IX. 


HUME 


285 


The  law  of  analogy  is  expressed  in  logic  as  a  general 
axiom  thus :  what  is  related  in  experience  to  particu- 
lars inexperience  is  possibly  related  to  other  particulars 
like  them  in  experience.     This  axiom,  however,  does  not 
appear  in  the  premises  of  the  inference,  but  as  the  laws 
of  association  are  laws  we  spontaneously  obey  in  repro- 
ducing ideas,  so  the  law  of  analogy  is  the  spontaneous 
law  which,  without  knowing  it,  we  obey  in  inferring 
from  particular  to   particular  judgment.     It  is  after- 
wards discovered  by  logicians,  and  then  is  expressed  as 
the  law  of  the  form  of  analogous  inference ;  but  it  would 
be  a  sad  confusion  to  suppose  that  because  logicians  know 
it  everybody  who  uses  analogy  knows  it.     The  axiom 
of  analogy  is  a  mechanical  law  of  analogous  inference ; 
and  the  man  who  has  not  studied  logic  infers  from  the 
above-stated  premises  that  a  sword  may  pain  him,  not 
by  reasoning  from  the  axiom  as  a  major  premise,  but 
by  the   habit  of  using  it  as  a  mechanical  law.     Tlie 
nearest  animals  to  man  probably  infer  by  the  very  same 
habit  of  analogy,  as  Hume  and  Mill  after  him  have  re- 
marked.   We  have  already  suggested  that  some  animals, 
after  the  lowest  stage  of  mere  feeling  and  the  stage  of 
mere  sense,  may  stop  at   simple  sensitive  association, 
while  others  may  rise  to  synthetic  sensitive  association. 
Perhaps  the  analogous  inference,  which  we    are   now 
describing,    is   the   highest   limit   of  brute    reasoning. 
Finally,  analogous  inference  is  like  synthetic  association, 
not  only  in  data  and  process,  but  also  in  result.     Both 
end  in  particulars. 

Where,  then,  is  the  difference?  One  ends  in  an 
idea  of  the  past,  the  other  in  a  judgment  of  the 
possible.  The  association  of  ideas  terminates  in  an 
idea  of  having  been  previously  pained ;  the  analogous 
mference  concludes  with  a  judgment  that  this  sword 


286 


PSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


FART   II. 


may  now  possibly  pain  me.     As  a  judgment  is  not  an 
idea,  so  there  must  be  something  different  in  the  processes 
which  produce  the  one  and  the  other.     The  difference 
consists   in   the   Liws   which  the  processes   habitually 
use:  association,  acting  by  the  laws  of  the  reproduction 
of  ideas  from   resemblance,   contiguity  and   sequence, 
&c.,  analogous  inference  by  the  law  of  the  analogous 
production  of  a  particular  judgment :  what  is  related  in 
experience  to  particulars  in  experience  is  possibly  re- 
lated  to   other   particulars   like    those   in   experience. 
Finally,  besides  terminating  in  a  judgment,  analogous 
inference  produces  another  effect,  to  which  association 
is  incompetent;   the   conception  of  an  idea  of  being 
possibly  pained,  which  is  not  to  be  confused,  as  Associa- 
tionists  confuse  it,  with  the  idea  of  having  been  formerly 
pained.     This  further  operation  I  propose  to  call  analo- 
gous conception.     It  is  an  important  operation.     Thus, 
having  by  analogy  inferred  that  Mars,  being  hke  the 
earth,   may   be    inhabited,   my    analogous    conception 
pictures  an  idea  of  Martial  men.     If  I   mistake  not, 
analogous  conception  comes  much  nearer  than  associa- 
tion to  the  productive  imagination  of  art.     Analogous 
inference,  then,  is  custom,  but  not  association.     Asso- 
ciation is  customary  reproduction  of  ideas ;  analogous 
inference  is  customary  inference  from  particular  to  par- 
ticular judgment;    and    analogous   conception   is    the 
conception  in  the  productive  imagination  of  an  idea  of 
a  new  particular  inferred  by  analogy. 

Hume's  reduction  of  inference  from  experience  to 
association  breaks  down  at  the  very  first  touch  of  logic. 
It  would  not  be  worth  while  to  pursue  the  subject,  had 
he  not  made  an  audacious  attack  on  induction,  reducing 
it  to  analogy,  in  order  to  identify  it  with  association. 
Moreover,  a  similar  attempt  appears  in  Mill's  reduction 


CHAP.   IX. 


HUME 


.287 


of  induction  to  inference  from  particular  to  particular,^ 
though  in  a  much  more  half-hearted  fashion,  partly  be- 
cause he  does  not  in  his  '  Logic  '  further  identify  analogy 
with  association,  and  partly  because,  immediately  and  in 
the  sequel,  he  proceeds  to  treat  induction  in  quite  a  differ- 
ent manner.  We  shall  find  that  induction  is  not  analo- 
gous inference,  much  less  association  of  ideas.  We  must 
retrace  our  steps  from  Mill,  through  Hume,  to  Bacon, 
who  says  : — '  Aut  enim  defer tur  judicium  ah  experimentis 
ad  experimenta  ;  aut  ah  experimentis  ad  axiomata^  quoB 
et  ipsa  nova  experimenta  designent ; '  '-^  and  to  Aristotle, 
who,  as  if  foreseeing  logical  scepticism,  warns  us  that 
'  inference  by  example  is  neither  as  particular  to  general, 
nor  as  general  to  particular,  but  as  particular  to 
particular.'^ 

Induction  is  not  analogy,  because  the  aim  of  induc- 
tion is  to  arrive  at  a  general  judgment.  By  analogy 
we  infer,  not  a  general  but  a  particular  conclusion :  by 
induction  we  infer  not  a  particular  but  a  general  con- 
clusion. Hence  induction  does  not  contain  the  very 
point  of  analogical  inference,  the  analogy  itself  To 
judge  that  a  particular  sword  is  like  previous  swords  is 
necessary,  if  we  want  to  reason  about  that  one  in  par- 
ticular, but  not  if  we  want  to  conclude  generally  that 
all  swords  whatever  are  painful,  when  levelled  at  one's 
breast.  It  is  true  that  there  is  a  point  in  common  be- 
tween the  two  processes — the  judgment  that  swords 
levelled  at  me  have  already  pained  me,  which  is  also 
present  in  synthetic  association.  But  the  difference  is 
that,  when  a  similar  sword  is  levelled  at  me,  by  associa- 
tion  I  reproduce   the   idea   of  having  been  formerly 

•  Mill,  Logic,  ii.  3,  7. 

2  Bacon,  De  Aug,  Scient.  v.  2  (p.  622 ;  ed.  Ellis  »fe  Spedding) ;  cf.  Nov. 

Org.  i.  103. 

3  Ar.  Prior.  Ayi.  ii.  24  =  69,  A  13-15. 


288 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


pained,  and  by  analogical  inference  I  infer  that  this 
sword  may  pain  me  again;  while,  withont  a  similar 
sword  Ijeing  present,  by  induction  I  conclude  generally 
that  all  swords,  levelled  at  me,  would  be  painful.  As- 
sociation ends  in  a  particular  idea,  and  analogy  in  a 
particular  j  udgment.  Induction  ends,  not  in  particulars, 
but  in  a  general  judgment,  beyond  the  reach  both  of 
association  and  of  analogy. 

There  is,  however,  a  difficulty  in  the  superior  claims 
of  induction,  which  did  not  escape  Hume's  inquiring 
mind.  How  do  we  go  from  the  particulars  of  experi- 
ence to  the  general  conclusion  of  inference,  from  many 
to  all;  for  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  we  cannot 
experience  all  ?  In  the  first  place,  particulars,  which 
at  once  prompt  us  to  association  and  analogy,  do  not 
justify  logical  induction.  In  order  to  draw  a  general 
conclusion,  we  must  not  rest  content  with  this  or  that 
particular,  but  accumulate  instances  of  three  kinds,  as 
Bacon  showed :  instances  of  presence  or  agreement,  of 
absence  or  difference  in  similar  circumstances,  of  com- 
parative degrees  or  concomitant  variations.^  Secondly, 
even  then,  we  have  only  experience,  albeit  scientific,  of 
many,  not  of  all.  There  may,  in  the  remaining  instances 
not  experienced,  be  an  exception.  '  Mox  enim  prod- 
ibit,'  says  Leibnitz, '  qui  negabit  ob  peculiarem  quandam 
rationem  in  aliis  nondum  tentatis  veram  esse.'  ^  There 
is  a  leap  in  induction  from  various  members  to  the 
whole  class,  from  the,  particulars  to  the  general,  from 
many  swords  to  all.  How  do  w^e  effect  this  leap? 
By  the  axiom  of  generality :  things  so  related  as  to  be 
always  present,  absent,  and  varying  together  in  experi- 
ence are,  with  a  probabihty  proportionate  to  the  extent 
of  the  experience  in  time,  place,  and  circumstance,  so 

*  Nov.  Org.  ii.  11  scq.      ^  Leibnitz,  Dc  Stilo  niilosojjliico  Nizolii,  xxxii. 


CHAT.    IX. 


IIUiME 


28a 


related  in  all  similar  cases.  This  is  the  law  of  the  form 
of  induction,  distinguishing  it  from  association  and 
analogy  by  the  power  of  inferring  a  general  judgment, 
leaving  it  indeed  a  probable  inference,  yet  with  au 
approximate  certainty  continually  tending  to  absolute 
certainty. 

Three  mistakes  are  often  made  about  this  axiom  of 
generality :  first,  it  is  stated  most  carelessly,  as  if  it 
were  simply  that  what  is  true  of  many  things  of  a  class 
belongs  to  the  rest,  omitting  both  the  scientific  cha- 
racter of  the  experience  and  the  problematic  character 
of  the  conclusion  ;  secondly,  it  is  frequently  confined  to 
laws  of  causation,  omitting  inductions  of  coexistence, 
&c. ;  thirdly,  it  is  often  regarded  as  if  it  w^ere  known  to 
all  men  who  induce,  as  an  assumption  involved  in  every 
case  of  induction,  and  even  as  a  major  premise  convert- 
ing induction  into  deduction.     The   first   and   second 
mistakes  t  have  just  corrected  by  attempting  a  more 
precise  and  general  statement  of  the  axiom.     The  third 
mistake  is  really  too  absurd ;  overlooking,  as  it  does, 
that  men,  from    time  immemorial,  however  primitive, 
have  made,  and  at  the  present  day,  however  savao-e, 
do  make  inductions  without  dreaming  of  the  axiom; 
while  Aristotle,  the  founder  himself  of  the  logic  of  in- 
duction, even  contradicted  the  law  of  uniformity  by 
holding  that  nature  has  only  a  uniform  tendency,  and 
that   there  are   exceptions  to  universaHty  caused   by 
accident  inherent  in  matter.^ 

This  false  view  of  the  axiom  of  generaUty,  by 
which  it  is  made  a  supposition  involved  in  induction, 
gave  Hume  his  opportunity:  he  saw  that  it  would 
involve  us  in  a  circle.  'To  endeavour,  therefore,' 
says   he,    '  the  proof  of  this  last  supposition  by  pro- 

1  Cf.  Ar.  Met.  E.  2  =  1027  A,  5-15. 

U 


290 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


'ba])le  arguments,  or  arguments  regarding  existence, 
must  be  evidently  going  in  a  circle,  and  taking  that  for 
granted  which  is  the  very  point  in  question.'  ^  This 
difficulty  has  been  often  felt :  we  require  an  induction 
to  found  the  axiom,  which  is  nevertheless  supposed  to  be 
the  assumption  involved  in  all  induction.  To  surmount 
it,  some  resort  to  the  theory  that  the  axiom  is  a  priori, 
tliough  many,  including  Aristotle,  have  not  even  believed 
it.  This  was  not  the  alternative  of  Hume,  whose  plan 
was  to  surrender  universality,  and  renounce  the  inductive 
inference  from  particular  to  general  judgments,  in  favour 
of  the  analogical  inference  from  pai^ticular  to  particular 
judgment,  which  he  falsely,  as  we  have  seen,  reduced 
to  association  from  particular  impressions  to  particular 

ideas  : — 
^^^^  'What,  then,  is  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter  ? 
A  simple  one  ;  though,  it  must  be  confessed,  pretty 
remote  from  the  common  theories  of  philosophy.  All 
belief  of  matter  of  fact  or  real  existence  is  derived 
merely  from  some  present  object  to  the  memory  or 
senses,  and  a  customary  conjunction  between  that  and 
some  other  object ;  or,  in  other  words,  having  found, 
in  many  instances,  that  any  two  kinds  of  objects,  flame 
and  heat,  snow  and  cold,  have  always  been  conjoined 
together:  if  flame  or  snow  be  presented  anew  to  the 
senses,  the  mind  is  carried  by  custom  to  expect  heat  or 
cold,  and  to  believe  that  such  a  quality  does  exist,  and 
will  discover  itself  upon  a  nearer  approach.'  ^ 

Hume  was  right  in  rejecting  a  quasi-inductive  de- 
duction from  the  supposition  of  generality.  It  does 
not  follow  that  induction  becomes  mere  analogy,  still 
less  association.  Such  an  alternative  is  inadequate  to 
the  extent  of  general  reasoning.    Moreover,  if  induction 

*  Inquiry,  §  4.  '^  lb.  §  5,  Part  I. 


CHAP.   IX. 


IlUxME 


291 


were  analogous  inference  and  association,  the  analogy 
nnist   always   be   present,   as   Hume  was  well   aware. 
Wherever   he  mentions  his    analysis,   he    admits    that 
the  analogous  object  is  present,  about  which  the  in- 
ference is  made.     In  the  instance  above,  flame  analo- 
gous to  previous  flames  has  to  be  '  presented  anew  to  the 
senses,'  in  order  that  we  may  expect  its  heat,  and  snow, 
analogous  to  previous  snows,  in  order  that  we  may  ex- 
pect its  cold.     In  the   instance  of  the  sword,   having 
experienced  that  swords  levelled  at  us  have  been  pain- 
ful, I  again  experience  that  another  sword  is  present, 
in  order  to  infer  that  this  particular  sword  is  painful. 
If  a  new  particular,  similar  to  previous  particulars,  were 
not  present  in  the  premises,  how  could  analogy  infer 
an  attribute  of  that  particular  in   the  conclusion,  or 
association  use  it   to  introduce   an  idea?      Now,  this 
condition,  though  essential  to  association  and  analon-y, 
is  unnecessary,  or  rather  completely  extraneous,  to  in- 
duction.    Having  experienced  the  relations  of  former 
particulars,  without  any  new  particular  being  present, 
it  infers  that  all  flame  is  hot,  all  snow  is  cold,  all  swordp 
levelled  at  one's  breast  are  painful. 

We  must  find  some  other  alternative,  then,  which 
neither  surrenders  the  inference  of  generality  nor  makes 
the  axiom  of  generality  a  supposition  antecedent  to 
induction,  whether  by  an  inductive  circle  or  by  a  priori 
mysticism.  We  have  already  chosen  such  an  alternative 
in  explaining  analogous  inference :  it  is  also  applicable 
to  induction.  As  the  axiom  of  analogy  is  tlie  law  of  the 
form,  without  being  a  premise,  of  analogical  inference, 
so  the  axiom  of  generality  is  the  law  of  the  form,  without 
being  a  premise,  of  induction  ;  a  law  not  known,  but 
mechanically  and  spontaneously  obeyed  by  the  ordinary 
man,  and  only  afterwards  discovered  by  logicians.    The 


u  2 


292 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


reason  why  we  induce  from  some  flame  is  hot,  some 
snow  is  cold,  some  sword-thrusts  are  painful,  is  because 
we  have  accumulated  so  many  instances,  in  which  the 
related  objects  have  been  present,  absent  and  varying 
together  in  our  synthetic  experience,  that,  by  the  law  of 
generality  acting  on  us  without  our  knowing  it,  we 
cannot  but  infer  general  judgments  that  all  flame  is  hot, 
all  snow  is  cold,  all  sword-thrusts  are  painful. 

Induction,  then,  like  analogy,  is  the  inference  of  a 
judgment;  but  is  distinguished  from  analogy,  because 
it  proceeds  from  such  an  experience  as  will  enable  it 
by  the  law  of  generality  to  infer  a  general  judgment. 
Induction,  like  association,  is  not  a  deduction  from  the 
law  of  its  form,  but  a  customary  process  by  that  law. 
But  its  custom  is  not  association.      First,  association  is 
^reproduction  of  past  ideas,  induction  an  inference  of 
general  judgments;  secondly,  in  order  to  suggest  an 
idea,  synthetic  association  contents  itself  with  experience 
of  any  relation  of  objects ;  but  in  order  to  produce  a 
general  judgment,  induction  logically  requires  experi- 
ence of  a  relation  of  objects,  present,  absent  and  vary- 
ing together  ;  thirdly,  the  form  of  association  is  governed 
by  the  spontaneous  laws  of  the  reproduction  of  ideas, 
the  form  of  induction  by  the  equally  spontaneous  but 
different  law  of  generaUty.     Finally,  association  and  in- 
duction differ  not  only  in  themselves,  their  experience, 
and  their  laws,  but  also  in  their  result  on  conception  : 
association  produces  no  new  idea  of  a  particular,  much 
less  a  general  idea ;  induction,  having  inferred  a  uni- 
formity, produces  what  we  may  call  an  inductive  idea 
of  the  uniformity,  e.g.  of  the  heat  of  flame  in  general, 
of  the  cold  of  snow  in  general,  of  the  painfulness  of 
sword-thrusts  in  general. 

/•Deduction    from  induction  must   be  discarded   by 


CHAP.    IX. 


HUME 


293 


every  philosopher  such  as  Hume,  who  resolves  induc- 
tion into  analogy,  because,  in  that  case,  the  inference 
from  particular  to  particular  usurps  the  double  function 
at  once  of  the  inference  from  particular  to  general,  and 
of  the  inference  from  general  to  particular.  Suppose,  as 
Mill  would  say  in  imitation  of  Hume,  this  universal  type 
of  all  inference  :  swords  have  been  painful ;  this  sword  is 
like  previous  swords ;  therefore  it  is  or  may  be  painful. 
Then  there  is  nothing  left  for  the  double  process  up  to 
the  general  judgment  about  swords  as  a  whole  class, 
and  down  to  a  particular  judgment  about  a  sword  not 
previously  known.  Accordingly,  Hume  banished  reason- 
ing, by  which  he  meant  deduction,  entirely  from  em- 
pirical conclusions ;  and  Mill  declared  syllogism  to  be 
no  inference,  regarding  the  double  inference  from  par- 
ticulars through  a  generality  to  a  new  particular  as  an 
unnecessary  circuit.^ 

But  induction  and  deduction  are  integral  and 
complementary  parts  of  a  double  process  of  inference, 
from  particular  to  general,  from  general  to  particular. 
As  we  have  seen,  induction  is  not  analogy ;  it  begins 
with  particulars,  but  ends,  not  with  a  new  particular,  but 
with  a  general  judgment  about  a  class.  Deduction  from 
induction,  or  empirical  deduction,  as  we  may  call  it,  com- 
pletes the  double  process  :  it  combines  the  general  judg- 
ment with  a  particular  judgment,  that  a  new  particular 
belongs  to  this  class,  and  infers  that  what  belongs  to  the 
class  belongs  to  the  new  particular.  Empirical  deduc- 
tion differs  from  analogy  in  starting,  not  directly  from 
particulars,  but  from  a  general  judgment,  given  by 
induction ;  it  differs  from  induction,  not  only  in  using 
this  general  judgment  as  major  premise,  but  in  adding 
a  minor,  and  drawing  a  particular  or  less  general  con- 

^  Mill,  Logic,  ii.  3. 


204 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


elusion.  It  may  be  called  tlie  complement  of  induction, 
needed  to  convert  generalities  into  particulars,  and 
bring  the  double  process  of  general  reasoning  to  a 
particMjlar  conclusion,  like  that  of  analogy,  but  reached 
tlirough  a  generality. 

Deduction,  as  discovered  by  Aristotle,  and  disen- 
gao'ed  from  the  mere  schematism  of  Galen  and  later 
logicians,  consists  of  three  orders  or  figures.  They  are 
three  different  wavs  of  thinking.  Sometimes  I  want  to 
prove  or  disprove  by  means  of  a  class  ;  for  example, 
belon<nnfr  to  the  class  of  mamitudes  whose  angles  are 
equal  to  those  of  a  perpendicular  falling  on  a  straight 
line,  proves  that  a  triangle  has  its  angles  equal  to  two 
ri<dit  an<:fles  :  this  is  the  first  figure  or  order  of  deductive 
thinking.  Sometimes  I  want  to  disprove  by  means  of  a 
difference  ;  for  example,  as  a  demagogue  differs  from  a 
statesman  in  being  a  truckler,  he  is  not  a  statesman  : 
this  is  the  second  order  of  deductive  thinking,  the  figure 
of  difference.  Sometimes  I  want  to  prove  by  an  instance 
or  disprove  by  an  exception ;  for  example,  the  genius 
of  Nelson  is  sufiicient  to  prove  what  Englishmen  were 
capable  of  at  the  beginning  of  this  century :  this  is  the 
third  order  of  deductive  thinking,  the  figure  of  instance. 
Each  of  these  fissures  has  its  own  axiom ;  that  of  the 
first  being  the  dictum  de  omni  et  nidlo,  discovered  by 
Aristotle  ;  those  of  the  second  and  third  being  respec- 
tively the  dictum  de  diverse,  and  the  dictum  de  exemplo 
et  e.vcepto,  discovered  by  Lambert.^ 

I  have  a  purpose  in  calling  attention  to  these  three 
axioms  of  the  three  orders  of  deductive  reasoning.  They 
are  necessary  laws  of  deduction  ;  yet  they  are  not  in  the 
premises.  Moreover,  as  men,  in  deducing  conclusions, 
know  nothing  about  them,  they  have  not  already  been 

^  Lambert,  Neues  Organon,  i.  4,  §  232. 


cnAT.  IX. 


IimiE 


295 


acquired  by  a  previous  induction,  still  less  are  appre- 
hended a  prioii.  They  are  not  presupposed,  but  used. 
What  is  the  explanation?  Precisely  the  explanation 
already  given  for  the  law  of  analogy  and  the  law  of 
generality.  They  are  spontaneous  laws  used  by  every 
deducer,  but  discovered  afterwards  by  the  logician. 
Hence  they  never  appear  in  a  syllogism,  being  not  its 
premises,  but  the  laws  of  its  form,  each  of  the  three 
dicta  being  the  law  of  its  own  order  of  deductive  think- 
ing. As  Aristotle  said,  '  the  nature  of  a  syllogism  is 
not  premised  in  a  syllogism.'  ^ 

Deduction  would  not  be  an  inference,  if  it  were  not 
an  advance  in  knowledge  ;  but  it  is  an  advance  in 
knowledge.  If  induction  were  founded  on  a  complete 
examination  of  all  members  of  the  class,  there  would  be 
no  occasion  for  deduction.  But  usually  we  only  examine 
some  members,  from  which  induction  leaps,  by  the 
axiom  of  generality,  to  the  class  ;  and  this  very  fact  is 
what,  according  to  Mill,  makes  induction  an  inference  : 
we  need  only  know  some,  not  all  particular  men,  to  say 
that  all  men  are  mortal.  Hence  there  is,  so  to  speak,  a 
generality  about  induction  which  only  says  that  every- 
body who  may  be  a  man  is  mortal :  it  does  not,  and 
cannot,  enumerate  every  particular  man.  The  con- 
sequence is  that  the  subsequent  process  of  deduction, 
which,  by  combining  the  generality  in  the  major  premise 
with  a  new  particular  in  the  minor,  enables  us  to  dis- 
cover that  a  particular  object,  which  we  never  appre- 
hended before  to  be  a  man,  is  mortal,  must  be  an 
advance  in  knowledge,  and  therefore  a  process  of 
inference. 

Mill  would  reply  that,  in  this  case,  we  are  committing 
a  petitio  principii  by  adducing  in  jjroof  of  a  particular 

1  Ar.  Post.  An.  ii.  6  =  92  A,  11. 


200 


rSVCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


a  general  judgment  which  presupposes  it.  This  objec- 
tion can  only  mean  that  the  general  judgment,  all  men 
are  mortal,  ought  to  have  been  inductively  proved  by 
examining  all  men  :  otherwise  it  does  not  presuppose 
every  particular  man.  But,  according  to  his  own  show- 
ing, the  general  judgment  is  not  to  be  proved  by  every 
particular  :  therefore  it  does  not  presuppose  every  par- 
ticular, but  only  the  original  particulars  of  induction ; 
and  therefore  the  process,  which  adds  to  the  general 
judgment  a  new  particular,  is  not  using  a  general  judg- 
ment which  presupposes  that  new  particular,  and  is  not 
a  petitio  principii.  Mill  made  the  beauty  of  induction 
the  vice  of  syllogism :  he  first  says  that  only  some  par- 
ticulars are  presupposed  to  induce  a  universal,  and 
then  that  the  universal  presupposes  every  particular  to 
deduce  a  particular.  Really,  the  justification  of  induc- 
tion is  the  justification  of  deduction  from  induction. 
Induction  from  many  of  the  particulars  concludes  all  in 
general :  deduction  adds  the  rest  of  the  particulars. 

Mill  was  deceived  by  another  mistake  :  he  thought 
the  inference  was  over  when  we  get  to  the  general  judg- 
ment, and  the  remainder  is  deciphering  our  notes.  But 
the  major  premise  is  as  powerless  without  the  minor 
premise  as  the  minor  without  the  major.  '  It  is  evi- 
dent,' as  Aristotle  says,  '  that  a  syllogism  consists  of 
two  premises,  and  no  more ;  for  three  terms  make  two 
premises.'  ^  We  therefore  require  two  sets  of  notes  in 
order  to  decipher  a  conclusion,  and  their  combination 
in  the  two  premises  is  the  essence  of  syllogism.  Mill 
was  further  deceived  by  writing  down  two  simple  pre- 
mises, and  thinking  that,  as  the  syllogism  consists  in 
drawing  the  conclusion,  which  is  contained  in  the  pre- 
mises,  it  does  not  advance  our   knowledge.       But   a 

J  Ar.  Pr.  An.  i.  25  =  42  A,  32  3. 


I 


CHAP.   IX. 


HUME 


297 


syllogism  does  not  consist  in  merely  drawing  a  conclu- 
sion ;  and,  when  you  have  written  down  the  two 
premises,  the  essence  of  syllogism  is  over  :  the  difficulty 
is  in  combining  the  premises,  and  although  the  syllogism 
does  not  discover  each  premise,  it  does  combine  the 
two.  So  important  an  act  is  this,  that,  as  Aristotle 
says,  '  a  man  may  know  that  all  B  is  A  and  all  C  is  B, 
and  yet  think  that  C  is  not  A ;  e.g.  that  every  mule  is 
barren,  and  this  is  a  mule,  and  yet  think  it  is  going 
to  foal,  through  not  considering  each  of  the  two  premises 
in  combination.'  ^ 

Syllogism,  then,  from  induction  is  an  inference, 
because  it  is  an  advance  in  knowledge  by  adding  j)ar- 
ticulars  not  contemplated  in  induction  ;  a  legitimate 
inference,  because  it  presupposes  only  the  particulars 
contemplated  in  experience,  and  the  indefinite  generahty 
inferred  by  induction,  but  not  the  new  particular  it  is 
about  to  prove  ;  a  complex  inference,  which  consists 
neither  in  merely  interpreting  a  major  premise,  nor  in 
merely  drawing  a  conclusion,  but  in  a  new  combination 
of  premises,  or  a  direct  comparison  of  two  things  with  a 
third  thing,  so  as  to  draw  an  indirect  conclusion  about 
their  relation.  In  order  to  express  the  essence  of  syllo- 
gism as  a  process  of  inference,  I  propose  to  define  it :  a 
combination  of  two  premises  so  as  to  produce  a  conclu- 
sion, not  presupposed  in  either  separately,  though  con- 
tained in  their  combination.  Hume's  theory  of  inference. 
is  inadequate,  because  it  ignores  this  process  of  reason- \ 
ing  from  experience  and  induction ;  and  Mill's  is  false, 
because  it  ignores  the  combination  of  premises,  which 
produces  a  new  conclusion,  advancing  our  knowledge. 

There  are  two  ways  of  inferring  from  particular  to 
particular ;  directly  by  analogy,  and  indirectly  through 

^  /A?)  avv6€(op(bv  TO  Ka&  UuTepov.   Ar.  Pr.  ii.  21  =  67  A,  33-7. 


298 


rSYCIIOLOGIOAL  IDEALISM 


TART  ir. 


a  crenerality  by  induction  and  deduction.     Mill,  follow- 
m<T  Hume,   confuses  tliem.     'The  mortality  of  John, 
Thomas,  and  others,'  he  says,  'is,  after  all,  the  whole 
evidence  we  have  for  the  mortality  of  the  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington.    Not  one  iota  is  added  to  the  proof  ])y  inter- 
polating a  general  proposition.'  ^     Why,  he  asks,  should 
we  not  take  the  shortest  cut?     We  often  do:  we  go, 
like  brutes,  from  particular  to  particular.     But  Mill 
himself  gives  a  very  good  reason  why  we  should  not ; 
that  to  pass  through  a  general  proposition  is  '  a  security 
for  good  reasoning.'  '^     Now,  surely  the  aim  of  every 
honest  man  is,  not  reasoning,  but  good  reasoning  ;  and 
logic  is  the  art  of  reasoning  well.     We  must  avoid  the 
shortest  cut  and  go  round  the  circuit  of  induction  and 
deduction  to  rational  truth,  as  we  must  avoid  the  broad 
and  choose  the  narrow  path  to  eternal  life.    We  may  be 
sure  also  that  there  is  something  more  than  usual  in 
a  security  for  good  reasoning.    That  something  more  is 
the  evidence  of  induction.     We  saw  that  we  want  less 
evidence  for  association  and  for  analogy,  which  begin 
directly  after  experience,   than    for    induction,   which 
requires  experience  to  be  accumulated  and  sifted,  by 
finding  things  present,  absent,  and  varying  together,  so  as 
to  bring  into  operation  the  law  of  generality,  by  which 
we  spontaneously  induce  a  general  judgment.     In  order 
to  deduce  a  new  particular  we  must  have  apprehended 
not  only  the  original  particulars,  but  also  that  they  are 
sufficient  to  authorise  a  general  judgment,  which  is  the 
same  thing  as  inferring  it.     The  beauty  of  induction  is 
the  virtue  of  the  syllogism.     It  is  because  analogy  has 
not,  induction  has,  sufficient  evidence  to  infer  a  general 
judgment,  that  syllogism  from  induction  is  a  security 
for  good  reasoning.     I  do  not  say  that  this  security  is 


^  Mill,  Logic,  ii.  3,  3. 


2  lb.  ii.  3,  8. 


cirAr.  IX. 


HUME 


more  than  general  probability.  But  niudogy  has  not 
this  general  probability :  it  varies,  indeed,  in  proba- 
bility, l)ut  directly  its  evidence  guarantees  general 
probability,  analogy  becomes  induction  followed  by 
deduction.  Induction  is  the  inference  of  general  pro- 
bability and  empirical  deduction  the  inference  from 
general  prol)ability ;  and  the  probability  of  the  double 
process,  induction  and  deduction,  varies,  according  to 
the  original  synthetic  exj^erience,  from  uncertainty  to 
apj^roximate  certainty. 

Few  modern  logicians  seem  to  have  a  sense  of  the 
enormous  importance  of  syllogism  or  deduction.  They 
do  not  feel  the  indefiniteness  of  the  subject  of  a  general 
judgment,  which  signifies  all  whatever  they  may  be  I 
do  not  know,  the  consequent  imjierfection  of  induction 
without  deduction,  and  the  necessity  of  syllogism  to  give 
definiteness  to  our  inferences  from  experience  beyond 
experience.  It  is  but  little  use  knowing  that  when  the 
earth  intervenes  between  the  sun  and  the  moon  there 
will  be  an  eclipse,  unless  we  are  prepared  to  combine 
this  mere  generality  with  minor  premises  stating  when 
the  earth  will  be  in  this  position.  It  is  by  deduction 
that  we  go  back  to  the  distant  past:  for  example, 
nations  which  have  words  in  common,  expressing  a 
degree  of  civilisation,  too  many  to  be  explained  by 
nature,  chance,  or  communication,  lived  together  up 
to  that  degree  of  civilisation ;  the  Greeks  and  Eomans 
had  a  multitude  of  words  in  common  up  to  the  stage  of 
settled  agriculture  ;  therefore  they  lived  together  to  that 
point.  It  is  by  deduction  we  dive  into  the  imper- 
ceptible present :  for  example,  perceptible  bodies  elastic 
and  compressible  have  parts  and  pores ;  solid  bodies  are 
elastic  and  compressible  ;  therefore  they  consist  of  parts 
and  pores,  though  imperceptible.    It  is  by  deduction  that 


300 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   11. 


CHAP.   IX. 


HUME 


301 


we  predict  tlie  future  :  for  example,  a  planet  deflected 
from  the  path  prescribed  by  its  gravitation  to  the  sun 
gravitates  to  another  planet  in  the  direction  of  deflec- 
tion ;  Uranus  was  found  so  to  deflect ;  therefore,  a  new- 
planet  was  predicted  in  the  direction  of  deflection,  and 
the  new  planet,  Neptune,  was  afterwards  discovered  in 
that  direction.  Inferences  of  this  kind  are  sometimes 
analogical,  but  they  are  often  deductive,  and  they  are 
so  whenever  induction  has  established  a  general  judg- 
ment. They  are  sometimes  confused  with  induction, 
as  when  Mill  calls  the  discoverer  of  a  murderer  by 
circumstantial  evidence  induction.^  But  when  such  an 
inference  is  not  analogy  it  is  deductive,  because  it  con- 
tains, besides  the  circumstances  in  the  minor  premises, 
a  number  of  major  premises  judging  such  circumstances 
to  be  signs  of  murder,  and  a  particular  conclusion  infer- 
ring a  murderer. 

Empirical  deduction,  like  analogical  and  inductive 
inferences,  is  not  association,  and  for  the  same  reason ; 
it  ends,  not  in  conception,  but  in  judgment.  Even 
syllogism  is  a  customary  inference ;  but  its  custom  is 
not  an  association  of  ideas,  but  a  habit  of  inferrinef 
judgments  by  the  three  laws  of  the  three  figures.  Asso- 
ciation, even  of  the  more  developed  kind  which  starts 
from  synthetic  experience,  gets  as  far  as  reproducing 
the  ideas  of  the  objects  in  that  synthetic  experience, 
and  there  stops.  At  that  point  we  have  not  even  got  at 
tlie  beginning  of  deduction  :  induction  intervenes  to 
infer  the  general  judgment,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
no  result  of  association.  Empirical  deduction,  then, 
begins  with  this  general  judgment,  which  at  once  dis- 
tinguishes it  from  all  sensitive  synthetic  association. 
It  proceeds  frequently  to  ask  synthetic  experience  for  a 

^  Mill,  Logic,  iii.  14,  7. 


w 


minor  premise,  e.g.  this  is  a  sword ;  and  thus  returns  to 
the  arena  of  association.  But  association  deals  with 
this  new  particular  merely  to  reproduce  ideas  of  former 
pains  already  apprehended  by  experience,  analogy,  and 
induction.  Syllogism  goes  on  to  infer  a  new  particular 
judgment  that  this  sword  will  also  prove  painful. 

Nor  is  this  all  the  difference :  we  must  not  deceive 
ourselves  by  taking  too  simple  an  instance.  Through 
the  power  of  general  judgments  we  at  last  deduce  par- 
ticulars not  only  beyond  sense,  but  insensible  and  im- 
i:)erceptible  to  us,  e.g.  the  existence  of  insensible  particles 
or  corpuscles  of  solid  bodies.  Association,  from  the  pre- 
mises of  this  deduction  and  before  deduction  has  drawn 
the  conclusion,  will  reproduce  only  the  ideas  of  the 
parts  of  bodies  previously  known  :  without  deduction  it 
will  not  enable  me  either  to  judge  that  the  particular 
bodies  in  the  minor  premise  consist  of  parts,  or  to  con- 
ceive ideas  of  their  particular  parts.  Deduction,  on  the 
other  hand,  proceeds  to  draw  the  conclusion  and  then 
conceive  the  idea.  Not  association  of  ideas,  but  deduc- 
tion, produces  the  judgment  of  the  existence,  and  through 
this  judgment  the  deductive  conception  of  the  idea,  of 
a  corpuscle. 

Hume,  in  the  '  Treatise,'  said  :  '  I  form  an  idea  of 
Eome,  which  I  neither  see  nor  remember,  but  which  is 
connected  with  such  impressions  as  I  remember  to  have 
received  from  the  conversation  and  books  of  travellers 
and  historians.  .  .  .  All  this,  and  everything  else  which 
I  beheve,  are  nothing  but  ideas.'  ^  This  inadequate  ac- 
count of  my  knowledge  of  Eome  goes  further  than  could 
be  justified  by  Hume,  but  not  so  far  as  is  justified  by 
history.     Association  of  itself  would  not  even  give  me  I 


an  idea  of  Eome,  which  I  have  never  seen ;    history 


/ 


^  Hume,  Treatise,  iii.  §  9. 


302 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


infers  the  judgment  that  Eonie  has  existed,  perhaps 
from  the  time  of  Eomukis,  certainly  since  the  transition 
from  the  monarchy  to  the  repubUc.  If  association  of 
ideas  were  substituted  for  deduction,  on  being  tokl 
that  there  is  a  city  hke  London  and  other  cities  I  have 
eixperienced,  I  could  only  reproduce  my  particular 
idea  of  London,  my  particular  ideas  of  other  cities  in 
my  experience,  and,  with  induction,  my  general  idea 
of  cities  :  I  could  not  produce  a  new  particular  idea 
of  Eome  beyond  my  experience.  But  deduction  from 
the  conversation  and  books  of  travellers  and  historians 
enables  me  to  produce  a  belief  that  Eome  exists,  and 
has  existed  for  centuries,  which  is  not  an  idea,  and, 
moreover,  besides  the  belief,  an  inferential  idea  of 
the  eternal  city  in  my  productive  imagination.  De- 
duction is  not  association  of  ideas,  because  it  directly 
produces  deductive  judgments  about  the  existence,  and 
indirectly  deductive  ideas  ;  of  objects  beyond  sense,  such 
as  the  danger  of  a  sword  which  has  not  yet  hurt  me  ; 
of  insensible  objects,  such  as  historic  Eome  ;  of  imper- 
ceptible ol)jects,  such  as  a  physical  corpuscle. 
/  Hume,  having  falsely  identified  ideas  with  thoughts, 

Jnd  resolved  beliefs  into  ideas,  could  allow  only  one 
uccession  of  thoughts,  the  succession  of  ideas.  But 
idgments  are  not  ideas  but  apprehensions  of  relations, 
inferences  are  not  successions  of  ideas,  but  successions 
of  judgments,  and  rational  judgments  are  thoughts 
.which  are  not  ideas.  From  synthetic  sense,  which 
^produces  our  first  judgments  of  relations,  there  arise 
two  streams  of  thought,  synthetic  association,  which  is 
a  succession  of  ideas,  and  reasoning  or  a  succession  of 
judgments.  These  two  streams  flow  together,  yet  dis- 
tinctly ;  but  the  stream  of  reasoning  is  the  main  river 
of  human  thinking,  compared  with  which  the  stream  of 


C.TAP.   IX. 


HUME 


oUo 


association  is  a  mere  rivulet.  Hume  and  his  followers 
are  like  those  explorers  of  the  sources  of  the  Nile  who 
have  taken  a  mere  tributary  for  the  main  river. 

Inference  and  association  are  alike,  not  only  so  far 
as  both  start  from  synthetic  sense  and  experience,  but 
also  in  both  being  involuntary,  spontaneous,  custo- 
mary. Impressions  involuntarily  suggest  ideas,  though 
we  also  recall  them  by  voluntary  reminiscence ;  nor  can 
we  help  inferring  judgments,  though  we  also  reason 
voluntarily.  Association  and  inference  both  sponta- 
neously use  laws,  neither  inductively  nor  a  priori,  but 
mechanically  and  without  knowing  it :  as  the  laws  of 
association,  by  resemblance,  contiguity,  succession,  (fcc, 
are  spontaneously  used  to  introduce  ideas,  so  is  the 
law  of  analogy  spontaneously  used  to  infer  from  par- 
ticular to  particular  judgment,  the  law  of  generality  to 
infer  a  general  j  udgment,  the  laws  of  the  three  figures 
to  infer  from  general  to  particular  judgments.  The  ex- 
planation is  probably  the  same  in  all  cases,  namely,  the 
evolution  of  an  habitual  tendency  by  the  action  of  nature 
on  our  organs  without  our  knowing  it.  Again,  analo^^y 
and  induction  are  not  deductions  from  the  laws  of  their 
forms,  but  independent  inferences  from  experience ;  nay, 
deduction  itself  is  not  a  deduction  from  the  laws  of  its 
forms  or  figures,  but  from  major  and  minor  premises  : 
all  three  processes  of  inference  use  their  laws  to  pro- 
duce judgments  as  habitually  as  association  uses  its 
laws  to  reproduce  ideas.  But  because  inference  is  an 
inevitable,  spontaneous,  customary  use  of  laws,  it  is  not 
on  that  account  to  be  confused  with  association. 

Hume  made  two  very  great  blunders  aljout  inference  : 
he  confused  custom  with  association,  and  limited  reason- 
ing to  deduction,  or  rather  demonstration.  But  not  all 
custom  is  association :  there  are  habits  of  conceivino-. 


;o4 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  J  I. 


of  judging,  of  acting  ;  and  analogy,  induction,  and  de- 
/  duction  are  habits  of  judging  by  inference,  not  habits 
of  conceiving  by  association.  Again,  all  inference  is 
reasoning,  because  it  advances  from  judgment  to  judg- 
ment ;  reasoning  does  not  begin  with  demonstration 
from  axioms ;  and  there  are  three  kinds  of  reasoning,  all 
ultimately  founded  on  judgments  of  synthetic  sense,  all 
inevitable,  spontaneous  and  customary  inferences  bylaws 
of  their  forms,  used  without  being  known,  except  to  the 
science  of  logic  : — these  three  types  of  inference  are 
analogical,  inductive  and  deductive  reasoning. 

/  Eeasoning  is  an  instinct.  The  premises  are  acquired 
from  experience,  and  the  conclusion  is  inferred  ;  but  the 
})rocess  of  inferring  is  instinctive.  It  was  probably 
gradually  acquired  by  the  action  of  natural  uniformity 
on  our  organs :  but  it  is  used  without  presupposing  any 
axiom  of  natural  uniformity  as  a  major  premise.  This 
instinctiveness  of  reason  escapes  the  notice  of  philoso- 
phers and  even  of  logicians.  Hume,  for  example,  post- 
poned reasoning  to  association,  because  it  is  slow,  be- 
cause it  does  not  appear  during  the  first  years  of  infancy, 
because  it  is  liable  to  error,  and  because  nature  has  im- 
planted in  us  the  instinct  of  association.^  But,  in  the 
first  place,  nothing  is  more  rapid  than  reasoning,  which 
goes  through  its  trains  of  judgment  as  quickly  as  asso- 
ciation through  its  trains  of  ideas  ;  secondly,  it  is  an 
adult  prejudice  to  suppose  that  young  infants  are  not 
reasoning,  because  they  are  not  talking,  when  they  are 
far  better  occupied  in  the  sensible  and  rational  discovery 
of  an  internal  and  external  world ;  thirdly,  reasoning  is 
liable  to  error,  but  association  has  no  perception  of  truth ; 
fourthly,  if  association  is  an  instinct,  so  is  reasoning, 
each  spontaneously  using  its  laws  to  proceed  from  expe- 

'  Inquiry,  §  5. 


I 


I 


ciiAr.  IX. 


HUME 


305 


rience,  but  the  former  to  ideas,  the  latter  to  judgments. 
So  closely  related  are  the  instincts  of  association  and 
reasoning,  yet  so  different,  that,  if  association  were  not 
the  vaguest  term  in  the  vague  vocabulary  of  mental 
philosophy,  I  should  have  proposed  to  distinguish  the 
two  successions  of  thought  as  the  association  of  ideas 
and  the  association  of  judgments. 

Hume   allowed    the   psychology  of   association   to 
blind  him  to  the  logic  of  reasoning.     The  consequence 
was  that  he  missed  the  whole  origin  of  rational  judc»-- 
ments  and  of  rational  ideas ;    thus  defeating  his  own 
object,  which  was  to  find  the  causes  of  ideas.     The 
origin  of  ideas  is  in  reality  a  very  complicated  problem, 
inseparable  from  that  of  judgments.     We  must  distin- 
guish  productive   and  reproductive    conception.     The 
sources    of    productive    conception,   which   we    have 
reached  so  far,  are  simple  sensations  of  sensible  objects 
producing  sensible  ideas,  synthetic  sense  and  judgment 
of  sensible  relations  producing  ideas  of  relations,  and 
reasoning   to   rational    judgments   producing    rational 
conceptions;    moreover,    we  have   distinguished   three 
knids  of  rational  conception,  answering  to  three  kinds 
of  inference— analogous,  inductive  and  deductive  ;  and, 
finally,  deductive  conception  produces  ideas  not  only  of 
the  relation  in  the  conclusion  but  of  the  insensible  ob- 
jects of  that  relation,  e.g.  the  idea  of  corpuscles  as  well 
as  of  their  cohesion.     Eeproductive  conception  has  two 
main  sources,  both  obeying  the  same  laws— voluntary 
recollection    (dm/^i^T^o-is),    analysed  by   Aristotle,^  and 
involuntary  association,  analysed  by  Hume ;   who  pro- 
ceeded to  elevate  a  mere  reproduction  of  ideas  into  a 
substitute  for  the  inference  of  judgments,  and,  when  it 
does  not  produce  ideas  at  all,  and  is  only  one  way  of 


*  Ar.  De  Mem.  ii. 


X 


306 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   If. 


/ 


reproducing  tliem,  positively  made  it  the  sole  source  of 
all  belief  in  matters  of  fact.  What  a  contrast  there  is 
between  the  analytic  genius  of  Aristotle,  giving  each 
operation  its  due  place,  and  the  exaggerated  scepticism 
of  Hume,  exalting  the  weakest  over  the  strongest  force 
in  man's  composition  ! 

/       Hume  invariably  speaks  as  if  all  association  of  ideas 
were  of  one  kind ;    so  usually  do  his  followers.     It  is 
because  they  have  become  enamoured  of  one  power  to 
the  neglect  of  the  rest.     This  kind  I  have  ventured  to 
call  '  shnple  sensitive  association,'  because  it  starts  with 
simple   sensation  and  experience.     But  I  have  shown 
that  Hume  covertly  introduces  another  kind,  which  I 
have  called  '  synthetic  sensitive  association,'  because  it 
starts  with  synthetic  sense    and   experience.     To  this 
sort  belongs  the  association  used  by  him  to  explain  the 
apprehension  of  causation ;    a  process  which,  starting 
from  the  sense  of  sequence,  and  passing  through  the 
experience  of  constant  conjunction,  ends  by  the  ante- 
cedent introducing  the  idea  of  the  consequent,  which 
he  falsely  supposed  to   be  our  judgment  of  a  cause 
producing  an  effect.     But,  now  that  I  have  analysed 
reasonings  I  am  prepared  to  take  a  further  step  and 
say  that   reasoning,   though  never   association,  is  the 
foundation   of  a   third   kind   of   association,  which   I 
shall  call   'rational  association.'     When  we  have   by 
any  kind  of  inference  inferred  a  relation,  and  by  any 
kind  of  rational  conception  produced  the  ideas  repre- 
senting the  relation  and  its  objects,  then,  and  not  till 
then,  rational  association  will  enable  us  to  reproduce 
the   ideas   by   its    own    laws.      Thus    the    contempla- 
tion   of   eye,    which    suggests   to    the    ordinary    man 
the  idea  of  love  or  war,  will  to   the   optician  repro- 
duce   the   rational   ideas  of  aether,  of  undulation,    of 


CHAP.  IX. 


HUME 


307 


reflection  and  refraction.  But  it  would  be  mere  con- 
fusion to  merge  the  reasoning  by  which  he  dis- 
covered tliese  facts  in  the  association  of  the  ideas, 
when  the  rational  conception  of  the  ideas  intervenes 
between  the  rational  inference  and  the  rational  asso- 
ciation. Tlie  optician  first  by  reasoning  judges  the 
existence  of  asther  and  its  motions,  then  rationally 
conceives  what  ideas  of  them  he  can,  and  finally  is 
reminded  of  them  by  association.  Most  associations 
are  post-rational. 

The  inference  at  the  bottom  of  rational  association 
will  be  found  to  solve  many  unsolved  problems.     One 
is  the  solubility  of  association.     If  we  depended  on  as- 
sociation alone,  an  association  acquired  by  a  constant 
experience  could  only  be  dissolved  by  one  acquired  by 
a  still  more  constant   experience.     But,  as  a  fact,   a 
single  instance  will  destroy  the  strongest  association  : 
when  the  idea  of  the  proverbial  whiteness  of  swans  was 
dispelled   by   the  discovery  of  a  black   swan,   it   was 
reason  which  dissolved  the  association.     Another  pro- 
blem is  the  origin  of  complex  ideas  of  substance.     The 
theory  of  Associationists  is  that,  having  by  sensation 
acquired  together  the  ideas  of  yellowness  from  sight, 
smoothness  from  touch,  sweetness  from  taste,  association 
recalls  these  ideas  so  constantly  as  to  form  one  complex 
idea  of  an  orange.     In  this  analysis  the  main  elements 
of  the  simple  ideas,  and  the  process  between  them  and 
the  complex  idea,  are  omitted.     By  sight  we  already  see 
a  yellow,  by  touch  a  smooth,  by  taste  a  sweet  substance  ; 
hence  the  simple  ideas  of  substances  ;  by  reasoning,  we 
infer  that  all  these    correspond   in  our  senses  to  one 
complex  substance  outside,  represented  by  the  yellow 
in  sight,  the  smooth  in  touch,  the  sweet  in  taste ;  and, 
having  thus   inferred  an   external  orange,   we  form  a 


X  :i 


308 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


rAPiX  II. 


rational  complex  idea  of  it,  wliicli  we  then  reproduce, 
not  produce,  by  rational  association. 

Another  and  somewhat  different  kind  of  problem  is 
the  origin  of  fictitious  ideas,  of  the  ideas  of  art,  and  of 
ideals.  "^  Hume  truly  said  that  an  idea,  such  as  that  of 
a  golden  mountain,  is  ultimately  made  out  of  im- 
pressions, but  falsely  thought  that  it  is  produced  by 
sensitive  association,  which  by  itself  could  only  repro- 
duce the  sensil:>le  ideas  of  gold  and  of  mountain.  The 
reasoning  of  the  possible  intervenes.  We  infer  that  as 
a  mountain  is  made  of  one  material  it  might  be  made 
of  another,  and  having  judged  the  possibility,  analogi- 
cally conceive  the  idea  of  a  golden  mountain,  which  is 
only  reproduced  by  association.  Sometimes  we  infer 
tlie  possiljihty  of  more,  sometimes  of  less,  than  sense  per- 
ceives ;  hence  we  multiply  man  and  horse  into  centaur, 
or  diminisli  man  into  gliost.  Sometimes  we  infer  the 
possibility  of  something  better  than  ordinary,  as  Homer 
did  Achilles;  sometimes  worse,  as  Shakespeare  did 
Caliban.  But  in  artistic  idealisation  there  is  always  an 
inference  of  possibility,  which  is  the  foundation  of  all 
ideal  conception.  It  is  quite  the  same  in  philosophical 
ideals.  Plato  thought  of  the  possibihty  of  men  be- 
cominfT  angels  before  he  conceived  his  ideal  state. 

The  final  and  most  difficult  problem  is  the  influence 
of  the  association  of  ideas  beyond  ideas.  Locke  started 
this  general  problem  in  the  'Essay.'  The  following  is  an 
often  quoted  instance  from  his  chapter  on  Association : — 

'The  ideas  of  (johlhis  and  sprights  have  really  no 
more  to  do  with  darkness  than  light;  yet  let  but  a 
foolish  maid  inculcate  these  often  on  the  mind  of  a 
child,  and  raise  them  there  together,  possibly  he  shall 
never  be  able  to  separate  them  again  so  long  as  he 
lives ;  but  darkness  shall  ever  afterwards  bring  with  it 


CHAP     IX. 


HUME 


809 


these  frightful  ideas,  and  they  shall  be  so  joined  that 
he  can  no  more  bear  the  one  than  the  other.'  ^ 

Locke  did  not  make  so  much  of  this  effect  of  asso- 
ciation as  the  followers  of  Hume,  who  often  suppose 
that  the  association  of  the  ideas  of  ghosts  and  the  dark 
produces  a  belief  which  produces  a  fear.  But  the  fear 
often  follows  the  idea,  without  the  belief.  There  are  in 
reality  two  different  cases,  in  one  of  which  there  is  no 
belief,  in  the  other  a  belief,  but  not  caused  by  the  asso- 
ciation of  ideas.  Li  simple  sensitive  association,  where 
there  has  been  no  judgment  of  the  relation  of  a  ghost 
with  the  dark,  the  idea  of  the  dark  mechanically  recalls 
the  idea  of  the  ghost,  and  this  the  idea  of  pain  which  is 
sufficient  to  generate  fear.  Li  synthetic  sensitive  asso- 
ciation, where  there  has  been  a  judgment  that  a  ghost 
appears  in  the  dark  arising  from  a  child's  belief  in  the 
narratives  of  its  nurse,  the  association  of  ideas  is  accom- 
panied by  a  belief  that  a  gliost  may  possibly  appear, 
which,  however,  does  not  arise  from  the  association  of 
ideas,  but  by  parallel  inference  from  the  same  judgment 
as  that  which  produces  the  association.  Sometimes  this 
judgment  of  possibility  may  arise,  even  when  the  person 
is  sceptical  about  the  actuality  of  ghosts.  Still  more 
often  it  is  a  vague  inference  of  some  dreadful  possibility, 
because  the  dark  is  mysterious  to  man. 

Whenever,  then,  the  association  of  ideas  is  of  a 
simple  kind,  which  has  not  arisen  from  a  judgment,  it 
is  powerless  to  produce  one ;  and  whenever  it  is  ac- 
companied by  a  judgment,  they  are  joint  effects  of  an 
original  judgment,  which  produces  on  the  one  hand  an 
inference  at  least  of  possibility,  and  on  the  other  hand 
an  association  of  ideas.  At  the  same  time  there  is  an 
effect  of  association  on  belief,  like  the  effect  of  volition. 

^  Essatj,  ii.  33,  10. 


310 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALLSM 


PART   II. 


These  two  reproductive  causes  of  ideas,  by  constantly 
promoting  the  same  idea,  challenge  our  attention  not 
only  to  tiie  idea  but  also  to  the  parallel  judgments. 
Thus  a  person,  who  constantly  cherishes  the  idea  of 
being  wiser  than  others,  will  at  last  come  to  think  he  is 
so,  not  however  from  the  association  itself,  but  because 
his  attention  is  thereby  called  towards  the  evidences 
w^hich  infer  his  superiority,  and  away  from  those  which 

disprove  it. 

Hume's  empirical  theory  consists  in  three  proposi- 
tions:  (1)  All  perceptions  are  impressions  and  ideas  or 
thoughts;  (2)  All  ideas  or  thoughts  are  copies  of 
impressions;  (3)  Association  of  ideas  is  the  origin  of 
all  beliefs  of  facts,  that  is,  ideas  or  thoughts.  But  it  is 
one  thing  to  assert  an  empirical  theory  in  general,  and 
another  to  fill  in  its  details.  Impressions,  as  Hume  de- 
scribed them,  are  not  by  the  process  of  association,  as 
Hume  described  it,  the  origin  of  ideas,  which  are  not, 
as  Hume  described  them,  all  our  thoughts.  In  the 
first  place,  the  simplest  sensation  is  merely  an  abstract 
attribute  of  a  substantial  subject  apprehending  a  sub- 
stantial object,  and  the  simplest  reflection  an  abstract 
attribute  of  that  substantial  subject  apprehending  him- 
self^ Secondly,  sense  is  not  only  simple  but  synthetic ; 
■and  synthetic  sense  is  the  immediate  origin  of  sensitive 
judgment,  which  is  not  an  idea,  but  the  immediate  appre- 
liension  of  a  relation  of  sensible  objects.  Thirdly,  associa- 
/ion  is  a  reproduction,  but  it  is  not  a  production,  of  ideas, 
[still  less  of  beliefs,  which  are  not  ideas  but  judgments 
ultimately  based  on  synthetic  sense.  Fourthly,  reasoning 
TTTiot  an  association  of  ideas,  but  of  judgments;  and 
•there  are  three  types  of  inference — analogical,  inductive, 
and  deductive — all  starting  from  synthetic  sense,  and  by 
their  own  laws  instinctively  inferring  rational  judgments 


CHAP.   IX. 


IIUMR 


311 


which  are  not  impressions  nor  ideas,  yet  are  thoughts. 
Fifthly,  the  productive  origin  of  ideas  is  simple  sensed 
forming  the  first  ideas  of  qualified  substances,  synthetic 
sense  forminj^c  the  first  ideas  of  relation,  and  reasoninjj: 
analogical,  inductive  and  deductive,  which  forms  ideas 
not  only  of  what  is  inferred  to  be  actual,  but  also  of 
what  is  inferred  to  be  possible,  fictitious,  ideal :  the  re- 
productive origin  of  ideas  is  passive  association  and 
active  volition.  Sixthly,  there  are  three  species  of  a^^^ 
sociation,  simple  and  synthetic  sensitive  association,  and 
rational  association.  A  philosopher  who,  like  Hume, 
does  not  understand  reasoning,  cannot  understand  ideas 
and  their  association.  Logic  is  necessary  to  psychology. 
Empirical  philosophy  must  comprise  reason.  If  all 
knowledge  is  from  experience,  it  is  certainly  not  ac- 
quired by  association. 

Hume  concludes  his  '  Inquiry  '  with  his  Academical 
Philosophy.^  He  starts  with  what  he  calls  the  instinct 
by  which  men  '  suppose  the  very  images  presented  by 
the  senses  to  be  the  external  objects ; '  on  which  he 
makes  the  following  comment : — 

'  But  this  universal  and  primary  opinion  of  all  men 
is  soon  destroyed  by  the  slightest  philosophy,  which 
teaches  us  that  nothing  can  ever  be  present  to  the 
mind  but  an  image  or  percej)tion,  and  that  the  senses 
are  only  the  inlets  through  which  these  images  are 
conveyed  without  being  able  to  produce  any  immediate 
intercourse  between  the  mind  and  the  object.' 

This  most  instructive  passage  shows,  first,  that  ideal- 
ism has  a  real  advantage  over  intuitive  realism,  which 
falsely  accepts  the  perception  of  an  external  object, 
and  secondly,  that  idealists  tend  to  beg  that  the  repre- 
sentative image  perceived  is  a  perception  by  confusing 

'  Inquiry,  §  12. 


312 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


tlio  object  with  the  operation  of  sense.  Ideahsiu  is  the 
sc^ieiitific  trutli  tliat  sensible  objects  are  efTects  on 
tlie  senses,  misinterpreted  into  the  hypothesis  that  tliey 
are  '  perceptions  in  the  mind,'  as  Hume  calls  them  in 
the  same  paragraph,  without  evidence. 

Having  now  got  himself  into  a  self-made  difficulty 
about  the  data  of  sense,  he  proceeds  to  torture  himself 
with  the  following  question  : — 

'  By  what  argument  can  it  be  proved  that  the  per- 
ceptions of  the  mind  must  be  caused  by  external  objects, 
entirely  different  from  them,  though  resembling  them 
(if  that  be  possil)le),  and  could  not  arise  eitlier  from  the 
energy  of  the  mind  itself,  or  from  the  suggestion  of 
some  invisible  and  unknown  spirit,  or  from  some  other 
cause  unknown  to  us  ? ' 

This  question  is  put  with  the  logical  power  of 
Berkeley,  and  is  answered  with  even  more  logic : — 

'  It  is  a  question  of  fact,  whether  the  perceptions  of 
the  senses  be  produced  by  external  objects  resembling 
them  :  how  shall  this  question  be  determined  ?  By 
experience,  surely,  as  all  other  questions  of  a  like 
nature.  But  here  experience  is,  and  must  be,  entirely 
silent.  The  mind  has  never  anything  present  to  it  but 
the  perceptions,  and  cannot  possibly  reach  any  experi- 
ence of  their  connection  with  objects.  The  supposition 
of  such  a  connection  is,  therefore,  without  any  founda- 
tion in  reasoning.' 

The  fallacy  of  this  argument  consists  in  the  assump- 
tion with  which  it  begins.  Eeally,  we  are  conscious  of 
perceptions,  or  rather  of  ourselves  perceiving  ;  but  we 
perceive  not  perceptions,  but  sensible  objects,  and  not 
in  the  mind,  but  in  the  nervous  system ;  and  from  these 
physical  objects  within  we  infer  physical  objects  with- 
out, different  individually,  but  specifically  similar  to  the 


CHAP.    IX. 


HUME 


313 


sensible   objects   from   which    they  are    inferred.     But  ^ 
though  Hume's  data  were  false,  his  conclusions  were  ^ 
logical.     If  all  that  we  perceived  were  perceptions,  they 
would  be  entirely  different  from  external  objects ;  and\ 
experience,  being  confined  to  perceptions,  would  have  j 
no  data  to  prove  anything  at  all  about  objects,  internal 
or  external.     Moreover,  if  the  data  both  of  sensitive 
and  reflective  perception  were  perceptions,  qualities  as 
ideas  of  sensation,  and  operations  as  ideas  of  reflection, 
as  Locke  and  Berkeley  formally  stated,  we  should  only 
be  able  to  infer  perceptions.     Hume  has  the  best  of  the 
logic  when  he  refuses  to  follow  either  Locke  in  sup- 
posing matter,  or  Berkeley  in  supposing  mind,  seeing 
that  neither  of  these  philosophers  allowed  matter  and 
mind  in  the  data  of  sensation  and  reflection,  when  they 
were  delivering  themselves  ex  cathedra  on  the  subject  of 
sensible  data.     As  Hume  afterwards  sa^^s,  nothing  re- 
mains but  '  a  certain  unknown,  inexplicable  something^ 
as  the  cause   of  our  perceptions.'     Such  is  the  false 
though  logical  end  of  Hume's  speculative  philosoph}^ 

He  proceeds  illogically  to  correct  himself  of  his 
Pyrrhonism  by  the  old  view  of  the  Academy  that  '  all 
human  life  must  perish,  were  his  principles  universally 
and  steadily  to  prevail,'  which  is  no  answer  to  the 
Pyrrhonist  or  to  Berkeley,  who  would  immediately 
resolve  our  bodies,  our  clothes,  our  food,  our  estates, 
into  perceptions.  But  Hume  valued  common  life  too 
highly,  and  natural  philosophy  too  little.  We  are  not 
committed  to  the  dilemma  of  thinking  in  one  way  and 
living  in  another.  The  answer  to  his  'mitigated  scepti- 
cism or  academical  philosophy'  is  the  physical  dis- 
coveries of  natural  philosophy.  If,  indeed,  the  objects 
of  perception  were  j^erceptions,  we  should  never  infer 
anything   but   perceptions,    with    an   unknown,    inex- 


314 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


plicable  sonietliing.  But  natural  pliilosopliy  lias  dis- 
covered imperceptible  objects,  substances  qualified, 
causing  and  receiving  motions,  in  accordance  with  uni- 
versal laws,  and  ultimately  causing  our  perceptions. 
Therefore,  it  is  neither  true  that  knowledge  ends  in  an 
unknown  something,  nor  that  the  objects  of  perception 
are  perceptions,  from  which  imperceptible  objects  of 
science  could  not  have  been  inferred.  The  slightest 
philosophy  teaches  us  that  what  is  present  to  sense  is  an 
image,  but  not  that  this  image  is  a  perception.  Simple 
sense  perceives  an  object,  internal  but  physical ;  syn- 
thetic sense  and  experience  perceive  the  relations  of 
these  physical  objects  within,  and  reason  infers  the 
relations  and  existence  of  physical  objects  without. 

Hume's  philosophy  is  a  dedudio  ad  absurdum  of 
idealistic  hypotheses.  It  is  what  was  sure  to  follow  if 
Locke  and  Berkelev  were  taken  at  their  word,  no  re- 
gard  being  paid  to  their  admissions.  As  soon  as  the 
Cartesian  consciousness  of  the  thinking  subject  had 
been  forgotten,  all  the  data  of  sense  were  reduced  by 
Locke  and  Berkeley  to  ideas,  qualities  as  ideas  of  sen- 
sation, and  operations  as  ideas  of  reflection ;  and  the 
objects  of  understanding  were  logically  inferred  to  be 
also  ideas.  Locke  illogically  admitted  the  su2)position 
of  substances,  material  and  thinking;  Berkeley  dog- 
matically asserted  the  existence  of  mind  as  gathered  from 
its  effects ;  and  both  ended  by  admitting  the  conscious- 
ness of  one's  own  existence.  Berkeley  saw  the  incon- 
sequence of  Locke's  supposition  of  material  substance 
beyond  mere  ideas  of  sensation,  but  he  did  not  see 
that  he  was  with  equal  inconsequence  introducing 
mind,  soul,  spirit,  directly  after  mere  ideas  of  reflection. 
Hume  acutely  detected  the  half  measures  of  Berkeley, 
but  took  the  wroni^  alternative.     Listead  of  e:oin£^  be- 


CHAP.    IX. 


HUME 


315 


hind  both  Locke  and  Berkeley  to  show  that  both  sensa- 
tion and  reflection  perceive  qualified  substances,  he 
banished  the  thinking  to  the  limbo  of  the  material 
substance,  and  rigidly  confined  us  to  the  abstract  per- 
ceptions which  form  the  sum  of  the  data  of  perception 
by  the  confession  of  both  his  predecessors.  This  con- 
clusion is  argued  out  in  the  '  Treatise '  on  the  following 
text :  '  We  have  no  perfect  idea  of  anything  but  of  a 
perception.  A  substance  is  entirely  different  from  a, 
perception.  We  have  tlierefore  no  idea  of  a  substance.'  ^1 
This  logical  syllogism,  of  which  however  the  major  isy 
quite  false,  is  applied  both  to  material  and  thinking 
substance,  in  the  '  Treatise.'  In  the  '  Inquiry,'  he  became 
silent  on  this  point ;  but  ignorance  of  substance  is  a 
necessary  consequence  from  the  perception  of  percep- 
tions, which  is  common  to  both  books. 

Hume  may  be  said  to  have  gathered  the  ideal  theory 
of  perception  into  a  focus  which  reveals  to  us  its  errors. 
The  supposition  that  sensible  objects  are  psychical 
operations  deprives  us  of  objects  and  physical  objects 
within,  from  which  to  infer  physical  objects  without. 
The  supposition  that  sensible  objects  are  qualities  and 
operations  deprives  us  of  the  sense  and  inference  of 
substances ;  of  the  sensation  and  inference  of  material 
substances,  and  of  the  consciousness  and  inference  of 
thinking  substances,  partly  physical,  partly  psychical. 
On  every  side  he  paraded  the  mere  logic  of  ideahsm. 
He  was.  particularly  attracted  by  Berkeley's  philosophy ; 
for  instance,  by  the  theory  of  general  ideas,  and  of 
primary  and  secondary  quaUties.  Berkeley's  hypothesis,^ 
in  the  'Principles,'  of  the  inactivity  of  ideas,  antici- 
pated Hume's  scepticism  about  power  in  causation; 
while,  in  the  '  Theory  of  Vision,'  the  hypothesis  that 

*  Treatise,  iv.  §  5. 


o 

o 


IG 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TAUT    11, 


visible  ideas  su^L^i^est  tangiljle  ideas,  without  any  iiifereuee 
bf  an  external  object  common  to  touch  and  vision,  gave 
^he  first  hint  for  Hume's  substitution  of  association  for 
reasoning.  Hume's  scepticism  is  the  dark  shadow  of 
Berkeley's  theosophy,  giving  us  the  logical  warning— 
if  no  matter,  then  no  spirit,  and  no  God.  He  had  no 
suspicion  that  Berkeley's  so-called  principles  were  hypo- 
theses, any  more  than  modern  idealists  have.  Hence  he 
says  of  Berkeley's  arguments  that  '  they  admit  of  no 
answer^  and  produce  no  conviction'^ 

Here  Hume  missed  an  opportunity,  such  as  seldom 
falls  to  the   lot  of  a  philosopher.      Instead  of  being 
merely  logical  from  the  original  hypotheses  of  his  pre- 
decessors, he    ought   to   have   used   their   subsequent 
admissions  for  a  new  departure  in  philosophy.      He 
should  have  returned  to  the  Cartesian  consciousness  of 
a  thinking  subject.     He  should  have  shown  that  both 
Locke  and  Berkeley,  after  beginning  with  a  reflection  of 
mere  ideas  of  operations,  admitted  at  last  a  direct  con- 
sciousness of  one's   own  existence.      He  should  have 
pointed  out  that  this  means  a  reflective  consciousness 
of  oneself  as  a  thinking  substance,  and  have  similarly 
recognised   sensations   of  qualified   substances   within 
oneself.     From  these  data,  together  with  the  synthetic 
sense  of  relations,  he  could  have  proceeded  to  explain 
our  inferences  of  external  substances— bodies,  thinkers, 
God.     But  he  preferred  not  to  answer  his  predecessors, 
to  stick  to  the  idealistic  last,  and  to  work  on  nothing 
but  impressions  of  sensation  and  reflection. 

To  this  scepticism  about  sense  Hume  added  a  scepti- 
cism about  reason.  Logic,  through  the  process  of  being 
made  into  text-books  for  education,  has  been  too  much 
schematised.       For    example,    Aristotle    distinguished 

*  Inquiry,  §  12,  Part  I.,  note. 


ciiAr.  IX. 


HUME 


317 


simple  from  complex  apprehension,^  and  names  from 
propositions,^  but  did  not  co-ordinate  reasoning  with  the 
two  other  apprehensions.  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  schema- 
tistically  added  reasoning  as  a  third  operation.^  The 
moderns,  by  co-ordinating  the  three  operations,  have 
tended  to  lose  sight  of  the  process  of  reasoning  at  the 
l)ack  of  conception  and  judgment,  and  many  modern 
logicians  speak  as  if  there  were  three  independent  pro- 
cesses, conducted  quite  independently,  each  with  its 
own  independent  laws.  But  reasoning  is  a  process  from 
judgment  to  judgment,  producing  new  conceptions. 
Again,  the  conceptualistic  view  of  logic  intensified 
the  mischief,  by  regarding  judgment  as  apprehending, 
and  therefore  reasoning  as  inferring,  relations  of  ideas. 
At  the  same  thne,  Descartes  exaggerated  the  power  of 
ideas  over  knowledge. 

These  causes  produced  the  exaggerated  attention  to 
ideas  and  their  origin,  their  arbitrariness,  and  the  post- 
ponement of  reasoning  in  Locke's  '  Essay '  and  Berkeley's 
'Principles.'  The  disease  came  to  a  head  in  Hume's 
works.  Li  the  first  part  of  his  'Treatise,'  which  is 
directly  modelled  on  Locke's  Second  Book,  Hume  takes 
as  his  problem  the  mere  origin  of  ideas.  Li  the  course 
of  the  same  work  he  animadverts  on  the  distinction  of 
acts  of  the  understanding  into  conception,  judgment 
and  reasoning,  and  the  definitions  given  of  them.  '  Con- 
ception,' he  says,  '  is  defined  to  be  the  simple  survey  of 
one  or  more  ideas ;  judgment  to  be  the  separating  or 
uniting  of  different  ideas ;  reasoning  to  be  the  separating 
or  uniting  of  different  ideas  by  the  interposition  of 
others.' "^  But  his  animadversions  on  these  purely  con- 
ceptualistic definitions  only  end  in  his  reducing  all  these 


^  Ar.  De  An.  iii.  6. 

^  Aquinas  in  Periherin,  i. 


"^  Id.  Periherm,  i. 

*  Treatise,  iii.  §  7,  note. 


318 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


acts  to  conceptions.  Hence  liis  resolution  of  judgment 
or  belief  into  a  vivid  conception  or  idea,  from  wliicli 
the  substitution  of  association  of  ideas  for  inference  of 
judgments  immediately  follows.  The  answer  is  tliat 
judgment  is  an  apprehension  of  relations,  beginning 
with  the  synthetic  sense  of  the  relations  of  sensible 
objects,  and  reasoning  an  inference  from  sensitive  to 
rational  judgments,  culminating  in  the  laws  or  uniform 
relations  of  insensible  objects.  Judgment  is  not  an 
idea  ;  reasoning  not  an  association  of  ideas. 

Hume  was  misled  by  psychological  idealism  and 
conceptualistic  logic.  Hence  his  scepticism  about  sense 
and  reason.  His  philosophy,  after  all,  is  only  the  most 
conspicuous  instance  of  four  idealistic  faults  :  the  con- 
fusion of  the  operation  and  the  object  of  sense,  the  in- 
vention of  all  sorts  of  out-of-the-way  sources  of  ideas 
which  are  all  the  time  due  to  sense  and  inference,  the 
postponement  of  reasoning,  and  the  conceptualistic 
supposition  that  conception,  judgment,  and  reasoning 
are  all  equally  concerned  with  ideas/  The  proper  cor- 
rective is  the  study  of  Aristotle's  '  Organon,'  Bacon's 
'  Novum  Organum,'  and  Newton's  '  Principia.'  '  The 
fame  of  Cicero,'  says  Hume,  '  flourishes  at  present ;  but 
that  of  Aristotle  is  utterly  decayed.'  Deservedly  did 
Aristotle's  fame  decay  in  natural  philosophy.  But  his 
logic  of  reasoning,  widened  by  Bacon's  theory  of  induc- 
tion and  Newton's  explanatory  method,  is  necessary  to 
all  mental  philosophy.  Logical  reasoning  from  ade- 
quate data  of  sense  is  the  main  origin  of  knowledge, 
and  of  ideas,  and  of  their  association. 


319 


CHAPTEE  X. 


If 


KAXTS    'CRITIQUE      AND   NECESSARY    TRUTHS. 

Kant's  '  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason '  ^  begins  by  assuming 
Hume's  theory  of  impressions  ' ; — 

'  That  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience 
there  can  be  no  doubt ;  for  how  should  the  faculty  of 
knowledge  be  awakened  into  exercise  otherwise  tlian 
by  means  of  objects  which  affect  our  senses,  and  partly 
of  themselves  produce  representations,  partly  rouse  our 
power  of  understanding  into  activity,  to  compare,  to 
combine,  or  to  separate  these,  and  so  to  convert  the 
raw  material  of  our  sensor}^  impressions  into  a  know- 
ledge of  objects,  which  is  called  experience  ?  In 
respect  of  time,  therefore,  no  knowledge  of  ours  is 
antecedent  to  experience,  and  all  begins  with  it.' 

This  passage  contains  the  truth,  which  I  have  all 
along  admitted  to  lie  at  the  foundation  of  psychological 
idealism  ;  that  sense  perceives  not  external  things  in 
themselves,  but  internal  images  representing  them  in 
our  senses.  But,  like  his  predecessors,  Kant  went  on 
to  corrupt  this  truth  by  two  assumptions.  On  the 
one  hand,  he  supposed  the  operation  of  sense  to  be 
purely  psychical ;  on  the  other  hand,  he  confounded  the 
representative  image  with  the  operation  of  representa- 

*  Critique  of  Pure  Beason,  ed.  Hartenstein,  p.  33  =  Meiklejohn's 
translation  (Bohn),  p.  1. 

Ueberweg's  summary  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  is  printed  in 
an  Appendix  at  the  end  of  this  essay. 


320 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


tiou— a  confusion  constantly  fiivoured  by  tlie  vague 
abstractions  of  modern  languages,  in  which  representa- 
tion means  indiscriminately  both  the  operation  of  repre- 
senting and  the  representative  object,  sensation  and 
the  seiisible,  or,  in  Aristotelian  language,  cesthesis  and 

cestJiema. 

Hence,  he    started  with   the    assumption  that  the 
'matter  of  sense  is  nothing  but  its  own  representations, 
which  do  not  exist  out  of  the  mind,  and  are  not  sensibly 
apprehended  as  objects.^     This  mere  assumption  vitiates 
the  whole  work  ;  for,  of  course,  if  there  is  no  sense  of 
objects   within,  reason   cannot  infer   objects   without, 
and,  to  know  objects,  we  must  find  some  other  origin 
of  knowledge.     Hence,  also,  in  the  absence  of  adequate 
data  of  inference,  sense  and  reason  are  displaced  and 
divorced  from  one  another  by  the  intervention  of  an 
independent  understanding,  on  which  the  main  stress 
is  laid.     Hence,  finally,  as  understanding  can  act  only 
on  sensible  representations,  which  are  not  sufficient  data 
for  a  rational  inference  of  external  objects,  knowledge 
is    limited    to    sensible    representations    converted   by 
understanding  into  objects  of  experience,  or  plijenomena 
of  the  mind.     This  would  have  been  tolerable,  if  Kant 
had  started  by  proving  that  sense  only  apprehends  its 
own  representations.     But  he  did  not  even  make  it  a 
question.     It  never  occurred  to  him  that  touch  and 
vision  are  operations,  but   the  hot   felt   and  the  red 
seen  objects.     He  straightway  begged  that  there  is  no 
such  distinction  in  sense,  and  founded  the  '  Critique  ' 
on  a  petitio  principii.     Why  ?     Because,  uncritically,  he 
accepted  the  hypothesis,  that   the  matter   of  sense  is 
impressions,  from  Hume. 


1  Cf.  Hart.  111-20,  347  =  Meik.  77-86,  307. 


CHAP.  X.   KANT'S  'CRITIQUE' AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   321 


Of  all  the  many  errors  of  psychological  idealism  the 
worst  is  its  sequacity.  Even  critical  idealism  begins  by 
being  uncritical.  Kant  seemed  to  delight  in  assuming 
as  data  the  unproved  assumptions  of  his  predecessors, 
which  have  been  already  criticised  in  this  essay.  From 
Descartes  he  accepted  the  confusion  of  subject  and 
soul,  the  imaginary  power  of  eliciting  ideas,  and  the 
supposed  psychical  object  of  sense  ;  and  from  Locke  the 
deduction  that  all  objects  of  understanding  are  ps^x^hical, 
the  hypothesis  that  outer  sense  is  concerned  with  mere 
qualities  and  inner  sense  witli  mere  operations,  the 
neglect  of  logical  reasoning,  the  consequent  deduction 
of  the  false  conclusion  that  relations  are  a  work  of 
understanding,  and  the  unexplained  supposition  of  an 
unknown  thing  as  cause  of  the  data  of  sense.  After 
Berkeley,  Kant  surrendered  the  inconsequent  deduction 
by  Descartes,  and  the  inconsistent  admission  by  Locke, 
of  a  knowledge  of  physical  objects,  and  accepted  the 
logical  conclusion  that  the  objects  of  human  knowledge, 
with  all  their  qualities,  primary  as  well  as  secondary, 
are  psychical  objects  of  perception,  and  the  consequent 
but  false  identification  of  the  perceptible  and  the  real, 
so  far  as  known. 

But  Hume  was  Kant's  main  authority.  They  rightly 
agreed  in  rejecting  Berkeley's  dogmatism  about  the  ex- 
istence of  mind  and  the  non-existence  of  matter,  and  in 
the  revival  of  the  real  distinction  made  by  Aristotle 
between  sensation  and  conception,  in  Hume's  termin- 
ology between  impression  and  idea,  in  Kant's  between 
intuition  and  conception.  Along  with  these  merits, 
the  critic,  without  a  word  of  criticism,  accepted 
from  the  sceptic  the  extraordinary  mass  of  paradoxes 
about  sense  and  the  sensible,  by  which  ideahsm  had 
become  scepticism.     What  men  call  sensible  objects, 


322 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


and  ]x4ieve  to  be  external,  what  we  have  found  to  be 
internal  but  not  psychical  objects,  are  supposed  by 
Hume  and  Kant  to  be  not  only  internal  but  in  the  mind, 
not  objects  distinct  from  the  operation  of  sensation  or 
sensor}^  '  representation,'  as  Kant  would  say,  not  sub- 
stantial, nor  including  any  sensible  relation  of  cause 
and  effect;  in  a  word,  impressions,  nothing  more. 
Critical  or  transcendental  idealism,  and  all  the  many 
idealisms  which  have  sprung  from  it,  exist  only  under 
tlie  shadow  and  protection  of  Hume's  scepticism  ;  for 
all  of  them,  without  exception,  start  with  a  sense  of 
sensations,  which  has  no  authority  except  idealistic 
hypothesis  ending  in  Hume's  paradox  of  impressions. 
]3ut  we  must  go  behind  both  Hume  and  Kant  for  the 
data  of  sense. 

Kant  even  went  beyond  Hume's  scepticism  about 
the  matter,  which  the  senses  receive  from  without. 
The  sceptic  had  doubted  a  sense  of  anything  spatial  or 
temporal,  and  had  denied  a  sense  of  connection ;  but, 
however  informally,  he  allowed  a  sense  of  conjunction. 
His  critic,  taking  him  at  his  word  when  he  put  forward 
mere  impressions  as  the  data  of  sense,  proceeded,  logi- 
cally but  falsely,  to  separate  space  and  time  from  the 
matter  of  sense,  to  obliterate  the  last  trace  of  sensible 
relation,  and  to  reduce  the  matter  of  sense  to  sensible 
representations  or  impressions,  only  lasting  for  an  in- 
stant. Moreover,  Kant  was  the  author  of  the  paradox 
that  '  the  apprehension  of  the  apparent  manifold  is 
always  successive,'  and  '  the  manifold  of  appearances  is 
always  successively  produced  in  the  mind,'  ^  not  rJlow- 
ing  that  even  coexistence  is  sensible.  Accordmg  to 
him,    the   matter   of  sense   received   from  without   is 

^  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  ed.  Hartenstein,   p.  175  =  Meiklejohn's 
translation  (Bohn),  pp.  142-43. 


ciiAi\x     KANT'S  '  CRITIQUE  '  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   323 

nothing  but  a  manifold  or  aggregate  of  unrelated  im- 
pressions, a  mere  play  of  representations,^  a  rhapsody 
of  perceptions.^  One  wonders  at  last  that  he  did  not 
say  at  once  that  nothing  is  sensible.  Meanwhile,  this 
emasculation  of  the  senses  is  not  a  result  of  any  in- 
dependent examination,  but  simply  tlie  last  step  in  the 
imitation  of  one  idealist  by  another.  Yet  it  is  necessary 
to  the  argument  of  the  '  Criticjue.'  It  is  because  the 
matter  of  sense  is  presupposed  to  be  mere  impression 
that  our  knowledge  of  objects  is  suj)posed  to  be  due  to 
a  priori  sources.  In  short,  Kant  attempted  a  criticism 
of  pure  -reason  witliout  a  previous  criticism  of  the 
matter  of  sense.  After  what  I  have  said  in  this  essav, 
not  against  one  but  against  all  these  idealistic  assump- 
tions, I  cannot  be  expected  to  enter  even  the  vestibule 
of  this  uncritical  philosophy. 

The  opening  of  the  Introduction  to  the  '  Critique ' 
carries  us  insensibly  back  to  the  last  section  of  Hume's 
'  Inquiry  ' : — '  The  mind,'  says  Hume,  '  has  never  any- 
thing 2)i'esent  to  it  but  the  percej)tions,  and  cannot 
possibly  reach  any  experience  of  their  connection  with 
objects.'  ^  Hence  we  see  the  resemblance  and  difference 
between  the  two  philosophers.  Both  agree  that  the 
senses  perceive  impressions  or  representations.  But 
the  point  of  Hume's  philosophy  is  :  given  impressions, 
we  haye  not  the  faculties  to  experience  objects  of  any 
kind.  The  point  of  Kant's  philosophy  is  :  given  repre- 
sentations, the  objects  of  knowledge  require  faculties  to 
convert  the  raw  material  of  our  sensory  impressions 
into  a  knowledge  of  objects  called  experiencej  The 
difference,  however,  is  by  no  means  so  great  as  it 
appears  at  first  sight ;  for  Hume  and  Kant  alike  begin 

1  Hart.  178  =  Meik.  145.  ^  jjart.  152  =  Meik.  118. 

^  Inquiry^  12,  Part  I. 

T  2 


i  ^..^ 


.? 


/ 


324 


rSYCIlOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PAET  IT. 


by  assuming  that  the  matter  of  sense  is  mere  impres- 
sions, and  end  by  denying  a  knowledge  of  objects  beyond 

experience. 

How,  then,  from  sensible  representations,  supposed 
to  be  the  matter  of  sense,  do  we  arrive  at  a  knowledge 
of  objects?  The  answer  of  Kant  immediately  follows 
the  opening  passage  of  the  Introduction  :— 

'  But,  though  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  expe- 
rience, it  by  no  means  follows  that  all  arises  oz«f  ^/expe- 
rience!    For  it  could  well  be  that  even  our  empirical 
knowledge  is  a  compound  of  that  which  we   receive 
through  Impressions,  and  that  which  our  own  power  of 
knowledge  (merely  occasioned  by  sensible  impressions) 
supplies  from  itself,  an  addition  which  we  cannot  dis- 
tinguish from  the  original  element  given  by  sense,  till 
long  practice  has  made  us  attentive  to,  and  skilful  in 
separating  it.    It  is,  therefore,  at  least  a  question  which 
requires  close  investigation,  and  is  not  to  be  answered 
at  first  sight;  whether  there   exist  a  knowledge  alto- 
gether independent  of  experience,  and  even  of  all  im- 
pressions of  sense  ?     Knowledge  of  this  kind  is  called 
a  priori,  in  contradistinction  to  empirical  knowledge, 
which  has  its  sources  a  posteriori,  that  is,  in  experience.'  ^ 
By  a  priori,  as  he  proceeds  to  explain,  he  does  not 
mean  merely  deductive   from  the  results  of  previous 
experience,  though  this,  or  rather  deductive  from  the 
prior  cause  to  the  posterior  effect,  was  the  usual  mean- 
ing of  the  phrase  :  what  he  calls  knowledge  a  priori  is 
'  absolutely  hidependent  of  experience.'  ^     It  is  nearly 
related   to   what   Descartes    called    innate.     But   the 
noveUy  of  Kant's  theory  is  that  even  sense  and  expe- 
rience contain  a  priori  forms.     Given  that  mere  repre- 
sentations are  the  matter  of  sense  received  from  with- 


»  Hart.  33  -  Meik.  1. 


2  lb.  34  -  Meik.  2. 


CHAP.  X.  KAxrs  '  cnn  iQUE '  and  necessary  truths  325 


L^ 


out,  sense  requires  a  priori  forms  or  pure  intuitions  of 
space  and  time  to  receive  representations  in  outer  and 
inner  sense ;  understanding  requires  a  priori  forms  of 
thouglit,  pure  notions,  or  categories,  to  convert  repre- 
sentations into  a  perception  and  experience  of  objects  ; 
and  reason  requires  us  to  conceive  a  p)riori  ideas  beyond 
objects  of  sense,  understanding,  perception,  experience, 
knowledge,  but  cannot  enable  us  speculatively  to  know 
the  unconditioned  objects  of  those  ideas.  Tlie  Kantian 
a  priori  theory  differs  from  the  Cartesian  theory  of 
innate  ideas  by  the  assertion  of  a  priori  forms  m./ 
empirical  knowledge  and  by  the  denial  of  a  knowledge 
through  a  priori  ideas  beyond  experience. 

I  remarked  in  the  first  part  of  this  essay  that  every 
theory  of  tlie  origin  of  knowledge  is  an  hypothesis,  which 
must  be  tested  by  direct  and  indirect  evidence ;  and 
that  the  indirect  evidence  must  comprise  both  explana- 
tion of  the  known  facts  and  elimination  of  other  hypo- 
theses ;  while  of  all  things  what  must  be  avoided  is 
synthetical  hypothesis,  which,  starting  from  the  sup- 
posed verity  of  putative  principles,  arbitrarily  dictates 
and  denies  facts.  It  will  be  our  task  to  apply  these 
logical  rules  to  Kant's  a  priori  theory,  comparing  it 
with  other  theories  of  the  ori^^^in  of  knowled«^e,  as  occa- 
sion  may  arise.  In  the  treatment  of  this  subject  it  is 
too  often  supposed  that  the  alternative  lies  between 
Hume  and  Kant,  and  that  an  empirical  origin  of  know- 
ledge means  association,  from  which  the  only  refuge  is 
transcendentalism.  I  shall  avoid  this  danger,  thinking 
that  in  philosophy,  as  elsewhere,  this  is  a  pretty  safe 
rule :  when  opposite  parties  quarrel  with  one  ar\pther 
more  hotly  than  usual,  the  truth  lurks  elsewhere. 
Moreover,  I  have  shown  in  the  last  chapter,  first,  that 
sense  is  a  very  different  thing  from  mere  impression, 


326 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


and,  secondly,  that  tlie  empirical  association  of  ideas  is 
quite  different  from,  and  insignificant  compared  with, 
the  empirical  inference  of  judgments  and  the  conse- 
quent conception  of  ideas,  analogical,  inductive,  and 
deductive;  so  that  there  are  at  least  two  empirical 
theories  of  the  origin  of  knowledge  and  ideas,  which 
we  may  distinguish  as  the  imaginative  and  the  inferen- 
tial. Lastly,  I  pointed  out  that  there  are  laws  which 
our  operations  mechanically  obey  without  knowing 
them,  even  in  reasonino"  itself.  It  is  evident  that  causce 
coynoscendi  are  of  a  very  complicated  nature.  The 
choice  does  not  lie  between  Hume  and  Kant. 

Transcendentalism  has  no  direct  evidence.  It  sup- 
poses what  may  be  called,  perhaps,  a  self-informing 
power,  what  Cudworth  called  a  potential  omniformity 
of  the  mind.  But,  however  we  name  it,  it  is  a  power 
of  which  one  is  not  conscious.  In  this  respect  it  is 
inferior  to  all  forms  of  empiricism,  which  assume  only 
conscious  powers,  such  as  sense,  imagination,  associa- 
tion, memory,  judgment,  and  reasoning.  Kant,  on  the 
other  hand,  supposes  a  power  of  adding  a  irriori  to 
a  posteriori  elements  for  reasons  of  his  own,  not  on 
account  of,  but  rather  in  spite  of,  consciousness.  I  am 
not  conscious,  for  example,  when  I  put  my  hand  on  the 
table,  that  I  apprehend  something  a  posteriori  as  hard, 
and  a  priori  as  extended :  rather,  I  seem,  as  Berkeley 
said,  to  be  feeling  the  primary  quality  of  extension 
inseparably  united  with  the  secondary  quality  of  hard- 
ness. Moreover,  there  is  an  absence  of  any  anatomical 
evidence  for  a  self-informing  power.  Where  is  its  ner- 
vous organ  ?  Not  the  brain  in  particular,  which  is  the 
general  organ  of  sense,  reasoning,  will ;  not  the  nervous 
system  as  hereditarily  adapted  to  perform  its  operations, 
for  quick  is  not  a  priori   apprehension.     When  Kant 


CHAP   X.   KANT'S  'CKITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   327 

says  that  we  know  because  we  have  an  a  priori  power, 
it  is  suspiciously  like  saying  we  know  because  we  have 
an  occult  power  of  knowing.  Direct  evidence,  how- 
ever, is  not  absolutely  necessary,  and  it  may  be  urged 
perhaps  that  the  a  ptriori  stands  on  the  same  footing 
as  the  a3thereal  hypothesis.  But  there  is  a  decisive 
difference,  ^ther  is  supposed  to  be  moving  according 
to  the  known  laws  of  motion  of  all  bodies.  But  accord- 
ing to  what  laws  does  the  supposed  self-informing 
power  act  ?  The  only  laws  at  all  like  it  are  those  of 
pure  fancy,  which  supplements  the  adventitious  by  the 
fictitious.  But  the  laws  of  fancy  will  not  suit  the  a 
priori  hypothesis,  which  demands  not  fiction  but  know- 
ledge. The  peculiarity  of  transcendentalism  is  that  it 
supposes  a  power  and  supposes  it  to  obey  laws  of  its 
own.  It  is  what  Mill  would  call  an  hypothesis  of  both 
cause  and  law.^ 

Transcendentalism  reall}^  stands  and  falls  on  the 
indirect  evidence  that  the  objects  of  knowledge  cannot 
be  otherwise  explained.  Kant  appeals,  in  the  first  place, 
to  necessary  judgments.  As  experience  examines  only 
many  instances  and  not  all,  induction  can  conclude 
only  comparative  universality,  which  is,  after  all,  open 
to  exception.  '  Necessity  and  strict  universality,'  he 
concludes,  '  are,  therefore,  sure  sims  of  a  knowledire 
a  priori'  '^  Now  there  are,  according  to  him,  necessary 
judgments  ;  for  example,  any  proposition  in  mathema- 
tics, and  the  necessary  connection  of  cause  and  effect  in 
the  ordinary  use  of  understanding.  These  necessary 
judgments,  then,  will  be  not  inductive  but  a  priori. 
Secondly,  he  argues  that  '  not  only  in  judgments,  but 
even  in  universal  conceptions,  an  a  priori  origin  some- 
times discovers  itself;'  take  away  from  the  empirical 

1  Mill,  Logic,  iii.  14.  '^  Hart.  35  =  Meik.  3. 


328 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALIS>r 


PART  II. 


conception  of  a  body  everything  empirical,  it  disappears, 
but  the  space  it  occupied  remains ;  take  away  from  the 
empirical  universal  conception  of  any  object  its  em- 
pirical qualities,  substance  remains.*  Thirdly,  he  points 
to  universal  conceptions,  which  have  no  object  corre- 
sponding in  experience,  but  belong  to  a  suprasensible 
sphere,  where  experience  can,  as  he  thinks,  give  no 
guidance.  '  These  unavoidable  problems  of  pure  reason 
itself  are,'  he  says,  '  God,  Freedom,  and  Immortality.'  '^ 

These  three  arguments  for  the  a  priori  are  stated  in 
the  Introduction,  and  are  the  gist  of  the  'Critique.' 
They  have  a  common  point :  they  all  refer  to  objects, 
supposed  to  require  an  a  priori  or  self-informing  power. 
But  the  first  appeals  to  necessary  judgments  about 
objects  of  science,  the  second  to  objects  of  common  ex- 
perience, and  the  third  to  objects  beyond  all  experience 
in  a  suprasensible  world.  Again,  the  first  challenges 
the  limits  of  induction,  the  second  the  limits  of  sense, 
the  third  the  limits  of  experience.  To  answer  them, 
we  have  to  ask  ourselves,  indeed,  whether  induction, 
sense,  and  experience  are  so  limited  ;  but  also,  whether, 
in  each  case,  our  apprehensions  of  the  objects  are 
a  priori.  It  should  be  noticed  that  there  are  always 
two  different  questions  to  be  answered,  before  we  can 
draw  the  transcendental  conclusion ;  there  is  the 
question  what  is  not,  and  the  question  what  is,  the 
origin  of  our  knowledge  and  ideas.  The  negative 
criticism  of  a  given  aspect  of  empiricism  is  not  always 
a  positive  proof  of  transcendentalism. 

The  three  arguments  require  different  answers.  The 
first  is  the  most  plausible.  Induction  is  only  probable  ; 
necessary  judgments  therefore  are  not  merely  inductive. 
But  it  does  not  follow  that  they  are  therefore  a  priori  ; 

1  Hart.  36  =  Meik.  4.  ''  lb.  37  =  Meik.  4. 


CHAP 


.  X.   KANT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    o29 


on  the  contrary,  as  we  shall  presently  find,  they  are 
analytical  judgments  a  posteriori.    The  second  argument 
depends,  not  on  the  logical  hmits  of  induction,  but  on 
Hume's  hypothesis  of  the  limits  of  sense,  uncritically 
adopted  by  Kant.     But  sense  is  not  limited  to  repre- 
sentations ;    it  perceives  the  extended,  as  we  found  in 
examining  Berkeley's  '  Theory  of  Vision,'  and  substance, 
as  we  found  in  discussing  Locke's  '  Essay ' ;  whatever 
extended  substance  is  in   experience   is  previously  in 
sense,  and  what  is  not  in  sense  is  inferred  by  logical 
reasoning  from  sense.     The  third  argument  depends  on 
the  kind  of  experience  which  would  be  possible,  if  it 
were  made  out  of  representations  by  a  priori  notions  of 
understanding,  and  were,  therefore,  confined  to  sensible 
phaenomena,  as  Kant  supposes.      In  that  case,   there 
would   be    no   logical   reasoning    from   experience    of 
phsenomena  to   non-pha^nomenal  objects.      But  sense, 
outer  and  inner,  apprehends  internal  but  substantial 
objects,  unthinking  and  thinking  ;  experience  is  the  sum 
of  sense ;    and,  not  sense  and  experience,  but  logical 
reasoning  from   them  infers  a  posteriori  similar   sub- 
stantial objects  beyond  experience  ;  God,  nature  made, 
and  man  made,  saved,  and  raised  by  Him.      The  whole 
'  Critique '  is  a  depreciation  of  sense  and  reason ;  for, 
if  a  philosopher  denies  the  objects  of  sense,  he  destroys 
the  data  of  reason.      Finally,  to  close  this  preliminary 
sketch,   even  if  we  could  give  no  positive  answer  to 
Kant,  we  could  at  all  events  not  accept  his  theory, 
which  confessedly  limits  our   inferences  of  necessary 
truths  and  extended  substances  to  mere  phenomena, 
and  our  apprehension  of  God,  freedom,  and  immortaUty 
to  bare  ideas.     He,  at  any  rate,  does  not  explain  the 
power,  the  extent,  the  grasp,  of  human  reason,  because 
he  has  no  adequate  data  of  reasoning. 


ooU 


PSYCIIOLOGirAT.   IDEALISM 


PAKT   II. 


Of  the  three  indirect  arguments,  which  constitute 
the  proof  of  transcendentahsm,  the  first  is  furtlier  de- 
veloped in  the  Introduction,  and  required  throughout 
the  sequel  of  the  '  Critique.'  It  was  derived  from 
Leibnitz,  who,  in  the  Avant-propos  of  the  'Nouveaux 
Essais,'  had  argued  that  necessary  truths,  especially 
in  pure  mathematics,  though  they  are  occasioned  by 
the  senses,  do  not  depend  on  their  evidence,  but  are 
innate/  Hume  had,  moreover,  called  attention  to  the 
belief  in  the  supposed  necessary  connection  of  cause 
and  effect,  which  he  had  explained  away  by  experi- 
ence and  association.  Stimulated  by  the  problem 
of  Hume,  and  prepared  by  the  theory  of  Leibnitz, 
Kant  extended  the  hypothesis  of  an  a  jmori  origin  of 
necessary  judgments  from  mathematics  to  natural 
philosophy,  with  the  special  view  of  solving  thereby 
the  problem  of  causation.  At  the  same  time,  he  did 
more  than  extend  the  a  priori  theory ;  he  altered  its 
character.  Leibnitz  had  held  an  a  jwiori  analytical 
theory  of  necessity,  and  thought  that  necessary  truths 
are  innate  in  the  sense  of  an  analysis  of  our  con- 
ceptions. Kant,  agreeing  that  they  are  not  inductive 
but  a  priori^  added  the  novel  supposition  that  they 
are  not  analytical  but  synthetical,  and  therefore  pro- 
posed the  question:  How  are  synthetical  judgments 
a  priori  possible  ? 

At  the  present  day,  it  is  frequently  supposed  that 
the  question  of  necessary  truths  depends  on  a  choice 
between  two  synthetical  theories,  the  a  priori  view  of 
Kant  and  the  a  posteriori  view  of  Mill.  Kant,  in  his 
day,  was  at  all  events  free  from  this  defect.  He  knew 
that  he  had  to  deal  with  Leibnitz  as  well  as  empiricists, 
and  directed  his  theory,  so  far  as  synthetical  against 

»  Leibnitz,  Opera  (ed.  Erdmann),  195  A,  209  B. 


CHAP.  X.   KANT'S  '  CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    331 

the  former,  and,  so  far  as  a  priori  against  the  latter. 
There  are,  therefore,  at  least  three  alternatives  about 
necessary  truths  :  that  they  are  synthetical  a  posteriori ; 
that  they  are  synthetical  a  priori ;  that  they  are  analy- 
tical a  priori.  There  is  one  more  alternative  :  they  are 
analytical  a  posteriori. 

Having,  in  imitation  of  Leibnitz,  eliminated  the  in- 
ductive theory,  Kant  proceeded  to  eliminate  the  analy- 
tical a  priori  theory  of  Leibnitz,  in  order  to  estabhsh 
his  own  conclusion  that  necessary  truths  are  synthetical 
a  priori  judgments.  An  analytical  judgment  he  defines 
as  one  which  analyses  a  subject  into  its  constituent 
notions,  e.g.  all  Ijodies  are  extended  ;  while  a  synthetical 
judgment  is  one  which  adds  a  predicate  to  our  notion  of 
the  subject,  e.g.  all  bodies  are  heavy.^  Then  he  contends 
that,  though  some  necessary  judgments  are  analytical, 
all  necessary  principles  are  synthetical.  He  begins  with 
pure  mathematics.  From  arithmetic,  having  selected  the 
sum  7  +  5  =  12,  he  points  out  that  the  universal  con- 
ception of  twelve  is  by  no  means  thought  by  thinking 
the  union  of  seven  and  five.  Pure  geometry  seemed  to 
him  to  contain  the  judgment,  that  a  straight  line  is  the 
shortest  between  two  points,  which,  as  he  contended,  is 
synthetical,  because  the  notion  of  straight  contains 
nothing  of  magnitude,  but  only  a  quality,  and  the 
notion  of  shortest  is  added  to,  not  extracted  from,  the 
notion  of  a  straight  line.^  '  Natural  science  {Physica) 
contains  synthetical  judgments  a  priori  as  principles  in 
itself;'^  this  is  his  next  point.  Finally,  he  concludes 
that  '  metaphysics,  at  least  as  regards  its  end,  consists 
of  merely  synthetical  propositions  a  priori ; '  and  asks 
the  question.  How  are  synthetical  judgments  a  priori 

^  Hart.  40  =  Meik.  7.  '^  lb.  43-4  =  Meik.  10. 

3  lb.  44  =  Meik.  11. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PARI   II, 


possible?  He  even  commits  himself  to  the  extra- 
ordinary paradox  that  the  solution  of  this  problem 
must  determine   whether   metaphysics   is   to  stand  or 

fall.^ 

Now,  to  resume  his  whole  argument  from  necessary 
to  synthetical  a  joy  wz  judgments  :  necessary  judgments 
are  not  inductive ;  they  are,  therefore,  a  priori :  but 
there  are  necessary  judgments,  e.g.  in  mathematics  and 
natural  philosophy ;  they  are,  therefore,  not  inductive, 
but  a  priori :  again,  they  may  be  analytical  or  syntheti- 
cal ;  now,  analytical  judgments  are  analyses  of  a  subject 
into  its  conceptions,  and,  though  some  necessary  judg- 
ments a  priori  are  of  this  kind,  necessary  principles, 
e.g.  in  mathematics  and  natural  philosophy,  being 
a  priori  additions  of  a  predicate  to  a  subject,  are  not 
analytical  but  synthetical  a  priori.  Such  is  the  in- 
genious reasoning  by  which  Kant  tried  to  eliminate,  first, 
the  inductive,  and,  secondly,  the  analytical  theories  of 
the  origin  of  necessary  truths.  It  opens  up  a  number 
of  questions  ;  but,  as  it  admits  the  existence  of  ana- 
lytical judgments,  and  w^e  have  not  as  yet  looked  into 
this  aspect  of  analysis,  our  first  anxiety  must  be  to  dis- 
cover what  is  the  nature  and  value  of  analytical  judg- 
ment, and  what  its  limit. 

Aristotle  laid  the  foundation  of  the  distinction 
between  analytical  and  synthetical  judgments  by  his 
investigations  about  simple  and  complex  being  and 
intelligence  (j^oT^crts),  about  the  axioms  of  being  and 
knowing,  about  the  self-evident  principles  of  demon- 
stration. In  the  '  Metaphysics '  he  discussed,  as  axioms 
of  being,  the  principles  of  contradiction  and  excluded 
middle,'"^  and  distinguished  simple  and  complex  being, 
remarking  that  things  simple  (rd  do-w^cra),  such  as  a 

^  Hart.  45  =  Meik.  12.  ^  ^^i^  y.  3  seg. 


oo  o 


CHAP.  X.   KANTS  '  CRITIQUE '  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   666 


unit,  are  objects  about  which  we  may  be  ignorant,  but 
not  deceived,  and  either  understand  them  altogether  or 
not  at  all ;  whereas  about  a  combination,  such  as  wood 
beino-  white,  we  may  make  propositions  either  true  or 
false.^  In  the  '  De  Anima,'  after  distinguishing  simple 
and  complex  intelligence,  he  contended  that  the  simple 
apprehension  of  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  always  true, 
while  the  complex  apprehension  of  something  merely 
belonging  to  it  may  be  either  true  or  false,  e.g.  a  white 
thing  may  or  may  not  be  a  man.'^  In  the  '  Posterior 
Analytics  '  he  insists  that  the  principles  of  demonstration 
must  be  necessary,  that  is,  self-evident,^  that  the  axioms 
of  being,  though  principles,  are  not  the  actual  premises,^ 
and  that  the  principles  of  demonstration  are  acquired 
by  a  gradual  process  of  sense,  memory,  experience, 
induction,  and  are  recognised  by  intellect  {vov<;\  of 
which  the  obvious  function  is  to  apprehend  their  ne- 
cessity.^ 

I  do  not  commit  myself  to  the  whole  of  this  theory 
of  the  self-evident  principles  of  demonstration.  Aris- 
totle did  not  successfully  explain  the  power  of  intellect 
to  apprehend  the  self-evident,  and,  though  he  founded 
the  constituents,  did  not  actually  recognise  the  analytical 
judgment.  Especially  I  take  exception  to  his  doctrine 
that  the  apprehension  of  an  essence  or  definition  is 
always  true.  There  are  really  two  ways  of  arriving 
at  definitions,  one  of  which  I  take  to  be  on  the  whole 
that  described  by  Aristotle,  and  exemplified  in  the 
simple  definitions  of  mathematics ;  but  the  other  is  far 
more  complicated,  being  an  accumulation  of  facts, 
followed  by  an  explanatory  hypothesis  of  essence ;  a 
way  which  is  exemphfied   in   the   explanation  of  the 


'  Met.  e.  10. 
^  lb.  i.  11. 


-  Dc  An.  iii.  6.  ^  Post.  An.  i.  4-6. 

^  lb.  ii.  19. 


O  O   I 

oo4 


rSVCIlOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


facts  of  lieat    and  liglit  by  defiiiiiig  them  as  undula- 
tions of  aetlier.     The  omission  of  this  second   process 
is  a  great  blot  in   Aristotle's  logic  of  science,  which 
is  too  much  modelled  on  mathematics.     It  made  him, 
as  liacon  remarked,  fly  to  principles,  think  all  scientific 
principles  simple  and  self-evident,  and  all  science  de- 
monstrative, or  deductive  from  the  self-evident.    Hence 
his  anticipation  of  nature   in   natural  philosophy ;  for 
example,  his  hypothesis  that  heat  is  a  primary  quality 
of  matter  whose    nature    is  simple    and   self-evident; 
whereas  it  is  a  secondary  quality,  whose    nature    has 
been  discovered  only  after  an  indirect  process  of  ac- 
cunudating  its  properties,  and  then  explaining  them  by 
icthereal  motion.     ]3ut  at  the  bottom  of  these  exajiirera- 
tions  Aristotle  was  the  discoverer  of  a  great  truth.    There 
are  self-evident  truths  about  things,  simple  not  synthetic, 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  contradiction  and 
excluded  middle,  yet  not  deduced  from  them,  discovered 
a  posteriori,  but  recognised  by  some  power  of  intellect, 
and  forming  principles  of  demonstration.     Aristotle's  is 
a  realistic  theory  of  self-evident  truths.     It  has,  more- 
over, exercised  an  immense  influence  on  modern  philo- 
sophy, though  it  has  become  corrupted  by  conceptuahsm 
and  nominalism. 

Even  empirical  philosophers  admit  self-evident  truths, 
and  some  of  them  even  adopt  the  analytical  theory  of 
mathematics.  Among  the  conceptualists,  Locke,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Fourtli  Book  of  his  '  Essay,'  recognised 
self-evidence  under  the  name  of  '  intuitive  knowled<»-e  ' 
which  perceives  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas 
by  themselves,  e.g.  that  white  is  not  black,  that  a  circle 
is  not  a  triangle,  that  three  are  more  than  two  and 
equal  to  one  and  two ;  he  admitted  that  intuition  is  the 
most  certain  kind  of  knowledge,  and  the  foundation  of 


o  o  rr 


CHAP.  X.     KANT S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   ooo 


demonstration,^  in  mathematics.  But  he  gave  no  proof 
that  it  is  limited  to  ideas,  nor  any  explanation  of  its 
operation.  Similarly,  Hume  in  the  '  Treatise  '  admits 
intuition.  '  No  one,'  savs  he,  '  can  once  doubt  but 
existence  and  non-existence  destroy  each  other,  and 
are  perfectly  incompatible  and  contrary.''^  In  the 
'Inquiry'  he  regards  pure  mathematics  as  consisting 
of  propositions,  which  express  relations  of  ideas,  either 
intuitively  or  demonstratively  certain,  and  discoverable 
by  the  mere  operation  of  thought.^  'The  conclusions,' 
says  he,  '  which  it  draws  from  considering  one  circle 
are  the  same  which  it  would  form  upon  surveying  all  the 
circles  in  the  universe.'  *  But  he  confined  the  self- 
evident  and  demonstrative  to  mathematics.^  He 
adopted  from  Locke  the  analytical  theory  of  mathema- 
tics in  a  conceptualistic  form,  but  neither  of  them 
proved  that  self-evident  truths  express  merely  relations 
of  ideas.  Mill  differed  on  this  subject,  from  them  in 
two  respects.  In  the  first  place,  he  adopted,  from 
Hobbes,  a  nominalistic  view  of  self-evidence,  regarding 
all  self-evident,  analytical,  identical,  essential  proposi- 
tions as  purely  verbal,  stating  the  meaning  of  a  name 
but  giving  no  information  about  a  thing. ^  Secondly, 
he  attempted  to  banish  the  self-evident  entirely  from 
science,  and  went  to  a  pitch  of  scepticism  of  which  even 
Hume  hardlv  dreamt,  bv  reducing  mathematical  neces- 
sity  to  probability,  resulting  from  induction  and  asso- 
ciation. In  this  respect  he  at  the  same  time  departed 
from  Hobbes,  who  had  taken  up  the  extraordinary  posi- 
tion that,  while  self-evident  propositions  are  merely 
nominal,  they  are  principles  of  science,  which  would 
make  truth  and  falsity  purely  arbitrary.     Meanwhile, 


'  Essay,  iv.  2,  1. 
^  lb.  §  5. 


-  Treatise,  iii.  §  1.  ^  Inquiry,  §  4. 

*  Cf.  ib.  §  12,  Tart  III.     "  Mill,  Logic,  i.  6^  4. 


Y 


000 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART  II. 


Mill's  nominalism  did  not  rid  him  of  self-evident  pro- 
positions. He  allowed  that  they  are  '  such  as  every 
one  assented  to  without  proof  the  moment  he  compre- 
hended the  meaninpr  of  the  words.' ^  Moreover,  he 
admitted  '  the  original  inconceivability  of  a  direct 
contradiction,'^  without,  however,  seeing  that  it  is  a 
negative  instance  entirely  disproving  the  reduction  of 
all  necessity  to  association. 

There  are,  therefore,  three  theories  of  self-evidence, 
all  admitting  the  self-evident :  the  realistic  theory  of 
Aristotle,  the  conceptualistic  of  Locke  and  Hume,  and 
the  nominalistic  of  Hobbes  and  Mill;  and  there  are 
two  theories  among  modern  empiricists  about  necessary 
truths  in  mathematics,  the  older  empiricists  holding  them 
to  be  self-evident,  while  Mill  thinks  them  mere  results 
of  induction  and  association.  But  before  going  any 
further,  we  must  first  say  something  about  Leibnitz, 
whose  views  about  self-evidence,  and  the  self-evident 
character  of  the  necessary  truths  of  mathematics,  were 
the  immediate  occasion  of  Kant's  distinction  of  analy- 
tical and  synthetical  judgments  a  priori. 

Leibnitz,  being,  even  more  than  Locke,  under  the 
influence  of  Descartes,  adopted  the  conceptuahstic 
theorv  that  self-evident  truths  are  founded  on  ideas. 
But  his  originality  appeared  in  his  attempt  for  the  first 
time  to  explain  in  detail  how  we  apprehend  their  neces- 
sity. In  opposition  to  Locke's  criticism,  Leibnitz  con- 
tended for  innate  ideas,  in  the  form  that,  on  the 
occasion  of  sensation,  the  mind  by  reflection  finds 
certain  ideas  in  itself,  and  for  innate  principles  formed 
out  of  these  innate  ideas.  The  axiom  of  identity,  that 
which  is  is,  of  difference,  that  which  is  the  same  thing 
is  not  different,  of  contradiction,  it  is  impossible  that  a 

^  Mill,  Logic,  i.  6,  4.  ^  Examinaiion  of  Hamilton's  Phil,  chap  vi. 


CHAP.  X.   KAKT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   337 

thing  should  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time,  were  re- 
garded by  him  as  innate  identical  principles,  from  which 
we  deduce  propositions  such  as,  sweet  is  not  bitter,  and 
a  square  is  not  a  circle.  To  the  objection  that  men 
make  such  propositions  without  knowing  the  principles, 
he  answers  that  they  are  like  the  majors  suppressed  in 
enthymemes.  Finally,  he  regarded  arithmetic  and 
geometry  as  purely  innate,  consisting  of  necessary  prin- 
ciples analysing  our  innate  ideas  by  the  principles  of 
identity,  difference,  &c.^ 

Hence  Kant's  theory  of  analytical  judgments.  Ac- 
cording to  him,  an  analytical  judgment  is  obtained 
a  priori  from  an  analysis  of  a  conception  by  means  of 
the  principle  of  contradiction,  which  he  regards  as  the 
supreme  principle  a  priori  of  all  analytical  judgments.^ 
From  Leibnitz  lie  adopted  the  conceptuahstic  theory  of 
the  nature,  and  the  a  priori  theory  of  the  origin,  of  an 
analytical  judgment.  But  he  difl^ered  from  his  prede- 
cessor in  thinking  that  the  necessary  principles  of 
mathematics  are  not  included  among  such  analytical 
judgments,  but  are  synthetical  judgments  a  priori. 
We  have,  therefore,  now  to  find  a  way,  if  we  can, 
through  a  liost  of  disputes,  and  to  ask  ourselves  about 
the  nature,  origin,  and  limits  of  analytical  judgments. 
Are  they  concerned  with  names,  conceptions,  or  things? 
Are  they  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  ?  Are  they  necessary 
principles  ? 

To  begin  with  the  last  point,  mathematicians  evi- 
dently use  some  analytical  premises.  The  axiom,  the 
whole  is  greater  than  its  part,  is  confessedly  an  analytical 
judgment,  which,  according  to  Mill,  would  state  the 
meaning  of  the  name,  and  according  to  Leibnitz  and 

»  Leibnitz,  Nouveaux  Essais,  i.  1  {O^cra,  p.  204  sea.  ed.  Erdmann) 
2  Hart.  148-50  ^  Meik.  115-7. 


338 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


Kaut,  the  analysis  of  the  conception,  of  a  whole.  Now, 
to  take  one  instance  out  of  many,  it  is  used  as  a  major 
premise  in  Euclid  I.  7,  twice  over  to  prove  that  an  angle 
is  greater  than  an  angle  contained  in  it.  Again,  Kant 
confesses  that  the  axioms  of  equality  are  analytical,^  and 
the  first  of  them  is  the  major  premise  of  the  very  first 
proposition  in  Euclid,  while  the  third  is  the  basis  of  the 
fifth  proposition.  The  way  of  getting  out  of  this  ob- 
jection in  the  '  Critique '  is  exceedingly  lame.  Kant, 
liaving  to  admit  the  use  of  these  analytical  judgments 
in  geometry,  maintains  that  they  serve  only  'for  the 
chain  of  method,  and  not  as  principles.""^  But  in 
Euclid  I.  7  the  axiom,  the  whole  is  greater  than  its 
part,  is  used  as  a  primary  major  premise,  and,  when  it 
is  combined  with  a  minor  premise,  stating  that  a  given 
angle  is  a  whole  of  which  the  contained  angle  is  a  part, 
it  produces  the  conclusion  that  the  given  angle  is 
greater  than  the  contained  angle.  A  confessedly  ana- 
lytical axiom  then  is  a  primary  major  premise  in  a 
geometrical  deduction ;  and  it  is  a  mere  affair  of  words 
whether  it  is  called  a  principle  or  not. 

Analytical  judgments,  being  scientific  principles,  in 
the  sense  of  primary  premises  in  mathematical  reason- 
ing, are  not  mere  analyses  of  conceptions,  nor  meanings 
of  names.  Both  Kant  and  Mill  admit  that  mathematical 
truths  apply  beyond  conceptions  and  names  to  sensa- 
tions or  phaenomena,  which  they  regard  as  facts,  while 
mechanics  and  all  mixed  mathematics  prove  that  they 
apply  to  the  minutest  particles,  beyond  our  sensations, 
conceptions,  and  names.  But  if  any  premise  in  a 
mathematical  deduction  were  about  conceptions  or 
names,  it  would  be  a  fallacy  to  conclude  about  any- 
thing else.     The  demonstration  in  Euclid  I.  7  would  be 


»  Hart.  157  =  Meik.  124. 


2  Hart.  44  =  Meik.  11. 


! 

I 


CHAP.  X.    KANT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   339 

a  paralogism  with  a  quaternio  terminorum,  if  it  stood  in 
this  form  :  the  conception  or  the  name,  whole,  is  the 
conception  or  the  name,  of  something  greater  than  its 
part;    but   the    angle  ACD  is  a  whole,  of  which  the 
angle  BCD  is  a  part ;    and  therefore,  the  angle  ACD 
is   greater   than  the  angle  BCD.      The  conception  or 
the  name  would  never  prove  that  an  actual  whole  in- 
cludes its  part,  even  among  phaenomena,  much  less  that 
a  whole  body  is  greater  than  its  particles.     Since,  then, 
this  and  other  analytical  axioms  are  principles,  which 
enable  us  to  come  to  conclusions  beyond  conceptions  and 
names,  they  must  themselves  be  concerned  with  some- 
thing more  than  conceptions  and  names.   That  something 
more  would,  according  to  Kant  and  Mill,  have  to  be 
phaenomena;  but  really,  it  includes  insensible    things 
beyond.     The  axiom  of  totality  enables  me,  as  I  look  at 
this  paper  and  its  ink-marks,  to  infer  that  the  whole 
coloured  surface  must  be  greater  than  any  one  of  its 
black  parts ;  and  it  also  enables  science  to  infer  that  a 
whole  drop  of  water  must  be  greater  than  any  one  of 
its  imperceptible  particles.    Every  whole  in  the  universe 
is  a  case  of  this  analytical  law.     Hence  the  conceptu- 
alistic  and  nominalistic  theories  of  analytic  judgments 
are   miserably   narrow;    for  analytical  judgments  are 
principles  of  sensible  and  of  insensible  objects.     We 
must  return  to  Aristotle's  reahsm  of  the  self-evident. 

The  conceptuahstic  and  nominahstic  theories  of 
analytical  judgments  liave  each  its  pecuHar  error.  The 
former  theory  was  caused  by  the  Cartesian  confusion  of 
the  sensible  and  conceivable.  Since  the  objects  of  sense 
were  supposed  to  be  concerned  with  Ideas,  it  followed 
that  analytical  judgments,  requiring  no  new  experience, 
could  not  go  beyond  our  ideas.  We  have  destroyed 
this  error  from  the  foundation  by  separating  sensible 

z  2 


11 


I 


340 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


objects  from  ideas.  The  latter  tlieon^  as  it  exists  in 
Mill's  'Logic,'  is  founded  on  a  false  disjunction.  He 
supposes  that  all  propositions  are  either  verbal  or  real, 
and  finding  that  analytical  judgments,  often  expressing 
the  meaning  of  a  name,  are  verl^al,  concludes  that  they 
are  not  real.  But  the  division  of  propositions  into 
verbal  and  real  is  defective.  A  verbal  is  not  necessarily 
opposed  to  a  real  proposition,  a  predicate  does  not  cease 
to  be  a  characteristic  of  a  thing  by  becoming  the  meaning 
of  a  name,  and  there  are  some  propositions  which  are 
verbal  and  real,  such  as  all  bodies  are  extended,  the  whole 
is  greater  than  its  part.  Mill  pokes  fun  at  such  a  propo- 
sition as  Omnis  homo  est  rationalis,  which  expresses  part 
of  the  meaning  of  the  name,  man.  But  does  that  pre- 
vent men  from  being  rational  ?  Again,  his  remark  that 
analytical  judgments  convey  no  information  about  the 
thincr,  betrays  a  sad  ignorance  of  human  nature  ;  for  most 
men's  simple  apprehensions  are  miserably  confused,  as 
you  may  find  by  asking  them  what  is  a  substance,  an 
attribute,  a  body,  a  unit,  a  whole,  a  circle ;  and  one  of 
the  main  uses  of  analytical  judgments  is  to  make  a  con- 
fused apprehension  distinct  by  dividing  it  into  a  subject 
and  the  predicates  contained  in  it.  In  short,  the  division 
into  analytical  and  synthetical  does  not  correspond  to 
the  imperfect  distinction  of  verbal  and  real ;  analytical 
judgments  are  sometimes  about  names,  sometimes  about 
conceptions,  but  also  sometimes  about  objects  distinct 
from  both  ;  and  these  latter  are  real.  Sometimes  the 
same  analytical  judgment  is  at  once  real,  notional,  and 
verbal,  e.g.  the  whole  is,  is  conceived,  and  means,  that 
which  is  the  sum  of  its  parts. 

So  far,  then,  we  have  ascertained  that  analytical 
judgments,  such  as  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part, 
are   principles   of    science,    and   are    accordingly   not 


I 


CHAP.  X.   KANT'S  'CRITIQUE  '  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    341 

limited  to  names  and  conceptions,  but  are  concerned 
with  sensible  and  insensible  objects  of  science.  Our 
next  step  must  be  to  find  their  origin.  Mill  has  no 
theory  on  the  subject.  Leibnitz  and  Kant  have  a  theory, 
the  common  point  of  which  is  that  we  deduce  the 
analysis  of  our  conceptions  from  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction a  priori.^  As  Kant  merely  followed  Leibnitz 
in  this  respect,  it  will  be  best  to  criticise  the  original 
authority,  in  accordance  with  the  method  of  this  essay, 
which  always  contemplates  the  discovery  of  idealistic 
errors  at  their  first  source. 

Descartes  had,  as  we  found,  a  confused  notion  of 
an  innate  power  discovering  ideas  in  ourselves,  which 
Locke  showed  to  be  nothing  but  inner  sense  or  reflec- 
tion. It  is  an  extraordinary  thing  that  in  the  '  Nou- 
veaux  Essais,'  which  is  an  elaborate  criticism  of  Locke's 
'Essay,'  Leibnitz  knew  Locke's  theory  of  reflection, 
and  yet  coolly  repeats  that  the  ideas  derived  from  it 
are  innate,  without  taking  any  notice  of  the  sensible  and 
presentative  origin  of  such  ideas  from  inner  sense. 
'Perhaps,'  he  says,  'our  able  author  will  not  be  entirely 
removed  from  my  sentiments  ;  for,  after  having  employed 
all  his  first  book  in  rejecting  innate  lights,  taken  in  a 
certain  sense,  he  avows  at  the  commencement  of  the 
second  and  in  the  sequel,  that  ideas  which  have  not  their 
origm  from  sensation  come  from  reflection.  Now  re- 
flection is  nothing  but  attention  to  that  which  is  in  us, 
and  the  senses  do  not  give  us  that  which  we  already 
possess.  This  being  so,  can  it  be  denied  that  there  is 
much  that  is  innate  since  we  are  innate,  so  to  speak,  to 
ourselves  ;  and  that  there  is  in  us  Being,  Unity,  Sub- 
stance, Duration,  Change,  Action,  Perception,  Pleasure, 

»  Hart.  39-42,  148-50  =  Meik.  7-9,  115-17. 


I  ii 


342 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  It. 


and  a  thousand  other  objects  of  our  intellectual  ideas  ?  '  ^ 
Locke's  answer  would  have  been  simple  and  conclusive. 
Admitting  that  we  derive  all  these  ideas,  except  that 
of  substance,  by  attention  to  what  is  in  us,  which  is 
reflection  and  not  sensation,  he  had  shown  that  this 
reflection  is  a  sense,  which  notices  our  being,  unity, 
&c.,  only  because  they  are  there  to  be  noticed,  and  are 
presented  to  it,  precisely  as  sensation  notices  white  or 
hot  when  presented.  To  call  these  results  of  inner  sense 
innate  is  to  confuse  the  intuitive  and  presentative  with 
the  a  priori  and  elicited. 

Leibnitz  made  a  second  mistake  about  innate  ideas, 
in  which  Locke  himself  perhaps  encouraged  him.  He 
put  ideas  down  to  reflection  which  are  not  confined  to 
it.  The  correction  of  this  mistake  is  of  consequence, 
because  Locke's  exaggeration  of  the  sphere  of  reflection, 
and  the  conversion  of  its  ideas  by  Leibnitz  into  innate 
ideas,  gave  occasion  to  Kant's  hypothesis  that  time  is 
the  mere  form  of  inner  sense  and  similar  errors.  Now,  in 
the  list  of  ideas  quoted  above,  and  supposed  by  Leibnitz 
to  be  innate,  perception  and  pleasure  are  pure  data  of 
reflection,  but  being  and  unity  belong  to  all  data  of 
sense,  and  to  all  thincfs.  Not  beincr  confined  to  reflec- 
tion,  they  are  not  innate  ideas,  in  the  Leibnitzian 
meaning  of  this  phrase.  He  made  the  same  mistake 
about  numbers,  which  he  supposed  to  be  purely  innate 
ideas,  giving  rise  to  innate  truths.^  But,  as  the  very 
hairs  of  our  heads,  so  are  the  data  of  sense,  and  the 
particles  of  matter,  all  numbered.  His  theory,  there- 
fore, that  number  and  its  truths  are  innate,  because 
they  are  results  of  reflection,  is  not  adequate  to  our 
knowledge  of  universal  number. 

To  come  now  to  the  bearing  of  the  theory  of  innate 

1  Leib.  0;pera  (ed.  Erdmann),  196  A.  ^  lb.  210  A,  212  A. 


CHAP.  X.   KANT'S  'CrJTIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   343 

ideas  on  the  origin  of  analytical  judgments.  If  analytical 
judgments  were  formed  out  of  ideas,  they  would  be 
concerned  with  ideas,  and,  as  we  have  already  found, 
they  would  not  in  that  case  be  applied  to  the  sensible 
and  insensible  beyond  ideas,  and  therefore  could  not  be 
principles  of  science.  But  Leibnitz  admitted,  or  rather 
contended,  that  they  are  the  principles  of  science.  It 
follows  that  an  analytical  judgment,  such  as  a  square  is 
not  a  circle,  cannot  be  formed,  as  Leibnitz  thought, 
purely  from  innate  ideas,  because  it  is  applicable  to 
sense.  In  fact,  it  was  the  adoption  of  this  theory  of 
analytical  judgments  from  Leibnitz  that  made  Kant 
refuse  to  analytical  judgments  tlie  title  of  principles. 
But  the  right  alternative  would  have  been  to  conclude 
that,  since  analytical  judgments  are  universal  principles 
of  science  beyond  conceptions,  they  are  not  derived 
from  mere  conceptions. 

But  the  most  fundamental  error  of  Leibnitz,  which 
Kant  shared  with  him,  was  the  supposed  deduction 
of  analytical  judgments  from  metaphysical  principles 
a  priori.  Leibnitz  supposed  that,  in  order  to  say  a 
square  is  not  a  circle,  or  bitter  is  not  sweet,  we  must 
already  be  in  possession  of  the  general  axioms,  A  is  A,  A 
is  not  non-A,  A  is  not  B,  and  so  forth,  which  are  there- 
fore innate  principles  of  analytical  judgments.  It  is 
better  to  have  no  theory  than  a  bad  one  ;  and  Locke, 
though  he  did  not  prol)e  the  origin  of  an  analytical 
judgment,  such  as  white  is  not  black,  at  all  events 
divined  that  it  cannot  be  derived  by  deduction  from 
principles,  because  men  make  such  judgments  in  entire 
ignorance  of  the  principles.  '  Who  perceives  not,'  he 
asks,  '  that  a  child  certainly  knows  that  a  stranger  is 
not  its  mother :  that  its  sucking-bottle  is  not  the  rod, 


344 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  IT. 


long  before  he  knows  that  'tis  impossible  for  the  same 
thinj?  to  be,  and  not  to  be  ?  '  ^ 

Leibnitz  replies  that  '  one  founds  oneself  on  these 
general  maxims,  as  one  founds  oneself  on  the  majors, 
which  are  suppressed  in  reasoning  by  enthymemes.'^ 
But  in  an  enthymeme  we  apprehend  the  major  in 
thought  and  suppress  it  in  speech,  usually  because 
the  hearer  will  supply  it  himself,  though  sometimes  be- 
cause we  know  it  to  be  doubtful,  and  hope  that  it  will 
escape  his  notice ;  moreover,  we  recognise  the  major 
when  expressed.  On  the  other  hand,  it  can  hardly  be 
maintained  that  a  young  child  apprehends  but  sup- 
presses the  principle  of  contradiction  :  and  it  is  cer- 
tainly false  that  he  would  recognise  it  when  expressed. 
It  needs  a  considerable  education  to  recognise  such 
principles ;  and,  indeed,  they  were  rejected  over  and 
over  again  by  philosophers  until  the  genius  of  Aristotle 
established  their  metaphysical  formula.  That  same 
genius  established  them  without  exaggerating  them. 
He  pointed  out  that  the  principle  of  contradiction  is 
a  condition,  but  not  a  premise  of  any  deduction,  unless 
it  has  been  denied  in  a  particular  case.^  Leibnitz,  on 
the  other  hand,  and  Kant  after  him,  fell  into  the  error 
of  confusing  the  man  with  the  metaphysician,  when 
they  supposed  that  we  deduce  analytical  judgments 
from  the  principle  of  contradiction  a  priori. 

It  does  not  follow  that  we  must  commit  ourselves 
wholly  to  Locke's  view  about  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction. This  and  similar  axioms  put  us  in  a  kind 
of  dilemma.  On  tlie  one  hand,  Locke  shows  that  they 
are  not  known  a  priori-,  on  the  other,  Leibnitz  as 
clearly   shows   that   they   are   required   to   make  any 

*  Locke,  Essay,  iv.  7,  9.  ^  Opera  (ed.  Erd.),  211  A. 

*  Ar.  Post.  An,  i.  11. 


CFAP 


.  X.   KANT'S  ^CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   345 


analytical  judgment.  The  way  out  of  this  difficulty 
mav  be  found  by  combining  the  hint  of  Aristotle, 
that  they  are  conditions,  not  premises,  with  the  last 
chapter,  in  which  I  pointed  out  that  the  laws  of  asso- 
ciation, and  the  axioms  obeyed  by  reasoning,  analogical, 
inductive  and  deductive,  are  not  premises  of  associa- 
tion and  reasoning.  Now,  as,  when  the  sight  of  a 
doer  recalls  the  idea  of  his  master,  I  use  the  law  of 
association  by  contiguity  ;  as,  when  I  reason  from  the 
earth  to  Mars,  I  use  the  axiom  of  analogy ;  as,  when  I 
reason  from  dead  men  to  the  mortality  of  man,  I  use  the 
axiom  of  uniformity  ;  as,  when  I  reason  in  the  first 
ficTure,  I  use  the  dictum  de  omni,  in  the  second  the  die- 
turn  de  diverso,  in  the  third  the  dictum  de  exemplo  ;  l)ut 
in  no  case  deduce  either  my  idea  in  association,  or 
my  judgment  in  reasoning,  from  the  law,  axiom,  or  dic- 
tum which  governs  the  process  ;  so  do  I  use  the  axioms 
of  identity,  difference,  contradiction,  &c.,  when  I  make 
an  analytical  judgment,  such  as  the  whole  is  greater 
than  its  part,  or  white  is  not  black,  or  a  square  is  not 
a  circle ;  but  I  do  not  deduce  any  of  these  analytical 
judgments  from  these  axioms,  which  are  the  sponta- 
neous laws  of  the  form  of  analytical  judgments,  not 
known  premises  to  deduce  them  a  priori. 

The  arguments  of  Leibnitz  prove  this  and  no  more. 
He  admitted  that  they  are  not  universally  known,  but 
rejoined  that  '  one  employs  them  without  envisaging 
them  expressly,'  that  'they  are  necessary  as  muscles 
and  tendons  are  necessary  to  walk,'  and  that  they  are 
like  veins  in  marble  before  they  are  discovered.^  But 
these  arguments  and  analogies  only  prove,  not  that 
the  principle  of  contradiction  and  similar  axioms  are 
innate  major  premises,  but  that  they  are  laws  which 

»  Opera  (ed.  Erd.),  207  B,  211  B,  213  A. 


316 


PSYCilOLOGlCAL   IDEALISM 


PART    ]I. 


regulate  the  operation  of  analytical  judgment.  The 
ordinary  man  knows  nothing  about  them:  the  meta- 
physician has  often  denied  them,  Plato  only  caught 
glimpses  of  them,  and  they  were  never  extended  to  the 
whole  universe  of  being  and  thinking,  until  Aristotle 
established  them.  In  metaphysics,  indeed,  they  are 
themselves  analytical  judgments,  and  are  a  justifica- 
tion of  the  self-evidence  of  other  analytical  judgments, 
but  in  ordinary  tliinking  they  are  laws  spontaneously 
governing  analysis,  without  being  known. 

If,  then,  we  frame  analytical  judgments  not  from, 
but  only  by,  the  axioms  of  identity,  &c.,  from  what 
source  do  we  derive  them?  Ultimately,  by  general 
reasoning^  from  sense,  inductive  and  deductive.  The 
axioms  alone,  even  if  they  were  known  a  priori,  would 
be  powerless :  as  it  is,  being  only  used,  they  are  not 
even  major  premises.  Without  sense  and  reasoning, 
we  should  never  know  of  anything  being  one  and 
many,  whole  and  part,  white  or  black,  sweet  or  bitter, 
square  or  round,  or  solid.  By  general  reasoning  we 
infer  that  there  are  classes  of  these  objects,  and  also 
that  a  body  moves  its  places  in  time,  that  a  solid 
body  is  of  three  dimensions,  that  things  are  one  and 
many,  that  a  w^liole  thing  is  greater  than  its  parts.  It 
is  thus  we  get  the  content  of  all  our  general  judgments. 
But  I  have  confessed  that  induction  and  deduction  from 
induction  are  only  probable.  How,  then,  do  we  pass 
from  the  probability  of  general  reasoning  to  the  neces- 
sity of  analytical  judgment?  By  the  perfection  of 
rational  abstraction. 

There  is  another  power  in  man,  discovered  by 
Aristotle — abstraction.  Abstraction  has  already  been 
mentioned  in  this  essay.  I  have  admitted,  in  the 
chapter  on  Locke,    that   abstraction  from   sense  may 


CHAP  X.   KANT'S  '  CRITIQUE  '  AND  NEOESSAKY  TRUTHS    347 

conceive  general  ideas  ;  and  in  the  chapter  on  Berkeley, 
that  abstraction  is  a  kind  of  attention,  wdiich  does  not 
form  a  merely  abstract  general  idea.  I  have  con- 
tended, against  Locke  and  Berkeley  alike,  that  it  forms 
a  general  idea  of  a  miscellaneous  assemblage  of  similar 
individuals.  But,  without  reasoning,  such  abstraction 
is  limited  merely  to  a  general  idea  of  sensible  objects  ; 
it  is  general,  not  universal.  I  added  that  there  is  a 
rational  abstraction,  such  that,  when  reasoning  infers 
a  class  of  objects,  e.g.  of  corpuscles,  and  rational  con- 
ception forms  a  general  idea  of  them,  abstraction  is 
capable  of  attending  to  them.  Now,  because  it  is  at- 
tention, abstraction  is  not  limited  to  ideas,  but  attends 
also  to  their  objects.  We  may  attend  to  names,  to 
ideas,  and  to  objects  of  sense  and  reason  ;  and  it  is  no 
easier  to  attend  to  ideas  than  it  is  to  objects.  Abstrac- 
tion, like  other  powers,  has  suffered  at  the  hands  of 
modern  conceptualists. 

Abstraction,  as  Aristotle  was  aware,  neglects  the 
other  characteristics  of  a  complex  object  for  the  purpose 
of  isolating  one  characteristic,  or  rather  the  object  as  so 
characterised.  For  example,  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
a  whole ;  l3ut  we  can  neglect  the  other  characteristics 
of  an  object,  which  is,  among  other  things,  a  whole, 
and  attend  to  it  so  far  as  it  is  a  whole.  Hence  we  often 
use  the  formula,  '  as  a  whole,'  or  '  qua  whole ' — the 
Latin  '  qua  '  being  a  translation  of  the  Aristotelian  "  y  ." 
The  value  of  this  operation,  which  the  moderns  ridi- 
cule as  metaphysicians  but  use  as  men,  is  that  we  get 
rid  of  the  complexity  of  general  reasoning,  and  are 
able,  by  attention,  to  isolate  a  simple  kind  of  ob- 
ject ;  and  all  abstract  sciences  take  advantage  of  this 
isolation.  Now,  not  in  all  cases,  but  in  those  objects 
which  are  peculiarly  susceptible  of  isolation,  there  is  a 


348 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   IT. 


further  effect:  we  are  able  so  far  to  isolate  a  simple 
kind  of  object,  that  we  get  rid  of  the  synthesis  of 
general  reasoning,  attend  to  a  simple  object  in  its  com- 
pleteness, and  apprehend  its  nature  or  essence.  Thus, 
general  reasoning  infers  that  a  whole  thing  is  greater 
than  its  part ;  but  this  conclusion  is  liable  to  exceptions, 
for  the  thing  may  be  absolutely  simple,  in  which  case 
it  has  no  part  to  be  exceeded  by  the  whole.  Again, 
general  reasoning  infers  that  one  thing  is  undivided  in 
quantity ;  but,  if  it  is  a  complex  body,  it  is  also  many 
corpuscles  in  quantity,  divided  from  one  another.  But 
by  rational  abstraction  we  are  so  far  able  to  isolate  the 
wholeness  of  a  thing  as  to  apprehend  a  thing  qua  whole 
as  that  which  is  nothing  but  a  sum  of  its  parts ;  and  so 
far  able  to  isolate  the  unity  of  a  thing  as  to  apprehend 
a  thing  qua  one  as  the  undivided  in  quantity,  and 
nothing  more. 

This  perfect  abstraction  is  the  foundation  of  exact 
science.  The  perfect  a])stractions  of  arithmetic  have 
just  been  given.  In  the  same  way  in  geometry, 
general  reasonin<]^  tells  us  that  bodies  are  extended  in 
three  dimensions,  but  perfect  abstraction  is  required 
to  isolate  the  solidity  of  body  and  apprehend  body  quel 
solid  as  that  which  is  long,  broad,  and  deep,  and  notliing 
more.  Similarlv,  in  abstract  mechanics,  it  is  not  till  we 
have  regarded  a  body  qua  moving  as  simply  changing 
place  during  time,  and  not  as  possessing  any  particular 
structure,  that  we  can  strictly  apply  to  it  the  laws  of 
motion.  There  is,  then,  in  exact  sciences,  a  perfect 
abstraction,  not  a  prioi^i,  but  founded  on  general  reason- 
ing, inductive  and  deductive,  from  sense,  consisting  of 
attention,  not  to  an  abstract  idea,  but  to  a  simple  object 
in  the  abstract,  and  the  apprehension  of  its  nature,  to 
the  neglect  of  its  synthesis  with  other  characteristics  or 


CHAT 


.  X.   KANT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   349 


with  other  objects.  This  power  is  sometimes  called 
intuition.  But  it  is  not  intuitive  any  more  than  a  priori. 
It  requires  sense,  general  reasoning,  and  rational  ab- 
straction ;  nor  is  this  rational  abstraction  always  perfect ; 
but  when  it  is  perfect  it  is  a  simple  apprehension  of 
the  nature  of  the  object. 

An   analytical  judgment   is   one  which   divides   a 
simple  object  of  perfect  abstraction  into  subject  and 
predicate.     When  we  have  thus  got  the  entire  content 
from  creneral   reasonincr    and   have    abstracted   simple 
objects,    an    affirmative     analytical    judgment   simply 
divides  the  same  simple  object  into  subject  and  predi- 
cate by,  not  from,  the  principle  of  identity — a  thing  is 
the  same  as  itself.     This  operation  must  be  carefully 
guarded  from  misapprehension:    there  is  no  mystery 
about  it.     In  the  first  place,  it  is  not  merely  concerned 
with  a  common  name,  nor  with  an   abstract  idea,  but 
with  an  object  in  the  abstract,  discovered  by  reasoning, 
isolated  by  perfect  abstraction,  and  divided  into  subject 
and   predicate   by  analysis.      Secondly,  it   is   not,    as 
usually  described,  an    analysis  of  the  subject  of  the 
judgment  into  the  predicate,  which  would  deprive  the 
latter  of  its  content,  but  an  analysis  of  the  simple  object 
isolated  by  perfect  abstraction  into  subject  and  predi- 
cate, as  the  object  and  its  nature.     Thirdly,  it  adds 
nothing  to  the  abstraction,  but,  as  the  abstraction  iso- 
lates the  simple  object  from  the  synthesis  of  general 
reasoning,  so  the  analysis  divides  this  simple  object  into 
subject  and  predicate.    For  example,  having  discovered 
that  things  which  are  wholes  contain  their  parts,  and 
havincT  by  perfect  abstraction  isolated  a  thing  qua  whole 
as  merely  a  sum  of  its  parts,  the  analytical  judgment 
simply  asserts  this  result  of  perfect  abstraction  in  the 
form  of  a  judgment,  for  the  purpose  of  making  demon- 


850 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  ir. 


strations  from  it.  Indeed,  Aristotle  Avas  not  wrong  in 
saying  that  there  is  a  simple  apprehension  of  simple 
objects,  though  he  ought  to  have  added  the  analytical 
judgment,  because  it  is  as  a  judgment  that  the  appre- 
hen'sion  becomes  a  principle  of  demonstration.  Fourthly, 
the  analytical  judgment  is  made  spontaneously  by  the 
l)rinciple  of  identity,  which  is  the  law  of  its  form,  but 
not  deduced  from  the  principle  as  a  premise.  It  has 
nothing  a  priori  about  it,  being  derived  from  sense  and 
general  reasoning,  through  perfect  abstraction,  by  ana- 
lysis, adding  nothing  but  the  division  into  subject  and 
predicate,  not  independent  of  experience,  but  only  re- 
quiring no  new  experience  ;  in  short,  a  priori  only  in 
the  old  sense  of  indirectly  a  posteriori. 

Anegative  analytical  judgment  is  of  the  same  kind,but 
one  deg'ree  more  complicated.  General  reasonhig  from 
sense  infers  that  white  objects  are  not  black,  that  sweet 
objects  are  not  bitter,  that  square  objects  are  not  round, 
and  so  forth.  Terfect  abstraction  isolates  the  different 
objects  and  causes  a  simple  apprehension  of  their 
natures  as  different.  In  the  case  of  simple  objects  of 
sense,  such  as  sensibly  white  and  sensibly  black,  perfect 
abstraction  is  appUcable,  because  the  objects  are  so 
simple,  and  the  abstraction  simply  apprehends  the  sen- 
sibly white  as  containing  nothing  black,  and  vice  versa. 
In  the  case  of  other  objects,  such  as  things  which  are 
square  or  round,  the  abstraction,  to  become  perfect, 
requires  the  neglect  of  many  extraneous  circumstances, 
in  order  to  apprehend  a  thing  qua  square  containing 
nothing  round,  and  vice  versa.  A  negative  analytical 
judgment,  thereupon,  divides  the  objects  differentiated 
hi  the  abstract  as  subject  and  predicate  of  a  negative 
judgment,  a  sensible  object  qiid  white  is  never  black,  a 
thing  qua  square  is  never  round.     Its  principle  is  that 


cnAP 


.  X.   KANTS  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   351 


of  difference,  that  which  is  the  same  thing  is  not  different, 
or  two  different  things  are  not  the  same,  or,  in  its  more 
developed  form,  the  principle  of  contradiction.  But 
this  law  of  the  form  of  a  negative  analytical  judgment 
is  not  an  a  priori  major  premise  from  which  any 
analytical  judgment  is  deduced,  except  in  metaphysics 

and  logic  as  sciences. 

Perfect  abstraction  and  analytical  judgments  are  not 
unhmited.     Quantitative  objects  are  more  capable  of 
abstract  isolation  than  qualitative,  in  the  narrow  sense 
of  this  word.     Perhaps  no  precise  limit  can  be  marked 
out,  but  we  may  lay  down  the  general  rules,  that  with 
the'  power  of  isolating   a  simple    kind  of  object  and 
apprehending  its  nature,  abstraction  ceases  to  be  perfect, 
and,  when  perfect  abstraction  fails,  analytical  judgment 
is  no  longer  possible.      Thus  we  can  perfectly  abstract 
a  thing  qua  whole,  and  judge  analytically  that  so  far 
it  is  greater  than  its  part ;  perfectly  abstract  the  sensibly 
white  from  the  sensibly  black,  and  judge  analytically 
that  so  far  one  is  not  the  other.     On  the  other  hand, 
when  we  come  to  so  complicated  an  object  as  external 
light,  we  can  no  longer  apprehend  in  isolation  what 
light  is  as  light,  but  must  accumulate  its  facts  and  infer 
that  its  nature  is  undulative  by  the  method  of  explana- 
tion.    Hence  two  origins  of  definition  :  perfect  abstrac- 
tion in  exact  science,  explanation  of  properties  in  other 
sciences.     An  abstract  science  is  one  which  attends  to 
an  object,   so  far  as  characterised  in  some  particular 
manner :  an  exact  science  is  one  in  which  this  abstract 

attention  is  perfect. 

An  analytical  is  the  same  as  a  self-evident  judgment, 
and  its  necessity  is  self-evidence.  If  all  other  things 
are  possible,  it  is  at  least  impossible  that  a  thing  should 
not  be  the  same  as  itself,  or  be  the  same  as  something 


^^9 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


TART  II, 


different.  Not  metaphysics  but  perfect  abstraction 
gives  this  internal  necessity  to  analytical  judgments. 
But  metaphysics  justifies  it  by  analysing  the  analytical 
axioms  of  identity  and  difference,  and  affords  a  technical 
description,  by  which,  if  we  are  asked  why  a  whole, 
for  example,  is  greater  than  its  part,  we  can  answer 
because  a  thing  qua  whole  is  the  same  as  the  sum  of 
its  parts,  because  otherwise  it  would  not  be  a  whole, 
and  because  to  deny  it  would  be  a  contradiction  in 
terms.  But  such  a  deduction  is  purely  metaphysical. 
Nor  is  it  a  valid  objection  that  the  ordinary  man  could 
not  apprehend  the  necessity  of  his  analytical  judgments 
unless  he  knows  the  axioms,  for  he  is  in  the  same 
position  about  ordinary  deduction,  where  he  plainly 
knows  the  logical  necessity  of  the  inference,  without 
knowing  the  axioms  which  it  requires.  Analytical 
judgments,  then,  are  self-evident,  without  being  deduced- 
a  priori  from  their  axioms. 

This  self-evidence  has  several  special  characteristics. 
In  the  first  place,  we  have  no  apprehension  of  it  till 
we  apprehend  the  objects,  but  directly  we  apprehend 
them  in  the  abstract  we  at  once  accept  the  analytical 
judgment.  Hence  it  is  that  there  are  many  men,  and 
even  nations,  who  have  never  heard  of  the  very  judg- 
ments which  to  others  are  self-evident.  The  former 
have  not,  the  latter  have,  performed  the  necessary 
abstraction.  A  man  who  has  not  thought  of  a  thing  as 
a  whole  has  no  acquaintance  with  the  judgment,  the 
whole  is  greater  than  its  part ;  no  sooner  has  he  thought 
of  it  qua  whole,  than  he  asks  for  no  proof  of  the  axiom. 
The  analytical  theory  of  principles  is  the  only  one 
which  accounts  for  this  extreme  contrast  between 
ignorance  and  certainty.  Secondly,  self-evidence  gives 
to  analytical  judgments  a  ifniversal  applicability.     They 


I 


CHAP.  X.    KANTS  'CRITIQUE'  A^'I)  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    353 

are  not  liable  to  the  difficult}^  of  synthesis,  tliat  an 
exception  may  be  found  to  the  combination  of  two  kinds 
of  objects;  a  difficulty  which,  Kant  confesses,  applies  even 
to  a  priori  syntliesis  beyond  objects  of  experience.  In 
an  analytical  judgment  there  is  only  one  kind  of  ob- 
ject, which  must  be  the  same  as  itself  and  different  from 
other  things,  wherever  it  is  found.  Thus  the  synthe- 
tical judgment,  a  whole  thing  is  greater  than  its  part, 
is  liable  to  the  exception  that  a  thing  may  sometimes 
have  no  parts ;  but  the  analytical  judgment,  a  thing  so 
far  as  it  is  a  whole  is  greater  than  its  part,  can  have  no 
exception,  because  qua  w^hole  it  is  only  a  sum  of  parts. 
Thirdly,  self-evidence  makes  analytical  judgments  con- 
vertible or  coextensive :  so  lonjj^  as  a  \\\m^  is  a  whole  it 
is  greater  than  its  part,  and  as  soon  as  it  ceases  to  be 
greater  than  its  part  it  ceases  to  be  a  whole.  We  can 
even  say  that  such  a  judgment  is  of  eternal  application  ; 
for,  even  if  things  ceased  to  be  wholes,  it  would  still  be 
true  that  they  would  be  greater  than  their  parts  if  there 
were  wholes.  Hence,  there  could  not  be  another  world 
in  which  a  whole  would  not  be  greater  than  its  part, 
for  it  could  not  be  a  whole  ;  nor  can  any  really  self- 
evident  or  analytical  judgment  be  reversed. 

Such  is  the  outline  of  a  realistic  theorv  of  self- 
evident  analytical  judgments  a  posteriori^  of  which  the 
points  are,  first,  that  such  judgments  are  not  always 
about  names  and  conceptions,  but  also  about  objects  of 
sense  and  reason  ;  secondly,  that  we  discover  the  objects 
by  general  reasoning  from  sense,  by  perfect  abstraction 
apprehend  a  simple  kind  of  object,  and  analyse  it  into 
subject  and  predicate  by,  not  from,  the  principles  of 
identity  and  difference,  or  contradiction,  a  posteriori ; 
thirdly,  that  anah^tical  judgments  are  self-evident  to 
one  who  has  abstracted  the  objects,  universal  without 

A  A 


Sol 


rSYCII  )LOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


exception,  and  convertible  ;  and,  fourthly,  that  analy- 
tical judgments  about  objects  of  reason  in  the  abstract 
are,  sometimes  principles  of  science. 

As  analytical  principles  are  self-evident,  conclusions 
lo'^ically  deduced  from  them  are  necessary,  though  not 
self-evident,  and  the  process  of  deduction  from  self- 
evident  principles    is    demonstrative.     There    are    two 
kinds  of  necessary  truths :  self-evident  principles  and 
demonstrative  conclusions.     Again,  there  are  two  kinds 
of  deduction,  which  may  be  distinguished  as  empirical 
and  demonstrative,  provided  we  remember  that  demon- 
stration is  indirectly  empirical.     In  the  last  chapter  we 
discussed  empirical  deduction  from  induction,  which, 
though  formally  necessary,  is  materially  only  as  pro- 
bable as  the  induction  on  which  it  is  founded.     In  the 
present  chapter  we  have  added  that  deduction  is  not 
always  limited  by  the  probabiUties  of  induction,  but, 
when   mediated   by  perfect   abstraction,   and   starting 
from  analytical  self-evident  principles   a  posteriori^  is 
demonstrative   of  necessary  conclusions.      There    are, 
therefore,  two    kinds    of    knowledge:    one    consisting 
of  induction  and  deduction,  combined  together  in  cir- 
cumstantial evidence,  with  various  degrees  of  proba- 
bility up  to  approximate  certainty  ;  wdiile  the  other  starts 
in  the  same  manner,  but  by  the  perfect  abstraction  of 
a  simple,  non-synthetic  object,  such  as   a   thing  qud 
whole,  a  body  qud   solid,  a   body   qud  moving,  &c., 
obtains  self-evident   analytical  judgments,  from  which 
deduction  demonstrates  conclusions,  materially  as  well 
as  formally  necessary.     The  former  is  science  ;  but  the 
latter  is  exact  science. 

Kant  in  the  '  Critique,'  and  Mill  in  his  '  Logic,'  both 
recognised  analytical  judgments  and  their  self-evidence, 
but  the  former  was  deceived  by  conceptualism  and  the 


N? 


I 


CHAP.  X.    KANT'S  'CRITIQUE*  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    35d 

latter  by  nominalism,  and  accordingly  both  fell  into  the 
common  error  of  excluding  analytical  judgments  from 
principles  of  science.  In  order  to  answer  them,  we 
have  only  to  remember  that  the  axiom,  the  whole  is 
greater  than  its  part,  is  confessedly  an  analytical  judg- 
ment, and  certainly  a  primary  major  premise  in  mathe- 
matical demonstrations.  Hence  it  is  not  a  mere  analysis 
of  conceptions,  still  less  the  mere  meaning  of  a  name. 
It  is  the  analysis  of  an  object  of  general  reasoning  iso- 
lated by  a  perfect  abstraction  of  a  thing  qua  whole  as 
a  sum  of  its  parts.  This  analytical  a  posteriori  axiom, 
being  a  real  principle,  is  a  sufficient  contradictory  in- 
stance to  destroy  both  the  theory  in  Kant's  '  Critique  ' 
that  all  mathematical  principles  are  synthetical  a  priori^ 
and  the  synthetical  a  posteriori  theory  in  Mill's  '  Logic' 
Major  est  vis  instanticc  negativce. 

We  found  that  Kant  starts  his  argument  by  the 
position  that  necessity  and  strict  universality  are  not 
inductive.  This  position  is  common  ground.  After  and 
beyond  induction,  Aristotle  introduced  an  intelligent 
understanding  of  principles,  purposely  to  explain  their 
necessity.  '  Neque  tamen,'  says  Bacon,  '  etiam  in  uni- 
versalibus  istis  propositionibus  exactam  aut  absolutam 
affirmationem  vel  abnegationem  requirimus.'^  Newton,  in 
the  fourth  '  Eegula  Philosophandi,'  with  which  he  opens 
the  Third  Book  of  the  '  Principia,'  acknowledges  that  in- 
duction is  only  valid  'donee  alia  occurrerint  pli£enomena.' 
Similarly,  all  that  Mill  contends  is  that  '  whatever  has 
been  found  true  in  innumerable  instances,  and  never  found 
to  be  false  in  any,  we  are  safe  in  acting  on  as  universal 
provisionally  until  an  undoubted  exception  appears  ; 
provided  the  nature  of  the  case  be  such  that  a  real 
exception  could  scarcely  have  escaped  notice."'^..  More- 

1  Nov.  Org.  ii.  33.  ""  Mill,  Logic,  iii.  21,  4. 

A  A  2 


35(1 


rSYCIlOT.OGICAL  IDEATJSM 


PVRT   TT. 


over,  it  is  patent,  from  the  limitation  of  human  expe- 
rience to  some  instances  out  of  all,  that  the  induction  of 
all  must  end  in  probability,  however  great. 

The  difference  between  Kant  and  Mill  begins  with 
the  contention  of  the  latter  that  there  are  no  truths 
more  necessary  than  those  mere  probabilities  of  induc- 
tion which  seem  necessary  to  us  only  through  insepar- 
able association.  But,  in  the  first  place.  Mill  is  not  true  to 
his  own  position,  because,  as  we  saw  before,  he  acknow- 
ledcres  '  the  original  inconceivability  of  a  contradiction ' ; 
though,  like  other  philosophers,  he  passes  lightly  over 
this  negative   instance  destructive    of  his  theory  that 
association   is    the   origin   of    all   ideas   of    necessity. 
Secondly,  he  ought  to  have   gone  further  than  mere 
inconceivability.     Analytical  principles  of  science  are 
such  that  the  contradictory  is  not  only  inconceivable  in 
idea  but  impossible  in  beUef,  because  it  is  incredible 
that  a  thing  should  not  be  the  same  as  itself.     Now 
Mill  admits?  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  impossible  is 
different   from    the   inconceivable,    and,  on   the   other 
hand,  that  association  is  hmited  to  the  inconceivable. 
As,  then,  association  is  no  origin  of  principles,  whose 
contradictions  are  impossible,  and  as  self-evident  ana- 
lytical judgments  are  such  principles,  it  follows  that 
their  necessity  cannot  be  due  to  association  of  ideas. 
Moreover,  if  the  axiom,  the  whole  is  greater  than  its 
part,  were    a   synthetical   a  posteriori  judgment,  dis- 
covered by  mere  induction,  with  a  mere  idea  of  necessity 
due  to  association,  there  would  be  two  ideas,  one  of 
which  would  suggest  the  other  ;  but  there  is  only  one 
idea  of  one  kind  of  object  which  is  analytically  judged 
to  be  identically  a  whole  and  greater  than  its  part. 
Association,  in  fact,  is  no  origin  of  the  real  and  iden- 
tical necessity  of  an  analytical  principle,  which  is  self- 


CHAP 


.  X.   KANT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    357 


evident.  There  are,  then,  necessary  truths  of  which 
the  opposites  are  neither  mere  improbabilities  of  in- 
duction nor  mere  inconceivabihties  of  association,  but 
incredible  impossibiUties  of  existence ;  namely,  self- 
evident  analytical  judgments. 

Kant  then  was  right  in  repeating  after  Leibnitz  that 
there  are  necessary  judgments  in  the  sciences;  thereby 
he  ehminated  their  synthetical  a  posteriori  origin.     But 
he  did  not  thereby  eliminate  their  analytical  a  posteriori 
origin.     'Necessity  and  strict  universality  are,  there- 
fore,' says  he,  '  sure   signs  of   a  knowledge  a  priori! 
That   'therefore'  is  a   rash  word.      '  Baculus    stat   in 
angulo;  ergo   pluit.'      There    is    another   alternative. 
Because  the  necessary  is  not  inductive,  it  does  not  follow 
that  it  is  straightway  a  priori.     Necessity  is  a  soluble 
and  not  an  infallible  sign,  because  there  is  another  source 
of  necessity,  namely,  self-evident  analytical  judgments  a 
posteriori.    But  Kant  was  misled  by  Leibnitz  into  think- 
ing that   analytical  judgments  were  a  priori.     Hence 
his    non  sequitar  from  the   inductive  to   the  a  priori. 
Hence   also   the    importance   of  showing,    as   I   have 
attempted  to  do,  that  analytical  judgments  are  a  pos- 
teriori, real,  and  necessary  principles.     It  is  to  found  a 
theory  of  necessity  without  mysticism. 

Kant,  in  fact,  eliminated  analytical  judgments  from 
the  position  of  scientific  principles,  only  in  the  concep- 
tualistic  a  priori  shape  into  which,  under  Cartesian 
influences,  they  had  been  thrown  by  Leibnitz.  He  did 
not  eliminate  them  in  the  realistic  a  posteriori  light  in 
which  they  were  rightly  regarded  by  Aristotle.  Not 
all  necessary  truths  are  a  priori,  because  self-evident 
necessary  truths  are  a  posteriori.  Not  all  necessary 
principles  of  science  are  synthetical  judgments  a  priori, 
because    some    analytical  judgments   a  p)Osteriori    are 


358 


rSYCHOLOGlCAL   IDEALISM 


PART  ri. 


necessary  principles  of  science.  Tlie  analytical  axioms, 
the  whole  is  greater  than  the  part,  if  equals  be  added 
to  equals  the  wholes  are  equal,  if  equals  be  taken  from 
equals  the  remainders  are  equal,  haye  a  reality  in 
things,  and  an  a  posteriori  origin,  and  a  position  among 
Euclid's  principles,  which  contradict  the  fundamental 
hypothesis  of  Kant's  'Critique,'  that  all  necessary 
principles  of  science  are  synthetical  judgments  a  priori, 
Kant  might  reply  that,  though  some  analytical 
judgments  may  be  principles,  they  do  not  carry  us  far ; 
and  that  most  principles  at  all  events  are  synthetical 
judgments  a  priori  ;  such  as  7  +  5  =  12  in  arithmetic, 
and  a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  between  two  points. 
But  Kant  was,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  unfortunate  in 
his  instances.  The  proposition,  7  +  5  are  12,  is  not  an 
arithmetical  principle,  but  a  demonstrative  conclusion  ; 
and  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points  is  so  far 
from  being  the  geometrical  definition  of  a  straight  line 
that  it  is  not  geometrical  at  all,  being  merely  that 
property  of  a  straight  line  which  is  of  most  importance 

in  mechanics. 

The  definition  of  a  straight  line  would  require  an 
investigation  of  space  and  geometry.  I  will  only  remark 
at  present  that  EucUd's  definition  is  at  all  events  geome- 
trical, and  it  is  unsatisfactory  only  because  he  attempted 
to  define  a  line  without  a  superficies,  committing  a 
blunder  common  with  systematisers  of  previous  dis- 
coveries, that  of  beginning  too  synthetically.  A  point 
is  only  definable  by  abstraction  from  a  line  ;  and  simi- 
larly, a  line  from  a  surface,  a  surface  from  a  solid,  in 
the  manner  indicated,  though  not  completely  developed, 
by  Dr.  Simson  in  his  Notes  to  the  First  Book  of  Euclid. 
A  straight  line  also  requires  this  analytical  treatment. 
It  has  been  for  centuries  perfectly  abstracted ;  but,  as 


cuAP.  X.    KANT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    859 

often  happens,  it  has  been  over-abstracted,  and  will 
never  be  successfully  defined  until  it  is  analytically 
approached  from  its  place  in  a  superficies.  But  arith- 
metic comes  before  geometry :  a  unit  is  simpler  than 
a  point,  a  number  than  a  magnitude.  As  Aristotle 
remarked,  and  Comte  repeated,  a  science  from  fewer 
data  precedes  a  science  which  adds  more.^  Accordingly, 
the  question  of  necessary  truths  ought  to  be  contested 
in  the  simpler  and  more  universal  science  of  arithmetic. 

The  arithmetical  principle  concerned  with  the  number 
12  is  11  +  1,  which  is  its  sole  and  sufiicient  definition. 
If  we  were  to  take  7  +  5  for  a  definition,  12  would  have 
infinite  definitions  by  the  addition  and  subtraction  of 
other  numbers,  none  of  which  would  be  of  any  further 
use,  because  to  use  a  number  in  a  sum  we  must  know 
out  of  what  number  it  is  formed  by  the  addition  of  a 
unit.  In  the  case  of  12,  11  is  that  number  which  by 
the  addition  of  1  makes  12,  as  10  is  the  number  w^hich 
by  the  addition  of  1  makes  11,  and  so  on  till  we  come 
back  to  1  +  1  are  2.  All  those  arithmetical  principles, 
which  are  definitions  of  numbers,  are  founded  on  the 
units  added  together  ;  as  the  Greeks  knew  perfectly 
well  when  they  said  that  the  unit  is  the  origin  of  num- 
ber, and  number  is  multitude  composed  of  units.^ 

The  discovery  of  abstract  numbers  is  a  good  instance 
of  the  process  of  abstraction  and  analysis  I  have  been 
describing  in  this  chapter.  By  sense  and  reason  we  find 
that  objects  are  one  and  many  and  wholes,  among  other 
of  their  attributes,  and  infer  that  one  object  is  always 
undivided,  many  are  divided  into  units,  and  a  whole  is 
greater  than  its  part.  We  thus  discover  truths  of  num- 
ber. But  how  do  we  apprehend  their  necessity  ?  By 
perfect  abstraction  we  isolate  an  object  qua  one  as  undi- 

'  Ar.  Post.  An.  i.  27.  ""  Eucl.  VII.  Def.  2. 


3G0 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


vided  in  quantity,  objects  qua  two  as  one  -|  one,  &c.,  &c. 
This  abstraction  is  necessary  to  the  science  of  arithmetic. 
As  Plato,  though  he  did  not  understand  abstraction, 
long  ago  pointed  out,^  concrete  units  are  not  altogether 
undivided  ;  a  man,  for  example,  is  many  in  his  members 
and  only  one  on  the  whole :  but  an  arithmetical  unit  is 
absolutely  undivided.    Why  ?     Simply  because  the  thing 
as  divided  is  neglected,  and  attended  to  only  as  undi- 
vided, by  perfect  abstraction.    On  this  abstraction  of 
the  unit,  not  as  a  mere  conception,  but  as  a  simple 
object  of  attention,  we  have,  not  a  j^riofH,  but  by  a 
jiosteriori  analysis,  the  analytical  judgment,    which   is 
the  definition  of  a  unit :  not,  be  it  remarked,  the  con- 
tingent   proposition,    one   thing    is    the    undivided   in 
quantity,  which  is  not  always  true ;  but  a  thing  qua 
one  is  the  undivided  in  quantity,  which  is  self-evidently 
necessary.     So  far  as  a  thing  is  one,  it  is  undivided  in 
quantity,  and  so  far  as  it  is  divided  in  quantity,  it  is  no 
longer  one.     This  analytical  definition  is  the  foundation 
of  all  arithmetical  definitions,  all  of  which  are  merely 
analyses  of  numbers  into  units  ;  thus  1  +  1  are  2  ;  2  4-  1 
are  3,  and  so  forth  ;  every  one  of  which  are  analytical 
definitions.     Hence,  though  7  +  5  is  not,  11+ I  is,  the 
analytical  definition  of  12.    All  things,  qua  11  +  1  are  12, 
and  qua  12  are  11  +  1. 

MiU,  indeed,  contends  that  there  is  a  difference 
between  2  +  1  and  3,  because  'three  pebbles  in  two 
separate  parcels,  and  three  pebbles  in  one  parcel,  do 
not  make  the  same  impression  on  our  senses.'  '^  But  he 
overlooks  the  fact  that,  when  three  pebbles  are  in  two 
separate  parcels,  if  they  give  us  the  impression  2  +  1, 
this  is  the  impression  3  without  any  comparison  with 
three  pebbles  in  one  parcel ;  and  conversely,  w^lien  three 


»  Plato,  Bep.  vii.  525  D-6  B. 


Mill,  Logic,  ii.  6,  2. 


CHAP.  X.   KANTS  'CRITIQUE'  A^D  KECESSARi  TRUTHS    oGl 


pebbles  are  in  one  parcel,  if  they  give  us  the  impression 
o,  this  is  the  impression  2  -i- 1,  without  any  comparison 
with  three  pebbles  in  two  parcels.  We  do  not  require  two 
sets  of  three  objects  each  to  count  2  and  1  are  3.  The 
truth  is  that  he  was  deceived  by  the  formula  2  +  1  =  3, 
in  which,  for  mere  convenience,  we  apply  to  number  the 
geometrical  sign  for  equality  of  tw^o  magnitudes  ;  but 
we  must  not  allow  this  mere  symbol  to  make  us  think 
that  we  are  always  comparing  different  quantities  on 
each  side  of  it;  in  arithmetic,  equality  means  identity, 
and  the  correct  arithmetical  formula  is  2  +  1  are  3. 

Kant,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  even  take  the 
definition  of  the  number  12,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is 

11  +  1,  but  one  of  its  many  properties,  7  +  5.  He  rightly 
says  that  the  proposition,  7  +  5  are  12,  is  not  analytical  : 

12  is  not  the  selfsame  thing  as  7  +  5,  because  it  is 
8  +  4,  &c.  But  this  proposition,  though  not  analytical, 
is  also  not  a  principle,  but  a  demonstrative  conclusion 
from  principles  which  are  analytical,  the  definition  of 
the  unit  and  the  definitions  of  the  numbers  up  to  12,  as 
11  +  1  ;  and  we  are  able  from  these  analytical  to  demon- 
strate synthetical  judgments,  by  that  combination  which 
we  found  in  the  last  chapter  to  be  the  essence  of  syllogism 
or  deduction.  Kant's  attempt  to  prove  that  the  prin- 
ciples of  arithmetical  demonstration  are  not  analytical 
by  the  instance  7  +  5  are  12,  is  an  ignoratio  elenchi,  be- 
cause this  proposition  is  not  a  principle,  but  a  demon- 
strative conclusion  from  analytical  principles,  including 
11  +  1  are  12. 

It  is  curious  what  a  cursory  attention  is  paid  to 
arithmetic  in  Kant's  'Critique'  and  Mill's  'Logic'  But  by 
looking  a  little  more  closely  into  this  most  fundamental 
of  all  special  sciences,  we  have  found  that  it  contains 
analytical  principles  a  posteriori  both  in  the  axiom,  the 


3G2 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PAKT   II. 


whole  is  greater  than  its  part,  and  in  its  definitions. 
Thus  we  can  destroy  both  tlie  synthetical  theories.     On 
the  one  hand,  as  these  principles,  being  self-evident, 
are  such  that  the  contradictory  is  impossible,  Mill  is 
wrong  in  reducing  arithmetic  to  the  mere  probability  of 
induction  and  association.     He  quotes,    indeed,    with 
approval  a  supposition  that  there  might    be  a  world, 
in  which,   whenever  two  pairs  of  things   are  contem- 
plated together,  a  fifth  thing  is  brought  within  con- 
templation,  and  the  result  to  the  mind  of  contemplating 
two  two's  would  be  to  count  five.^     But  it  is  absurd 
to  suppose  minds  contemplating  a  fifth  thing  without 
counting  it  in  the  enumeration,  and  yet  to  end  the  sum, 
as  if  tliey  had  counted  it,  with  the  number  5.     Either 
one  would  count  the  fifth  thing,  in  which  case  the  sum 
would  be  2  +  2  +  1  are  5,  or  one  would  not,  in  which 
case  the  sum  would  be  2  +  2  are  4.     There  can  be  no 
world  in  which  the  result  to  the  mind  of  contemplating 
two  two's  would  be  to  count  five,  because  2  +  2  are  de- 
monstrably 4,  and  4  +  1  are  identically  the  same  as  5. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  necessary  arithmetical  principles 
are  a  posteriori  analytical  judgments,  we  cannot^  follow 
Kant  in  passing  from  the  synthetical  a  p)osteriori  to  the 
a  priori  synthetical  theory  ;  for  a  definition,  such   as 
11  +  1  are  12,  is  discovered  by  empirical  reasoning,  and 
by  perfect  abstraction  and  analysis  becomes  a  self-evi- 
dent principle,  whereby  7  +  5  is  12  are  demonstrated. 

Finally,  if  we  were  to  surrender  entirely  the  analy- 
tical a  posteriori  origin  of  necessary  truths,  yet  the 
synthetical  a  priori  origin  is  an  untenable  hypothesis, 
because  it  does  not  explain  the  facts.  Let  us  take  for 
granted  the  Kantian  series  of  arguments  :  the  neces- 
sary is  not  inductive,  therefore  it  is  a  priori ;  there  are 

»  Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  chap.  vi.  note. 


.^-j 


CHAP.  X.    KANTS  'ClUTIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    3C3 

necessary  principles  in  the  sciences,  therefore  they  are 
a  prion  ■  analytical  judgments  are  merely  a  prion  ana- 
lyses of  conceptions,  but  principles  of  science  are  true 
beyond  conceptions,  therefore  they  are  never  analytical 
iudcrments:  but  if  they  are  neither  synthetical  a  poste- 
riori, nor  analytical  a  priori,  all  principles  of  science  are 
synthetical  a  priori.     Now,  everywhere  throughout  the 
'Critique,'  Kant  confesses  that  the  a  prion  is  contri- 
buted by  mind  to  mental  representations,  and  that  the 
data  of  mental  representations,  without  which    the  a 
priori  is  mere  conception,  are  sensations,  which  the  a 
priori  converts  into  objects  of  knowledge.     Hence  he 
concludes  that  perception,  experience,  understandmg, 
reasoning,    knowledge,    science    are    aU    confined    to 
sensible  representations  hiformed  by  a  prion  elements. 
Hence,  according  to  him,  necessary  principles  of  scieiice, 
bein<T  synthetical  a  priori,  are  necessary  within,  but 
impossible  without,  the  sphere  of  sense  and  experience 
Kant  everywhere  accepts  this  consequence  :  synthetical 
principles  a  priori  are  necessary,  and  apply,  only  within 
the  limits  of  phsenoniena.^ 

This  corollary  of  transcendentalism  maybe  illustrated 
by  its  appUcation  to  arithmetic.  According  to  Kant, 
arithmetic  will  contain  analytical  a  prion  axioms - 
for  example,  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part— which, 
however,  will  not  be  principles ;  and  synthetical  prin 
ciples  a  priori,  an  example  of  which  will  be  7  +  5  are  1^. 
He  did  not,  indeed,  leave  a  satisfactory  theory  of  the 
place  of  number  in  his  system.  There  is  a  sentence  lu 
the  '  Critique  '  '■'  in  which  he  says  '  that  number  is  no- 
thiiK'  but  the  unity  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  ot 
a  homogeneous  intuition  in  general,  gained  by  my  gene- 

1  Hart.  57, 152-3,  208  =  Meik.  44,  119, 177. 
'  Hart.  144  =  Meik.  110. 


3G4 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


rating  time  itself  in  the  apprehension  of  the  intuition ; ' 
that  is,  apparently,  by  generating  a  successive  addition 
of  units  in  time.  The  same  view  is  confirmed  by  a  passage 
in  the  '  Prolegomena  to  all  Future  Metaphysics.'  '  Geo- 
metry,' says  he,  '  is  based  upon  the  pure  intuition  of 
space.  Arithmetic  accomplishes  its  concept  of  number 
by  the  successive  addition  of  unities  in  time.'^  This, 
however,  is  a  conclusion  so  paradoxical,  that  we  may 
in  charity  suppose  him  to  concede  that  we  also  apprehend 
contiguous  units  in  space.  But  even  so,  space  and  time 
alike  are  regarded  by  him  merely  as  a  priori  forms  of 
sense  and  of  sensible  phoenomena.  Moreover,  the  cate- 
gories, schemata,  and  principles  of  quantity  are  all 
confined  by  him  to  phaenomena.  The  consequence  is 
that  number  is  strictly  limited  to  phaenomena,  and  even 
the  synthetical  principles  a  priori  of  arithmetic  are  re- 
garded by  Kant  himself  as  necessarily  true  of  phenomena 
of  sense,  and  no  more.  Hence  his  extraordinary  state- 
ments, '  numerus  est  quantitas  phaenomenon,'  and 
'  ceternitas,  necessitas,  phasnomena,'  &c.'^ 

But  is  it  true  that  the  laws  of  number  are  limited 
to  the  phaenomena  of  sense  ?  The  very  first  definitions 
of  Newton's  '  Principia  '  disprove  such  a  narrow  theory. 
'  The  quantity  of  matter  is  the  measure  of  the  same 
arising  from  its  density  and  magnitude  conjointly  : '  this 
is  the  first  definition,  which  is  immediately  illustrated  by 
the  arithmetical  proposition  that  '  air  of  a  double  density 
in  a  double  space  is  quadruple,  in  a  triple  space  sex- 
tuple,' while  this  quantity  of  matter  is  identified  with 
its  mass.  '  The  quantity  of  motion  is  the  measure  of 
the  same  arising  from  the  velocity  and  quantity  of 
matter  conjointly  : '  this  is  the  second  definition,  which 

*  Prolegomena  (translated  by  Maliaffy),  p.  45. 
2  Hart.  146  =  Meik.  113. 


CHAP.  X.   KANT  S  'CPvTTTQUF/  AXD  NECESSAKY  TRUTHS    365 


is  anrani  elucidated  bv  the  arithmetical  illustration,  that 
'  in  a  body,  double  in  quantity,  motion  with  equal  velocity 
is  double,  with  double  velocity  quadruple.'  If,  now, 
arithmetic  were  limited  to  the  phaenomena  of  sense,  the 
laws  of  mass  and  motion  would  either  have  to  be  limited 
to  the  phenomena  of  sense,  or,  l^eyond  the  phaenomena 
of  sense,  contain  no  quantity  of  matter  or  of  motion,  no 
measure,  no  numerical  proportion  ;  both  of  whic^h  alter- 
natives are  absurd. 

The  truth  is  that  the  laws  of  mass  and  motion  carry 
us  far  beyond  the  phaenomena  of  sense  into  a  non- 
phaenomenal  yet  scientific  world  of  material  particles, 
and  carry  the  laws  of  arithmetic  with  them.  The  law 
of  gravitation  is  a  law  of  motion  by  numerical  propor- 
tion. All  the  particles  of  matter  gravitate  to  one  an- 
other with  a  force  directly  as  their  mass,  and  inversely 
to  the  square  of  the  distance  ;  on  the  one  hand,  this 
gravitation  is  inferred  to  be  in  numerical  proportion 
both  to  the  quantity  of  matter  and  to  the  distances  of 
the  particles;  on  the  other  hand,  every  particle  of 
matter  in  the  universe  is  inferred  to  gravitate  with  this 
numerical  proportion,  in  times,  places,  and  circumstances, 
wdioUy  inaccessible  to  any  possible  senses  of  living 
being's.  In  the  laws  too  of  the  structures  and  motions  of 
imperceptible  particles,  all  the  definitions  and  axioms 
of  arithmetic  are  employed.  For  example,  in  a  drop  of 
water,  every  thousand  of  the  imperceptible  particles 
w^ith  another  particle  makes  one  thousand  and  one,  and 
is  a  whole  including  every  one  of  these  particles  as  parts. 
'  In  rebus  enim,'  says  Bacon,  '  quae  per  numeros 
transiguntur,  tarn  facile  quis  posuerit  aut  cogitaverit 
millenarium,  quam  unum ;  aut  millesimam  partem 
unius,  quam  unum  integrum.'  ^     As  Mill  remarks,  '  the 

^  Bacon,  Nov.  Org.  if.  8. 


300 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL   I1)1-:ALISM 


TART.    JI. 


^rcat  agent  for  transforiniug  experimental  into  deductive 
sciences  is  the  science  of  number.'  ^  We  can  neither 
allow  that  these  deductive  sciences,  which  measure  the 
structures  and  motions  of  imperceptible  particles,  are 
limited  to  phaenomena  of  sense,  nor  that  there  is  any 
measure  of  quantity  available  except  number. 

But  we  need  not  go  beyond  the  '  Critique '  itself  to  see 
the  impossibility  of  limiting  number,  the  quantitative 
categories  of  unity  plurality  and  totality,  and  arith- 
metical principles,  to  phaenomena.  One  of  the  points 
of  the  '  Critique '  is  that  God  is  not  a  phasnomenon. 
]]ut  God  is  one.  Therefore  unity  is  not  limited  to  pha3- 
nomena.  Kant  also  assures  us  that  we  have  a  unity  of 
apperception,  an  identical  self,  which  is  supposed  by 
him  to  be  not  a  pha3nomenon,  but  that  which  unites 
phicnomena.  Lest  we  should  suppose  that  these  objec- 
tions prove  only  unity  and  not  number  beyond  pluc- 
nomena,  he  distinguishes  for  us  the  human  understand- 
ing with  its  unity  of  apperception  to  comljine  sensible 
representations  from  the  divine  understanding,  which 
does  not  require  it.'^  There  are,  therefore,  according 
to  Kant,  who  was  innocent  of  the  Hegelian  identifica- 
tion of  similars  and  confusion  of  divine  and  human, 
two  understandings,  the  divine  and  the  human,  numeri- 
cally different,  yet  neither  a  phaenomenon.  God,  he 
also  tells  us,  does  not  make  a  whole  with  the  world ; 
there  are,  therefore,  three  things — God,  the  world,  and 
human  understanding ;  none  of  them  phaenomena. 

All  things  are  at  least  numbered,  whether  they  be 
material  or  spiritual ;  hence  the  dispute,  whether  Kant 
ought  to  have  made  number  belong  to  space  or  to  time, 
is  completely  beside  the  mark,  for  it  belongs  to  every- 
thing whatever.     It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  confine 

'  Mill,  Logic,  ii.  4,  7.  *  Hart.  119,  123  =  Meik.  85,  89. 


CHAr.  X.    KANTS  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    307 

number,  arithmetic,  or  arithmetical  necessity  to  phae- 
nomena of  sense.  What  is  the  consequence  ?  Not  all 
necessary  principles  are  limited  to  phaenomena.  Con- 
sequently, again,  they  cannot  be  synthetical  judgments 
a  priori,  which,  on  Kant's  own  confession,  would  limit 
them  to  phaenomena.  In  other  words,  the  synthetical 
a  priori  tlieory  does  not  account  for  arithmetical  neces- 
sity, the  simplest  and  best  instance  of  scientific  neces- 
sity, beyond  phaenomena  in  an  imperceptible  world. 

Arithmetical  principles  apply  to  everything  what- 
ever. After  all,  there  is  only  one  theory  which  can 
account  for  this  absolute  universality  of  arithmetic,  which 
counts  subjects  as  well  as  sensations,  men,  bodies,  cor- 
puscles, and  God  Himself.  There  is  not  one  arithmetical 
judgment  limited  to  phaenomena  any  more  than  to  ideas. 
Now,  this  (50uld  not  be,  if  they  were  analytical  a  priori, 
which  would  limit  them  to  ideas,  nor  synthetical  a  pos- 
teriori, which  would  make  them  contingent,  nor  syn- 
thetical a  priori,  which  would  make  them  necessary 
only  within  the  limits  of  phaenomena.  But  it  can  be, 
if  they  are  analytical  a  posteriori  judgments  about 
simple  objects  of  reasoning  in  the  abstract.  Either, 
then,  this  tlieory  must  be  accepted,  or  some  new  theory 
found.     But  where  ? 

When  we  look  back  on  the  whole  discussion  of  this 
difficult  subject,  we  sliall  find  that  there  is  no  evidence 
for  the  Kantian  hypothesis  of  a  priori  synthetical  judg- 
ments, as  the  origin  of  necessary  truths,  except  its 
advantage  over  the  synthetical  a  posteriori  and  the 
analytical  a  priori  theories.  It  has  no  direct  evidence, 
either  from  consciousness  or  from  anatomy,  and  it  is 
not  only  that  we  are  unconscious  of  a  priori  necessity, 
but  that  we  are  unconscious  of  any  a  priori  power,  or 
of  anything  like  it.     In  indirect  evidence  it  also  fails.     It 


368 


rSYCIIOLOGICAL  IDEATJSM 


PART  II. 


does  not  attempt  to  eliminate  an  analytical  a  posteriori 
theory,  althongh  such  a  theory,  as  I  have  shown,  can 
readily  be  developed  from  the  works  of  Aristotle.  But 
what  finally  condemns  it,  and  makes  it  quite  impossil)le, 
is  its  confessed  inability  to  explain  even  the  logical  in- 
ference, much  more  the  scientific  knowledge,  of  neces- 
sary truths  beyond  the  phasnomena  of  sense ;  when,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  in  all  the  sciences,  and  not  only  m 
mechanics  and  all  natural  philosophy,  but  also  in  psy- 
cholotty  and  theology  itself,  insensible  and  impercep- 
tible  objects  are  logically  inferred  and  known  to  obey  the 
necessary  laws  of  unity,  pluraUty,  and  totality.  Every- 
thing known  is  one ;  not  everything  a  phasnomenon. 

What  makes  so  many  philosophers  at  this  moment 
cling  to  an  hypothesis  so  utterly  wanting  in  verification, 
elimination,  and  explanation?  Partly,  no  doubt,  its 
superioritv  to  the  hypothesis  of  Mill.  But  two  blacks 
do  not  make  a  white;  and  it  makes  little  difference 
whether  we  say  that  association  makes  us  necessarily 
conceive,  or  a  priori  synthesis  necessarily  believe,  the 
necessity  of  principles  within  the  phasnomena  of  sense, 
when  the  real  question  is  how  we  infer  their  necessity 
in  insensible  and  imperceptible  nature,  and  in  the  super- 
natural world.  Partly,  it  is  thought  that  the  Kantian 
theory  of  necessity  must  be  accepted,  because  other 
])arts  of  the  '  Critique '  seem  to  support  rehgion.  But 
we  must  beware  of  building  the  house  of  religion  on 
the  sand ;  and  religion  can  hardly  be  supported  by  a 
philosophv,  which  makes  it  a  fallacy  to  say  that  God 
is  one.  The  main  cause  of  the  popularity  of  Kant's 
philosophy,  however,  seems  to  be  founded  on  the  vague 
use  of  the  term  '  phaenomena,'  which  suggests  to  the 
unwary  all  the  facts  in  heaven  and  earth,  sensible,  in- 
sensible,  and  imperceptible.     But  this  is  not  what  Kant 


CHAP.  X.     KANT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS   3G9 

meant,  nor  what  he  could  mean,  by  pha^nomena,  and 
it  would  be  a  sad  pity  to  rest  the  reputation  of  a 
philosophy  on  an  equivocation. 

As  Leibnitz  before  him  spoke  of  ' phcenomena  sive 
apparitiones   qua?   in   mente   mea  existunt,' ^   so  Kant 
always  speaks  of  them  as  sensible  representations  which 
cannot  exist  out  of  our  mind ;  opposing  them  to  nou- 
mena,  or  things  of  which  we   must  form  ideas,  but 
which  as  objects  are  unknown.     He  was  aware  that  his 
philosophy  compelled  him  to  make  these  sensible  repre- 
sentations the  limit  of  knowledge,  not  merely  because 
they  are  the  matter  of  sense,  but  also  because  a  priori 
forms  of  mind  cannot  be  valid  beyond  a  posteriori  data 
of  mind.     Moreover,  as  we  find  from  the  Preface  to  the 
Second  Edition,^  he  looked  upon  it  as  one  of  the  ad- 
vantages of  his  '  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason,'  so  to  limit 
speculative  knowledge  to pha3nomena that  'we  can  have 
knowledge  of  no  object  as  a  thing  in  itself,  but  only  so 
far  as  it  is  an  object  of  sensory  intuition,  i.e.  as  manifes- 
tation,' because  thereby  he  thought  to  make  room  for  a 
practical  proof  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  beyond  the 
area  of  phasnomena. 

Kant,  then,  in  limiting  all  speculative  knowledge  to 
phenomena,  meant  that  necessary  truths,  being  synthe- 
tical judgments  a  priori,  are  only  necessary  about  the 
a  priori  forms  of  sensible  representations  and  about 
sensible  representations  converted  into  objects  of  know- 
ledge by  these  a  priori  forms.  Such  a  limitation  to 
things  of  sense,  Sinnenwesen,  phaBnomena,  is  far  too 
narrow,  because  arithmetical  necessity  applies  to  every 
imperceptible  object  of  logical  reasoning  and  scientific 
knowledge.     His  fundamental  position,  that  necessity  is 


*  Leibnitz,  Op.  (ed.  Erdmann),  p.  442,  A. 
2  Hart.  22  seq.  =  Meik.  xxxii.  seq. 


B  B 


370 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


rAIlT    IT. 


an  infallible  sign  of  a  priori  knowledge,  must  be  tra- 
versed by  this  still  more  fundamental  position  :  imper- 
ceptibility  is  an  infallible  sign  of  a  logical  inference  and 
a  scientific  knowledge  which  is  neither  plunsnomenal  nor 

a  priori. 

Kant's  '  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason '  is  a  conspicuous 
instance  of  the  failure  of  the  synthetic  method,  and 
indeed  of  the    impossibility  of    carrying   it   out  con- 
sistently.    He    supposes   himself  to  use  the  origin  of 
knowledge  to  determine  the  limits  of  the  objects  known. 
Accordingly,  on  this  synthetic  method,  he  begins  with 
sense,  at  once  begs  a  sense  of  sensible  representations, 
Ind  thus  founds  his  philosophy  on  an  hypothesis  which 
dictates  the  conclusion  that  knowledge  is   limited   to 
pha^nomena.     On  the  other  hand,  every  one  of  his  main 
arguments  takes  a  premise  from  the  other  end  of  know 
ledge,  its  objects,  and,  by  an  analytic  method,  uses  the 
objects  to  infer  an  a  priori  origin  of  knowledge.  ^  Thus, 
in  the  Introduction,  necessary  truths  about  objects  of 
science  are  used  to   deduce   the   theory   of  synthetic 
judgments  a pnm;  in  the  'Transcendental  J^sthetic,' 
from  their  known  properties  space  and  time  are  inferred 
to  be  a  priori  forms  of  sense ;  in  the  '  Transcendental 
Analytic,'  a  definition  of  the  objects  of  knowledge  is  used 
to  prove  that  they  contain  a  priori  categories  of  under- 
standing.   Nor  is  this  alL    Having  taken  as  much  about 
an  object  as  he  wants  for  his  a  priori  theory,  Kant  then, 
by  his  synthetic  method,  uses  his  a  priori  theory  to  dis- 
pose of  the  rest  of  the  object.     Thus,  he  argues  that 
necessity  requires  synthetical  judgments  a  priori,  w^hich 
again  prove  necessity  phenomenal ;  that  the  properties 
of  time  and  space  require  a  priori  forms  of  sense,  which 
again  prove  time  and  space  pha3nomenal ;   that  known 
objects  require  a  priori  categories,  e.g.  substance  and 


CHAP.  X.    KANT'S  'CRiriQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS     371 

cause,  which  again  prove  known  objects,  e.g.  substances 
and  causes,  phasnomenal.^ 

The  '  Critique  '  is  a  perpetual  see-saw  between  two 
methods ;  the  professed  from  the  origin  to  the  objects, 
and  the  concealed  from   the  objects  to  the  origin  of 
knowledge.     It  is  first  synthetical,  then  analytical,  and 
finally  synthetical.     It  assumes  as  a  principle  that  the 
matter  of  sense  is  representations.      But  tliis  synthetic 
beginning  would  not  justify  transcendentalism.    It  then 
argues  that  the  objects  of  knowledge  require  a  priori 
elements.     Now,  this  analytical  procedure  gives  trans- 
cendentalism a  momentary  plausibility.     It  finally  con- 
tends that  a  posteriori  representations  converted  into 
objects  by  a  priori  elements  are  the  objects  of  experience, 
and  that  all  objects  of  logical  inference  and  knowled^^e 
are  pha3nomena.     But  this  synthetical  ending   brings 
transcendentalism   into    conflict  with   a  characteristic 
of  the  objects  of  knowledge,  omitted  in  the  analysis  ; 
namely,  that  they  are  not  Ihnited  to  pha3nomena.     It  is 
as  if  a  natural  philosopher  should  show  that  the  theory 
of  emission  explains  reflection  and  refraction,  and  then 
deny    the   interference   of  polarised   light.      So  Kant 
shows  that  the  a  priori  theory  explains  the  necessity 
of  synthetical  truths,  and  then  denies  their  universal 
applicability ;  shows  that  it  explains  the  properties  of 
time  and  space  in,  and  then  denies  them  beyond,  sense  ; 
shows  that  it  explains  the  experience  of  objects,  and  then 
denies   the   knowledge  of  objects  beyond   experience. 
He  arbitrarily  appeals  to  some  of  the  characteristics, 
but  neglects  the  insensibihty,  of  objects  of  science.    His 
whole  method  is  ad  placitum.      He  makes  origin  and 
objects,  objects  and  origin,  origin  and  objects,  recipro- 
cally determine  one  another,  in  a  perpetual  circle. 

'  Hart.  22,  80,  123-4,  133-4,  &c.  =  Meik.  xxxiii.  44,  90,  100,  &c. 

B   B     2 


372 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


The  analytic  method,  used  consistently,  makes  com- 
plete  havoc   of    the    'Critique.'      '  Tempus,    spatium, 
locus,  et  motus  sunt  omnibus  notissima.      Notandum 
tamen,  quod  vulgus  quantitates  hasce  non  aliter  quam 
ex  relatione  ad  sensibilia  concipiat.'  ^     In  this  passage, 
Newton  points  out  that  the  limitation  of  the  objects  of 
science  to  the  sensible  is   a  vulgar  error.     Yet  it  is 
a  constant  error  of  mental  philosophers,  who  think  that, 
when  they  have  considered  only  objects  of  sense,  they 
have  solved  the  secret  of  the  scientific  universe.     It 
was  the  very  error  of  Kant  when  he   called  time  and 
space  forms  of  sense,  and  therefore  limited  motion  to 
sense  ;  when  heenunciated  the  extraordinary  series  of 
paradoxes :  'numerus  est  quantitas  phasnomenon,  sensatio 
realitas  pha3nomenon,  cofistans  et  perdurabile    rerum 
substantia  phicnomenon,    ceternitas,  necessitas,  phoeno- 
mena,  &c.'  '^ ;  when  he  concluded  that  whatever  is  known 
is  a  pWnomenon,  and  what  is  not  a  phaenomenon  can  be 
conceived  by  pure  reason,  but  neither  inferred  by  logical 
reason  nor  scientifically  known.    This  philosophy,  semm- 
dum  sensum,  was  an  hypothetical  corollary  from  the 
theory  that  all  objects  of  experience  are  sensible  repre- 
sentations informed  by  a  priori  intuitions  and  notions  of 
mind.     But  as  certainly  it  is  false,  because  it  cannot 
explain  a  millionth,  nor  even  an  infinitesimal,  part  of 
the  insensible  objects  of  science. 

Let  us  return  from  the  '  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason ' 
to  the  '  Philosophia3  Naturalis  Principia  Mathematica,' 
and  enlarge  our  thoughts,  not  to  the  immensity  of  the 
unknown,  but  to  the  extent  of  the  objects  of  science, 
such  as  was  made  known  by  Newton, 

Felix,  qui  potuit  rerum  cognoscere  causas. 

Insensible  corpuscles  of  matter  are  scientifically  inferred 

1  Newton,  Princi_pia,Def.  Scliolmm,  ^  Hart.  146  =  Meik.  113. 


CHAP.  X.    KANT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS     378 


to  be  each  one,  many  and  numbered,  and  to  obey  the 
necessary  laws  of  number ;  to  be  in  insensible  time  and 
space,  and  to  obey  the  necessary  laws  of  magnitude  ;  to 
be  insensible  substances,  and  move  according  to  the  laws 
of  motion  ;  to  be  insensible  causes  of  insensible  motions, 
and  to  be  insensible  causes  of  sensible  objects.  They 
are  actual,  but  they  are  not  actual  pha^nomena  of  sense, 
but  insensible  external  causes  of  internal  sensible  ef- 
fects. Nor,  being  actual,  are  they  possible  phasnomena  ; 
for  possible,  whicli  are  not  actual,  plia^nomena  are 
nothing  at  present,  whereas  the  insensible  particles  of  a 
drop  of  water,  now  gravitating  towards  my  hand,  are 
actual  at  present,  real  because  causal  of  effects  in  my 
senses,  and  at  the  same  time  not  only  insensible  but 
imperceptible  ;  so  far  from  possibilities,  impossibilities  of 
sensation ;  yet  actual  objects  of  science.  The  irresistible 
conclusion  of  this  consistent  and  thorough  appeal  to 
the  objects  of  knowledge,  is  that  not  all  of  them  are 
plia3nomena,  actual  or  possible,  but  far  the  larger  part 
non-plia?nomenal,  noumenal  in  the  sense  of  rationally 
inferred,  known  things  in  themselves,  as  apart  from  our 
senses,  though  not  as  apart  from  their  relations  to  one 
another. 

The  weight  of  natural  philosophy  is  destined  to 
destroy  all  that  mental  philosophy  of  the  present  day 
which  begins  from  a  sense  of  sensations,  even  if  it 
makes  a  vain  effort  to  recover  its  false  start  by  catching 
at  the  shadow  of  a  priori  mysticism.  When  Kant  pro- 
poses to  convert  sensible  representations  of  minds  into 
objects  of  knowledge  by  a  priori  intuitions  and  notions 
of  minds,  he  all  the  more  limits  scientific  inference  to 
phsenomena.  But,  as  we  have  just  seen,  the  objects  of 
scientific  inference  include  insensible  and  imperceptible 
things,  which  are  not  phsenomena,  actual  or  possible. 


374 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


Therefore,  in  the  first  place,  tlie  '  Critique '  is  incredibly 
narrow  and  absolutely  false  in  limiting  scientific  infer- 
ence to  phienomena,  actual  and  possible  ;  and  secondly, 
the  data  of  scientific  inference  cannot  be  sensible  re- 
presentations, even  sublimated  by  a  priori  forms,  which 
all  the  more  surely  would  condemn  science  to  the  nar- 
row limits  of  phasnomena. 

Finally,  we  must  apply  consistent  analysis  to  the 
Kantian  arguments  in  detail.     Thus,  if  necessary  truths 
were   synthetical  judgments  a  priori,  they  w^ould  be 
limited  to  phcenomena  ;  but  science  extends  them   to 
all  particles  of  matter  ;  therefore,  they  are  not  limited 
to  phoenomena,  and  therefore  are  not  synthetical  judg- 
ments a  priori.     Secondly,  if  time  and  space  were  such 
as  to  be  necessarily  a  priori  forms  of  sense,  they  would 
be  limited  to  phasnomena ;  but  science  infers  that  they 
are  forms  of  every  particle  of  matter  in  the  universe ; 
therefore,   they   are   not   limited  to   phasnomena,    and 
therefore  they  are  not  a  prioiH  forms  of  sense.    Thirdly, 
if  objects  were  such  as  to  require  a  priori  categories  of 
substance  and  cause,  they  would  be  limited  to  pliae- 
nomenal  substances  and  causes ;  but  science  infers  that 
all  particles  of  matter  are  substantial  bodies,  causing 
and  receivinjf  motions,  actin<]^  and  reactin^]^  on  one  an- 
other,    inert  until  moved  or  resisted  by  one  another, 
and,  among  countless  effects,  producing  sensible  objects 
in  us  ;  therefore,  objects  scientifically  inferred  are  not 
phcenomenal  substances  and  causes,  and,  therefore,  sub- 
stance and  cause  are  not  a  priori  categories.     In  short, 
objects  of  scientific  inference  are  not  phoenomena,  and 
could  not  be  inferred  from  a  posteriori  sensations  con- 
verted into  objects  by  a  priori  forms.     Critical  idealism 
is  a  false  philosophy,  both  of  the  limits  and  of  the  origin 
of  knowledge. 


CHAP.  X.    KANT'S  'CRITIQUE'  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    375 

The  one  beacon  of  the  present  day  is  scientific  dis- 
covery and  invention :  it  was  lighted  by  the  principles 
ofthe  Newtonian  philosophy.  But  though  natural  philo- 
sophy will  reveal  to  us  nature,  and  provide  us  external 
o-oods,  it  will  not  alone  produce  philosophical  wisdom 
or  constitute  essential   happiness.     What  we  w^ant  is 
principles  in  general  philosophy.     When  such  princi- 
ples have  been  found,  it  will  be  discovered  that  there 
was  a  time  when  the  details  of  nature  were  not  so  well 
known,  but  the  general  relation  of  God,  nature,  and  man 
was  much  better  understood  than  at  present.     We  may 
laugh  at  the  want  of  knowledge,  but  we  must  never 
foro-et  the   wisdom  of  the   ancients.      The    stream  of 
human  discovery  has  been  like  a  river,  part  of  which 
escapes  into  marshes,  while  the  main  channel  flows  on 
into  the  sea  :  so  philosophy,  the  perennial  sources  of 
which  are  to  be  found  in  Greek  philosophy  and  sciences, 
speculative  and  practical,  has    in  modern  times   been 
partly  diverted  into  the  marshes  of  ideahsm,  while  the 
main  stream  has  expanded  into  the  natural  philosophy 
of  Copernicus  and  Kepler,  Bacon  and  Galileo,  Descartes 
and  Newton,  and  perpetually  issues  in  discoveries  and 
inventions. 

Can  w^e  bring  mental  philosophy  back  into  the  main 
stream  of  discovery  ?  We  can,  by  using  the  discoveries 
of  natural  philosophy  as  objects  of  science  to  discover 
the  data  of  sense.  Ideahsm  has  failed  because  it  has 
used  a  wrong  method,  and  begun  at  an  unknown  be- 
ginning. It  has  taken  psychical  data  of  sense  for  prin- 
ciples, which  are  really  hypotheses,  and  has  used  them 
to  dictate  the  objects  of  knowledge.  As  it  has  found 
new  difficuhies,  it  has  feigned  new  hypotheses,  until  it 
has  culminated  in  the  absolute  idealism  of  Hegel,  who, 
by  heaping  hypothesis  on  hypothesis, — sensible  repre- 


376 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II.. 


sentations,  a  priori  categories,  one  spiritual  subject 
in  God  and  all  men,  of  which  nature  is  a  system  of 
objective  thoughts — compiled  a  system  of  philosophy 
which  is  as  cumbrous  a  mass  of  hypotheses  as  the 
Ptolemaic  system  of  astronomy.  But  the  truth  is,  that, 
like  the  old  hypothesis  of  planetary  circles  round  the 
earth,  the  modern  idealistic  hypothesis  of  a  sense  of 
psychical  data,  whether  called  ideas  or  impressions, 
representations  or  sensations,  is  a  false  beginning,  and 
could  never  lead  to  scientific  knowledge. 

Modern  astronomers  succeeded  by  reversing  the 
method  of  astronomy.  They  gave  up  reasoning  synthe- 
tically from  hypotheses  of  planetary  circles  to  the  de- 
tails of  planetary  motion,  and  began  with  the  planetary 
motions  as  facts.  Copernicus  found  that  the  planets 
move  round  the  sun,  and  Kepler  that  they  move  not  in 
circles  but  in  ellipses :  proceeding  from  these  facts, 
Newton  inquired  analytically  what  simple  motions  were 
required  to  explain  such  elliptical  motions  :  this  was  the 
analytical  method  which  ended  in  Newton's  discovery 
of  astronomical  principles.  In  the  same  way  mental 
philosophy  should  reverse  its  method.  Instead  of  reason- 
ing synthetically  from  hypotheses  of  sensible  data  to 
what  objects  we  can  and  must  know,  we  should  find 
what  we  do  infer  and  know  in  the  sciences,  and  then 
inquire  analytically  what  sensible  data  are  required  to 
explain  our  inference  and  science.  In  this  way,  and  no 
other,  as  Newton  by  an  analysis  of  elliptical  motions 
discovered  the  principles  of  astronomy,  so  may  we  by 
an  analysis  of  the  objects  of  scientific  reasoning  dis- 
cover the  principles  of  mental  philosophy. 

There  is  one  characteristic  of  objects  scientific, 
which  is  at  once  a  positive  instance  to  bring  us  to 
principles  of  mental  philosophy,  and  a  negative  instance 


CHAP.  X.    KANT  S  'CRITIQUE^  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    377 

to  destroy  all  psychological  idealism:  it  is  the  insen- 
sibility of  corpuscles.  Corpuscles,  insensible  and  inq)er- 
ceptible  substances  in  time  and  space,  moving  according 
to  laws  of  motion,  are  physical  objects  of  science, 
requiring  physical  data  of  sense.  On  the  one  hand, 
consider  this  analytical  deduction  destructively.  In 
the  first  place,  it  follows  that  these  insensible  and 
imperceptible  objects  of  scientific  inference  are  not 
sensible  ideas,  not  perceptions,  not  phasnomena,  nor 
unknown  things.  This  consequence  destroys  the  ideal- 
isms of  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  Kant.  Secondly,  these  in- 
sensible and  imperceptible  objects  of  scientific  inference 
could  not  be  logically  inferred  from  ideas,  nor  from  im- 
pressions, nor  from  sensible  representations  converted  into 
phsenomenal  objects  by  a  priori  forms.  This  destroys 
the  idealisms  I  have  examined,  from  Descartes  to  Kant. 
Nor  could  they  be  inferred  from  any  sense  of  sensations, 
however  elaborated.  This  destroys  the  ideaUsms  of 
our  own  day.  On  the  other  hand,  consider  this  analy- 
tical deduction  constructively.  These  insensible  and 
imperceptible  objects  of  scientific  inference  require  a 
sense,  from  which  reason  may  infer  them  by  parity  of 
reasoning.  Hence,  in  the  first  place,  sense  is  simple  and 
synthetic ;  perceiving  substantial  objects,  which  are 
internal  but  physical,  durable,  extended,  and  related 
to  one  another,  within  our  nervous  systems.  Secondly, 
reason  infers  similar  objects  and  relations  in  external" 
nature.  There  are  three  types  of  inference,  analogical, 
inductive  and  deductive,  each  mechanically  obeying  its 
own  laws,  and  primarily  from  judgments  of  synthetic 
sense  inferring  judgments  about  objects  insensible  and 
imperceptible.  General  reasoning,  inductive  and  de- 
ductive, used  circumstantially,  produces  a  knowledge 
and   science  with  an   approximate  always  tending   to 


378 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


PART   II. 


an  absolute  certainty.  After  sense  and  general  reasoning, 
perfect  abstraction  by  attention,  mechanically  obeying 
the  laws  of  identity  and  difference,  makes  us  apprehend 
a  kind  of  object  as  simply  the  same  with  itself,  and 
frame  analytical  judgments  of  what  it  must  be  and  not 
be,  in  the  abstract.  These  analytical  judgments  are  self- 
evident  principles  of  demonstration,  producing  exact 
science,  but  a  posteriori.  This  is  a  general  outline  of 
the  analytical  philosophy  attempted  in  tliis  essay. 

Among    many   difficulties,    which    may   occur    to 
others,  I  anticipate  three  main  lines  of  objection  to  this 
essay.     In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  thought  that,  wdiat- 
ever  value  physical  realism  may  have  in  dealing  with 
nature  as  an  object  of  scientific  knowledge,  idealism 
retains  an  advantai^e  of  its  own  in  its  treatment  of  man 
as  a  spiritual  subject.     On  the  contrary,  against  Des- 
cartes and  all  his  followers,  but  from  the  consilience  of 
consciousness,  observation,  and  reasoning  about  myself, 
I  contend  that  man  is  an  organism,  partly  body  and 
partly  soul ;  who  knows  of  himself,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  he  is  an  animal,  inhabiting  the  surface  of  no  very 
large  planet  in  a  considerable  solar  system,  wdiicli  is 
only  one  among  countless  stellar  worlds,  in  a  stupen- 
dous immeasurable  universe  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
that,  infmitesimally  little  as  he  is  in  himself,  by  sense 
and  reason  he  is  great,  in  his  knowledge  and  power 
over  nature,  which  make  him  like  even  to  God.     But, 
reasonable  as  is  this  realistic,  but  not  materialistic,  con- 
clusion, the  idealists  more  and  more  tend  to  the  hypo- 
thesis, that  man  is  a  purely  psychical  self,  while  his 
own  body  is  not  an  integral  part  of  himself,  as  subject, 
but  is  one  among  all  other  known  bodies,  which,  as 
objects,  are  either  all  alike  inferred  from,  or  all  alike 
identical  with,  his  sensations  or  thoughts  in  general. 


CHAP.  X.    KANT'S  'CRITIQUE' AiSD  NECESSAHY  TRUTHS    379 


Now,  the  former  of  these  alternatives  leaves  out  half 
the  man ;  the  latter  inverts  man  and  nature ;  while 
both  idealistic  theories  of  personal  identity,  by  draw- 
ing the  line  of  self  at  spirit,  or  between  soul  and  body 
instead  of  between  man  and  nature,  contradict  the  con- 
silience of  consciousness,  observation,  and  reasoning  : 
a  combined  evidence  not  to  be  parted,  because  man 
is  a  complex  being,  mainly  imperceptible  to  himself, 
who  by  night  falls  asleep  and  becomes  oblivious  of  his 
being,  by  day  does  not  remember  his  infancy,  never 
can  remember  nor  as  yet  be  conscious  of  his  future 
career,  and,  therefore,  is  not  aware  of  his  personal  iden- 
tity throughout  life  by  retentive  consciousness  alone. 
Why,  then,  does  modern  thought  tend  towards  idealistic 
spiritualism  ?  Partly  from  a  want  of  simplicity  and  a 
certain  vanity  of  man,  who  in  his  rationality  would 
fain  forget  he  is  an  animal ;  mainly  from  a  confusion 
of  idealism  and  spiritualism  with  Christianity.  But  we 
have  the  best  possible  authority  on  the  Christian  doc- 
trine of  man  himself:  the  words  of  Christ  incarnate. 
'  And  He  said  unto  them,  why  are  ye  troubled  ?  and 
wherefore  do  reasonings  arise  in  your  heart  ?  See 
My  hands  and  My  feet,  that  it  is  I  Myself :  handle  Me, 
and  see  ;  for  a  spirit  hath  not  flesh  and  bones,  as  ye 
behold  Me  having.'  ^ 

Secondly,  it  will  be  doubted  whether  my  general 
theory  can  be  worked  out  in  detail.  I  feel  the  full 
force  of  this  difficulty.  When  this  essay  was  mapped 
out  it  was  to  include  many  more  details.  Starting  from 
Newton's  '  Principia,'  I  had  hoped  to  include  a  theory, 
long  cherished,  that  the  properties  of  time  and  space, 
enunciated  l)y  him  in  the  '  Scholium  to  the  Definitions,' 
can  only  be  explained  by  defining  time  and  space  as 

*  St.  Luke  xxiv.  38-39  (Revised  Version). 


380 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


TART   II. 


the  continuance  and  continuity  of  the  universe,  tlie 
former  being  the  continual  duration,  the  latter  the 
continuous  extension,  of  the  universe  as  one  substance 
including  many  substances,  from  a  star  to  an  atom. 
From  the  same  starting-point,  I  hoped  to  show  that  a 
necessary  physical  cause  of  motion  is  an}^  body  which 
displaces  or  resists  any  other  body,  as  demonstratively 
following  from  the  impenetrability  of  matter,  by  which 
two  bodies  cannot  at  the  same  time  occupy  the  same 
place  in  space,  and  that  again  from  the  analytical  judg- 
ment that  a  body  as  solid  is  extended  in  three  dimen- 
sions. Moreover,  I  had  hoped  to  apply  the  analytical 
a  posteriori  theory  of  necessity  to  geometry  by  starting 
from  the  definition  of  a  solid.  I  have  also  written 
chapters,  which  are  in  print,  on  possible  phoenomena, 
and  on  actual  realities,  in  order  to  show  at  lenc^th  that 
scientific  objects  cannot  be  resolved  into  the  former. 
These  were  to  be  followed  by  a  discussion  of  ideas, 
includin^f  a  criticism  of  Hef^jelianism,  written  but  not 
printed.  I  l.ave  in  print  chapters  on  touch  and  on 
vision,  directed  against  the  doctrines  of  '  local  signs,' 
further  developing  the  views  in  my  criticism  of  Berke- 
ley's '  Theory  of  Vision,'  and  also  based  on  the  argu- 
ment that  a  sense  of  place  is  necessary  to  a  sense  of 
motion.  Finally,  I  meant  to  have  revolved  the  logic  of 
a  method,  which  appears  in  Aristotle,  but  has  fallen 
out  of  logic.  I  mean  the  analytical  deduction  from 
effect  to  cause,  which  appears  to  me  to  be  the  com- 
monest method  of  science,  because  man  knows  facts 
before  and  better  than  causes.  But  seeing  that  all 
these  matters  would  have  made  at  least  another  volume, 
and  fearful  of  becoming  tedious,  I  also  felt  that  I  had 
already  claimed  as  much  attention  as  could  be  hoped 
bv  an  untried  author. 


CHAP. 


X.    KANTS  'CRITIQUE'  xlND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    381 


Thirdly,  it  will  be  said  that  I  have  exaggerated  the 
power  of  sense.  This  is  a  difficulty  I  do  not  feel  or 
allow.  The  emasculation  of  sense,  which  is  the  most 
fundamental  defect  of  modern  philosophy,  is  a  result  of 
a  bygone  anatomy.  It  was  formerly  thought  that  the 
five  senses  were  inlets,  passages,  or  pores  through  which 
sensible  effects  were  received  within  us,  according  to 
some,  to  the  heart,  according  to  others,  to  the  head. 
In  these  circumstances,  it  was  excusable  to  suppose 
that  such  poverty-stricken  organs  contributed  nothing 
but  isolated  data,  which  the  soul  worked  up  within  into 
all  sorts  of  relations.  But  all  that  is  changed  nov.\  It 
has  been  discovered  that  the  senses  are  highly  co>npli- 
cated  nervous  structures  ending  in  the  brain,  that  the 
brain  is  an  integral  organ  of  sense  as  well  as  of  reason, 
and  that  the  whole  nervous  system  has  been  for  count- 
less generations  hereditarily  modified  by  its  operations, 
and,  on  the  whole,  better  adapted  to  perform  more  and 
more  complex  operations.  Since  these  discoveries,  I 
submit  that  there  is  no  bar  to  supposing  that  so  wondrous 
a  sensitive  structure,  as  a  brain  and  a  system  of  sensory 
nerves  has  become,  is  an  organ  of  simple  and  synthetic 
sense  of  objects  and  relations,  internal  and  physical, 
as  I  have  suggested.  But  I  do  not  merely  rely  on 
anatomy. 

My  main  trust  is  in  the  philosophy  of  science. 
Science  proves  the  power  of  man  to  know  nature.  But 
logic  also  proves  the  weakness  of  mere  reason,  which, 
without  adequate  data  of  sense,  is  consistency,  not 
science.  Eeason  cannot  logically  infer  insensible  objects 
and  relations  in  external  nature,  unless  there  are  sensible 
objects  and  relations  in  our  internal  nature  for  sense 
to  perceive.  Hence,  to  provide  adequate  data  for  the 
parity  of  reasoning,  I  suppose  a  simple  and  synthetic 


382 


rSYCIlOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


PART  II. 


sense  of  pliysical  objects  and  relations  within  the  ner- 
vous system.     I  hope,  by  this  means,   to  have  done 
what  I  could  to  physic  two  diseases  of  modern  ideahsm 
— the  separation  of  reason  from  nature,  and  the  divorce 
of  reason  from  sense.      The  real  problem  of  philosophy 
is  not  how  to  form  ideas,  nor  how  to  escape  from  them 
to  things  ;  it  is  not  to  start  with  sensations,  and  ask 
how  much,  by  association,  we  can  conceive  but  not 
know,  nor  how  much,  by  a  priori  elements,  we  can 
know,  of  mere  plia3nomena.     What  are  the  adequate 
data  of  sense,  and  what  the  logical  processes  of  reason- 
ing, which  enable  science  to  infer  an  insensible  and  im- 
perceptible world.     These  are  the  questions  for  psycho- 
logy and  Icgic  to  ask  about  sense  and  reason.     '  Itaque,' 
in  the  words  of  Bacon,  '  ex  harum  facultatum,  Experi- 
mentahs   sciHcet   et    Eationahs,    arctiore    et   sanctiore 
fcodere  (quod  adhuc  factum  non  est)  bene  sperandum 
est.'  1 

'  J^iov.  Org.  i.  95. 


APPENDIX. 


VEBEBWEG'S  SUMMAIiY  OF  THE  '  ClilTIQVE.'^ 

By  tlie  critique  of  the  reason  Kant  understands  the  exami- 
nation of  the  origin,  extent,  and  limits  of  human  knowledge. 
Pure  reason  is  his  name  for  reason  independent  of  all  experience. 
Tlie  '  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason  '  suhjects  the  pure  speculative 
reason  to  a  critical  scrutiny.  Kant  holds  that  this  scrutiny  must 
precede  all  other  philosophical  procedures.  Kant  terms  every 
philosophy,  which  transcends  the  sphere  of  experience  without 
having  previously  justified  this  act  by  an  examination  of  the  faculty 
of  knowledge,  a  form  of  '  Dogmatism '  ;  the  philosophical'  limita- 
tion of  knowledge  to  experience  he  calls  '  Empiricism ' ;  philoso- 
phical doubt  as  to  all  knowledge  transcending  experience,  in  so 
far  as  this  doubt  is  grounded  on  the  insufficiency  of  all  existing 
attempts  at  demonstration,  and  not  on  an  examination  of  the 
human  faculty  of  knowledge  in  general,  is  termed  by  him  '  Skepti- 
cism,' and  his  own  philosophy,  which  makes  all  further  philosophis- 
ing dependent  on  the  result  of  such  an  examination,  '  Criticism.' 
Criticism  is  '  transcendental  philosophy '  or  '  transcendental  idealism  ' 
in  so  far  as  it  inquires  into  and  then  denies  the  possibility  of  a 
transcendent  knowledge,  i.e.  of  knowledge  respecting  what  lies 
beyond  the  range  of  experience. 

Kant  sets  out  in  his  critique  of  the  reason  with  a  twofold 
division  of  judgments  (in  particular,  of  categorical  judgments). 
With  reference  to  the  relation  of  the  predicate  to  tlie  subject,  he 
divides  them  into  analytical  or  elucidating  judgments— where  the 
predicate  can  be  found  in  the  conception  of  the  subject  by  simple 
analysis  of  the  latter  or  is  identical  with  it  (in  which  latter  case  the 
analytical  judgment  is  an  identical  one)  —and  synthetic  or  amplifi- 

1  Ueberweg's  Hist,  of  Phil.  {English.  Trans.),  vol.  ii.  pp.  154-58  (§122). 


384      UEBERWEG'S   SUMMARY  OF   THE   'CRITIQUE.' 


Ccative  judgments — where  the  predicate  is  not  contained  in  the 
concept  of  the  subject,  but  is  added  to  it.  The  principle  of  analy- 
tical judgments  is  the  principle  of  identity  and  contradiction  ;  a 
synthetic  judgment,  on  the  contrary,  cannot  be  formed  from  the 
conception  of  its  subject  on  the  basis  of  this  principle  alone.  Kant 
further  discriminates,  with  reference  to  their  origin  as  parts  of 
human  knowledge,  between  judgments  a  priori  and  judgments  a 
posteriori  ;  by  the  latter  he  understands  judgments  of  experience, 
but  by  judgments  a  priori,  in  the  absolute  sense,  those  which 
are  completely  independent  of  all  experience,  and  in  the  relative  sense, 
those  which  are  based  indirectly  on  experience,  or  in  which  the  concep- 
tions employed,  though  not  derived  immediately  from  experience,  are 
deduced  from  others  that  were  so  derived.  As  absolute  judgments 
a  priori  Kant  regards  all  those  which  have  the  marks  of  necessity 
and  strict  universality,  assuming  (what  he  does  not  prove,  but 
simply  posits  as  self-evident,  although  his  whole  system  depends 
upon  it)  that  necessity  and  strict  universality  are  derivable  from  j^ 
no  combination  of  experiences,  but  only  independently  of  all  ex- 
perience. All  analytical  judgments  are  judgments  a  priori  ;  for 
although  the  subject-conception  may  have  been  obtained  through 
experience,  yet  to  its  analysis,  from  which  the  judgment  results,  no 
further  experience  is  necessary.  Synthetic  judgments,  on  the  con- 
trary, fall  into  two  classes.  If  the  synthesis  of  the  predicate  with 
the  subject  is  effected  by  the  aid  of  experience,  the  judgment  is 
synthetic  a  posteriori  ;  if  it  is  effected  apart  from  all  experience,  it 
is  synthetic  a  priori.  Kant  holds  the  existence  of  judgments  of 
the  latter  class  to  be  undeniable  ;  for  among  the  judgments  which 
are  recognised  as  strictly  universal  and  apodictical,  and  w^hicli  are 
consequently,  according  to  Kant's  assumption,  judgments  a  priori, 
he  finds  judgments  which  must  at  the  same  time  be  admitted  to  be 
svnthetic.  Amonc:  these  beloncj,  first  of  all,  most  mathematical 
judgments.  Some  of  the  fundamental  judgments  of  arithmetic 
(e.g.  a=a)  are,  indeed,  according  to  Kant,  of  an  analytical  nature  ; 
but  the  rest  of  them,  together  with  all  geometrical  judgments,  are, 
in  his  view,  synthetic,  and,  since  they  have  the  marks  of  strict 
universality  and  necessity,  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori.  The 
same  character  pertains,  according  to  Kant,  to  the  most  general 
propositions  of  physics,  such  as,  for  example,  that  in  all  the  changes 
of  the  material  world  the  quantity  of  matter  remains  unchanged. 
These  propositions  are  known  to  be  true  apart  from  all  experience, 
since  they  are  universal  and  apodictical  judgments  ;  and  yet  they 
are  not  obtained  through  a  mere  analysis  of  the  conceptions  of  their 
subjects,  for  the  predicate  adds  something  to  those  conceptions.     In 


APPENDIX 


385 


like  manner,  finally,  are  all  metaphysical  principles,  at  least  in  their 
tendency,  synthetic  judgments  a  j>riori,  e.g.  the  principle,  that 
every  event  must  have  a  cause.  And  if  the  principles  of  meta- 
physics are  not  altogether  incontrovertible,  yet  those  of  mathematics 
at  least  are  established  beyond  all  dispute.  There  exist,  therefore, 
concludes  Kant,  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  or  judgments  of  the 
pure  reason.  The  fundamental  question  of  his  Critique  becomes, 
then  :  How  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible  ? 

The  answer  given  is  :  Synthetic  judgments  a  pyriori  are  possible, 
because  man  brings  to  the  material  of  knowledge,  which  he  acquires 
empirically  in  virtue  of  his  receptivity,  certain  pure  forms  of  know- 
ledge, which  he  himself  creates  in  virtue  of  his  spontaneity  and 
independently  of  all  experience,  and  into  which  he  fits  all  given 
material.  These  forms,  which  are  the  conditions  of  the  possibility 
of  all  experience,  are  at  the  same  time  the  conditions  of  the  possi- 
bility of  the  objects  of  experience,  because  whatever  is  to  be  an 
object  for  me,  must  take  on  the  forms  through  which  the  Ego,  my 
original  consciousness,  or  the  '  transcendental  unity  of  apperception,' 
shapes  all  tliat  is  presented  to  it ;  they  have,  therefore,  objective 
validity  in  a  synthetic  judgment  a  priori.  But  the  objects,  with 
reference  to  which  they  possess  this  validity,  are  not  the  things-in- 
themselves  or  transcendental  objects,  i.e.  objects  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  apart  from  our  mode  of  conceiving  them  ;  they  are  only 
the  empirical  objects  or  the  phsenomena  which  exist  in  our  conscious- 
ness in  the  form  of  mental  representations.  The  things-in-them- 
selves  are  unknowable  for  man.  Only  a  creative,  divine  mind,  that 
gives  them  reality  at  the  same  time  that  it  thinks  them,  can  have 
power  truly  to  know  them.  Things-in-themselves  do  not  conform 
themselves  to  the  forms  of  human  knowledge,  because  the  human 
consciousness  is  not  creative,  because  human  perception  is  not  free  p 
from  subjective  elements,  is  not  '  intellectual  intuitiojii'  Nor  do 
the  forms  of  human  knowledge  conform  themselves  to  things-in-them- 
selves  ;  otherwise  all  our  knowledge  would  be  empirical  and  without 
necessity  and  strict  universality.  But  all  empirical  objects,  since 
they  are  only  representations  in  our  minds,  do  conform  themselves 
to  the  forms  of  human  knowledge.  Hence  we  can  know  empirical 
objects  or  phjenomena,  but  only  these.  All  valid  a  j^riori  knowledge  1 
has  respect  only  to  pha3nomena,  hence  to  objects  of  real  or  possible  * 
experience. 

The  forms  of  knowledge  are  forms  either  of  intuition  or  of 
thought.  The  '  Transcendental  -Esthetic  '  treats  of  the  former,  the 
'  Transcendental  Logic  '  of  the  latter. 

The  forms  of  intuition  are  space  and  time.     Space  is  the  form 

C  C 


386      UEBERWEQ'S  SUMMARY  OF  THE  'CRITIQUE' 


/ 


of  external  sensibility,  time  is  the  form  of  internal  and  indirectly 
of  external  sensibility.  On  the  a  priori  nature  of  space  depends 
tlie  possibility  of  geometrical  and  on  the  a  prior'i  nature  of  time 
depends  the  possibility  of  arithmetical  judgments.  Things-in-them- 
selves  or  transcendental  objects  are  related  neither  to  space  nor  to 
time ;  all  co-existence  and  succession  are  only  in  phrenomenal 
objects,  and  consequently  only  in  the  perceiving  Subject. 

The  forms  of  thought  are  the  twelve  categories  or  original  con- 
ceptions of  the  understanding,  on  which  all  the  forms  of  our  judg- 
ments are  conditioned.  They  are  :  unity,  plurality,  totality, — 
reality,  negation,  limitation, — substantiality,  causality,  reciprocal 
action, — possibility,  existence,  necessity.  On  their  a  priori  nature 
depends  the  validity  of  the  most  general  judgments,  which  lie  at  the 
foundation  of  all  empirical  knowledge.  The  things-in-themselves  or 
transcendental  objects  have  neither  unity  nor  plurality  ;  they  are  not 
substances,  nor  are  they  subject  to  the  causal  relation,  or  to  any  of 
the  categories ;  the  categories  are  applicable  only  to  the  phtenomenal 
objects  which  are  in  our  consciousness. 

The  reason  strives  to  rise  above  and  beyond  the  sphere  of  the 
understanding,  which  is  confined  to  the  finite  and  conditioned,  to 
the  unconditioned.  It  forms  the  idea  of  the  soul,  as  a  substance 
which  ever  endures ;  of  the  world,  as  an  unlimited  causal  series  ; 
and  of  God,  as  the  absolute  substance  and  union  of  all  perfections, 
or  as  the  '  most  perfect  being.'  Since  these  ideas  relate  to  objects 
which  lie  beyond  the  range  of  all  possible  experience,  they  have  no 
theoretic  validity  ;  if  the  latter  is  claimed  for  them  (in  dogmatic 
metaphysics)  this  is  simply  the  result  of  a  misleading  logic  founded 
on  appearances,  or  of  dialectic.  The  psychological  paralogism  con- 
founds the  unity  of  the  I — wliich  can  never  be  conceived  as  a  pre- 
dicate, but  only  and  always  as  a  subject — with  the  simplicity  and 
absolute  permanence  of  a  psychical  substance.  Cosmology  leads  to 
antinomies,  whose  mutually  contradictory  members  are  each  equally 
susceptible  of  indirect  demonstration,  if  the  reality  of  space,  time 
and  the  categories  be  presupposed,  but  wliich  with  the  refutation  of 
this  supposition  cease  to  exist.  Rational  theology,  in  seeking  by  the 
ontological,  cosmological,  and  physico-theological  arguments  to  prove 
the  existence  of  God,  becomes  involved  in  a  series  of  sophistications. 
Still  these  ideas  of  the  reason  are  in  two  respects  of  value  :  (1)  theo- 
retically, when  viewed  not  as  constitutive  principles  through  which 
a  real  knowledge  of  things-in-themselves  can  be  obtained,  but  as 
regulative  principles,  which  affirm  that,  however  far  empirical  in- 
vestigation may  at  any  time  have  advanced,  the  sphere  of  objects  of 
possible  experience  can  never  be  regarded  as  fully  exhausted,  but  that 


APPENDIX 


387 


there  will  always  be  room  for  further  investigation  ;  (2)  practically, 
in  so  far  as  they  render  conceivable  suppositions,  to  which  the 
practical  reason  conducts  with  moral  necessity. 

In  the  '  Metaphysical  Principles  of  Physics,'  Kant  seeks,  by 
reducing  matter  to  forces,  to  justify  a  dynamical  explanation  of 
nature. 


PRIKTED    BY 

SPOTTISWOODB   AND   CO.,    NEW-STBBBT   6QITABB 

LONDON 


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